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SUMMARY
In this thesis, I examine issues pertaining to equity cross-listing in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Specifically, I examine two issues, namely the effects of an international equity cross-listing on 
domestic investor protection, and firm value. First, in Chapter 3, I examine the effects o f listing in the 
U.S. on the level o f domestic investor protection for non-U.S. firms. Others have examined whether non- 
U.S. firms can ‘completely’ bond to the U.S. governance regime (like U.S. firms do), as the legal bonding 
hypothesis predicts. In general these studies conclude that bonding to the U.S. regime is ‘incomplete’. 
Implicit in this is the belief that domestic/ordinary shareholders are also protected, although this has not 
been examined. I explicitly examine this issue. My results suggest that the ordinary shareholders o f non- 
U.S. cross-listed firms do enjoy additional protection under the U.S. governance regime.
In the remainder o f the thesis, I examine die valuation effects o f listing abroad. I build upon the 
cross-sectional work of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and Kristian-Hope, Kang, and Zang (2005), and 
examine the effects o f listing abroad over time for Irish, Emerging, and both Emerging and Developed 
firms, respectively. My results suggest the following. In Chapter 4 I find that Irish firms that exchange 
cross-list experience an increase in value after listing abroad. This contrasts notably with the calendar year 
valuation discount reported by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) for Irish cross-listed firms. In contrast, 
Level 2/3 exchange-traded Emerging market firms are worth more than non-cross-listed firms in calendar 
time, but not necessarily in event time. The results outlined in Chapter 5 suggest that listing in the U.S. 
does not enhance value. After listing in the U.S., these firms are no longer worth more than non-cross- 
listed firms. Finally, in Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the valuation effects o f listing for non-exchange 
traded issues. I find that trading in the U.S. via a non-exchange issue does not enhance value. The result 
holds irrespective of how I classify firms. Finally, I extend the later by examining the valuation effects of 
listing for non-exchange traded firms, on a country-by-country basis. I find that listing does enhance 
value for firms from certain countries.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
O ver the course o f  the last three decades, there has been an increased tendency on  the 
part o f  large firms to  initiate and sustain, in addition to a dom estic listing, a foreign equity listing. 
In  many respects, the growing tendency o f  international listings has m irrored the attractiveness o f  
intranational listings for U.S. firms over the course o f  the last century (See Ule (1937), Van 
H orne (1970), D haran  and Ikenberry (1995, D I  Hereafter), C heng (2005) for a very recent study, 
and M cConnell, Dybevik, Haushalter, and Lie (1996) for an overview). In  addition, the data 
suggests that the U nited States has becom e the m ost attractive location for a secondary equity 
listing (See Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002, P R Z  Hereafter)), although familiarity, m easured in 
term s o f  great circular distance (GCD), and econom ic and cultural ties exherts a sizable influence 
on the international listing choice o f  firms (See Sarkissian and Schill (2004, SS Hereafter)). F or 
example, this so called ‘proxim ity preference’ is evident in the listing behaviour o f  b o th  Canadian 
and Irish firms w ho list predom inantly the U.S, and the U .K ., respectively. O ver the course o f  
the same period (1986-2005), European stock exchanges experienced a sharp decline in  the 
num ber o f  foreign lists (including U.S. firms listed abroad).
In  the interim period, the growing tendency on  the part o f  international firms to list in  die
U.S., and in som e respects, the increased incidence on the part o f  other global exchanges to  lose
their share o f  foreign lists, has attracted considerable attention from bo th  academics and
practitioners alike. As a direct consequence, our understanding o f  die international cross-listing
market has been enhanced considerably. For example, we now  have a better understanding o f  the
type o f firms that cross-list internationally (e.g. Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2003, CKS
Hereafter), PRZ (2002)) and those that do n o t (e.g. Barzuza, (2005), Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller,
and Stulz (2005, DKLM S Hereafter)), the motives for cross-listing (e.g. Bancel and M ittoo (2001,
BM Hereafter)), and the valuation implications d iereof (e.g. Miller, (1999), Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2004, D K S Hereafter), Kristian-Hope, Kang, and Zang (2005, K K Z , Hereafter), K ing and
Segal (2004, KS Hereafter), and M ittoo (2003)). In  the case o f  the later, the academic community
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has uncovered a new  hypothesis that has served to better explain bo th  the observed listing trends 
that occurred in  the 1990’s, and the valuation implications thereof. This new  legal bonding 
hypothesis (See Coffee (1999, 2002), S tub  (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002, RW  Hereafter), D K S
(2004)) has served to challenge the ‘conventional w isdom ’ (See Karolyi (2005)). T he ‘conventional 
w isdom ’ asserted that the valuation benefits o f  listing (i.e. enhanced valuation, lower cost o f  capital) 
were explained within the context o f  at least mildly segmented international capital markets (See 
Alexander, E un, and Janakiramanam, (1987, 1988, AEJ Hereafter), E rrunza and Losq (1985, EL  
Hereafter), S tub, (1981)).
The legal bonding hypothesis, stemming from  the ‘law and finance’ literature o f  LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1997, 1998, 2002, LLSV Hereafter), contends that a firm 
cross-lists on  U.S. exchanges in order to  bond  themselves to the U.S. governance and regulatory 
regime1. In  the subsequent period, two questions stem m ing from  the predictions o f  the legal 
bonding hypothesis have dom inated academic research2. First, a considerable am ount o f  research 
has been devoted towards examining whether non-U.S. firms are able to  ‘completely’ bond  to  the 
U.S. governance regime (i.e. as domestic U.S. firms do). T he consensus finding appears to  be that 
bonding to  the U.S. governance regime is ‘incom plete’ for non-U.S. firms (e.g. Licht, (2002), Lang, 
Raedy, Wilson, (2006, LRW  Hereafter), Burns and Francis (2006, BF Hereafter)), and at best, 
exchange listing in the U.S. provides only ‘reputational bonding’ (e.g. Siegel (2005), KS (2004)). 
Nevertheless, bo th  Barzuza (2005) and KS (2004), using theoretical and empirical approaches, 
respectively, show that the desire on the part o f  firms to ‘signal low private benefits’ (See Barzuza,
(2005), Barzuza, Smith, Valladares (2006, BSV Hereafter)) is sufficient to  generate a ‘cross-listing 
prem ium ’ (See KS (2004), D K S (2004)). S tub  (2005, pg. 1632) concludes that even give the 
‘incompleteness’ o f  legal bonding for international firms, listing in the U.S. endows firms w ith “ .... 
m onitoring that otherwise would not have taken place” .
1 Consistent with this, given the introduction of tide Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, die increased incidence o f cross 
delisting remains consistent with the predictions o f the bonding hypothesis (See Witmer (2005), and Marosi and 
Massoud (2006)).
2 In Chapter 2 I outline the theoretical predictions underpinning the legal bonding hypothesis.
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tSecond, researchers have attem pted to examine w hether this com m itm ent on the part o f  
non-U.S. firms to  provide fuller disclosures under the U.S. regime enhances value? D K S (2004) 
outline a dieoretical m odel grounded in a standard principal-agency framework. They dem onstrate 
that the valuation gains from  listing, w hat they term the ‘cross listing prem ium ’ is increasing in  bo th  
the host level o f  investor protection (given that after listing in the U.S., the ability o f  the 
m anager/controlling shareholder to consume private benefits o f  control is greatly reduced) and the 
investment opportunity set o f  the firm. They quantify that exchange listed Level 2 /3  ADRs are 
endowed with a ‘cross-listing prem ium ’ o f  37%. N on-exchange traded firms i.e. Level 1 and Rule 
144a firms are not. These finings are reinforced in D K S (2006) and K K Z  (2005). In  the next 
chapter, I outline a detailed review o f the cross-listing literature, and present a detailed analysis o f  
the international cross-listing market.
In this thesis I examine issues relating to  b o th  areas. First, while bonding  to  the U.S. regime 
appears to  be ‘incom plete’, w hat remains am biguous is w hether the U.S. governance regime 
offers any protection  to  the ordinary shareholders o f  cross-listed firms. F or example, Aggarwal, 
Dahiya, and K lapper (2005, p .3, A D K  Hereafter) suggest “A D R  holders have better legal 
standing o f  the underlying security as die A D Rs are purchased in  the U.S” , w ithout offering any 
p ro o f o f  such. I examine w hether the ordinary shareholders i.e. the holders o f  the underlying 
security enjoy any increm ental protection under the U.S. governance regime.
T o  examine this issue, I employ the agency m odels o f  dividends, introduced by LLSV 
(2000), and examined in a dynamic setting by Liu (2002). I examine the ordinary dividend payout 
o f  cross-listed firms around a cross listing in the U.S. My choice o f  variable is m otivated by the 
fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in the level o f  investor pro tection  (See LLSV (2000)) 
and, consequendy (2) changes in external investor protection  are associated w ith changes in firm 
dividend payout (e.g., Liu (2002)), once I contro l for firm, industry and country level 
determ inants o f  dividend payout. Furtherm ore, m y choice o f  dependent variable enables us to 
isolate the im pact o f  cross listing on the dom estic/ordinary  shareholders (as against the A D R
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shareholders) o f  cross-listed firms. My results suggest that listing in  the U.S., via a Level 2 /3  
exchange traded depositary receipt confers additional protection  on the ordinary shareholders o f  
these firms. I also find that the investors o f  non-exchange Level 1 firms are also better 
protected. O n further exam ination, I find that this additional pro tection  stems, n o t from  
protection offered under the U.S. governance regime, b u t in term s o f  enhanced firm-level 
governance. T he results are consistent w ith  the bonding hypothesis.
Second, I devote the rem ainder o f  the thesis to  analysing the valuation effects o f  cross 
listing. In  doing so, I seek to  answer the following questions; first, I examine w hether cross-listed 
Irish firms are w orth  m ore? I am  m otivated by an irregularity that arises in  the w ork o f  D K S 
(2004). Specifically, and in  contrast to  the predictions o f  their m odel, their summ ary statistics 
(See D K S (2004) Table 1, pg. 223) suggest that Irish exchange-traded firms (Level 2 /3 ) are w orth  
less than their counterpart non-cross-listed firms. It may well be the case that Irish exchange 
traded firms that list-abroad are n o t necessarily w orth  m ore than their counterpart non-cross- 
listed firms. E ither way, it is n o t necessarily clear as to  w hether listing causes value for listed Irish 
firms. G iven the predictions o f  the m odel presented by D K S (2004), a priori one w ould expect 
that the greatest gains to  an international listing accrue to  those firms that trade as Level 2 /3  
exchange-traded depositary receipts. I examine this issue further using a panel o f  Irish firms in 
C hapter 4. My results are in  line w ith m y p rio r expectations.
N ext, I extend the cross-sectional approach o f  D K S (2004), and others (e.g. Lang, Lins, 
and Miller (2003, LLM  Hereafter), K K Z  (2005)) and examine the evolution o f  the ‘cross-listing 
prem ium ’ over time using a num ber o f  panel selection correction estim ators. However, and 
m ost im portantly I, unlike D K S (2004, 2006), examine the valuation effects o f  listing in  calendar 
tim e, as they do, but also in event tim e. T h en  results suggest that cross-listed firms are w orth  on 
average 16.5% m ore than non-cross-listed firms in 1997, and this ‘cross listing prem ium ’ reaches 
37%  for exchange-traded depositary receipts. In  subsequent analysis (See D K S (2006)), they 
show  the ‘cross listing prem ium ’ persist over time (1997-2004).
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I em ploy valuation metrics i.e. T o b in ’s q, and contro l explicitly for self-selection bias. 
Previous studies on the benefits o f  listing using event studies have been either, too short (e.g. 
Miller, (1999)), or have failed to  contro l for self-selection bias. In  his synopsis o f  M ittoo (2003), 
Heidle (2003, pg. 1664) concludes, “As w ith all event studies, the analysis in this paper suffers 
from  a potential self-selection bias” . In  fact M ittoo (2003, pg. 1659) explicitly acknowledges this 
shortcom ing in  her conclusion, “ ...long-term  perform ance is generally difficult to  m easure and 
our results should be interpreted  w ith  som e caution because o f  several lim itations o f  our 
m ethodology. First, benchm arking perform ance with m arket indexes as done in our study could 
lead to serious biases and m easurem ent problem s” . Similar accusations can be directed towards 
m uch o f  the earlier w ork on the valuation effects o f  international cross-listings (e.g. Miller, 
(1999)). In  fact, in  my approach, I incorporate the suggestions o f  M ittoo  (2003, pg. 1659), w ho 
assets that “Ideally, perform ance o f  sample firms should be benchm arked w ith that o f  control 
firms m atched by industry, book-to-m arket value, and firm size” . In  C hapter 5, I m atch firms 
w ith an (almost) identical probability o f  cross listing based upon  propensity  scores, and calculate 
the average effect o f  the treatm ent on  the treated (ATT) up to  five years post-listing. In  addition, 
I estimate firm fixed effects, pooled  ordinary least squares (with M undlak (1978) corrections), and 
two-stage treatm ent-effects m odels (See Li and Prabhala (2005, LP Hereafter)).
My results suggest that there are no  long-term  valuation benefits to listing in  the U.S. In  
fact, I find that the valuation benefits from  exchange cross listing in the U.S. are imm ediate, bu t 
transitory. Consequently, like Clarkson, N ow land and Ragunathan (2006, pg. 17, CN R 
Hereafter), I conclude that “there is no  such thing as a cross listing prem ium ” .
In  Chapters 6 and 7, I turn my attention tow ards the study o f  non-exchange traded 
depositary receipts. In  C hapter 5, my results suggest that listing in  the U.S. does n o t cause value 
fo r non-exchange traded firms domiciled in em erging markets. H ow ever, there is som e weak 
evidence to suggest that non-exchange traded firms domiciled in low-disclosure regimes may gain 
some value from  listing in the U.S. I use this finding to  m otivate the analysis presented in
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C hapter 6. M ore specifically, I extend my sample to include b o th  developed and emerging 
m arket firms. Using a sample o f  non-exchange traded firms from  39 countries; I find that the 
results from  Chapter 5 generally hold fo r a m uch larger sample o f  firms. Furtherm ore, I show 
that while the absolute value o f  non-exchange traded firms differs substantially across different 
sub-categories o f  firms in the post-listing period, the conclusions draw n for the entire sample o f  
film s still apply. Listing in the U.S. does no t cause value fo r non-exchange traded firms. In  fact, 
I find that trading in the U.S. via Rule 144a private placem ents greatly reduces value for emerging 
m arket firms.
Finally in Chapter 7, I examine the valuation effects o f  listing for non-exchange traded 
depositary receipts on  a country-by-country basis, because o f  the tendency o f  previous studies to  
generalize. My results suggest that listing in the U.S. via a Level 1 depositary receipt program  
causes value for firms from  Mexico, N edierlands, and N ew  Zealand, and low er (relative) value 
for firms from  Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Germ any, H o n g  K ong, Italy, Japan, Phillipines, 
Poland, Sweden, and Turkey. F o r Rule 144a firms, I docum ent only 4 statistically significant 
‘cross listing prem ia’: Chile, Peru, Portugal, and Switzerland. In  contrast, France, Germany, 
Norway, India, Finland, Singapore, Spain, and the U .K . experience the greatest losses. T he 
results suggest that listing in the U.S. via a non-exchange program  does cause value for some 
firms. Chapter 8 concludes.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
T he globalization o f  equity markets over the course o f  the last three decades has been 
clearly visible in the num ber o f  firms that have sought, in  addition to  a dom estic listing, an 
international listing o f  their stock3. Since 1984, the U.S. has experienced a dramatic increase in 
the num ber o f  non-U.S. firms that have sought an international listing either as a direct ‘ordinary’ 
list (largely Israeli and Canadian firms) or via depositary receipt issues. A t present, ten percent o f 
firms registered w ith the Securities and Exchange Com m ission (SEC) are non-U.S. firms based in 
60 countries, seventeen per cent o f  N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange firms are foreign, and at the end 
o f  2003 approxim ately 1,200 foreign firms w ere registered w ith  the SEC. Internationally 
(including the U.S.), the num ber o f  firms w ith at least one international listing has fallen to just 
over 2,632 at the end o f  2004 after reaching a high o f  4,703 in 1997 (See International Federation 
o f  Stock Exchanges), This fall can be attributed to a num ber o f  econom ic and political reasons 
(e.g. equity m arket bubble, introduction  o f  the Sarbanes-Oxley A ct4). This rise in the num ber o f  
listings has attracted considerable interest on  the part o f  the econom ics, accounting, and finance 
academic com munities.
O ver the course o f  the last decade, the “conventional w isdom ” as to why firms cross-list 
internationally, sum m arized originally by Karolyi (1998), has been challenged. In  fact, the 
emergence o f  this new  legal bonding hypothesis, has p rom pted  Karolyi (2005) to docum ent this
2.1 Introduction
3 A related, but earlier literature focuses on the benefits o f intra-national (as opposed to international listings) (See 
Ule (1937) for some of the earliest literature in this area). Interestingly, these earlier studies document no significant 
medium to long-term benefits to intra-national listings. The typical finding suggested that the pre-listing run-up in 
value was more than offset by a fall-off in value, post-listing. Interestingly, Cheng (2005) re-examines the valuation 
effects o f intra-national listings (NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX to NYSE). They document that this ‘post-listing 
drift’ is confined to a small subset o f firms moving from NASDAQ to AMEX (e.g. D I (1986)).
4 With the introduction o f  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms listed in the U.S. were obligated to provide even greater 
disclosures. The SOX amended the Securities and Exchange Act o f 1934, and provided for a tightening up of the 
rules that govern financial disclosure and internal controls. In essence the act established a new level o f governance 
for public accounting firms. For an overview see Berger, Li and W on (2004) and Ribstein (2003). Smith (2005), 
Witner (2006), and Marosi and Massoud (2006) all find evidence that suggests that the introduction o f the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act precipitated an increase in the number o f voluntary ADR delists. Liu (2004) examines solely the market 
reaction to involuntary foreign firm delists from the U.S. The latter finds that delisting leads to a permanent drop in 
stock price in the region of 4.5%, a result they deem consistent with the downward sloping demand curve 
hypothesis.
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shift in emphasis away from  the traditional m arket segm entation (e.g., Black (1974), S tapleton 
and Subrahmanyam (1977, SS Hereafter), AEJ (1987, 1988), Stulz (1981), E L  (1985)) and liquidity 
(e.g., A m ihud and M endelson (1986, A M  Hereafter)) hypotheses tow ards this new  governance- 
based explanation o f  listing. T he legal bonding hypothesis (e.g. Coffee (1999, 2002), Stulz (1999), 
D oidge (2004, 2005), D K S (2004), Barzuza (2005)) has proven  to be quite successful in 
explaining the trends in, the decision to  cross-list (and n o t to  e.g. Barzuza (2005), BSV (2006) and 
DK LM S (2005)), and the cross-sectional valuation effects o f  cross-listing, that bo th  the m arket 
segm entation and liquidity hypothesis failed to  explain (See Karolyi (2005, pg. 12-13) and D K S
(2004) for an overview o f  tire criticisms o f  the m arket segm entation and liquidity hypotheses). In 
its simplest form, the legal bonding  hypothesis states that by exchange cross listing in the U.S., a 
firm can externally finance their grow th opportunities by com m itting to  adhere to  the U.S. 
governance regime. Interestingly, while it has been show n that the ability o f  foreign firms to 
bond  to  the U.S. regime is ‘incom plete’ (See Licht (2003), Siegel (2005) for argum ents against the 
legal bonding hypothesis and LRS (2006) for a com parison o f  foreign cross-listed firms to  U.S. 
firms), exchange listing in  the U.S. does, nevertheless serve to  reduce firms capital 
constrain ts/low er their cost o f  capital (See RW  (2002), K hurana, Pereira, and X ium in (2004), and 
Eaton, Nofsinger, and W eaver (2003)), enhance their inform ation environm ent (See LLM
(2002)), resulting in  a cross-listing prem ium  (See D K S (2004), KS (2004), and K K Z  (2005)). 
Barzuza (2005) contends that even if  bonding to  the U.S. is ‘incom plete’, the ability o f  firms to  
benefit from  listing in the U.S. stems from  their ability to  credibly signal to U.S. investors low 
private benefits o f  control. This suggests that reputational bonding (i.e. incom plete bonding), as 
opposed to  legal bonding (i.e. com plete bonding) is sufficient to  generate post-listing benefits for 
foreign firms.
The legal bonding hypothesis stems from the “Law and Finance” or “Law matters” 
literature with the pioneering w ork o f  LLSV (1998). Abstracting from  the traditional law and 
economics view that private contracting is sufficient to protect investors, the authors dem onstrate
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how legal protection and especially enforcem ent (See Harvey, Lins and R oper (2005)) is a 
fundamental determinant for the protection o f  minority investors. Furtherm ore, they show that the 
ability o f  the legal system to adequately protect minority shareholders is a characteristic o f  com m on 
law (as opposed to civil/code law) jurisdictions only. In addition to their seminal work, subsequent 
w ork has shown that com m on law countries are characterised w ith highly developed, deep (liquid) 
capital markets, w ith corresponding dispersed equity ownership. C om m on law firms are less capital 
constrained (i.e. a lower cost o f  capital, (e.g. Hail and Leuz (2003, H L  Hereafter)) larger and m ore 
liighly valued (See also D em erguc-K unt and Maksimovic (1998, D M  Hereafter)). These 
characteristics form  the basis o f  the arguments pu t forward by those w ho cham pion the legal 
bonding hypothesis.
T he im portance o f  cross listing, especially for those firms domiciled in  civil law 
jurisdictions is highlighted by the “Law and Finance” literature. T he ability o f  firms w ith sizable 
investm ent opportunity  sets to  finance these grow th opportunities are by and large constrained 
by underdeveloped dom estic legal and capital institutions. These constraints are further 
reinforced by stem  opposition to legal convergence reform  in these countries (See Bekeart and 
Harvey (2003) for a discussion). Cross-listing internationally provides a rem edy for those firms 
w ishing to  finance their grow th opportunities w ith external finance (See Lins, Strickland, and 
Z enner (2005, LSZ Hereafter), RW  (2002))5. By listing abroad, a firm can subject itself to the 
strong securities and enforcem ent laws o f  the host country, by effectively “renting” or 
“piggybacking” the host countries legal and governance regime. In  effect, cross-listed firms “o p t­
in’’ to the securities legislation o f  the host country, bu t do n o t “opt-ou t” o f  their dom estic market 
regime, as is the case in  the truest sense o f  the opt-out theories o f  securities regulation (e.g. Fox 
(2003)). T he distinction is w orth  noting. I t implies that cross listing abroad in a country with
5 O ther remedies are available to firms. These suggest that firms can engage in cross-border strategic alliances (e.g., 
Siegel (2006), Bris and Brisley (2006, BB Hereafter), seek political favour (e.g., Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006, LO 
Hereafter)), or commit themselves to greater protection o f  their minority shareholders by improving their internal 
firm-level governance (e.g., Klapper and Love (2003, KL Hereafter); Durnev and Kim (2005, D K  Hereafter)). 
Specifically, Siegel (2006) notes that rather than utilizing listing in the U.S. as a bonding device, relational contracting 
with foreign multinational firms can serve a similar role.
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superior protection afforded to minority investors, may endow  the dom estic investors o f  cross­
listed firms w ith increm ental investor protection, and a consequent appreciation in firm value. I 
devote my energies in  this thesis towards answering bo th  questions. Interestingly m y results are 
consistent w ith recent w ork suggesting that, given the sizable costs associated w ith cross-listing, 
the valuation benefits o f  such are greater, n o t fo r em erging m arket firms, bu t for firms from  high 
investor protection  jurisdictions (See D K S (2004a) fo r a theoretical and empirical overview, and 
K K Z  (2005)).
This increased tendency for firms to fist abroad has attracted considerable interest on  the 
part o f  the economics, finance, and accounting academics and practitioners to  (1) explain w hy and 
which kind o f  firms fist abroad? (2) Examine the valuation implications o f  listing abroad (if they do 
exist), and finally, (3) identify the sources o f  the valuation effects o f  listing. T o  begin with, the 
extant literature has suggested a num ber o f  reasons as to  why firms fist abroad. These include; (1) 
enhanced liquidity (e.g. A M  (1986)), (2) reduced investm ent barriers (e.g. AEJ (1987, 1988), E L  
(1985), Stulz (1981)), (3) reduced agency costs/private benefits o f  control (e.g. Coffee (1999, 2002), 
DKS (2004), D oidge (2004, 2005), DKLM S (2005), Barzuza (2005), RW  (2002)), (4) enhanced 
externally financed growth (e.g. RW  (2004), LSZ (2005) (5) an enhanced inform ation environm ent 
(e.g. Cantale (1996), Feurst (1998), Moel (1999)), and (6) enhanced investor awareness and investor 
base (e.g. M erton (1987)). Interestingly, the im portance o f  each m otive appears to  differ across 
geographical regions (See BM  (2001)). Second, there exists a sizable literature, com monly referred 
to as ‘migration studies’ that contrast those firms that cross-list, relative to those that refrain form  
listing (e.g. PR Z (2002), D urand and Tarca (2002), CKS (2003), for an Irish study o f  U.K. listed 
Irish finns, see Buckland and Mulligan (1996, BM  Hereafter)). Finally, I examine w hether cross 
listing is the U.S. is value enhancing? O ver the course o f  the last two decades, researchers have 
adopted two distinct approaches; standard event study m ethodology (e.g. Foerster and Karolyi 
(1999, F K  Hereafter), Miller (1999), Serra (1999), M ittoo (2003), Bohl and K orzcak (2005)).
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Second, there has been a recent emphasis on using standardized valuation metrics (See D K S (2004), 
KS (2003, 2004), K K Z  (2005)). In  this thesis I adopt the latter approach.
In  the next section, I outline the theoretical underpinnings, and predictions o f  the legal 
bonding hypothesis. I then outline the ‘mechanics’ o f  cross listing. Finally, I examine w hether the 
governance and valuadon predictions o f  the bonding hypothesis, are borne out in empirical studies.
2.2 Why do firms cross-list abroad?
In  this section, I outline the legal bonding hypothesis. First, I outline the theoretical 
underpinnings o f  the legal bonding hypothesis. Then, I  outline and discuss the empirical 
literature relating to  the predictions o f  the bonding hypothesis. G iven the conten t o f  my thesis, I 
pay particular attention towards issues relating to  investor protection, and firm value.
Legal Bonding Hypothesis and Private Benefits o f Control
The decision o f  firms to cross-list international, involves in effect a trade-off between the 
consequent increase in  the value o f  the firm, and the simultaneous loss in private benefits that 
accrue to the insiders/controllers o f  the firm. The extant literature has outlined how, given sizable 
growth opportunities, a firm will cross-list internationally (under a stricter legal regime) w hen the 
loss in private benefits associated with listing under a stricter regime is m ore than offset by an 
increase in value o f  die controlling m anager/insiders stake in the firm. Implicidy, this implies that 
on average those firms w ho cross-list are those w idi bo th  sizable growth opportunities and low 
private benefits o f  control6, given that large control blocks are valuable. In  fact, Barzuza (2005) 
identifies two markets for controlling shareholders; the m arket for publicly traded shares (cross- 
listing), and the m arket for controlling blocks i.e. control. T hose firms that refrain from  cross 
listing, signal, no t their low private benefits, but their ability to extract sizable, and ultimately 
valuable private benefits o f  control (See also BSV (2006)). Non-surprisingly, the probability o f  
exchange cross listing is decreasing in the level o f  control rights (See DKLM S (2005)). Along
6 Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide an excellent review on private benefits o f  control.
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similar lines, Wojcik, Clark, and Bauer (2004) outline that E uropean firms cross-listing in  the 
United States have higher corporate governance ratings relative to firms that do no t cross-list. 
D oidge (2005) docum ents a significant fall in private benefits (measured using dual-class shares), 
post-listing, but in line w ith Ayyagari (2006) he docum ents no shift in ownership structure from  
concentrated to  dispersed. This argument forms the basis o f  theoretical models proposed by 
Barzuza (2005), and joint theoretical/empirical papers by D K S (2004), Melvin and V alero-Tonone 
(2003, Hereafter MV) and BSV (2006). I return to a descripdon o f  these models in later sections.
T he ability o f  firms to finance their growth opportunities externally is largely contingent 
upon their ability to return  this capital to investors, rather than consum e this investm ent privately. 
This argument forms the basis o f  die formal definitions o f  corporate governance outlined by 
Shleifler and Vishny (1997), and Denis and McConnell (2004). T he ability o f  controlling insiders to 
consume private benefits is decreasing in the strength o f  minority shareholder rights. In effect, 
private benefits o f  control are lower in com m on law jurisdictions. Private benefits o f  control are 
control rights that exceed cash flow rights. They accme to  those that control corporations (e.g. 
managers, controlling shareholders, insiders), bu t n o t to minority shareholders. C ontrol benefits 
can take many forms. These include non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. D em setz and Lehn (1985)).
Next, I outline the theoretical foundations o f  the legal bonding  hypothesis. M uch o f  the 
following is drawn from  Jensen and Meckling (1976) and D oum a and Schreuder (2002). I begin 
with the standard principal-agent relationship, resulting from  the separation o f  ow nership and 
control. T he m odel outlined below is the sim plest m odel given that I ignore risk-preferences and 
assume symmetric inform ation betw een the principal and the agent. H ow ever, the m odel 
remains fruitful in furthering our understanding o f  the potential effects o f  managerial bonding. 
T he absence o f  risk and asymmetric inform ation does n o t prevent us from  presenting the m ost 
salient issues. A lthough simplistic, the lessons that w e learn from  this m odel (and other agency 
type models) form  the basis o f  cross-listing m odels by M V (2003), D K S (2004), BSV (2006) and 
Barzuza (2005). All o f  the afore m entioned, m odel the benefits that accrue to  firms that
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exchange-list in  the U.S., in  term s o f  higher value, as a result o f  enhanced m anagerial bonding 
and outside m onitoring, given sizable grow th opportunities (See Stulz (2005)).
T he m odel is as follows: I begin w ith a m anager w ho owns all o f  the com pany shares. 
This is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Consumption of Private Benefits and Firm Value
>
Present Value of on-the-job consumption, C
As a result o f  his dom inant position the m anager is faced w ith the following conflicting 
objectives; he can maximize the value o f  the firm  by investing in positive net-present value 
positions and refrain form  engaging in ‘on-the-job’ consum ption, o r he can consum e private 
benefits (i.e. w hat is now  term ed in  the literature, private benefits o f  contro l (See G rossm an and 
H art (1988)). Private benefits o f  contro l can be defined as any additional benefits that accrue to 
the m anager (agent) o f  the firm over and above his cashflow rights (control rights >  cashflow 
rights)1. These additional private non-shared benefits can take the form  o f  anything from  private 
use o f  the com pany jet to  outright theft. I assume here that the consum ption o f  additional 
private benefits by the m anager only serves to  reduce the value o f  the firm. In Figure 1, the
7 Benos and Weisbach (2004, B W I Iereafter) review tlie literature on cross listing and the private benefits o f control.
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present value o f  on-the-job consum ption, C is plo tted  against firm value, V. T he relationship 
between private benefits o f  contro l and the value o f  the firm  is presented here to  be constant i.e. 
a one unit increase in  private benefits reduces the value o f  die finn  by one unit. This is depicted 
by the line segm ent [V0C0] w here [V0C0] represents all com binations o f  private benefits and firm 
value i.e. the m anagers (agent) budget constraint w ith  slope -1. Thus, if  the m anager (agent) 
consum es C4 private benefits, die value o f  the firm is V4 (i.e. the consum ption o f  private 
benefits reduces the value o f  the firm by V0 — V4). I f  the m anager refrains from  consum ing 
private benefits, the value o f  the firm is maximized at V0.
T he m anager will choose the optim al levels o f  V and C that maximize their utility, 
depicted in  Figure 1 as indifference curves w here U, > U, > U3. T he m anager maximizes his 
utility along U, at po in t P corresponding to firm value Vj and private benefits Q  .
N ex t I take the analysis a step further. I begin by relaxing the assum ption o f  zero outside 
ownership. Thus, I assume that the m anager sells a fraction o f  his shares (1 — a) to  outsiders (the 
distinction betw een the type o f  outsider does n o t m atter here. F or example, these outsiders may 
be individual (minority) investors a n d /o r  institutional investors. I deal w ith this later in  the 
analysis). F or example, let a  = 70 per cent. In  this instance, if  the m anager consum es an 
additional $1 o f  private benefits, the value o f  the firm is reduced by exactly $1. How ever, the 
m anager’s personal w ealth is only reduced by 70 cents and the w ealth o f  outside shareholders by 
30 cents. In  this case the m anager will spend a certain am ount on  private consum ption such that 
the marginal utility o f  an additional $1 o f  private consum ption is equal to  the marginal utility o f  
an additional 70 cents o f  personal wealth. Thus, the m anager will spend m ore on  private 
benefits.
In the next section I analyse just how  m uch m ore private benefits the m anager will 
consume. T h e  m anager o f  the firm  derives utility from  two sources: pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary benefits. Exam ples o f  non-pecuniary benefits are contributions to  charity etc. T he 
following is drawn heavily from  D e M atos (2003). Let’s define the present value o f  the firm as
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V and let F denote the m arket value o f  the m anagers’ expenditures on  non-pecuniary benefits. 
This in turn reduces the effective value o f  the firm :V  = V - F  (1). T h e  m anager holds a 
fraction a  o f  the shares o f  the firm. His utility is described by the real function: U (a V ,F ) , w hich 
is increasing and concave in b o th  arguments. G iven an optim al choice o f  F it is obvious that (a) 
the utility o f  the m anager decreases as new  equity is issued and (b) the effective value o f  the firm 
decreases. I can easily show that the decline in the value o f  the firm  is im posed entirely on  the 
m anager (through a fall in  h is /h e r  utility). F or a fixed level o f  a ,  the optim al value F *(a)is 
obtained by maximizing die utility: max U[OC(V —F ),F], whereF* (a )  m ust satisfy the following 
first-order condition: - a U , + U, = 0 . Let £ /a ) denote the optim al value o f  the utility, or: 
^ (a) = U [a(V  -F*(a)),F* ( a ) ] . U sing the F O C  i;(a)is a m onotonic increasing function o f  a ,  
since: di;(a) = (-0(UI + U2)dF* + V da = V d a . This implies that as a  increases, the optim al utility o f  
the m anager increases. Thus, if  the firm issues equity and a  is reduced, the utility o f  the m anager 
decreases. H is /h e r  decrease in  utility stems from  the fact that die m anager bears all the reduction 
in  value as new  equity is issued. G iven (1) it follows thatdV  = —dF . A s value increases w ith a  
and decreases in F, it suffices to  show that the value o f  the firm mcreases as F  decreases. This 
dF
follows since —  can be obtained by differentiating the F O C  and using die envelope theorem . It 
d a
d2U dF
follows that: —  -=  U ,. By assum ption U1 > 0 and since these derivatives are calculated at the
dF ' d a
optim um , < 0 , leading to, < 0 . Thus, as equity is issued, the effective value o f  the firm 
decreases. I can show  this graphically using Figure 2.
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Figure 2
P re se n t Value o f  on -th e-jo b  co n su m p tio n , C
P ost equity issuance, the am ount the m anager spends on private benefits is a function o f  
all possible com binations o f  personal wealth (derived from  his stake in  the firm i.e. shared 
benefits o f  control) and on-the-job consum ption. This in  tu rn  is dependent on  the price that the 
manager can receive for the shares from  the outsiders, and this price depends on  w hether the 
outsiders know  ex-ante that the m anager will consum e additional private benefits, ex-post. I f  the 
outsiders are no t aware o f  this possibility (this is a strong assum ption given the cross-country 
differences in  investor rights (See LLSV (1998)), and the cross-firm  differences in firm-level 
governance (See D K  (2004), K L  (2003)), they will be willing to  pay 30 per cent for a 30 per cent 
stake in the firm. In  this instance, the budget constraint now  facing the m anager is outlined in 
Figure 2 as L with slope -0.70. H ere, the m anager can trade $1 o f  consum ption for 70 cents o f 
personal wealth (changes in  the value o f  the firm. H ence the incentive for increased on-the-job 
consum ption has risen i.e. the optim al value F* o f  the non-pecuniary benefits has risen). This 
new  budget constraint m ust pass through po in t P, where at such a p o in t the m anager consumes 
C, and his personal w ealth is V, (30 per cent o f  V, is in cash and the o ther 70 per cent o f  V, in
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equity/shares). A t po in t P 2 there is an indifference curve tangential to  budget constraint L, at 
w hich the m anager consum es C2 in private benefits. Consequently, the value o f  the firm is 
reduced to V2. A t this p o in t the value o f  the outsiders’ stake (who paid 30 per cent o f  V, for 
their shares) is now  w orth  only 30 per cent o f  V2 and n o t V,.
I now  turn to  the situation w here outsiders are n o t so naive ex-ante. In  this instance the 
outsiders are aware o f  the probability that ex-post, the m anager will increase his consum ption o f  
private benefits. Let’s further suppose that the outsiders know  the exact shape o f  the m anager’s 
indifference curves as outlined in  Figure 3.
Figure 3
Present Value of on-the-job consumption, C
W ith such knowledge the outsiders will try and find a po in t P3 such that P 3 lies no t on  L 
bu t on V0C0 and the indifference curve at this po in t has slope o f  —a. A t P 3 the marginal utility for 
the manager o f  an additional $1 o f  private benefits is equal to  the marginal utility o f  an additional 
70 cents in  personal wealth. A t this po in t they are only willing to  pay 30 per cent o f  V 3 for the 
shares, and no t 30 per cent o f  V, as before. Consequently, the m anager’s budget curve now
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becom es line segment M  w ith slope -0.70. Here, the m anager will consum e private benefits 
totalling C3 w here C ,<  C2. T h e  value o f  the firm is V 3 and the outsiders neither gains n o r loses 
from  purchasing the shares. T he personal w ealth o f  the m anager is now  V 3 w hich is m ade up o f  
a fraction (1-a) in cash and the rem ainder a  in  shares and his wealth is reduced by V ,- V3 and the 
present value o f  private benefits is increased by C3 - C, T he result is a decrease in  the managers 
level o f  utility as he is now  on  a lower indifference curve U3 w here (U3<  U,). T hus from  this 
analysis it is clear that no m anager will ever sell a fraction o f  his stake in the com pany, unless 
there are o ther m otivations, n o t presented here that may induce h im  to do so. T hese include: (1) 
the m anager may prefer to  have a certain portion  o f  his wealth in cash a n d /o r  (2) h e /sh e  may see 
an opportunity  for investm ent that he cannot finance ou t o f  his ow n investm ent.
In  the preceding analysis I ignored the possibility that the outsiders may m o n i to r  the 
behaviour o f  the manager. M onitoring devices can take many forms. These norm ally include the 
use o f  external auditors (the use o f  the strategic audit has becom e p rom inen t in  recent times), the 
use o f  a board  o f  directors (board size, com position, independence, and board  equity ownership 
are fundamentally im portan t issues here), and m onitoring by institutional investors i.e. 
shareholder activism. Furtherm ore, the behaviour o f  managers can be incented: th rough the use 
o f  incentive m echanism s, outsiders can align the interests o f  m anagem ent w ith  theirs i.e. 
shareholder value (of course this ignores the claims o f  o ther stakeholders o f  the firm, b u t it 
remains consistent w ith the Freidm anite view o f  the firm (See Allen (1992))8. The ability o f 
outsiders (and at least in theory boards o f  directors) to  incent the behaviour o f  managers has 
alm ost always taken the form  o f  effectively designed C E O  com pensation packages (e.g. Stock 
options). In  addition, the task o f  outsiders to  align the interests o f  m anagem ent with theirs is 
largely helped by an active m arket for corporate control (although this is n o t very effective in  
som e countries e.g. Germany). T he greater the level o f  effective m onitoring, the low er the level 
o f  on-the-job consum ption o f  private benefits by the manager.
8 “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the foundations o f our free society as the acceptance by corporate 
officials o f  a social responsibility other than to make as much money for shareholders as possible”, Milton Friedman.
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In  addition, the m anager and no t the shareholders/outsiders can take die initiative to  
behave in the best interests o f  the shareholders. Why? T he reasoning is simple. I f  the m anager 
can convince i.e. send a credible signal9 to outsiders that before selling a fraction o f  his equity that 
he will consum e less than C , o f  private benefits, he will be able to sell his shares for a greater 
am ount than 30 per cent o f  V 3. I f  he consum es less, this increases the value o f  the firm, w hich is 
fully captured by the manager. Thus it is in the in terest o f  the m anager to  b in d  himself. In  bo th  
instances i.e. m onitoring and bonding, the level o f  private benefits is reduced. In  the case o f  
m onitoring, the outsiders take the initiative; in  the case o f  m a n a g e r ia l  b o n d in g ,  the 
m anagem ent take the initiative.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define bond ing  as the “costs o r liabilities that an agent or an 
entrepreneur will incur to  assure investors that it will perform  as prom ised, thereby enabling 
them  to m arket its securities at a higher price” . In  one o f  the earliest empirical references to 
bonding, G ordon  (1988) oudines how  dom estic U.S. firms can low er its cost o f  capital by listing 
on die NYSE. Like m onitoring, bonding also involves additional costs. B onding and m onitoring 
costs are borne by the managers. By consum ing less than C3 the m anagem ent increase their 
utility. However, the additional spending on m onitoring and bonding reduces the value o f  the 
firm (This line o f  reasoning implies that if  the costs o f  lis ting /bonding  are large, it remains 
possible that the post-listing valuation benefits o f  listing may, in  the extreme, n o t materialise. I 
return to this p o in t later in  the thesis). Consequently, the budget constraint o f  the m anager is no 
longer represented by [Y0C 0] bu t by the S curve outlined in  Figure 4. A long S there exists an 
optim al am ount to  be spent on m onitoring and bonding, w hich is given by po in t P 4. H ere, the 
m anagem ent spend an am ount MB (equal to the vertical distance P 5P 4) on  m onitoring and 
bonding costs. T h e  m anagem ent’s level o f  utility is now  U 4, higher than U 3 b u t low er than U,
1J It is important to note the distinction between signaling and bonding. In the case o f bonding the controlling 
shareholders/managers commit to protect their investors. Signaling may not actually entail this commitment. 
However, bonding entails signalling. For a discussion see Ribstein (2005).
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2.3 The International Depositary Receipt Market
In this section I outline the m echanism  by w hich international, non-U.S. firms can list in 
the United States. Like U nited States firms, international firms can list directly on  U.S. exchanges 
as ‘Ordinary Lists’. However, the conditions required o f  firms to initiate an ‘O rdinary’ listing in 
the U.S. are such, that the majority o f  foreign firms list in the U.S. as American D epositary 
Receipts. T hus, absent Canadian and Israeli firms, the majority o f  international firms trade in 
the U.S. as A m erican depositary receipts.
D epositary Receipts (American D epositary Receipts (ADR’s), G lobal D epositary Receipts 
(G D R ’s) and E uropean  D epositary Receipts (E D R ’s)) are negotiable certificates that represent 
the equity or debt o f  a non-U.S. company. American D epositary Receipts (ADR’s) are 
“Hatchecks” for foreign securities that provide U.S. A D R  holders’ bo th  investm ent and dividend 
liquidity n o t available through direct investm ents in non-U.S. securities. F or example, the legal 
fram ework in the U nited States prevents certain Institutions from  ow ning foreign securities not
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listed in the U nited States. N o  such restrictions exist fo r depositary receipt issues. Consequendy, 
the share o f  A D R ’s held by U.S. investors has risen substantially over the course o f  the last 
decade. F or example, the Bank o f  N ew  Y ork (2003) show  that in a sample o f  2,469 institutions, 
74%  (1,839) invest in depositary receipts. In  addition, E dison  and W arnock (2004, E W  
Hereafter) and A m m er, H olland, Smith, and W arnock (2005) analyse the portfolio  holdings o f  
U.S. investors, and find that U.S. exchange listing foreign firms enjoy a considerable weighting in 
U.S. investors portfolios. E W  (2004) estimate that the U.S. share o f  ow nership o f  foreign cross­
listed firms is 27 percent. Com parable n o n  cross-listed firms are less widely held by U.S. 
investors (7 percent). Since 1980, the share o f  foreign equities in U.S. portfolios has risen from  
just under 2%, to alm ost 14% in 2004. T he figure now  stands at just under 16% (third quarter 
2005). D epositary Receipts can also trade on non-U.S. markets. F or example, Depositary' 
Receipts can also trade in London, Luxem bourg or the E urom arket, either via an exchange listing 
or trade over-the-counter.
G lobal D epositary Receipts (GDR) provides the com pany w ith the ability to  raise capital 
either in the U nited States or on European markets. F or an excellent review o f  G lobal 
Depositary Receipt program s see Karolyi (2003). These depositary receipt structures are virtually 
identical in term s o f  a legal, operational and technical viewpoint.
A m erican D ep ositary R eceip ts
A n A m erican D epositary Receipt is a certificate that represents equity ownership, on  the 
part o f  the holder, o f  a non-U.S. Company. A m erican D epositary Receipts w ere the first 
depositary receipt program , established by the predecessor o f  J.P. M organ Chase. In  1927, 
Selfridges Stores, a U.K. com pany becam e the first A D R  created. T he creation o f  the American 
Depositary Receipts were necessitated due to  the introduction  o f  law in Britain, prohibiting 
British com panies from  registering shares overseas w ithout a British based transfer agent. 
American D epositary Receipts (ADR’s) were created to satisfy U.S. investor dem and for overseas
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equities. As such they created the situation whereby U.S. investors could invest in overseas 
securities w ithout suffering the illiquidity and dividend conversion expenses o f  direct foreign 
ownership. A D R ’s bestow  on  the holder, dividend paym ents denom inated in  U.S. Dollars. T he 
first exchange-listed A D R  was initiated in 1928 w ith the British A m erican T obacco depositary 
receipt program  on the American Stock Exchange. The first F rench  and A ustrian A D R s were 
established in 1928, w ith G erm any following suit in  1929. Irelands first A D R  was established 
w hen Elan C orporation established a Level 3 listing in 1984. A D R ’s assum ed their present form  
in 1955, w hen the Securities and Exchange Com m ission established F orm  S-12, fo r registration 
o f  all depositary receipt program s. Form  F-6 subsequendy replaced this, w hich is still relevant 
today.
There exist several different types o f  American D epositary Receipt Program s, differing in 
term s o f  their trading locale, and in their disclosure and regulatory obligations. Specifically, there 
are five types o f  program s: unsponsored program s, sponsored Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and 
private placem ent Rule 144A’s (Table 2.1 provides an overview)1". U nsponsored  program s are 
created by one or m ore depositary banks in  response to  m arket dem and. They do no t involve a 
formal agreem ent between the depositary bank and the com pany. Since 1983, the SEC has 
required that all new  A D R  program s be sponsored. Consequendy, the vast m ajority o f  A D Rs are 
sponsored. Sponsored depositary receipt program s involve a form al agreement, know n as a 
deposit agreement, betw een the com pany and the depositary bank. Australian and South African
10 There also exist other structures, similar to American Depositary Receipts that provide a means for U.S. investors 
to hold non-U.S. equities. These include, New York Shares (NYS), primarily initiated by Dutch firms, and Global 
Registered Shares (GRS’s). The New York Share (NYS) program was established in 1954, and is used by, inter alia 
Royal Dutch Petroleum, and Unilever NV. They offer many o f the benefits o f Depositary Receipts but they are less 
efficient in terms of cross-border setdement, and in their registration process. They are no t registered under the 
1933 Securities Act, further reducing their appeal among U.S. investors. Daimler Chrysler AG established the first 
Global Registered Share (GRS) in 1998. GRS are advantageous in that they offer cheap cross-border settlement, but 
they are expensive to issue, and provide no greater liquidity (See Karolyi (2003)). Furthermore, they trade without an 
ADR Ratio (the price o f an ADR = ordinary shares converted to U.S. dollars at die prevailing exchange rate, 
adjusted for the appropriate ADR ratio, plus transaction costs. More precisely, this ratio implies that each ADR is 
backed by a specific num ber o f  local shares. This allows each ADR to trade in a U.S. dollar price range competitive 
with the issuers U.S. peer group. Furthermore, trading in ADR’s is largely done through Intra-market trade i.e. 
depositary receipt to depositary receipt trading, radier than conversion o f ordinary shares to ADR’s. It is estimated 
that intra-market trade, accounts for 95% of total ADR trading. For example, the ADR Ratio for AIB is 1:2 on the 
NYSE, while Bank of Ireland is 1:4).
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m ining com panies w ere the first to  established them  in the 1950’s. Unlike, unsponsored  issues, 
they are exclusive to  one depositary receipt bank. Furtherm ore, unsponsored  and sponsored 
depositary receipt program s cannot exist simultaneously, due to price differentials betw een the 
two.
T h e  U.S. stock m arket structure is m ulti-tiered, and hierarchical in  term s o f  the 
attractiveness o f  each exchange, and in  term s o f  die benefits (and costs) that accrue to  firms that 
list on  these exchanges. A t the N ational level, the two established exchanges, N Y SE  and A M EX , 
and the N A SD A Q  occupy the peak o f  this hierarchal structure. There are also a num ber o f  
smaller regional exchanges. Finally, the lowest tier is m ade up o f  three m ajor over the counter 
markets, the over the counter bulletin board (OTCBB), the ‘P ink Sheets’, and, the PORTAL. 
T he O TCBB was established by the N A SD  in 1988, and are generally com prised o f  those equities 
that are n o t listed or traded on  N Y SE, A M E X  o r N A SD A Q . Rule 144A private placements and 
Regulation S are quoted on P O R T A L  (Private Offerings, Resales, and T rading through 
A utom atic Linkages was established in 1990). Level 1 issues trade over-the-counter as pink-sheet 
issues on N A SD A Q . Level 2 /3  issues trade either on  the N Y S E /A M E X  or N A SD A Q .
Furtherm ore, a final distinction can be m ade between Level 1 and Level 2, and Level 3 
and Rule 144A’s issues. Level 1, and Level 2 issues involve no  capital raising provisions. In  this 
instance, ordinary shares are converted into depositary receipts. In  contrast, Level 3 and Rule 
144A’s issues provide for capital raising. A  Level 3 issue bestow s on the holder the ability to 
make a public issue o f  shares in the U nited States. Rule 144A are capital raising program s, 
whereby securities are privately placed to  Qualified Institutional Buyers.
Sponsored L evel 1 A D R
A Level 1 issue is the sim plest and cheapest way for non-U.S. firms to access U.S. and 
non-U.S. capital markets. They trade over-the-counter and also on  som e exchanges outside o f  
the U.S. Unlike, Level 2 /3  program s, Level 1 firms are n o t obliged to  reconcile their accounting
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procedures to U.S. G.A.A.P. o r to  file periodic reports w ith the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In this regard, a Level 1 program  allows the firm access to  the U.S. capital markets, 
w ithout the costs associated w ith accounting and legal com pliance, and the scrutiny associated 
w ith SEC regulation and from  financial analysts. They require m inim al SEC registration, and are 
exem pt form  the SEC ’s reporting  and accounting obligations under Rule 12g3-2(b). They 
provide instead, an English translation o f  financial statem ents prepared according to hom e 
country accounting practices. Unlike Level 2 /3  issues w ho com m it to provide fuller disclosures 
under U.S. G.A.A.P., the perceived benefits o f  listing, such as a reduced cost o f  capital, greater 
liquidity, and an enhanced inform ation environm ent, are unlikely to  be realised. Interestingly, 
D urand, Tan, and Tarca (2005, D T T  Hereafter) provide som e evidence to suggest the contrary. 
In  a sample o f  119 Level 1 firms from  seven countries (H ong K ong, U K , Australia, Japan, South 
Africa, Germany, and Brazil), 30%  o f  the firms experienced at least one favourable change in 
accounting variables and m arket measures. N um erous studies (e.g. Sarr (2001)) have found that 
the primary factor deterring firms from  establishing exchange-listed A D R ’s have been the costs 
associated w ith com pliance to  U.S. G.A.A.P. In  this regard it is n o t surprising that o f  the total 
num ber o f  depositary receipt program s, Level 1 issues dom inate the list. T he Bank o f  N ew  Y ork 
(2003) provides evidence to  suggest that such program s can constitute 5 to 15% o f  the firm s’ 
investor base.
L evel 2 and L evel 3 cap ital raising A D R s
Level 2 and Level 3 capital raising program s facilitate non-U.S. firms that wish to  list on 
an organised exchange in the U nited States. Level 2 issues are sponsored, public depositary 
receipts that do n o t provide for capital raising in  the U.S. Level 3 provisions facilitate the 
issuance o f  new stock in the U nited States".
11 Most o f  this increase in Level 2 /3  issues has been concentrated in NYSE listings - the NYSE share o f  ADR 
listings (among exchange listings) has risen from 17% in 1985 to 65% in 1999. Over the same period, NASDAQ’s 
share o f Depositary Receipt Listings declined alarmingly, from 77% in 1985 to 34% in 1999. The American Stock
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Unlike Level 1 and Rule 144A firms, a Level 2 /3  issue obligates the firm  to adhere to  
sizable disclosure, regulatory, and legal requirem ents. A n exchange-listed issue necessitates the 
firm to conform  and adhere to U.S. G .A.A.P., becom e subject to  greater Securities and Exchange 
Com m ission scrutiny, and, becom e subject to civil liability under Section 18 o f  the 1934 
Securities & Exchange Act. In  addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley A ct o f  2002 requires that C E O ’s 
and C F O ’s m ust personally certify that inform ation in each year filed under form  20-F is accurate 
and free from  material m isstatem ents and omissions, and that the financial statem ents and other 
financial inform ation in the report fairly present, in all material respects, the issuer’s financial 
position, results o f  operations and cash flows. (See Bank o f  N ew  Y ork (2003)). Finally, a Level 
2 /3  issue exposes the firms to  the scrutiny o f  ‘Reputational Interm ediaries’. These include, 
financial analysts, underwriters, b o n d  rating agencies, auditors, and institutional investors.
P r iv a te  P la c e m e n t  S E C  R u le  1 4 4 a /R e g u la t io n  S A D R s.
A Rule 144A depositary receipt program  facilitates access to  U.S. and non-U.S. markets 
through a private placem ent o f  sponsored depositary receipts to Qualified Institutional Buyers 
(Q IB ’s). Like Level 1 issues, they do n o t require com pliance w ith  U.S. G.A.A.P. o r SEC 
registration. U nder Regulation S, a com pany can offer a depositary receipt program  to non-U.S. 
investors. It is no t uncom m on for firms to  establish a Level 1 A D R  in connection w ith a 144A 
Program.
2.4 Trends in the U.S. and Global Depositary Receipt Market
In this section I examine the international cross-listing m arket over the course o f  the last 
decade. I pay particular attention to the U.S. cross-listing market, bu t I also present some global 
cross-listing statistics. All inform ation is obtained from  a variety o f  sources: Bank o f  N ew  York,
Exchanges share has fallen from 5% to 1% over die same period - it now accounts for only two depositary receipt 
listings.
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Citibank, JP  Morgan-Chase, and Deutsche-Bank. F or International non-U.S. cross-listings, I 
source all data from the International Federation o f  Stock Exchanges.
Figure 2.1 outlines the total num ber o f  depositary receipt program s from  1996 to the end 
o f  2005. This figure displays the num ber o f  exchange-listed Level 2 /3 , the num ber o f  Level 1, and 
the num ber o f  global depositary receipts. A  num ber o f  features are noteworthy. First, the num ber 
o f  Level 2 /3  exchange-traded issues has fallen o ff over the last few years, after accelerating 
throughout the 1990’s. In fact, in recent times, die num ber o f  firms that have cross-delisted has 
increased substantially. For example, W itm er (2006) identifies a total o f  140 foreign delists (both 
voluntary and involuntary) from  U.S. markets over the period from  1990 to 2003. Incidentally, 
39%  o f the total num ber o f  delists occurred in 2002 and 2003, the period after the im position o f 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consequentiy, die share o f  Level 2 /3  issues as a percentage o f  total 
depositary receipts has also decreased. Second, but for som e stagnation at the start o f  the decade, 
the total num ber o f  Level 1, and global depositary receipts has continued to increase over this 
period. Interestingly, for die first time the num ber o f  global depositary receipts has surpassed the 
num ber o f  Level 1 issues, to  becom e the leading depositary receipt program  (See Bank o f  New 
Y ork 2006). In Figure 2.2, I present the total num ber o f  sponsored depositary receipts by country. 
T he list is dom inated by India 10% (185), die United K ingdom  8%  (154), Australia 6%  (119), 
Taiwan 6% (108), H ong K ong 6% (107), and Russia 5%  (103).
Figure 2.3 plots the num ber o f  new  depositary receipts. T he trends outlined in Figure 2.3 
are consistent w ith those docum ented in  Figure 2.1. First, the num ber o f  new  Level 2 /3  programs 
has declined dramatically in recent years. T he total num ber o f  new  exchange-listed issues initiated 
over the course o f  the last four years remains less than the total num ber o f  new programs created 
in  2000 alone. Coupled with an increase in the num ber o f  Level 2 /3  delists, this explains the trends 
outlined previously. In  contrast, the num ber o f  new Level 1 program s has been pretty constant. 
Finally, while the num ber o f  new global depositary receipt programs has oscillated over time, in 
2005 die num ber o f  newly created G D R s was 82, the largest num ber o f  depositary receipts created
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by any depositary receipt level last year. T he majority o f  new  global depositary receipt programs in 
2005 were initiated on the Luxem bourg stock exchange.
Figure 2.4 outlines the ‘host’ exchange for all new exchange-traded depositary receipt 
programs initiated in 2005. Luxem bourg accounted for 43%  (35), N A SD A Q  23% (19), London 
19% (15), and the N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange 11% (9). O ther global exchanges accounted for the 
remaining 4% (3). I outline in Figure 2.5, the annual am ount o f  capital raised by international and 
U.S. listed depositary receipts. A fter four lackluster years, the am ount o f  capital raised bo th  in the 
U.S., and internationally, im proved considerably in 2005. For example, in  the U.S., $15 billion in 
capital was raised by non-U.S. firms in 2005, com pared to just $6 billion in 2004, and $5 billion in 
2003. The am ount o f  capital raised in the U.S. by non-U.S. firms peaked in 2000 at $24.75 billion. 
N o t surprisingly, the same year saw the largest num ber o f  new  Level 2 /3  issues. F or International 
depositary receipts, 2005 represented the largest am ount o f  capital ever raised internationally.
In Table 2.3, I present a m ore detailed analysis o f  the American depositary receipt market. 
I source from  the Bank o f  N ew  Y ork at the end o f  2005, a com plete list o f  depositary receipts by 
country. F or each, I outline the total num ber o f  cross-listed firms. I then proceed by calculating 
the percentage o f  the total num ber o f  cross-listed firms, listed under each A D R  level. F or example, 
o f  the total num ber o f  cross-listed Argentinean firms (22), the majority o f  these firms trade as 
exchange traded A D Rs (i.e. 14/63.64%). In  contrast, the vast majority o f  Australian firms cross-list 
over-the-counter as Level 1 American depositary receipts. Similar preferences are evident for firms 
from  Austria, Belgium, Brazil, H ong Kong, Japan, Norway, N ew  Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, and Thailand. A t the end o f  2005, all Malaysian U.S. cross-listed firms were Level 1 over- 
the-counter issues. O n the other hand, firms from  Chile, China, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. exhibit a greater tendency to  exchange 
cross-list. Finally, firms from  Colombia, Greece, Hungary, India, South Korea, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Taiwan, and Turkey display a preference for a private placem ent issue. K K Z  (2005) find
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that there is a lower tendency on  the part o f  firms domiciled in low  disclosure countries to 
exchange cross-list because o f  the smaller net benefit they receive from  listing.
Figures 2.6-2.17 present the num ber o f  domestic and foreign lists on  global exchanges over 
the course o f  the last decade. In  Figures 2.Ö-2.7,1 outline the num ber o f  domestic and foreign lists 
for the N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange, and N A SD A Q , respectively. In  the remaining figures, I 
present data for the London, Japanese, Australian, Singapore, Toronto , Germ an, Italian, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, and South African stock exchanges. In  addition to  the outlined figures, 
I present in Table 2.2, the com position o f  total lists for all global stock exchanges over the last 
decade. F or three separate time periods (i.e. 1995, 1999, and 2002) I outline, for all stock 
exchanges, the total num ber o f  lists and the num ber o f  domestic and foreign firms that make up 
this total. Finally, I calculate the percentage o f  foreign to dom estic lists on  each exchange.
W ith few exceptions, the num ber o f  foreign firms listing abroad on global exchanges has 
fallen over the last decade. This trend has been particularly evident on  E uropean exchanges. In 
fact, PRZ (2002) docum ent that during the 1990’s, the num ber o f  foreign firms listed on  E uropean 
exchanges has dem onstrated an inverse-U shaped trend. This contrasts notably with the increase in 
foreign lists on  the N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange over the same period (although in recent times the 
num ber o f  foreign lists on the NY SE has fallen). T he percentage o f  foreign firms listed on the 
London stock exchange has fallen from 21.22% in 1995, to  16.81% in 2002. Similar trends are 
manifest in Spain, Luxem bourg, Paris, Germany (Deutsche-Borse), Switzerland, and Vienna. There 
are notable exceptions: the Peruvian (Lima), the Norwegian (Oslo), Australia, and Singapore stock 
exchanges, all experienced an increase in the num ber o f  foreign listings over the same period. Over 
the same period, the Irish stock exchange has increased its allocation o f  foreign firms from  9 in 
1995, to 14 in 2002, although the figure stood at 19 in 1999.
Finally, in Table 2.4, I outline the geographical pattern o f  international cross-listings. The 
data is sourced direcdy from  Karolyi (2005). T he ‘host’ country destination o f  all o f  their 
internationally listed firms is outlined. B oth PR Z (2002), and SS (2004) have examined the
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distribution o f  international listings by country. Their findings, w hich are evident from  Table 2.4, 
are as follows; first, they identify a ‘proximity preference’ in the decision o f  firms to  list 
internationally; firms tend to list internationally on geographically close markets. For example, the 
majority o f  Australian firms tend to list in N ew  Zealand, Irish firms list predominantly on  the 
London stock exchange, and Canadian firms tend to trade almost exclusively in the United States.
2.5 Literature Review
In  this section, I examine the empirical literature relating to  the legal bonding hypothesis. 
I pay particular attention to  two distinct areas. First, I examine the governance implications o f  
listing in the U.S. for non-U.S. firms. N ext, I review the extant literature that examines the 
valuation effects o f  listing abroad.
The analysis presented in Section 2.2 is the starting po in t for m odels developed by MV
(2003), D K S (2004), Barzuza (2005) and BSV (2006). F o r example, the m odel o f  M V (2003) is 
built on the assum ptions o f  managerial ow nership and expropriation o f  shareholders (private 
benefits). A  standard assum ption in all o f  the m odels is that expropriation is costly to  the 
manager and that it varies w ith  the level o f  investor protection  in the country. Consequently, an 
increase in m inority shareholder protection will reduce the optim al am ount o f  expropriation by 
the manager. T he w ealth o f  the m anager is com prised o f  his legal cash flow rights, and his 
expropriated cash flow from  investors, w hich is decreasing in the level o f  investor protection. In  
M V (2003), this is given by: W, = ^ (1  —e,)C, + e ;Cl[ l - p ( m ,e 1)] w here y, is the controlling 
shareholder o f  firm i’s legal cash rights, e, represents the fraction o f  cashflow expropriated by the 
controlling shareholder o f  firm  i, and Cj is the expected discounted cash flows o f  the firm. G iven 
that expropriation is costly, a share represented by p(m ,e;) is  lost. Consequently, the controlling 
shareholder/m anager only receives e ^ ^ l - p f m .e ,) ] .  By cross listing on a U.S. exchange the 
m anagem ent bonds h im self/herself to maximizing shareholder and firm  value, at the expense o f  
reduced personal private benefits. This implies that listing in the U nited States reduces the
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am ount by w hich the m anager can expropriate, given that expropriation is decreasing in  the level 
o f  investor protection. This does n o t preclude the possibility that the m anager does n o t gain 
from  listing. T he authors show that this signal by m anagem ent to  credibly com m it to  zero 
expropriation o f  their shareholders enhances the firm s’ ability to  finance their grow th 
opportunities, as a result o f  a lower cost o f  capital and a large poo l o f  investors in  the U.S. As a 
result, the cashflow to the controlling insider is given by: 
W;A =  Yi (1 — ef)(C f  + G ;)  + ef (Cf + G l) [ l -p (m ,e f1)], w here superscript A represents post-listing in 
the United States, and G, is the enhanced future discounted cash flows from  growth. 
Consequently, a firm  will cross-list on  a U.S. exchange if  the loss in  private benefits (C) 
experienced by the m anager is m ore than offset by an increase in the value o f  his equity stake in 
the firm (i.e. shared benefits o f  control) i.e. i f  G, > Qci — CA. Thus firms w ith sizable grow th 
opportunities are m ore likely to  cross-list'2. In  fact, this theoretical prediction has been ratified 
by num erous empirical ‘m igration’ studies (e.g. P R Z  (2002), and CKS (2003)).
D K S (2004) present alm ost identical arguments. They show  that the m anagem ent 
(corporate insiders) o f  a firm will only cross-list in  the U.S. if  they believe tha t their net benefit o f  
doing so is positive (i.e. loss in private benefits from  enhanced m onitoring is offset by an increase 
in  their wealth owing to  an increase in  firm value from  listing). They begin by show ing that the 
controlling shareholder can (but n o t w ithout cost) divert a fraction o f  the firm s’ resources to 
him self and the cost o f  diversion is increasing in  the level o f  investor protection. T he controlling
1shareholder receives (pre-listing): k(C —f C - —b f2pC) + fC , w here k represents the controlling
shareholders equity ownership in  the  firm, f  represents the share o f  cash flows C that he 
diverts/expropriates, p is the level o f  investor protection, the cost o f  diversion is given
1 1 fl
b y —b f2pC , and the total gain to the controlling shareholder is given by: kC +  — ------— C } where
2 2 bpk
12 In their empirical section, they show that the rivals o f cross-listed firms experience a negative price effect when 
their competitors list in the U.S. This implies that listing in the U.S. is value enhancing for cross-listed firms. I 
examine the valuation effects o f listing in the next section.
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the first term  represents the dividends received by the controlling shareholder, and the second 
corresponds to  the ne t private benefits o f  control if  the firm does n o t exchange-list in  the U.S. 
N ext, let z and pus represent the firms’ growth opportunities, and the level o f  investor p rotection  
in the U.S., respectively. I f  the firm exchange cross-lists in the U.S., the cash flow that accrues to
the controlling shareholder is given by: k(C + z) + i — — (C + z) = k(C + z) + v(pu s )(C + z). T he
2 bpu sk
firm  will cross-list in  the U.S. if  the ne t benefits from  doing so are positive i.e. the grow th 
opportunities from  listing in the U.S. are greater than the loss in private benefits. Finally, they 
address, the valuation im plications o f  listing in the U.S. T h e  value o f  the firm is contingent on 
w hether the firm lists in the U.S. o r not. I f  the firm does n o t list, its value is given by:
q = C — fC —-^-bf2p C , and q = C  + z - f us (C + z ) - - j b f ^ s p us (C + z) , w here z and p„s are as before,
and firm value is proxied by T ob in ’s q (q). G iven that film s in  high investor protection countries 
are w orth m ore (See LLSV (2002)), and value is increasing in  grow th opportunities (z), the cross­
listing prem ium  (i.e. the difference between listed and non-listed finns) is given by: 
1 + k
<|) = z -I------------tv(p) ~  v (pu s )(C + z)], which is increasing in z. In  empirical work, they show  that
k ( l - k )
firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. are w orth  on  average 16.5%  m ore than their counterpart 
non-cross-listed firms, using T ob in ’s q as the valuation metric. This ‘cross-listing prem ium ’ 
reaches 37% for exchange-listed non-U.S. firms. I return to a discussion o f  the valuation effects 
o f  listing in Section 2.6.
Finally, Barzuza (2005) and BSV (2006) identify bo th  a m arket for cross listing (as 
identified by D K S (2004) and M V (2003)), and a m arket fo r corporate control. T h e  essential 
difference between the m odel outlined by Barzuza (2005) and BSV (2006), and the previously 
m entioned models, is that case o f  the latter, the decision n o t to  list is n o t necessarily a signal o f  
low growth opportunities, b u t a signal o f  valuable private benefits. They show  that the decision 
to cross-list on  a U.S. exchange, o r to rem ain on  less-regulated dom estic m arkets signals
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inform ation on the ability o f  firms to extract private benefits. T he controlling insiders o f  diose 
firms that cross-list can extract only limited private benefits ex-ante. In  contrast, the controlling 
insiders o f  those firms that do not cross-list can, by n o t listing, signal their ability to extract 
sizable private benefits. Thus, their controlling block rem ains valuable to  any prospective buyers. 
T he m odel proves fruitful, in n o t only furthering our understanding o f  w hy n o t all firms cross-list 
(e.g. o f  all o f  the international firms that m eet the entry requirem ents to list in the U.S., only 10% 
do so), bu t is also explains the apparent positive price reaction upon  cross-listing in  a regulatory 
regime that offers considerable concessions to non-U.S. firms. T he m odel posits that the 
positive price reaction is due n o t to  the adoption  o f  the U.S. governance regim e (which is 
‘incom plete’), b u t to  a signalling on the part o f  the controlling shareholders o f  low private 
benefits.
In  the m odels proposed  by bo th  M V (2003), and D K S (2004), they explicitly assume that 
the ability to  expropriate is weaker (i.e. ef < given the adoption o f  p u s i.e. the level o f  investor 
p rotection  in  the U.S., assuming that p us > p . 13 G iven z, this m anifests into a cross-listing 
premium, w hich they assume is inversely related to the firm ’s dom estic level o f  investor 
protection. I test this proposition later. In  w hat follows I discuss the obligations required o f  
foreign firms w ho adopt pus .
Cross-listing in the U nited States via a direct list or a Level 2 /3  depositary receipt 
compels the firm to  comply with U.S. reporting and regulatory laws. Bonding to  the U.S. 
governance regim e obligates the firm to: conform  to, and reconcile their accounting procedures 
to  U.S. G.A.A.P. Level 1, and Rule 144a issues are n o t required to do so. Reconciliation to U.S. 
G.A.A.P. and a com m itm ent to provide fuller disclosures endows significant econom ic benefits 
on die firm. F o r example, Lang, Ready, and Y etm an-Sm ith (2003, H ereafter LRYS) find that
13 This assumption does no t necessarily hold for all countries. For example, Yehezkel (2005) argues that compared 
to the U.S., legal enforcement and status is just as onerous in Israel. Consequendy, they argue that the decision taken 
by Israeli firms to list in the U.S. are driven by concerns other than the desire to bond to the U.S. regime. This is in 
line widi the findings o f  Blass and Yafeh (2002, BY Hereafter) who using a sample o f Israeli cross-listed firms show 
that these firms signal their superiority over non-cross-listed firms, no t through bonding, but by the level o f costs 
involved in cross listing. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show how the decision to list can also be unrelated to bonding. 
They suggest that the decision to list can also be influenced by cultural characteristics and proximity preferences.
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non-US firms cross-listed in  the U.S. have higher quality accounting inform ation, m easured in 
term s o f  earnings m anagem ent and timely loss recognition, relative to  non-cross listed firms. In  a 
follow up study, LRW  (2006) conduct a similar analysis but, unlike LRYS (2003), they com pare 
their sample o f  foreign cross-listed firms to a m atched sample o f  U.S. firms (the m atching is 
simple two dim ensional m atching w here firms are m atched on Industry and grow th/size). 
Interestingly, they report that U.S. firms have higher accounting quality than cross-listed firms, 
w hen they m easure accounting quality in term s o f  the same em ployed in  the earlier study. Their 
results does no t question the effectiveness o f  the bonding hypothesis, as po in ted  ou t by Leuz
(2005), bu t suggests that bonding to  the U.S. regime is ‘incom plete’ for foreign firms. Second, 
firms m ust register and file periodic form s w ith the Securities & E xchange Com m ission (SEC). 
Registration is com pleted on form  20-F, under the Securities A ct o f  1934. F orm  20-F requires 
the firm to reconcile their hom e level accounting standards to  U.S. G.A.A.P. Furtherm ore, 
capital-raising Level 3 A D R ’s m ust also register the securities on  form  F -l under the Securities 
Exchange A ct o f  1933. Rule 144a firms are exem pt under 12g3-2(b). Registration w ith  the SEC 
also exposes the firm  to possible SEC enforcem ent.
Finally, a U.S. cross listing also changes the firm s’ legal liability. A n exchange-traded issue 
becom es subject to  civil liability under Section 18 o f  the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act. Coffee 
(1999) outlines how  a U.S. cross listing entails a sizable litigation risk. In  connection, 
Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, (2002), outline how  auditors o f  U K  exchange-listed firms, cross­
listed in  the US, charge a higher fee, to  com pensate them  for the greater litigation risk associated 
with the U.S. legal regime. A lthough enforcem ent can prove to be difficult, D oidge (2005) cites 
how  the SEC can discipline firms by de-registering shares and suspending trading o f  the ADRs. 
T he findings o f  LRYS (2003) suggest that the increased enforcem ent, and litigation environm ent, 
adopted by non-US cross-listed firms is, at a m inim um , a sufficient threat to ensure they fulfil 
their obligations. In  a sample o f  M exican cross-listed firms, T ribukait (2002) finds evidence 
consistent w ith this. T he U.S. Security Laws, are no t only designed to im prove firm disclosure
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and financial reporting, b u t are also designed to  mitigate the effects o f  the separation o f  
ownership and control. Coffee (1999) points out that such laws are also designed to  reduce firm 
agency costs by placing substantive obligations on  controlling insiders. This achieved by 
im posing ownership disclosure, insider trading, tender offer, and ‘G oing  Private’ rules on 
controlling shareholders/m anagem ent.
Cross-listing in the U.S. also exposes firms to the added scrutiny o f  ‘Reputational 
Intermediaries’ (Coffee (1999)). These include financial analysts, U.S. underwriters (for capital 
raising Level 3 issues), debt rating agencies, international auditors, and institutional investors. The 
extant literature dem onstrates how  each can be effective in m onitoring controlling 
shareholders/m anagem ent activity. F or example, LLM (2004) docum ent that analysts add m ost, in 
their role o f  m onitors, w hen they cover firms with poor internal governance. Furtherm ore, their 
analysis suggests that analysts can help to partially overcome the negative effects o f  p o o r external 
governance. In  an earlier study, LLM  (2003) find that a U.S. cross listing is associated with 
increased analyst coverage, and greater earnings forecast accuracy, w ith analyst coverage greater for 
exchange-listed ADRs. Leuz (2003) outlines how  increased analyst following relies exclusively on 
the act o f  listing; a cross-listing is associated w ith increased analyst following, b u t enhanced 
disclosure is required for greater forecast accuracy. Baker, N ofsinger, and W eaver (2002) 
dem onstrate how  a non-dom estic cross listing is associated w ith enhanced firm visibility; the 
authors define visibility as the extent to which analysts follow a firm, and the am ount o f  a firms’ 
news coverage. Their results show that an international cross listing is associated w ith increased 
firm visibility. Furtherm ore, firms that cross-list on  the N Y SE enjoys greater visibility than their 
counterparts that list on  the London Stock Exchange. Fan and W ong (2005) outline how  the big- 
five auditors fulfill an im portant m onitoring role in E ast Asia, thus providing an im portant 
governance mechanism.
The legal bonding hypothesis is, however, not w ithout its critics. O ne o f  its m ost vocal 
critics suggests that the role o f  U.S. institutions has been exaggerated on  a num ber o f  issues (See
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Licht (2003)). H e argues that the SEC has adopted a m ore conciliatory/accom m odating atdtude 
towards foreign firms, suggesting that the enforcem ent laws o f  the SEC as applied to  foreign firms 
have been loosely applied. Siegel (2005) concludes that the SEC has no t been very active in 
enforcing regulations w ith foreign firms, and concludes that cross listing in the U.S. is at best 
described as a functional convergence reform  (i.e. reputational bonding) as opposed to  legal 
convergence reform  (i.e. legal bonding). T hree recent papers support his assertion. First, KS
(2004) using a sample o f  Canadian cross-listed firms conclude that listing in the U.S. provides, at 
best reputational bonding. In  addition, recent studies by BF (2006), and LRW  (2006) conclude that 
the ability o f  foreign firms to legally bond  to  the U.S. regime is ‘incom plete’. Specifically, LRW
(2006) show that the accounting quality o f  foreign firms that reconcile their accounting procedures 
to  U.S. G.A.A.P. is inferior to a matched sample o f  U.S. firms w ho fully adopt U.S. G.A.A.P. 
While the study does no t challenge the effectiveness o f  legal bonding for foreign firms (See Leuz
(2006) for the reasons why in his discussion paper), it does nevertheless, highlight the inability o f  
foreign firms to  fully adopt the U.S. governance regime. Finally, B F (2006, pg. 1) concludes that 
the tendency for foreign firms n o t to use equity-backed takeovers suggests, “Cross-listing in the 
U.S. does n o t provide complete bonding” .
Market Segmentation and Liquidity Hypotheses.
In the early literature the benefits o f  an international cross listing were explained almost 
entirely in terms o f  the predictions o f  the m arket segmentation hypothesis. G iven m arket frictions 
i.e. regulations, inform ation asymmetries and transaction costs, the arguments p u t forward by 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977, SS Hereafter), AEJ (1987, 1988), Stulz (1981), E L  (1985), 
using standard asset pricing models, suggested that given at least mildly segmented markets, firms 
that cross-list could overcome diose barriers. Consequently, for firms that cross-list internationally, 
the resulting lower cost o f  capital results in  an expansion in their non-dom estic shareholder base. 
The subsequent increase in the firms’ non-dom estic shareholder base ensures that die risk o f  the
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firm is globally, rather than domestically shared. Greater risk sharing reduces the risk prem ium  
required by investors to  hold the firms stock. However, the majority o f  the gains from  greater risk 
sharing are likely to be borne by exchange, and n o t non-exchange traded ADRs. Finally, their 
findings suggest that Level 1 A D Rs do no t experience a large increase in  U.S. participation; the 
corresponding increase in ownership by U.S. investors is a m ere 5 percent. Interestingly, in earlier 
work, Holland and W arnock (2003, H W  Hereafter), using a sample o f  Chilean U.S. listed firms, 
show how  access to international capital is short-lived i.e. earlier cross-listed firms are replaced by 
newly listed firms in the portfolios o f  U.S. investors. In  addition, cross listing internationally 
exposes firms to m ore liquid capital markets, b u t increased liquidity is by no m eans guaranteed. 
F or example, Pagano (1989) and Chowdry and N anda (1991) outline how  liquidity may suffer in 
b o th  markets if  inter-market inform ation linkages are poor. Baruch, Karolyi and Lem m on (2003) 
examine the distribution o f  trading volum e o f  firms trading on multiple markets. Their analysis 
suggests that the trading volum e o f  a firm on  an individual exchange is related to  the correlation 
between the cross-listed asset returns and the returns o f  other assets traded on that market. 3Lis is 
in line with Barauch and Saar (2004). Finally, consistent w ith Karolyi (2003), Hailing, Pagano, 
Randl, and Zechner (2004) find support in favour o f  the “flow back” phenom enon: after listing 
abroad, trading volume migrates from  the foreign to the hom e market, resulting in a negligible 
share o f  total trade remaining abroad.
There is also a growing literature that examines die impact o f  international cross-listings on 
hom e market liquidity. Moel (2000) outlines how  overall domestic m arket liquidity is negatively 
impacted upon  w hen firms cross-list on  international capital markets. Furtherm ore, Levine and 
Schmukler (2003) dem onstrate how  firm migration to international equity markets has a negative 
spillover effect on domestic firm liquidity.
Interestingly, Chari and Henry (2004) argue that these segmentation theories have no 
lasting effects on firm value. Consequently, all else equal, valuation will n o t change around the time 
o f  listing.
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2.6 Cross-Listing and Firm Value
In  Chapters 4 -7 ,1 focus on examining the valuation effects o f  cross-listing for foreign firms 
listed in the U.S. In general, researchers have adopted two m ethodological/econom etric 
techniques. First, the vast majority o f  studies have concentrated on applying traditional event study 
methods. Ideally, using announcem ent day returns (and no t listing day returns), researchers have 
attem pted to  examine the valuation effect o f  listing by calculating m arket-adjusted returns around 
the time o f  listing. T he m ost widely cited papers are outlined in Panel A  o f  Table 2.5. T he general 
finding from these studies is that cross-listed firms experience a run-up in value, followed by a fall- 
o ff thereafter. W hile in many instances, the three-day announcem ents returns (i.e. [-1, 0, +1]) 
around the time o f  listing are significant for exchange traded firms, and in som e instances non­
exchange traded firms (e.g. Miller (1999)), the long-run returns tend to be negative. However, 
standard event study m ethods suffer from  two potential flaws: first, a failure to sufficiently account 
for self-selection bias. Second, K othari and W arner (2005) highlight the limitations o f  long-horizon 
event study methods. As a result, in m ore recent times, researchers have advocated the use o f  
standardised valuation metrics.
In  Panel B, I outline the m ost widely cited papers that seek to  answer the question by 
using valuation metrics. LLM  (2003), D K S (2004), and K K Z  (2005) apply treatm ent effect 
m odels (treatm ent effects in  the case o f  the first two, and two-stage least squares in the case o f  
the latter) to  a cross-section o f  foreign firms cross-listed in  the U.S. They find that exchange- 
traded firms tend to be w orth  m ore, bu t find no valuation effect for non-exchange traded 
depositary receipts. F or example, D K S (2004) find that exchange-traded (Level 2 /3 ) depositary 
receipts are w orth  on  average 37%  m ore than their counterpart non-cross-listed domestic 
counterparts. They coin the phrase ‘cross listing prem ium ’ to denote this valuation difference. 
Finally, using a panel o f  Canadian firms that list as ‘ordinaries’ in the U.S., KS (2004) using 
standard random  effects regressions conclude that listing is associated w ith enhanced value for
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these firms. They relate this valuation prem ium  to reputational, rather than legal, bonding  given 
the similarities o f  the U.S. and Canadian regulatory regimes. I t  w ould  appear tha t listing in  the 
U.S. causes value for non-U.S. firms.
However, the jury is still out. F or example, Smith (2005, p. 3) concludes that, “Unresolved, 
however, is the question o f  w hether or n o t cross-listing creates value by subjecting cross-listed 
firms to  U.S. regulatory system oversight” . In  large part, the criticisms o f  the afore-mentioned 
valuation studies centre, n o t on the econometric techniques that they apply, b u t on the cross- 
sectional nature o f  their data. Rather than examine the valuation effects o f  listing in event time (as 
event studies do), these studies do so in calendar tim e. W hile cross-listed firms may be w orth  m ore 
than non-cross-listed firms at any point in (calendar) time, this does no t suggest that listing in the 
U.S. causes value for non-U.S. firms. In  Chapters 4 to 7, I examine the valuation effects o f  cross 
listing in bo th  calendar and event time. O ur results highlight the im portance o f  doing both.
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Table 2.1: A m erican D epositary Receipts Characteristics.
Level 1 Level 2 l evel 3 SEC Rule 1+4,1
Primary Exchange OTC Tink Sheets’ NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ PORTAL
Accounting Standards Home Country U.S. GAAP U.S. GAAP Home Country
U.S. Reporting Requirements Exempt Rule 12g3-2(b) Form 20-F3 & Form 6-K Form 20-F (Annual) & Form 6- Exempt Rule 12g3-2(b)
Compliance2 Securities A ct o f 1934 K. Compliance or Rule 144a
Securities A ct o f 1934 Securities A ct o f 1934
SEC Registration Exempt Full Registration Full Registration Exempt
Equity Issuance Existing Shares only Existing Shares only New Equity Capital New Equity7 Capital
(Public Offering) (Public Offering) (Public Offering4) (Private Offering to QIB’s1)
Time to Completion 10 Weeks 10 Weeks 14 Weeks 16 Days
Costs <$25,000 $200,000-700,000 $500,000-2,000,000 $250,000-500,000
(1) - Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIB’s) are investors eligible to participate in the Rule 144a Market. The SEC defines these primarily as institutions that manage at least $100 million in securities 
including banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, investment companies, public employee benefit plans, employee benefit plans under ERISA, or an entity owned entirely by qualified investors. 
Also included are registered broker-dealers owning and investing, on a discretionary basis, $10 million in securities of non-affiliates.
(2) - Under certain circumstances, the SEC exempts non-US corporations wishing to trade their shares in the US from the full reporting burden. The Information Supplying Exemption, also known as 
Rule 12g 3-2(b), can be obtained by those non-US corporations that are not seeking a listing on a national exchange and are not intending to launch a public offering of their securities.
(3) - A Form 20-F is filed as a registration statement/annual report by issuers of Level II or III sponsored ADR/GDR. It is a comprehensive report of all material business activities and financial 
results and must comply with US GAAP. The Form 20-F consists of four parts. Part I requires a full description of the issuers business, details of its property, any outstanding legal proceedings, 
taxation and any exchange controls that might effect security holders. Part II requires a description of any securities to be registered, the name of the depositary bank for the DR’s and all fees to be 
charged to the holders of DR’s. Part III contains information on any defaults upon senior securities. Part IV requires various financial statements to be submitted.
(4) - Foreign Issuers planning a public offering in the US via a Level III ADR must register the proposed new securities by filing Form F-l.
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Table 2.2: Domestic and Foreign Listings on Global Stock Exchanges 1995-2002.
2002 1999 1995
Time Zone Exchange Total Dom estic Foreign For (%) Total Dom estic Foreign For (%) Total Dom estic Foreign For (%)
N. America AMEX 571 523 48 8.41 791 725 66 8.34
Bermuda 54 22 32 59.26 45 22 23 51.11
Cdn Venture 2,358 1,515
Chicago 4 4 0 8 8 0 287 287 0
Mexico 169 163 6 3.55 190 186 4 2.11 185 185
Montreal 129 128 1 0.78 550 540 10 1.82
NASDAQ 3,649 3,268 381 10.44 4,829 4,400 429 8.88 5,127 4,766 361 7.04
NYSE 2,366 1,894 472 19.95 3,025 2,619 406 13.42 2,242 1,996 246 10.97
Toronto 1,287 1,252 35 2.72 1,456 1,409 47 3.23 1,258 1,196 62 4.93
S. America B. Aires 114 110 4 3.51 125 124 1 0.80 149 149 0
Lima 230 198 32 13.91 239 227 12 5.02 243 242 1 0.41
R de Janeiro 514 513 1 0.19 570 569 1 0.18
Santiago 246 245 1 0.41 282 282 0 282 282 0
Sao Paulo 412 410 2 0.49 487 486 1 0.21 544 543 1 0.18
Europe Amsterdam 387 233 154 39.79 346 184 162 46.82
Athens 314 313 1 0.32 262 262 0 186 186 0
Barcelona 500 496 4 0.80 324 320 4 1.23
Bilbao 275 273 2 0.73 249 248 1 0.40
Brussels 268 146 122 45.52 279 150 129 46.24
Budapest 49 48 1 2.04
Copenhagen 201 193 8 3.98 242 233 9 3.72 252 242 10 3.97
D. Borse 934 715 219 23.45 851 617 234 27.50 1,622 678 235 25.74
Euronext 1,114 1,114
Helsinki 149 147 2 1.34 150 147 3 2.00 73 73 0
Irish 76 62 14 18.42 103 84 19 18.45 89 80 9 10.11
Istanbul 289 288 1 0.35 286 285 1 0.35 205 205 0
Italian 295 288 7 2.37 270 264 6 2.22 254 250 4 1.57
Lisbon 125 125 0 169 169 0
London 2,272 1,890 382 16.81 2,274 1,826 448 19.70 2,502 1,971 531 21.22
Luxembourg 245 48 197 80.41 277 51 226 81.59 283 55 228 80.57
Madrid 727 718 9 1.24 366 362 4 1.09
Malta 13 13 0 7 7 0
Oslo 203 179 24 11.82 215 195 20 9.30 165 151 14 8.48
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2002 1999 1995
Tim e Zone Exchange Total Dom estic Foreign For (%) Total Dom estic Foreign For (%) Total D om estic Foreign For (%)
Paris 1,144 968 176 15.38 904 710 194 21.46
Spanish 3,015 2,986 29 0.96
Exchanges
Stockholm 297 278 19 6.40 300 277 23 7.67 223 212 11 4.93
Swiss 398 258 140 35.18 412 239 173 41.99 449 216 233 51.89
Tel-Aviv 624 622 2 0.32 654 653 1 0.15 654 652 2 0.31
Valencia
Vienna 129 109 20 15.50 114 97 17 14.91 148 109 39 26.35
Warsaw 216 216 0 221 221 0 65 65 0
Africa, M. South Africa 451 429 22 4.88 668 644 24 3.59 638 612 26 4.08
East
Tehran 307 307 0 277 277 0 142 142 0
Ljubljana 135 135 0 130 130 0
Asia, Pacific Australian 1,421 1,355 66 4.64 1,287 1,217 70 5.44 1,178 1,129 49 4.16
Colombo 238 238 0 237 237 0
H.K. 978 968 10 1.02 708 695 13 1.84 542 518 24 4.43
Jakarta 331 331 0 276 276 0 237 237 0
Korea 679 679 0 712 712 0 721 721 0
Kuala 861 858 3 0.35 752 749 3 0.40 526 523 3 0.57
Lumpur
Mumbai 5,650 5,650 0
NSE India 916 916 0
New Zealand 199 150 49 24.62 171 114 58 33.72 175 135 40 22.86
Osaka 1,312 1,312 0 1,281 1,281 0 1,222 1,222 0
Philippine 234 232 2 0.85 226 225 1 0.44 205 205 0
Shanghai 715 715 0
Shenzhen 508 508 0
Singapore 501 434 67 13.37 399 354 45 11.28 272 250 22 8.09
Taiwan 641 638 3 0.47 462 462 0 347 347 0
Thailand 398 398 0 392 392 0 416 416 0
Tokyo 2,153 2,119 34 1.58 1,935 1,892 43 2.22 1,791 1,714 77 4.30
Total 2,335 11.26 2,829 12.91 3,508 14.60
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Table 2.3: Intra-Counttv ADR Composition (Excluding Reg S / GDR Issues).
Cawauj’ 1 ,evd 1 °A Level 2/3 % Portal Si Total
Argentina 1 4.55 14 63.64 7 31.82 22
Australia 99 76.15 25 19.23 6 4.62 130
Austria 16 80 1 5 3 15 20
Belgium 3 75 1 25 0 0 4
Brazil 46 53.49 36 41.86 4 4.65 86
Chile 2 8 20 80 3 12 25
China 16 40 17 42.50 7 17.50 40
Colombia 3 3.33 1 11.11 5 55.56 9
Denmark 4 44.44 4 44.44 1 11.11 9
Finland 2 20 5 50 3 30 10
France 20 32.79 35 57.38 6 9.84 61
Germany 26 50 22 42.31 4 7.69 52
Greece 4 23.53 5 29.41 8 47.06 17
Hong Kong 109 92.37 8 6.78 1 0.85 118
Hungary 3 25 1 8.33 8 66.66 12
India 1 1.54 11 16.92 53 81.54 65
Ireland 7 30.43 13 56.52 3 13.04 23
Israel 6 40 8 53.33 1 6.67 15
Italy 14 29.79 23 48.94 10 21.28 47
Japan 121 75.63 34 21.25 5 3.13 160
Korea 3 7.32 7 17.07 31 75.61 41
Malaysia 17 100 0 0.00 0 0.00 17
Mexico 36 44.44 28 34.57 17 20.99 81
Netherlands 18 38.30 26 55.32 3 6.38 47
Norway 9 47.37 7 36.84 3 15.79 19
New Zealand 4 57.14 3 42.86 0 0 7
Peru 4 40 2 20 4 40 10
Philippines 6 40 3 20 6 40 15
Poland 3 17.65 1 5.88 13 76.47 17
Portugal 2 22.22 3 3.33 4 44.44 9
Russia 48 67.61 5 7.04 18 25.35 71
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C ounty l.cvrl 1 °A Leyçl 2 / 2 % Portal % Total
Singapore 2 2 81.48 2 7.41 3 11.11 27
South Africa 54 72 1 2 16 9 1 2 75
Spain 4 2 2 . 2 2 1 0 55.56 4 2 2 . 2 2 18
Sweden 7 35 1 2 60 1 5 2 0
Switzerland 9 33.33 1 2 44.44 6 2 2 . 2 2 27
Taiwan 0 0 6 12.77 41 87.23 47
Thailand 15 88.24 0 0 2 11.76 17
Turkey 6 27.27 1 4.55 15 68.18 2 2
U.K 83 43.23 103 53.65 6 3.13 192
Source: B ank o f  N e w  Y ork.
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Table 2.4: Geographical Pattern o f International Cross-Listing.
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Table 2.5: Valuation effects o f  cross-listing abroad.
Panel A: Event Studies
Market Performance (CAR, %)
Reference Foreign Home Time-Period Events Event Period Skip Period Pre-Listing Post-Listing
Alexander et ai, (1988) USA Global 1969-1982 34 + /-  36 Months None 1 0 .6 -17.5
Foerster & Karolyi, (1993) USA Global 1976-1992 56 + /- 1 2  Months One Week 25.4 -26.3
Jayaraman et al., (1993) USA Global 1983-1988 95 + /-  1 Month None 15.1 -1 1 .1
Lau et a l, (1994)
Foerster & Karolyi, (1999)
Global
USA
USA
Global
1962-1990
1976-1992
346
153
+ 6  M onths/-l 
Week 
+ /-  12 Months
None 
One Week
0
17.0
-7.9
-1 2 . 0
Miller, (1999) USA Global 1985-1995 183 + /-  1 Month None 0 -34.7
Errunza & Miller, (2000) USA Global 1985-1994 126 + /-  36 Months 12 Months 10.3 -1 .1
Foerster & Karolyi, (2000) 
Korzcak & Bohn, (2005) 
Mittoo (2003)
USA
USA
USA
Global
Global
Canada
1982-1996
1995-2004
1976-1990
1991-1998
333
33
56
108
+36 M onths/- 
12 Months 
-1 0 0 / + 2 0 0  
Days 
+36 M onths/- 
12 Months
One Month 18.0
15.96
-11.7
6.49
Panel B: Valuation Metrics
Market
Reference Foreign Home Time-Period Sample (ADR) Countries Metric Estimator Performance
Lang, Lins, & Miller, (2003) USA Global 1996 235 28 Tobins q R E /T E Premium
King & Segal, (2004) 
Doidge et a l, (2004, 2006) 
Kristian-Hope et a l, (2005)
USA
USA
USA
Canadian
Global
Global
1990-2001
1997, 1997- 
2004 
2 0 0 0
206
713
744
1
40
36
Tobins q ,BM 
& E P  
Tobins q
Tobins q
Panel (RE) 
R E /T E  
OLS, 2SLS
Premium
Premium
Premium
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Figure 2.1: Total Sposored Depositary Receipts 1996-2005
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Figure 2.3: New Sponsored Depositary Receipts 1996-2005
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Figure 2.5: Annual DR  Capital Raised ({Billions)
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Figure 2.7: Nasdaq Domestic and International Lists 1995-2002
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Figure 2.15: Luxembourg Domestic and International Lists 1995-2002
Y e«
D om a stia ■ -  -  ■]
Figure 2.16: Sw itzerland D om estic  and In ternational Lists 1995-2002
Y*u
66
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Chapter 3: Cross-Listing in the United States and domestic
investor protection
3.1 Introduction
The ability o f firms to finance investment opportunities, over and above retained earnings 
is largely contingent on the effectiveness o f their domestic legal system to sufficiently protect 
m inority shareholders. The extant literature suggests that where the providers o f capital are 
sufficientiy protected, then required return is lower resulting in  a lower cost o f both debt and 
equity capital for firms (e.g., HL (2003)). Consequently, high-growth firms domiciled in countries 
characterised by poor legal institutional frameworks, and thus poor investor protection, are very 
often constrained in their attempts to finance their growth opportunities externally (e.g., DM 
(1998)). A bsent effective legal reform, man)' firms engage in substitute strategies designed to 
fund their investment opportunity set. For example, the extant literature suggests that such firms 
can engage in cross-border strategic alliances (e.g., Siegel (2006)), seek political favour (e.g., Siegel 
(2006); LO (2003)), or commit themselves to greater protection o f their m inority shareholders by 
im proving their internal firm-level governance (e.g., K L (2003), DK (2005)). Furthermore, a firm 
can substitute their domestic level governance for the superior disclosure and regulatory regime 
o f the United States by cross listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ (e.g., Coffee (1999, 2002), 
Stub: (1999), RW  (2002), Doidge (2004), DKS (2004)). Consequently, the ability o f firms to 
finance their growth opportunities through domestic financing, post-listing in the U.S., suggests a 
commitment on the part o f firms to better protect their investors14
14 Ribstein (2005) outlines other alternatives to cross listing. These include certification, a sale without listing and 
local incorporation. In addition, a related literature outlines how domestic exchanges have in response to sizable 
migrations o f  firms to U.S. capital markets improved their governance requirements. Dewenter, Kim, Lim, and 
Novaes (2005, DKLN Hereafter) and Carvalho and Pennacchi (2005) examine the impact o f  enhanced stock 
exchange governance regulations on firm value using Korean and Brazilian exchanges, respectively. They show that 
improved exchange governance enhances firm value. In a similar vein, Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) 
using the two major Indian stock exchanges demonstrate how demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized 
exchanges in terms o f governance.
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By ‘opting-in’ to the U.S. governance regime, these firms endeavour to encourage 
investment in their firm by committing to adopt the reporting obligations o f domestic U.S. firms. 
As such, the legal bonding hypothesis suggests that at least in tenns o f investor protection, 
investors should be indifferent between investing in domestic U.S. firms or non-U.S. American 
depositary receipts. However, this line o f reasoning has been questioned within the literature. 
For example, its m ost vocal critics (e.g., Siegel (2005), Licht (2003, 2004)) consistendy argue that 
the number o f SEC actions against ill-behaved foreign firms has been few, and L icht (2003) goes 
so far as to suggest that the enforcement laws put in place by the SEC remain largely ‘illusionary’ 
for non-U.S. firms, as non-U.S. firms are subjected to a less stringent regime than that laid out 
for U.S. firms. In connection, Siegel (2005) outlines that over the period from 1995 to 2001 the 
SEC took legal action against just five foreign firm s15. So while it appears that the holders o f 
ADRs are not as well protected as are the holders o f domestically listed U.S. firms, they do enjoy 
the benefits o f ‘Reputational Bonding’ from listing in the U.S. (e.g., KS (2004), Siegel (2005)) i.e. 
enhanced m onitoring from financial analysts, underwriters, auditors. In support Stulz (2005, p. 
1632) concludes that “Although this m onitoring [from listing in  the U.S.] may at times seem weak 
and tentative, it is monitoring that otherwise would not have taken place” . Finally, DKLMS 
(2005) conclude that such m onitoring acts as a sizable deterrent preventing m any firms from 
cross listing.
I examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. affords additional protection to those
investors who have already made the investment decision and invested in the firm i.e. the
ordinary shareholders, as opposed to those investors that invest post-listing i.e. A D R holders.
The majority o f non-U.S. firms that ‘opt-in’ to the U.S. governance regime do not ‘opt-out’ o f
their domestic regime. So while it is clear that the AD R holders are protected, although not to
the same extent as those investors that hold U.S. firms, it is not altogether clear as to whether the
holders o f the firms’ ordinary shares enjoy the same level o f additional investor protection. In
15 Joos (2003, p. 396) concludes that “At the very least, empirical work suggests that the effectiveness o f the bonding 
role o f the SEC regulation presents an empirical question rather than an established fact” .
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fact, AD K  (2005, p .3) suggest, “ADR holders have better legal standing compared to holders o f 
the underlying security as the ADRs are purchased in the U .S” . I examine whether the ordinary 
shareholders i.e. the holders o f the underlying security enjoy any increm ental protection under 
the U.S. governance regime.
In order to examine whether cross listing in the U.S. provides increm ental protection for 
m inority/ordinary shareholders, I follow the approach advocated by BW  (2004, p. 229). They 
argue that, given that regulatory bonding in  the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher, "the issue 
o f economic importance is whether managers and investors perceive cross-listings to have 
incremental protection or not. To examine this proposition, the appropriate approach is not to 
count SEC actions and debate whether they are im portant or not. Rather it is to examine the 
data for empirical implications o f the hypothesis that cross-listings provide incremental 
protection, and therefore serve as a device enabling managers o f non-U.S. firms to commit to 
protect the interests o f their m inority shareholders” .
I examine the ordinary dividend payout o f cross-listed firms around a cross-listing in the 
U.S. Our choice o f variable is motivated by the fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in  the 
level o f investor protection (e.g., LLSV (2000)) and, consequently (2) changes in external investor 
protection are associated with changes in firm dividend payout (e.g., Liu (2002)), controlling for 
firm, industry and country level determinants o f dividend payout. In addition, the choice o f 
dependent variable is motivated by our desire to isolate the im pact o f cross-listing on the 
domestic/ordinary shareholders (as against the AD R shareholders) o f cross-listed firms. I 
employ the ordinary dividend payout o f firms to achieve this goal. The agency models o f 
dividends do not rely on specific rights per se, but rest on the premise that country laws and/or 
governance practices allow m inority shareholders greater rights in general. I argue that firms may 
only be reluctant to pay lower dividends i f  they perceive that their m inority investors w ill accept 
lower dividends for improvements in investor protection, as dividend cuts are cosdy. 
M inority/ordinary shareholders are m ore likely to accept lower dividends post-listing i f  they are
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compensated for reduced dividends with enhanced protection from listing in  the U.S. 
Easterbrook (1984) outlined how governance practices and dividends are substitutes for one 
another. I argue that the additional protection afforded to m inority investors from listing in the 
U.S. derive not only from additional general rights per se, but also from a reduced ability o f 
controlling insiders to consume private benefits (e.g., Barzuza (2005), Doidge (2004), DKLMS 
(2005)).
Using a sample o f 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, I find that exchange-listed 
firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of 
firm, industry and country controls. This result is consistent with the notion that these investors 
are better protected under the U.S. regime. In line w ith m y expectations I find no evidence that 
the ordinary shareholders o f Rule 144a firms benefit from incremental protection, post-listing. 
Interestingly, m y results suggest that the m inority investors o f  Level 1 firms are better protected. 
A lthough inconsistent w ith the legal bonding hypothesis, I show that these firms consistently 
establish a reputation for better protection o f their investors by paying out a greater proportion 
o f their earnings as dividends. Consequendy, their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing may 
well result from a voluntary commitment on the part o f these firms to protect their investors that 
is credible given their reputation for fair treatment. In support o f this argument I find that the 
firm-level governance o f Level 1 firms, as measured by the number o f closely held shares 
improves in the post-listing period. I find no such effect for Rule 144a-traded firms.
M y results have also im portant implications for the agency models o f dividends. I find 
support for both the outcome and substitution models o f dividends. More specifically, I find 
that in all cross-sectional periods, and over the full sample period, dividend payouts are 
significandy higher in countries where m inority investors enjoy greater legal protection. In 
addition, and in line w ith L iu (2002), Zhang (2005), and Hwang, Park, and Park (2004, HPP 
Hereafter), I document support in favour o f the substitute m odel o f dividends: governance 
improvements substitute for dividends as a mechanism  o f controlling the agency costs associated
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with free cash flow. This finding is also consistent w ith the evidence that inter alia, improved 
governance helps explain w hy dividend payouts have been falling over time (e.g., Fama and 
French (2002), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2003))16. This o f course suggests that the 
relation between dividend payouts and governance is non-constant and as such purely cross- 
sectional tests are biased towards acceptance o f the outcome m odel o f dividends. M y results 
suggest that both are not directly competing against one another.
3.2 Data
I begin by obtaining a complete list o f depositary receipts from the Bank o f N ew York 
(www.adrbny.com) and cross-reference this list w ith data sourced from Deutsche Bank 
(www.adr.db.com), JP  Morgan (www.adr.com) and Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr). From  each 
I am able to obtain the names, listing dates, the firms’ country o f origin, and the type of 
depositary receipt, as o f Ju ly  2003. I also source a list o f direct listings, for which the legal 
requirements o f cross listing are essentially the same as those for exchange-listed depositary 
receipts from the official website o f the N YSE and N ASDAQ. For firms w ith joint and 
simultaneous depositary receipt listings (Level 1/Portal Programs) I classify these firms as Level 1 
programs. If a firm has multiple depositary receipt programs, w ith different start dates, I classify 
this firm according to its earliest depositary receipt program, and ignore any subsequent 
programs. Finally, I include on sponsored depositary receipt programs.
To be included in  the final sample, (1) I only include those firms for which data relating
to both variants o f our dependent variable is available, and (2) exclude firms with either, m issing
(entirely) pre or post listing dividend payout data. This ‘N arrow ’ sample approach is necessary to
ensure that any conclusions that I make are not due to a significant change in our sample makeup
around the cross-listing date. I obtain the non-cross listed sample from the country lists
provided by Datastream. From each, I exclude all firms w ith a U.S. listing, and include only
16 Interestingly, Ikenberry and Julio (2004) document a rebound in this trend. They show that since 2000 die 
proportion o f  U.S. firms paying cash dividends has increased and relate much of this shift to the maturity hypothesis.
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those firms in  our sample w ith data available on all our control variables. (3) Like L iu (2002), but 
unlike LLSV (2000), I include firms from countries w ith  mandatory dividend requirements 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Greece). I exclude all financial firms.
Finally, I exclude certain observations due to probable data errors; negative net sales or 
revenues, negative market-to-book assets, and negative dividends paid. In com mon w ith LLSV 
(2000), and L iu (2002), I elim inate possible outliers in our dependent variable(s) by rem oving the 
top 1% o f outliers. Due to possible errors in scaling the data w ith net sale or revenues, I also 
eliminate outliers from each o f our covariates by elim inating the top and bottom  1% of 
observations.
A fter im posing these requirements, m y final sample, outlined in detail in Table 3.1 is 
comprised o f 3,418 firms from 40 countries: 496 trade in the U.S., either as depositary receipts or 
directly on U.S. Exchanges. The remaining 2,922 firms are non-cross-listed. I provide, the 
percentage that each country (i.e. number o f firms) contributes to the total number o f firms in 
each depositary receipt level, and in each non-cross-listed sample. For example, my non-cross- 
listed sample is dominated firms from Brazil (7.60%), Japan (23.41%) and the United Kingdom 
(11.02%). In contrast, 18 countries contribute less than 1% each o f our non-cross-listed sample. 
The majority o f Level 1 issues are from Hong K ong (13.25%), the United K ingdom  (11.54%), 
Australia (5.98%), B razil (5.56%), India (5.56%) and South Africa (5.13%). Firms from the U.K. 
(20.69%), France (6.90%) and Japan (6.90%) dominate the exchange-traded sample. Non- 
surprisingly, the vast majority o f direct listings in the U.S. are Canadian firms (97.37%). Finally, 
India (26.00%) and Taiwan (20.00%) make up the majority o f firms that trade on the Portal 
under Rule 144a.
I begin by reporting some summary payout measures for both cross-listed and non-cross- 
listed firms. The results are presented in  Table 3.2. For both variants o f our dependent variable 
(D ividends-to-earnings and D ividends-to-cashflow), I calculate mean and m edian payout ratios 
over the full sample period. I outline summary measures for all cross-listed and non-cross-listed
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firms, and then further sub-divide the representative categories into firms originating from both 
high and low investor protection countries. Firms are characterised as either high or low  investor 
protection firms according to their countries anti-directors right index (See LLSV (1998)).
A t this point it is im portant that I make the distinction between payout ratios in  calendar 
as opposed to event time. In Figures 3.1-3.12, I p lot the time series behaviour o f  all firms in 
calendar time (which are averaged over the sample period and presented in  Table 3.2). 
Consequently, any interpretations made subsequently concern the level o f the divided payout, 
and not changes in  dividend payout that results from changes in domestic investor protection. In 
the next section, I examine the change in  dividend payout, resulting from a hypothesised change 
in  domestic investor protection. The relationship around the event date m ay be very different to 
the relationship that holds in calendar time. Consequently, I may find support in  favour o f both 
the outcome and substitution models o f dividends: the outcome m odel in calendar time, and the 
substitution model in event time. L iu (2002) provides sim ilar arguments in her paper.
First, Level 1 firm’s payout a higher percentage o f their earnings as dividends than both 
exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms in calendar time (as opposed to event time). Second, non­
cross-listed firms also pay out more dividends than both exchange-listed firms and Rule 144a 
firms, but pay slightly less (in terms o f median payout) than Level 1 firms. These results are 
replicated w hen dividends-to-cashflow is employed as our dependent variable. Interestingly, the 
earlier relations are largely replicated for Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a firms from both high 
and low investor protection countries. The results for low investor countries are especially 
interesting. They show that Level 1 firms pay higher dividends than both exchange-listed and 
Rule 144a firms. This result may be driven by anti-directors rights measure differences w ithin the 
low investor protection class or it m ay point to a relation between firm-level governance and 
dividend payout. To examine this issue further, I p lot the time series behaviour o f dividend- 
payout for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms over the full sample period. The results are 
reported in  Figures 3.1-3.12. In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, I outline the time-series behaviour of
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dividend-payout by depositary receipt level. In the rem aining figures, I classify cross-listed firms 
in accordance w ith their depositary receipt level, and their host countries level o f investor 
protection. The Figures suggest that the findings from Table 3.2 are largely replicated in each 
cross-section. For example, in  almost every year, dividend payouts are greater in those countries 
where investors are better protected. W hen I separate firms by depositary receipt level, I show 
that this relationship is unaffected. Finally, the earlier findings for Level 1 firms are replicated in 
Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.10. As before, Level 1 firms from high and low investor 
protection countries pay significandy higher dividends than their exchange-listed and Portal 
counterparts. Consistent w ith  LLSV (2000), dividend payout is increasing in the level o f investor 
protection. In addition to their findings, I show that this relationship has persisted over time.
In Tables 3.3(a) and 3.4(a), I present summary statistics for dividends-to-earnings and 
dividends-to-cashflow, respectively. I calculate dividend payout ratios for the non-cross-listed 
(column 2) and cross-listed samples (column 3) over the full sample period. I calculate mean and 
m edian (in brackets) dividend payout ratios for both the pre and post-listing periods. I replicate 
this analysis for each different depositary receipt level. Canadian and U.K. direct listings are 
included as Level 2/3 issues. The results for Level 1, Level 2/3 and Rule 144a firms are outlined 
in columns 5, 6, and 7 o f Tables 3.3(a) and 3.4(a), respectively. I begin by concentrating on some 
o f the results from Table 3.3(a). First, Level 1 firm ’s payout a higher percentage o f  their earnings 
as dividends than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms. This relation holds pre and post­
listing. Second, non-cross-listed firms pay out a greater proportion o f their earnings as dividends 
than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms, but pay slighdy less than Level 1 firms. These 
results are replicated when dividends-to-cashflow is employed as our dependent variable (See 
Table 3.4(a)).
N ext I examine die change hi m edian dividend payouts for each depositary receipt level 
by country in Tables 3.3(b) and 3.4(b). For each variant o f our dependent variable, I outline the 
median payout differential between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, pre and post-listing. I
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repeat the analysis for Level 1 firms, Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms and for firms that trade 
under R u le l44a on the Portal. The significance o f the m edian differential is calculated using the 
M ann-W hitney test statistic. In addition, I present for each depositary receipt level, before-after 
estimates o f the change in dividend payout. This is outlined in  the third sub-column for each 
depositary receipt level.
I begin by discussing the results using dividend-to-earnings as the dependent variable. 
The aggregated payout ratios suggest that Level 1 firms pay slightly higher dividends, Level 2/3 
firms pay lower dividends, and Rule 144a firms pay higher dividends, post-listing. I find that o f 
the 30 countries w ith Level 1 listings, exactly half pay lower dividends, post-listing (15/30), 40% 
pay higher dividends (12/30), and 10% remain unchanged (3/30). I find that o f the 28 countries 
w ith Level 2/3 issues, 57% (16/28) pay lower dividends post-listing, 11 o f the 28 pay higher 
dividends and 1 remains unaltered. Finally, for Rule 144a firms, 10 o f 19 pay higher dividends, 
while 9/19 pay lower dividends, post-listing. The results using dividend-to-cashflow, outlined in 
Table 3.3(b) mirrors those o f dividend-to-earnings. For example, 14 o f 28 pay lower dividends, 
while 13/28 pays higher dividends. The conclusions for the whole sample are the same as those 
outlined when I employ dividend-to-earnings as our dependent variable.
In the next section I test the agency models o f dividends in a dynamic setting by, allowing 
investor protection to change for at least a subset o f our sample i.e. for Level 2/3 cross-listed firms. 
I hypothesize that if  cross listing in die U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for die 
domestic investors o f Level 2/3 listed firms; I should observe a change in ordinary dividend 
payout.
3.3 Econometric Specification
In this section I outline the empirical methodology. I compare the change in ordinary 
dividend payout for cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listcd firms around the cross-listing 
date. This is motivated by the fact that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to die
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researcher. By examining the change in ordinary dividend payout, I seek to isolate the impact o f 
cross listing by controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants o f ordinary dividend 
payout. Next, I allow this effect to vary across the different listing types using a simple dummy 
variable specification, and use this change in dividend payments made to ordinary shareholders to 
make inferences about how domestic investor protection has changed, post-listing.
To estimate the effect o f cross listing on the ordinary dividend payout o f firms, the 
following regression specification is followed:
divit = p0 + Xitpt + SpTC* + 52EXCHit + 5, PORTAL, + y t + a, + uit (3.1)
divit = P0 + Xitp, + 8,07c * ADit + 82EXCH * ADit + 53PORTAL * ADit
n + w  (3'2)
W liere divlt is d ie ordinary dividend payout o f firm i in year t. I employ two different measures of 
ordinary dividend payout. First, I employ the traditional measure o f dividend payout, dividends-to- 
earnings. (Div/Earn)it is defined as ((Dividends per Share / Earnings per Share)* 100). The second 
measure, dividends-to-cashflow(Div/CF)itis defined similarly. OTC, ,EXCHit and PORTALit are 
dummy variables that identify whether an individual firm i  is cross-listed in the United States at 
time t either as a Level 1, Level 2/3 depositary receipt, or under SEC Rule 144a on Portal. 
8 , ,8 , ,83are parameters to be estimated. In the two-way fixed effects specification, these 
parameters estimate the ‘causal’ effect o f cross listing on ordinary dividend payout within firms that 
change from not listing to listing i.e. the within estimates. X it is a vector o f time-varying firm and 
time-invariant country level variables (rather than include country fixed effects). y t are time fixed 
effects, and Ult is a standard idiosyncratic disturbance term. In Equation 3.2, I interact each 
depositary receipt dummy variable with the anti-director rights measure provided by LLSV (1998). 
In this specification, AD is 1 i f  the firm originates in a country where investors are poorly protected 
(i.e. Anti Directors Rights <3). This specification allows me to measure the governance effects of 
cross listing for firms from countries where the protection afforded to investors is poor. The sign
of the coefficients 8j , 82,8 , and the significance o f such are ambiguous. I h e  coefficients on 
OTC, Portal should be insignificant in  line with the predictions o f the legal bonding hypothesis. 
However, the sign o f the coefficient for exchange-listed firms is less clear. The reasoning is as 
follows: given the considerable underdevelopment o f legal institutions in some countries (See LLSV 
(1998)), the prevailing wisdom suggests that the incremental investor protections from listing in  the 
U.S. should thus on theoretical grounds be greater for these firms. On the other hand, DKS 
(2004a) conclude that country and finn governance are actually complementary to one another. As 
such, voluntary firm governance improvements are more effective in countries where country 
governance is already effective. Mitton (2004) using a sample o f emerging market firms finds 
additional support in favour o f this proposition. Thus, the incremental governance benefits of 
listing in the U.S. for ‘emerging market’ firms may not be as effective due to poor governance at 
home17, a , is unobserved firm level heterogeneity. I test whether these effects should be treated 
as fixed or random by employing the standard Hausman (1978) test. The results (along with the 
Mundlak (1978) test) suggest that both the X itand a ; are correlated i.e. Cov(X „a;) =£ 0 . 
Consequentiy, we estimate a two-way fixed effects model outlined in Equations 3.1 and 3.2.
3.4 Standard Error Diagnostics
Next I test for the presence of a firm and time effect in  the data. To do so, I employ the 
‘intuitive’ approach of Petersen (2005). The Petersen (2005) approach is as foEows. Lets begin by 
assuming that the independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: 
e it =q : + y t + T )i t , and X it = 7t- + [X , + V it i.e. w ith a firm ( ^  + 7 t ) and time effect ( y t + (J .,)  in both the 
disturbance term and the independent variables. This test procedure is also adopted in Chapters 4- 
7.
17 In a similar vein, K K Z (2005) document that firms domiciled in a low disclosure regime experience a smaller net 
benefit to listing on an organized exchange (relative to firms domiciled in high disclosure regimes). The authors do 
no t explore empirically the reasons for such, but they do suggest a number o f possible explanations. Tn connection, 
Khurana, Pereira, and Xiumin (2004) outline diat developed market firms exhibit greater external financed firm 
growth, relative to emerging market firms, post-listing.
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The approach is as follows. First, I test for the presence of a firm effect i.e. & Jtt . For 
each specification, I outline standard errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no 
heteroscedastic or within group clustering), (2) White-Huber (1980) standard errors i.e. standard 
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, but not within-group clustering, and finally (3) Rogers (1993) 
standard errors clustered by firm. White-Huber (1980) standard errors serve as m y benchmark in 
testing for arbitrary w idiin group correlation. In the remaining columns o f each table, I compute 
the ratio o f die Roger’s (1993) (clustered by firm) to ordinary least squares standard errors
, and the ratio o f Roger’s (1993) (clustered by firm) to W hite-Huber (1980) standard
oE 3
errors — —— . Second, I test for the presence of a time effect. I present standard errorsV SEXVKilc J
generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering), (2) 
White-Huber (1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers 
(1993) standard errors clustered by time (year). In the remaining columns o f each table, I compute 
the ratio o f the Rogers (1993) (clustered by year) to ordinary least squares standard errors
, and the ratio of Rogers (1993) (clustered by year) to White-Huber (1980) standard errors
f s e Ro|SI„ 3
V ^ W h ile  J
In a final set o f tests I present Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm. In addition, 
I include time fixed effects to absorb the time effect. I compare these standard errors to (1) 
ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering), (2) White-Huber (1980) 
standard errors i.e. heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. Finally, in the remaining columns of 
each table, I compute the ratio o f the Rogers (1993) (clustered by firm, with time fixed effects) to
S F" R o g e r s
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ordinary least squares standard errors , and the ratio of Rogers (1993) (clustered by firm)
to White (1980) standard errors
The decision rules are as follows. First, i f  the Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
firm (time) are dramatically different than the W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors, then there is a
time effects, Rogers (1993) standard errors are robust.
I present standard error estimates using each estimator for the following independent 
variables: dummy variables for Level 1 [OTC], Level 2/3 [EXCH], and SEC Rule 144a [PORTAL] 
firms. I include the following firm level controls; market-to-book of assets [MBA], profitability' 
[ROE], si2e [Log of Total Assets], debt [Debt], free cash flow [FCF], and a dummy for firms that 
pay an AD R dividend [ADR Dividend], Dividends-to-earnings is employed as the dependent 
variable. I report similar findings when I employ dividends-to-cashflow as the dependent variable. 
I begin by testing for a firm effect. The results are presented in Table 3.5.
The results indicate a sizable firm effect in the data. I document significantly smaller 
standard errors for both ordinary least squares and heteroscedastic-adjusted i.e. White-Huber 
(1980) standard errors. The sizable differences between the Roger’s (1993) and White-Huber 
(1980) standard errors indicate the presence of a sizable firm effect. For example, Rogers (1993) 
standard errors are double the White-Huber (1980) standard errors for [EXCH], [Debt], [FCF]. 
For the remaining independent variables, Rogers (1993) standard errors are also considerably larger.
I test for the presence of a time effect in Table 3.6. I estimate Rogers (1993) standard 
errors clustered by time (year), and compare these standard errors to ordinary least squares, and 
ordinary least squares with a heteroscedastic correction i.e. White-Huber (1980) standard errors. 
The ratio o f Rogers (1993) to ordinary least squares, and White-Huber (1980) are outlined in the
significant firm (time) effect in the data. It is worth noting that in the presence o f both firm and
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By and large, the results from Table 3.6 do not lend support to the presence o f a 
significant time effect in the data. For example, except for the [ROE] standard errors, there 
appears to be litde variation in the estimated standard errors across the different estimators.
Specifically, the ratio o f Rogers (1993) to W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors f — JbEfi j i s unity
\  wiiiic /
or close to unity for the remaining independent variables.
I outline in Table 3.7, Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm. I include time fixed 
effects to account for the contemporaneous correlation. I compare these standard errors to 
ordinary least squares and White-Huber (1980) standard errors.
The results from Table 3.7 are in  line with expectations (i.e. the results are common to 
corporate finance panel data sets); bodi ordinary least squares and White-Huber (1980) standard 
errors are considerably smaller tiian the Rogers (1993) standard errors. In addition, tests adopted 
from Baum (2001), Drukker (2003) and Wiggins (2003) suggest that the idiosyncratic errors are not 
independent and identically distributed. Consequendy in all specifications, my reported standard 
errors are robust to both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-group correlation using Rogers 
(1993) standard errors clustered by firm.
In m y second empirical specification, I use a Tobit m odel to control for data censoring 
given that dividend payout is left censored at zero. The results o f the H ausman (1978) test 
suggest that the individual specific effects are correlated w ith the regressors. Unlike the fixed 
effects model, it is impossible w ithin the Tobit specification to eliminate the Ct by differencing 
them out. Furthermore, the unobserved effects cannot be conditioned out o f maximum 
likelihood. Consequendy, there exists no fixed effects Tobit model. In order to overcome this I 
adopt the approach o f W ooldridge (2002). He shows that one can use a general Chamberlain 
(1984) style model by specifying the unobserved heterogeneity as a function o f firm level means
_    j  t
of included regressors, as specified by M undlak (1978) so: a , = + a ; , where X ; = — ^ X it . The
T E=i
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means of time-invariant regressors are excluded. The firm level means are substituted into 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) yielding the following:
div* = P0 + Xitpj + 61OTCit + 82EXCHit + 53PORTAL[t + X £  + ^  (3-3)
divir = p0 + Xit(3, + 8,OTC * AD,t + 82EXCH * ADit + 83PORTAL * ADit 
— o. (3-4)
+X^ + Dit
Equations 3.3 and 3.4 are estimated using Pooled Tobit (e.g., W ooldridge (2002)). In all 
specifications the regression standard errors are robust to non-normality, heteroscedasticity and 
arbitrary w ithin-group correlation (e.g., Hardin (2005)). I present results for the pooled Tobit 
model in Tables 3.8-3.10 and use the fixed effects estimates (unreported) to validate the results I 
report for the pooled Tobit model.
The vector o f firm level controls, X lt includes the following: (1) firms investment 
opportunity set (market to book of assets) (e.g., Rozeff (1982)) (2) profitability o f assets in  place 
(ROE). Return on Equity is calculated as earnings per share divided by book growth per share 
(3) firm size (Total Assets (Log)) (4) free cash flow (FCF), (e.g., Jensen  (1986)) (5) operating and 
financial leverage (Cost o f Goods Sold (COGS) and Debt), (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988)) and (6) earnings volatility (EPS) (e.g., Fama and French (2002a)) is calculated as the 
variance o f the previous three years earnings per share. To conserve space, in  Tables 3.10-3.12 I 
present results using only MBA, size and profitability as firm-level controls. The results are not 
affected when I include the remaining firm-level control variables.
I outline summary statistics for all o f our dependent and independent variables by listing 
type in Tables 3.8-3.9. Table 3.8 presents mean and median summary statistics for our full 
sample, all cross-listed, and non-cross-listed firms, respectively. Finally, in the last column of 
Table 3.8, I test for any significant mean and m edian difference between the two samples. First, I 
find that non-cross-listed firms tend to pay higher dividends than cross-listed firms over the 
entire sample period. Both the mean and median difference (for both dividends-to-earnings and
8 2
dividends-to-cashflow) is highly statistically significant. Furthermore, and in  line w ith other 
studies, cross-listed firms tend to be larger (measured in terms of total assets), m ore profitable 
(measured by return on equity), and have greater growth opportunities (as measured by the 
market-to-book of assets) than non-cross-listed firms (See CKS (2003)). Civil law  firms (i.e. firms 
w ith low country levels o f governance) have a high tendency to cross-list, but not exchange 
cross-list. For example, the majority o f Civil law  firms trade over-the-counter as Level 1 pink- 
sheet issues. This is in line w ith  KKZ (2005).
I present in Table 3.9 summary statistics for each different depositary receipt level. In the 
remaining columns o f Table 3 .9 ,1 present both t and z-statistics to test for the significance o f the 
mean and m edian difference, respectively between each set o f cross-listed firms. Interestingly, 
both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms pay out more earnings and cashflow as dividends than 
Exchange traded firms. Exchange-listed firms tend to be larger, more profitable, and have 
greater growth opportunities than Rule 144a firms. The median exchange-listed firm also tends 
to be less indebted. Sim ilar differences exist between exchange-listed and Level 1 firms, although 
there exists no significant differences in profitability and debt. W hen I compare both the non­
exchange listed firms, I find that the median Level 1 firm tends be have greater growth 
opportunities, are more profitable, and are less indebted. Both sets o f firms tend to be o f similar 
size. Interestingly, Level 1 firms tend to have the highest propensity to pay AD R dividends. 
Finally, in our representative sample, there appears to be a greater tendency on the part o f both 
common and civil law  firms to trade as Level 1 firms i.e. the mean value o f both the Common 
and Civil Law dummy variables are significantly higher for firms that list as Level 1 issues relative 
to the other AD R levels. The results for common law  firms are not necessarily at odds w ith  what 
I would have expected. For example, KKZ (2005) suggest that given the costs associated w ith 
exchange cross listing, high disclosure/common law firms are more likely to exchange cross-list. 
However, when firms are ranked in terms o f their legal origin, English common law  firms tend to 
exchange cross-list. This is exactly what I document.
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In Table 3.16, I outline correlation coefficients and deal explicidy with concerns relating to 
multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors. The correlation coefficients are by and 
large o f the correct sign. For example, (D iv / E am )jt is positively related to profitability (ROE) 
and size, and negatively related to both volatility o f earnings and growth opportunities (MBA). 
Surprisingly, both (D iv / E am )it and (D iv / CF)it are negatively related to free cash flow, although 
neither is significant. The small variance inflation factors suggest that multicollinearity is not a 
significant problem in our data set. I employ two country dummies to control for variations in 
dividend payout across legal regimes: a simple 0/1 dummy for legal origin; 1 if  the country employs 
common law, and 0 otherwise (civil law). I also account for cross-country differences in investor 
protection; I classify those firms as firms from high investor protection countries if  their anti­
director score is equal to or greater than the median value o f 3 (See LLSV (1998)). I control for 
payout differences across industries by classifying each firm according to their primary standard 
industry classification code. Hence, I form seven industry dummies; (1) agriculture, fishing, and 
forestry (2) m ining and construction (3) manufacturing (4) transportation, communications, electric, 
gas and sanitary services (5) wholesale and retail trade (6) services and (7) public administration. I 
exclude all finance, insurance, and real estate firms (SIC beginning with 6).
I repeat the analysis by including American depositary receipt dividends as a covariate in 
each specification. AD R dividends are ordinary share dividends paid to tire holders o f ADRs, 
converted to U.S. Dollars at the prevailing spot exchange rate. I have no prior beliefs on the sign 
of the coefficient. For example, cross-listed finns with a history o f paying dividends may also be 
those to pay a dividend to their ADR shareholders. Furthermore, I find that the inclusion of ADR 
dividends does not alter my main conclusions. A ll AD R dividend data is sourced from The Bank 
of New York (www.adrbny.com). A ll variables employed in our empirical analysis are defined in 
Table 3.15.
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In Tables 3.10-3.13, I present the results estimating the effect o f cross listing on the 
ordinary dividend payout o f cross-listed firms. In Tables 3.10 and 3.12, I present the pooled Tobit 
results corresponding to Equation 3.3 for Dividends-to-Earnings and Dividends-to-Cashflow, 
respectively. In Table 3.11 and 3.13, I employ interaction variables to assess die impact o f cross 
listing on the dividend payout o f firms originating from countries where minority investors are 
poorly protected. In both tables, I outline regression results with the cross-listing dummies only 
(Column 1), the cross-listing dummies with firm level controls (2), and in (3) and (4) I include the 
ADR dummies and the firm level controls with country level governance variables. In column (3), 
I employ the LLSV (1998) anti-director rights measure, and in column (4) I include a dummy 
variable to signal if  a firm is domiciled in a common law  jurisdiction. Both variables are expected 
to impact positively on dividend payout (e.g., LLSV (2000)). These findings are robust to the 
inclusion of dividends to cashflow as our dependent variable. In addition to reporting the 
coefficient estimates, I also report the marginal effects at the means o f each variable. For the 
dummy variables the marginal effects are calculated as the discrete change in F(x) as the dummy 
variable x changes from 0 to 1.
The first major result from Table 3.10 is that exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower 
dividends, post-listing. This finding is robust to the inclusion of firm and country controls (and 
industry controls in the case o f the pooled Tobit model). This finding is important given that those 
firms that cross-list are very often those with sizable growth opportunities, proxied here by market 
to book o f assets. I show that even after including this control, exchange-listed firms pay 
significantly lower dividends, post-listing. Thus this result is not driven by the sizable investment 
opportunity set o f cross-listed firms. This result is in line with the results reported by Mitton (2004) 
for a sample of emerging market cross-listed firms and suggests that firms substitute dividends for 
improved firm-level governance. This result is also consistent with the findings o f Liu (2002), who 
outline how functional convergence measures initiated are associated with lower dividend payouts.
3.5 R esults
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This finding for Level 2/3 listed firms suggests that rather than compete w ith one another, the 
outcome and substitute models o f dividends are not mutually exclusive. Rather, this result suggests 
a role for both in explaining the relationship between investor protection and firm dividend payout. 
Like Liu (2002), my results suggest that cross-sectional tests are biased towards an acceptance o f the 
outcome model o f dividends. I find that the outcome model dominates in  calendar time. In 
contrast, I find that in event time firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance.
In all specifications, the country and firm level controls are highly significant and have the 
expected sign. For example, larger and profitable firms pay higher dividends, while firms with 
sizable growth opportunities retain a sizable amount o f earnings, rather than pay dividends. In line 
with my expectations, firms from common law  countries w ith efficient legal and institutional 
frameworks pay significantly higher dividends (See LLSV (2000)). Finally, I also document that 
firms that pay an ADR dividend also pay larger dividends suggesting a possible clientele effect.
In Table 3.11, I examine the impact o f cross listing on dividend policy for firms from 
countries with a poor record for protecting minority investors. Comparing Tables 3.10 and 3.11 
the results suggest that although the magnitudes o f the Tobit estimates are broadly similar, their 
significance is not as strong when compared to the results in Table 3.10. This suggests that the 
benefits to listing may not be as great for firms from poor-investor protection countries, consistent 
with the notion that firm and country governance improvements are in  fact complementary to one 
another.
The results for Rule 144a firms are consistent w ith  theory. The results from Tables 3.10- 
3.11 suggest that cross listing in the U.S. confers no additional protection benefits for die 
ordinary shareholders o f these firms. In alm ost all specifications Rule 144a firms do not 
significandy change the amount that they pay to their ordinary shareholders. The results for 
Level 1 firms are very interesting. In all regression specifications these firms pay significandy 
lower dividends, post-listing, a result consistent w id i the notion that like exchange-listed firms, 
these firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. However, this result warrants further
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discussion. Level 1 firms are exempt from becoming ‘reporting’ companies under the terms of 
their depositary receipt agreement. Consequently, our finding that these firms pay sizable and 
significandy lower dividends post-listing is inconsistent w ith any o f  the predictions o f the legal 
bonding hypothesis. In the next sub-section I attempt to shed more fight on this finding.
I report in  Tables 3.12 and 3.13 our regression results using D ividends-to-Cashflow as 
our dependent variable. The results are largely in  fine w ith  those outlined when I employ 
Dividends-to-Earnings.
3.6 Finn-Level Governance
The findings for Level 1 firms may be consistent w ith  the notion o f reputational bonding: 
both KS (2004) and Siegel (2005) document that even absent effective legal bonding, a firm can 
still voluntarily bond themselves to fair treatment o f their m inority investors18. In addition, the 
evidence from Section 3.2 suggests that Level 1 firms, from both strong and weak investor 
protection countries, establish a strong reputation for the protection of investors by paying a 
greater proportion o f their earnings as dividends, relative to both exchange-fisted and Portal 
firms, and this relation holds in the pre and post-fisting periods. Consequently, the ability o f 
Level 1 issues to pay low er dividends post-fisting may result from voluntary measures initiated by 
them post-fisting e.g. firm level governance improvements (e.g., D K  (2005)) and/or as a direct 
result o f their reputation for fair treatment o f m inority shareholders. In fact Pinegar and 
Ravichandran (2004, p .8) in their study o f Rule 144a/Reg S firms suggest as much when they 
conclude, “the reputation o f the issuer may be as im portant as ownership concentration or the 
legal environment in  protecting m inority shareholders rights”. The valuation premiums that 
Level 1 firms generate post-fisting are also consistent w ith  the notion that some of these firms
Reputational bonding refers to bonding as a result o f  increased m onitoring frum reputational intermediaries e.g. 
analysts, underwriters, and auditors. A large literature suggests that it is only exchange-traded firms that benefit from 
reputational bonding after listing in the U.S. (e.g. LLM (2003)). Consequently, firm level improvements for non- 
exchange traded firms are more likely to be driven by voluntary initiatives on the part of the firm.
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benefit from reputational bonding, post-listing (e.g., D TT (2005))19. Consistent with this 
argument, Aggarwal, K lapper, and W ysocki (2005, p. 2942) conclude in their study o f U.S. 
Institutional Investor foreign portfolio allocations “U.S. funds allocate a larger proportion o f 
their assets to firms w ith  listed ADRs and unlisted AD Rs that have better accounting and 
disclosure policies. Unlisted A D R firms have higher allocations only when they also adopt high 
quality accounting disclosures” .
To examine whether non-exchange listed firms (Level 1 and Rule 144a) voluntarily 
commit to bond themselves to fair treatment o f their m inority shareholders through improved 
firm-level governance, I proxy for firm-level governance using the number o f closely held shares 
and examine its behaviour around a cross-listing. A fall in the number o f closely held shares 
implies an im provem ent in firm-level governance. Numerous papers have employed closely held 
shares to proxy for firm-level governance (e.g. H W  (2003)). From  my original sample o f 496 
cross-listed firms, I am able to source data on Closely H eld Shares for 214 Level 1 firms, 137 
Level 2/3 (including ordinary lists) and 49 Rule 144a Portal firms from Worldscope. The results 
are outlined in Table 3.14.
In Table 3.14, I outline for each depositary receipt level, the median value o f closely held 
shares in the two years prior to listing, and on the list year. In the subsequent rows, I calculate 
the change in closely held shares between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the 
two years pre-listing (-2, -1). For example, A (3 ,-l) refers to the change in closely held shares one 
year prior to listing to three years post-listing. In the case o f Level 1 firms this change is negative, 
implying an im provem ent in firm-level governance. In the remaining rows o f Table 3.14, I 
outline the m edian value o f closely held shares in  the pre and post-listing period. The difference 
is outlined in the final row.
I begin by discussing the results for Level 1 firms. M y findings suggest that non­
exchange listed Level 1 firms improve their firm level governance in the post-listing period. The
19 I return to this issue in much greater detail in Chapters 6  and 7,
number o f shares closely held is lower in almost every period post-listing, relative to the two 
years pre-listing. For example, the number o f shares closely held by Level 1 firms is alm ost 33% 
lower three years post-listing relative to the year prior to listing. I find the opposite for Rule 144a 
firms; in  every period post-listing, I find that the level o f closely held shares is greater than in the 
pre-listing period (column 4). Interestingly, the results for both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are 
consistent w ith  our findings reported in section 3.2: Level 1 firms consistently pay higher 
dividends relative to both Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms, and Rule 144a firms. As such these 
firms establish a reputation for fair treatment o f their investors by paying out a sizable proportion 
of their earnings as dividends. Interestingly, the results for Level 2/3 exchange listed firms are 
mixed.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The ability o f firms to finance their investment opportunity set externally is largely 
contingent on the effectiveness o f their domestic legal system to protect the interests o f their 
minority shareholders. In a country characterised by poor legal protection o f investors, firms are 
very often constrained in their attempts to fund their growth opportunities. To rectify this, a 
number o f firms have over the last decade sought to substitute their home level governance for 
the superior governance o f the U.S. by listing on an organised U.S. exchange. RW  (2002) 
document that post-listing, exchange-listed AD Rs, capitally constrained at home pre-listing, were 
no longer post-listing. This suggests that the domestic investors o f these investors are better 
protected post-listing. I test this proposition.
In order to do so I employ the agency models o f dividends introduced by LLSV (2000). I 
examine the ordinary dividend payout o f cross-listed firms around a cross listing in the U.S. The 
choice o f variable is motivated by the fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in the level of 
investor protection and, consequently (2) changes in external investor protection are associated 
with changes in firm dividend payout, controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants
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o f dividend payout. I hypothesis that i f  die investors o f exchange-listed firms are better protected, 
they are more likely to accept lower dividends. I argue that ordinary shareholders are compensated 
for this reduced dividend payment with enhanced protection.
Using a sample o f 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, I show that exchange-listed 
firms pay significantiy lower dividends post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of 
firm , industry and country controls. This result is consistent w ith the notion that these investors 
are better protected under the U.S. regime. In line with m y expectations I find no evidence that 
the ordinary shareholders o f Rule 144a firms benefit from increm ental protection, post-listing. 
Interestingly, m y results suggest that the m inority investors o f Level 1 firms are better protected. 
A lthough inconsistent w ith the legal bonding hypothesis, I show that these firms consistently 
establish a reputation for better protection o f their investors by paying out a greater proportion 
o f their earnings as dividends. Consequently, their ability to pay low er dividends post-list may 
w ell result from a voluntary commitment on the part o f these firm to protect their investors that 
is credible given their reputation for fair treatment. I present evidence to suggest that these firms 
improve their firm level governance post-listing. The payment o f substantially higher dividends 
by these firms suggests a commitment on their part to bond to fair treatment o f their ordinary 
shareholders.
Finally, m y findings outline the importance o f testing the agency models o f dividends both 
cross-sectionally, and across time. Like Liu (2002), I find empirical support for both models; 
dividend payouts are larger in countries where investors are better protected. In addition I show 
that this relationship has persisted over time. Second, and consistent with the findings o f Liu 
(2002), I show that governance reforms are associated with lower firm dividend payouts. Liu’s 
(2002) findings suggest that country functional convergence reforms (as opposed to legal reforms) 
substitute for dividends in controlling the agency costs associated with free cash flow. M y findings 
suggest that governance reforms initiated at the level o f the firm, and not the country, are effective
9 0
reforms. This suggests that cross listing in the U.S. does enhance the protection of the domestic 
investors of those firms that list.
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Table 3.1: Sample Description
Country MCI. % Level 1 °A Level 2 /3 % Rule 144a & Ordinary 24 Total CL Sninnfr-
A rgentina 17 0.58 0 0 . 0 0 5 2.87 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 2 2
A ustralia 8 6 2.94 14 5.98 8 4.60 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 23 109
A ustria 23 0.79 9 3.85 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 9 32
Belgium 2 2 0.75 2 0.85 1 0.57 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 25
Brazil 2 2 2 7.60 13 5.56 7 4.02 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 1 243
C anada 1 1 2 3.83 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 37 97.37 37 149
Chile 25 0 . 8 6 0 0 . 0 0 4 2.30 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 29
C hina 2 2 0.75 3 1.28 5 2.87 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 30
C olom bia 25 0 . 8 6 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 26
D en m ark 33 1.13 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.57 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 34
Finland 31 1.06 4 1.71 3 1.72 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 39
France 134 4.59 1 2 5.13 1 2 6.90 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 24 158
G erm any 129 4.41 8 3.42 7 4.02 2 4.00 0 0 . 0 0 17 146
G reece 17 0.58 1 0.43 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 18
Flong  K ong 65 2 . 2 2 31 13.25 3 1.72 2 4.00 0 0 . 0 0 36 1 0 1
India 46 1.57 13 5.56 6 3.45 13 26.00 0 0 . 0 0 32 78
Ireland 2 0 0 . 6 8 2 0.85 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 2 2
Israel 6 6 2.26 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 6 6
Italy 51 1.75 6 2.56 8 4.60 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 15 6 6
Jap an 684 23.41 15 6.41 1 2 6.90 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 28 712
Malaysia 6 6 2.26 4 1.71 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 70
M exico 33 1.13 4 1.71 1 1 6.32 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 16 49
N etherlands 19 0.65 5 2.14 8 4.60 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 13 32
N orw ay 2 2 0.75 4 1.71 3 1.72 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 30
N ew  Z ealand 34 1.16 1 0.43 1 0.57 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 36
Peru 56 1.92 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.57 2 4.00 0 0 . 0 0 3 59
Phillipines 2 2 0.75 4 1.71 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 27
P oland 63 2.16 3 1.28 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 6 6
Portugal 29 0.99 1 0.43 2 1.15 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 33
Russia 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.57 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1
Sou th  Africa 23 0.79 1 2 5.13 5 2.87 2 4.00 0 0 . 0 0 19 42
Singapore 6 6 2.26 1 0 4.27 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 77
Sou th  K orea 44 1.51 5 2.14 5 2.87 4 8 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 14 58
Spain 83 2.84 1 0.43 3 1.72 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 8 8
Sw eden 28 0.96 2 0.85 7 4.02 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 38
Switzerland 7 0.24 2 0.85 4 2.30 2 4.00 0 0 . 0 0 8 15
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Country NCL % Level 1 °A LçysL2Jh °A Rule 144a % Ordinary °A Total CL Samnle
Taiwan 27 0.92 8 3.42 5 2.87 10 20.00 0 0 . 0 0 23 50
Thailand 28 0.96 8 3.42 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 36
Turkey 120 4.11 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 120
UK 322 11.02 27 11.34 36 20.69 0 0 . 0 0 1 2.63 64 386
TOTAL 2,922 100% 234 100% 174 100% 50 100% 38 100% 496 3,418
In this table I outline the final sample by country and cross-listing leveL N  (NCL) is the number o f  firms by country not cross-listed in the United States. All information on firms 
cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f  New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on 
PORTAL; Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ. Ordinary' Shares are shares that list directly in the United 
States
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Table 3.2: Dividend Payout Levels by A DR  Classification (Mean [Median])
B flm esik Level 1 Level 7/3 Rule 144a
Dividen ds-to-Tarnings
Full Sample 38.00 35.92 32.20 34.64
[30.29] [32.98] [25.31] [27.56]
Low Anti-Director 35.55 31.73 32.89 33.48
[29.84] [30.94] [31.35] [18.25]
High Anti-Director 39.05 35.92 31.61 32.17
[30.53] [32.85] [22.56] [23.62]
Dividends-to-C.ash flow
Full Sample 20.42 2 0 . 2 2 16.14 17.69
[14.21] [18.34] [11.89] [13.00]
Low Anti-Director 16.46 14.95 13.88 8.28
[11.69] [13.13] [1 2 .2 2 ] [5.46]
High Anti-Director 2 1 . 6 6 20.84 16.42 18.54
[14.93] [18.23] [11.31] [13.90]
■Significance Tests II h e ll v s . I.owl
Dividenda-tn-Eamings
Mean -3 23*** -2.54** 0.42 0 . 0 2 2
Median -6.93*** -2 .2 2 ** 2.73*** -0.554
Dividends-to-Cashflnw
Mean
Median
-15.88***
-16.26***
- 8  89*** 
- 6  94***
-4 61*** 
-0.765
-3 87*** 
_443***
In  this table I rep o rt m ean and m edian dividend payout levels fo r non-cross-listed  firms and cross-listed firms over
the full sam ple period. D ividends-to-cash£low  and  dividends-to-earnings are em ployed as ou r payout proxies. 
B oth  are defined in the appendix. D ividend payouts for all cross-listed firms are calculated over the  full sam ple 
period for each firm , w hich includes b o th  the  p re  and post-listing period. F o r b o th  cross-listed and  non-cross- 
listed firms I rep o rt b o th  t and Z  statistics fo r the m ean  and m edian difference betw een high and  low  investor 
p ro tec tion  countries, respectively. *, **, *** represents significance at th e  10, 5, and 1%  level, respectively.
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Table 3.3(a): D ividend-to-Earnings for cross-listed and non  cross-listed firms
Country NCI. Cross-List Ciosa-List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Rule 144a
Full Period Full Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Pest-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-1 .ist Post-list
A rgentina 17.23 61.10 66.96 58.54 - - 66.96 58.54 - -
(0 .0 0 ) (71.48) (83.19) (69.53) - - (83.19) (69.53) * -
Australia 66.43 50.20 47.26 52.29 53.35 54.72 43.19 47.43 14.22 65.91
(6 6 .1 2 ) (53.33) (46.36) (58.44) (53.29) (60.70) (39.36) (52.94) (5.88) (56.75)
A ustria 40.06 39.93 41.41 38.35 41.41 38.35 - - - -
(37.07) (31.92) (31.95) (30.72) (31.95) (30.72) - - - -
Belgium 37.35 41.08 38.88 47.57 38.68 45.65 39.12 60.97 * -
(31.23) (38.85) (34.53) (45.78) (33.64) (44.93) (37.95) (60.97) - -
Brazil 23.84 30.36 28.86 31.53 30.29 31.24 26.31 29.34 - 14.53
(18.18) (26.76) (24.32) (28.06) (25.35) (26.91) (22.90) (34.59) - (0 .0 0 )
C anada 24.31 17.97 23.49 13.24 - - 23.49 13.24 - -
(18.46) (8.98) (14.53) (0 .0 0 ) - - (14.53) (0 .0 0 ) - -
Chile 48.19 48.76 61.97 45.15 - - 61.97 45.15 - -
(41.65) (48.38) (58.96) (44.88) - - (58.96) (44.88) - -
C hina 34.81 27.70 13.04 34.50 30.97 26.17 0 . 0 0 40.40 - -
(38.08) (19.00) (0 .0 0 ) (28.57) (2 2 .8 8 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (32.69) - -
C olom bia 41.29 49.72 0 . 0 0 59.66 - * - - 0 . 0 0 59.66
(38.46) (68.53) (0 .0 0 ) (71.56) - - - - (0 .0 0 ) (71.56)
D enm ark 24.38 19.04 22.60 18.87 - * 22.60 18.87 * -
(19.96) (16.95) (22.60) (16.87) - - (22.60) (16.87) * -
F inland 36.64 35.71 31.01 42.56 33.43 42.69 27.27 35.94 27.52 51.49
(34.53) (32.79) (28.57) (39.65) (30.68) (42.91) (27.25) (32.39) (2 2 .2 2 ) (38.75)
France 34.18 27.31 26.77 27.95 29.72 34.12 22.91 16.43 - -
(28.67) (29.46) (28.19) (32.45) (30.43) (36.31) (24.89) (14.11) - -
G erm any 44.76 36.33 37.87 33.75 38.51 35.35 43.22 33.41 1.72 28.76
(44.08) (37.02) (38.24) (32.16) (37.48) (32.63) (40.38) (31.26) (0 .0 0 ) (33.43)
G reece 53.07 33.65 33.65 - 33.65 - - - * -
(49.11) (29.23) (29.23) - (29.23) - - - - -
H o n g  K o n g 40.56 40.65 45.12 36.87 47.61 38.30 28.48 28.92 10.13 2.91
(40.24) (41.13) (46.34) (34.78) (48.00) (36.38) (21.97) (17.61) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 )
India 32.07 26.40 24.61 27.13 28.86 27.24 14.17 16.23 30.07 28.73
(26.35) (22.83) (21.40) (23.36) (26.89) (25.46) (13.63) (9.04) (30.46) (22.83)
Ireland 30.34 12.94 11.93 15.07 11.93 15.07 - - - -
(26.32) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - - -
Israel 24.22 - - - - - - - - -
(14.13) - * - r - - - - -
Italy 38.21 35.22 29.97 38.84 20.14 40.14 38.47 41.13 15.57 9.84
(34.84) (33.31) (27.88) (33.89) (0 .0 0 ) (32.39) (45.12) (36.17) (13.95) (10.24)
Japan 33.52 31.13 31.92 30.08 31.56 35.15 31.66 24.22 45.11 15.68
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C m m üï NCT, Cross-List Cross -List Level 1 OTC Level 273 Rule 144a
Pull Period Full Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Poft-List Pre-List Post-List Pcc-List Post-List
(27.47) (24.87) (26.82) (22.59) (26.22) (28.40) (27.66) (16.54) (39.21) (14.52)
Malaysia 36.73 35.92 36.47 34.54 36.47 34.54 - - - -
(30.98) (27.42) (28.88) (23.18) (28.88) (23.18) - - - -
M exico 19.21 27.53 27.97 27.24 40.42 40.61 23.20 20.83 31.37 41.31
(14.48) (20.91) (20.91) (20.70) (29.02) (50.25) (15.03) (18.75) (27.69) (24.13)
N etherlands 35.43 27.69 26.05 29.61 30.72 32.67 23.05 27.79 - -
(34.48) (32.22) (31.61) (32.79) (33.95) (31.98) (31.13) (33.00) - -
N orw ay 22.23 56.06 48.77 61.22 55.34 62.16 - 58.60 39.38 60.79
(18.86) (50.38) (40.62) (55.44) (52.08) (54.34) - (69.79) (33.93) (51.72)
N ew  Z ealand 48.51 60.83 73.02 31.57 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 97.37 78.92 - -
(48.00) (76.36) (84.41) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (93.68) (78.92) - -
Peru 19.56 41.52 39.32 43.20 - - 49.66 35.15 32.86 47.59
(0 .0 0 ) (44.75) (32.14) (45.07) - - (38.53) (44.75) (2 2 .2 1 ) (58.42)
Philippines 13.74 13.74 8 . 8 6 16.47 9.02 16.18 - - 5.95 17.18
(0 .0 0 ) (3.46) (0 .0 0 ) (6.61) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - (5.95) (7.89)
Poland 13.90 4.81 2.96 5.86 2.96 5.86 - - - -
(0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - - -
Portugal 35.24 39.38 28.27 46.78 18.43 21.37 47.96 47.47 42.76 56.59
(32.97) (47.56) (26.97) (50.20) (18.32) (13.92) (49.01) (47.85) (42.76) (55.97)
Russia - 23.07 0 . 0 0 28.83 - - 0 . 0 0 28.83 - -
- (3.54) (0 .0 0 ) (13.16) - - (0 .0 0 ) (13.16) - -
South  Africa 43.61 37.30 40.36 32.51 33.43 25.91 51.94 47.06 27.77 39.87
(38.68) (37.06) (38.99) (34.45) (35.42) (32.69) (47.00) (34.95) (2 1 .1 2 ) (37.63)
Singapore 42.36 36.54 41.53 32.59 41.49 33.79 - - 41.82 24.83
(37.90) (31.04) (36.69) (30.15) (36.96) (30.92) - - (26.17) (22.78)
South K orea 28.95 29.67 37.72 23.14 41.48 18.65 30.61 18.83 37.70 34.09
(24.03) (22.61) (36.52) (12.99) (33.68) (10.25) (30.91) (16.27) (42.30) (23.47)
Spain 36.35 43.21 53.37 29.88 27.34 5.34 61.58 34.81 37.96 32.19
(33.58) (43.27) (49.56) (41.85) (14.96) (0 .0 0 ) (52.57) (43.24) (37.16) (23.44)
Sw eden 35.22 31.65 40.22 27.11 39.63 27.63 42.98 25.71 0 . 0 0 37.17
(33.87) (33.51) (40.54) (30.61) (46.73) (35.51) (39.57) (28.92) (0 .0 0 ) (35.05)
Sw itzerland 14.62 28.24 29.73 25.87 35.68 33.63 25.44 23.61 2 2 . 1 2 20.19
(13.63) (31.51) (30.93) (32.15) (34.78) (35.00) (18.75) (30.13) (21.17) (16.48)
T aiw an 25.45 23.77 22.29 24.61 20.87 26.59 0.40 0 . 0 0 44.69 31.76
(2 2 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (22.56) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (41.08) (8.84)
T hailand 37.21 24.29 26.33 22.90 26.33 22.90 - - - -
(37.42) (22.89) (32.04) (19.74) (32.04) (19.74) - - - -
T urkey 34.48 - - - - - - - - -
(30.18) • - -, - - - - - *
U K 42.85 37.21 33.99 40.44 35.39 42.59 32.72 38.87 - -
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Couauy NCI. 
Full Period
Cross-List 
Full Period
Cross-List 
Pre-List Post-List
LsyîI 1 QTC
Pre-List Post-List
Level 2 /3  
Pre-List Post-List
Rule 144a 
Pre-List Post-List
(32.82) (34.46) (31.89) (39.18) (32.39) (40.57) (31.66) (36.79) - -
TOTAL 35.51 33.44 33.96 32.96 36.06 35.70 32.26 29.94 29.32 32.43
(30.69) (31.34) (31.92) (30.67) (33.92) (34.36) (30.52) (25.66) (23.98) (27.55)
In this table I outline mean (median) Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for non-cross-listed and cross-listed firms for the full sample period. All firm level data is sourced from 
Worldscope and Datastream. Dividends-to-Earnings (%) are defined in the appendix. For cross-listed firms, I calculate payout ratios for the pre and post-listing period. All 
information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 
144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  issues trade on U.S. exchanges. All payout ratios are 
calculated after removing the top 1 % of observations to remove possible outliers.
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Table 3.3(b): M edian D m dcnds-to -E arrungs payout differentials.
Country Cross-hist Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2 /3 M sLldrla
CL-NCJ. Pre-NCL Pn.st-NCT. Pre-NCI, Post-NCI, Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCI. Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCI, Post-Pre
A rgentina 71.48*** 83.19*** 69.53*** - - - 83.19*** 69.53*** (13.66) * - -
A ustralia (12.79)*** (19.7)*** (7.68)*** (12.83)*** (5.42)*** 7.41 (26.76)*** (13.18)*** 13.58 (60.24)*** (9.37) 50.87
A ustria (5.15) (5.12) (6.35) (5.12) (6.35) (1.23) - - - - - -
Belgium 7.62** 3.30 14.55** 2.41 13.70** 11.29 6.72 29.74 23.02 - -
Brazil 8.58*** 6.14* 9.88*** 7.17 8.73*** 1.56 4.72 16.41** 11.69 - (18.18) -
C anada (9.48)*** (3.93) (18.46)*** - - - (3.93) (18.46)*** (14.53) - - -
Chile 6.73 17.31* 3.23 - - - 17.31* 3.23 (14.08) - - -
China (19.08)** (38.1)*** (9.51) (15.20) (38.08) (2 2 .8 8 ) (38.08)*** (5.39) 32.69 - - *
C olom bia 30.07 (38.46) 33.10 - - - - - - (38.46) 33.10 71.56
D en m ark (3.01) 2.64 (3.09) - - * 2.64 (3.09) (5.73) * - -
F inland (1.74) (5.96)* 5.12* (3.85) 8.38* 12.23 (7.28)* (2.14) 5.14 (12.31) 4.22 16.53
France q 7 9 *** (0.48)** 3.78 1.76 7.64** 5.88 (3.78)*** (14.56)*** (10.78) - - -
G erm any (7.06)*** (5.84)*** (11.92)*** (6.60)* (11.45)** (4.85) (3.70) (12.82)** (9.12) (44.08)*** (10.65)* 33.43
G reece (19.88)*** (19.9)*** (49.11)*** (19.88)*** (49.11)*** (29.23) - - - - -
H o n g  K o n g 0.89 6.10** (5.46) 7.76*** (3.86) (11.62) (18.27) (22.63) (4.36) (40.24)*** (40.24)*** -
India (3.52)*** (4.95)*** (2.99)** 0.54 (0.89) (1.43) (12.72)*** (17.31)*** (4.59) 4.11 (3.52) (7.63)
Ireland (26.32)*** (26.3)*** (26.32)*** (26.32)*** (26.32)*** * - - * - - -
Israel - - - - - - - - - - - -
Italy (1.53) (6.96)** (0.95) (34.84)*** (2.45) 32.39 10.28 1.33 (8.95) (20.89)*** (24.60)*** (3.71)
Japan (2.60)*** (0.65) (4.88)*** (1.25) 0.93 2.18 0.19 (10.93)*** (1 1 .1 2 ) 11.74 (12.95)** (24.69)
Malaysia (3.56) (2 .1 0 ) (7.80) (2 .1 0 ) (7.80) (5.70) - - - - - -
M exico 6.43*** 6.43** 6.22** 14.54*** 35.77*** 21.23 0.55 4.27 3.72 13.21 9.65** (3.56)
N etherlands (2.26)*** (2.87)*** (1.69)** (0.53) (2.50) (1.97) (3.35)*** (1.48)** 1.87 - - -
N orw ay 31.52*** 21.76*** 36.58*** 33.22*** 35.48*** 2.26 - 50.93*** - 15.07*** 32.86*** 17.79
N ew  Z ealand 28.36 36.41* (48.00) (48.00)*** (48.00)*** 0 . 0 0 45.68*** 30.92 (14.76) - - -
P eru 44.75*** 32.14 45.07*** - - - 38.53 44.75** 6 . 2 2 2 2 .2 1 58.42*** 36.21
Phillipines 3.46 0 . 0 0 6.61 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - - 5.95 7.89** 1.94
Poland 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - - - - 0 . 0 0 -
Portugal 14.59 (6 .0 0 ) 17.23** (14.65)* (19.05) (4.40) 16.04 14.88* (1.16) 9.79 23.00*** 13.21
Russia - . - - - - 0 . 0 0 13.16 13.16 - 0 . 0 0 -
South  A frica (1.62)*** 0.31 (4.23)*** (3.26)*** (5.99)*** (2.73) 8.32*** (3.73) (12.05) (17.56)*** (1.05) 16.51
Singapore (6.86)** (1.21) (7.75)*** (0.94) (6.98)*** (6.04) - - (11.73) (15.12)** (3.39)
Sou th  K orea (1.42) 12.49*** (11.04)*** 9.65*** (13.78)*** (23.43) 6 . 8 8 (7.76) (14.64) 18.27 (0.56) (18.83)
Spain 9.69** 15.98*** 8.27 (18.62) (33.58)** (14.96) 18.99*** 9.66 (9.33) 3.58 (10.14) (13.72)
Sw eden (0.36) 6.67* (3.26)*** 1 2 . 8 6 1.64 (11.22) 5.70** (4.95)*** (10.65) (33.87)** 1.18 35.05
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Country C io s s ü s t Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2 /3 Rule 144a
CL-NLL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Pre-NCL PoSthlCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL PostM CL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre
Switzerland 17.88*** 17.30*** 18.52*** 21.15*** 21.37*** 0 . 2 2 5.12** 16.50*** 11.38 7.54*** 2.85 (4.69)
Taiwan (2 2 .0 0 )** (2 2 .0 0 )** (2 2 .0 0 )** (2 2 .0 0 ) 0.56 22.56 (2 2 .0 0 )*** (2 2 .0 0 )*** 0 . 0 0 19.08*** (13.16) (32.24)
Thailand (14.53)*** (5.38)** (17.68)*** (5.38)** (17.68)*** (12.30) - - - - * -
Turkey - - - - - - - - - - - -
U K 1.64*** (0.93)*** 6.36 (0.43)*** 7.75 8.18 (1.16)*** 3.97** 5.13 - - -
TOTAL 0.65*** 1.23 (0 .0 2 )*** 3.23*** 3.67** 0.44 (0.17)*** (5.03)*** (4.86) (6.71)*** (3.14)*** 3.57
In this table, I calculate for each ADR Level the M edian dividend payout difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period. Dividend-to-Eamings is 
employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix. Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing. I test the equality o f medians 
between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic). *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. All firm level data is sourced 
from Worldscope and Datastream. AH information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP 
Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on U.S. exchanges.
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Table 3.4(a): Dividend-to-Cashflow for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms
Country NCI. Cross-List Cm ^s-Iisi Level 1 OTC Level lH Rule 144a
Bull Period Full Eeriod Pre-List Post-List Prr-1 .isr Pftft-Ust ITc-jjsi Post-List P r e - l is t Pl><t-I ist
A rgentina 11.07 27.52 20.51 30.12 - - 20.51 30.12 - -
(0 .0 0 ) (19.35) (25.40) (18.29) - * (25.40) (18.29) - -
A ustralia 51.71 27.83 28.48 27.43 31.37 28.41 28.01 26.09 6.13 26.23
(41.23) (26.45) (21.15) (28.66) (23.58) (29.41) (22.31) (28.38) (4.92) (20.89)
A ustria 16.86 15.16 10.90 19.58 10.90 19.58 - - - -
(10.62) (13.56) (10.32) (17.07) (10.32) (17.07) - - - -
Belgium 15.72 14.62 13.80 17.13 15.28 18.64 11.83 6.57 - -
(12.35) (13.33) (12.33) (18.70) (13.81) (19.71) (11.94) (6.57) - -
Brazil 13.72 14.24 13.16 15.01 15.03 16.02 10.19 14.85 - 5.35
(4.21) (10.23) (8.26) (1 0 .6 6 ) (8.83) (10.58) (7.69) (13.00) > (0 .0 0 )
Canada 14.83 9.15 11.98 6.72 - - 11.98 6.72 * -
(9.48) (5.26) (7.61) (1.91) - - (7.61) (1.91) - *
Chile 38.99 39.64 57.35 34.14 - - 57.35 34.14 - -
(30.53) (30.21) (56.96) (24.11) - * (56.96) (24.11) - -
China 19.99 14.67 7.37 17.95 18.97 14.06 0 . 0 0 20.54 - -
(15.89) (4.94) (0 .0 0 ) (14.80) (15.89) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (16.33) - -
C olom bia 32.31 24.86 0 . 0 0 29.00 • - - - 0 . 0 0 29.00
(29.04) (32.73) (0 .0 0 ) (33.72) • - - - (0 .0 0 ) (33.72)
D enm ark 16.43 13.05 15.94 12.92 - - 15.94 12.92 - -
(9.95) (12.16) (15.94) (11.90) - - (15.94) (11.90) - -
Finland 19.84 15.61 13.15 18.75 13.26 17.18 12.49 23.01 15.17 17.04
(15.94) (15.29) (11.94) (18.28) (8.04) (16.16) (11.29) (23.40) (14.96) (15.88)
France 18.19 13.08 12.33 13.92 14.00 16.77 9.97 8.58 * -
(13.36) (11.71) (1 0 .8 6 ) (13.75) (12.83) (16.23) (9.05) (3.26) - -
G erm any 16.25 1 1 .0 1 9.93 12.76 8.36 9.42 13.03 18.00 0.305 13.63
(13.04) (10.04) (1 0 .0 2 ) (10.64) (7.17) (7.65) (12.27) (18.52) (0 .0 0 ) (7.49)
G reece 40.30 2 0 . 0 2 - 2 0 . 0 2 - 2 0 . 0 2 - - * *
(34.84) (20.61) - (20.61) - (20.61) - - - '
H o n g  K ong 38.71 31.81 36.06 28.09 37.91 29.19 12.78 7.87 30.63 8.98
(31.90) (28.66) (33.38) (25.97) (35.13) (26.92) (8.74) (1 .6 8 ) (4.52) (10.07)
India 24.28 17.75 16.90 18.09 15.68 19.01 11.87 21.56 21.79 16.37
(18.44) (15.37) (13.27) (16.16) (13.32) (17.83) (1 1 .0 2 ) (8.90) (17.28) (15.65)
Ireland 22.38 10.37 11.24 8.65 11.24 8.65 - * - -
(19.42) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - - -
Israel 20.63 - - - - - * - - -
(8.58) - - - - - - * - -
Italy 18.52 13.68 8 . 1 2 17.21 6.54 17.32 9.61 18.47 4.03 3.66
(12.90) (12.38) (7.09) (14.98) (6.43) (17.17) (8.98) (14.82) (5.49) (3.38)
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Counrrv NCT. Cross-List Cross List Level 1 OTC Level 2 /3 Rule 144a
Full Period Full Period Eie-Lisi Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List
Jap an 13.63 12.41 14.45 10.51 15.21 12.37 13.65 8.48 10.56 10.50
(10.69) (10.23) (11.50) (7.40) (11.62) (10.23) (11.51) (5.85) (10.56) (1 0 .0 2 )
Malaysia 31.15 25.10 27.13 20.52 27.13 20.52 - - - -
(22.39) (20.41) (21.70) (19.46) (21.70) (19.46) - - » -
M exico 10.60 15.87 15.13 16.36 26.51 26.63 11.51 13.07 14.38 14.10
(0 .0 0 ) (10.08) (9.78) (10.23) (20.14) (20.44) (8 .2 2 ) (7.53) (12.48) (9.38)
N etherlands 20.63 13.62 12.92 14.43 15.32 19.70 11.34 11.32 - -
(18.71) (14.65) (14.65) (14.63) (15.84) (21.94) (13.28) (11.69) - -
N orw ay 14.33 33.42 29.34 36.22 33.29 42.28 19.45 31.29 -, 8  8 8
(9.35) (32.08) (25.36) (33.54) (29.42) (35.71) (17.13) (24.87) - (0 .0 0 )
N ew  Z ealand 34.22 42.52 54.64 16.25 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 71.03 32.49 - -
(27.17) (29.37) (52.55) (10.48) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (56.20) (23.69) - -
Peru 17.01 21.31 13.69 25.66 - - 8.08 13.79 17.70 31.60
(0 .0 0 ) (11.82) (4.07) (16.27) - - (2.75) (14.72) (5.38) (32.23)
Philippines 1 2 .8 6 8.64 4.55 10.73 4.49 7.86 - - 5.68 18.50
(0 .0 0 ) (2.43) (0 .0 0 ) (4.18) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - (5.68) (6.94)
Poland 7.12 5.48 10.79 3.03 10.79 3.03 - - - -
(0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) - - - -
Portugal 21.07 30.18 13.05 40.62 1 0 .2 2 0.0468 12.97 52.96 25.88 27.51
(13.22) (18.82) (12.42) (2 1 .1 2 ) (7.45) (0.0468) (9.96) (19.08) (25.88) (26.45)
Russia . 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 2.42 - - 0 . 0 0 2.42 - »
- (2.28) (0 .0 0 ) (2.34) - - (0 .0 0 ) (2.34) - -
Sou th  Africa 38.04 27.69 32.53 20.14 22.52 18.13 49.51 26.28 15.52 19.10
(28.37) (22.91) (25.00) (21.16) (21.67) (21.19) (41.04) (21.30) (6 .0 1 ) (16.49)
Singapore 36.51 24.85 30.35 20.08 31.54 21.36 - - 20.89 12.52
(25.67) (15.71) (17.37) (15.67) (19.92) (15.82) - - (12.84) (10.92)
South  K orea 9.59 8.65 12.08 6.37 9.85 9.88 9.75 5.38 16.96 3.20
(5.96) (4.33) (1 0 .2 1 ) (3.24) (6.85) (1 .8 8 ) (8 .0 1 ) (4.47) (12.33) (1.76)
Spain 21.72 16.37 19.74 12.08 21.87 2.40 18.01 14.63 31.84 8.89
(17.69) (15.35) (15.80) (13.04) (9.80) (0 .0 0 ) (15.70) (17.57) (30.99) (10.17)
Sw eden 25.48 17.51 18.20 17.18 19.14 15.08 18.92 16.67 0 . 0 0 26.52
(19.84) (17.52) (18.04) (17.52) (21.74) (17.49) (15.98) (16.48) (0 .0 0 ) (25.79)
Sw itzerland 16.09 20.59 18.17 24.08 2 2 . 0 2 29.80 17.36 18.03 11.09 25.95
(8.17) (19.47) (17.00) (20.95) (22.77) (22.38) (14.35) (20.27) (10.82) (2 1 .1 2 )
T aiw an 18.84 17.15 17.73 16.85 11.39 13.36 0.3245 0 . 0 0 41.76 24.46
(17.06) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (11.77) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .0 0 ) (36.99) (12.35)
Thailand 24.27 17.11 17.57 16.83 17.57 16.83 * - - -
(17.86) (1 2 .2 0 ) (14.22) (9.01) (14.22) (9.01) - - -
Turkey 23.81 - - - - - - - -
(13.96) - - - - - - - - -
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CrumiTv NCL Qassrli&t Cioas-I.ist Level 1 OTC Level 2 /3 Rule 144a
FuIListiod Eull Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List I’pft-Lifl Pre-List Poiii-lrisi
U K 33.42 25.63 23.66 27.50 22.19 28.99 24.96 26.36 - -
(25.43) (23.75) (20.27) (27.32) (20.58) (28.81) (19.92) (25.84) - -
TO TAL 22.04 19.30 19.54 19.09 21.11 21.16 17.93 17.13 18.63 17.74
(14.55) (15.12) (14.54) (15.86) (16.18) (19.01) (13.19) (12.75) (10.83) (13.14)
In this table I outline mean (median) Dividends-to-Cash flow (%) for non-cross-listed and cross-listed firms for the full sample period. All firm level data is sourced from 
Worldscope and Datastream. Dividends-to-Cash flow (%) are defined in the appendix. For cross-listed firms, I calculate payout ratios for the pre and post-listing periods. All 
information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. All 
payout ratios are calculated after removing the top 1 % o f observations to remove possible outliers.
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Table 3.4(b): M edian D ividends-to-C ashflow  payout differentials.
C ro ssJjs t Cross-List 1 Level 1 PT C Level 2/3 RukAM a
CL-NCL Pre-NCI, Post-NCI. Pre-NCL Post-NCI. Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL PostiPre Pre-NCL Posr-NCI. Post-Pre
A rgentina 19.35*** 25.40* 18.29*** - - - 25.40* 18.29*** (7.11) - - -
A ustralia (14.78)*** (2 0 .1)*** (12.57)*** (17.65)*** (11.82)*** 5.83 (18.92)*** (12.85)*** 6.07 (36.31)*** (20.34)** 15.97
A ustria 2.94*** (0.30) 6.45*** (0.30) 6.45*** 6.75 - - - - * -
Belgium 0.98* (0 .0 2 ) 6.35** 1.46 7.36*** 5.90 (0.41) (5.78) (5.37) - ~ -
Brazil 6 .0 2 *** 4.05 6.45*** 4.62 6.37*** 1.75 3.48 8.79** 5.31 - (4.21) -
Canada (4.22)*** (1.87) (7.57)*** - - (1.87) (7.57)*** (5.70) - - -
Chile (0.32) 26.43** (6.42) - - 26.43** (6.42) (32.85) - - -
C hina (10.95)** (15.9)*** (1.09) 0 . 0 0 (15.9) (15.9) (15.9)*** 0.44 16.33 - - -
C olom bia 3.69 (29.04) 4.68 - - - - - - (29.04) 4.68
D en m ark 2 .2 1 5.99 1.95 - (9.95) - 5.99 1.95 (4.04) - - -
Finland (0.65) (4.00)*** 2.34 (7.90)** 0 . 2 2 8 . 1 2 (4.65)* 7.46** 1 2 .1 1 (0.98) (0.06) 0.92
France (1.65)*** (2.50)*** 0.39 (0.53) 2.87 3.40 (4.31)*** (1 0 .1 0 )*** (5.79) - - -
G erm any (3.00)*** (3.02)*** (2.40)* (5.87)*** (5.39)*** 0.48 (0.77) 5.48* 6.25 (13.04)*** (5.55) 7.49
G reece (14.23)* - (14.23)* - (14.23)* - - • - - - -
Flong  K ong (3.24)* 1.48 (5.93)*** 3.23 (4.98)** (8 .2 1 ) (23.16)*** (30.22)*** (7.06) (27.38)*** (21.83)* 5.55
India (3.07)*** (5.17)*** (2.28)*** (5.12)*** (0.61) 4.51 (7.42)*** (9.54)*** (2 .1 2 ) (1.16) (2.79)*** (1.63)
Ireland (19.42)*** (19.4)*** (19.42)*** (19.42)*** (19.42)*** 0 . 0 0 * - - - - -
Israel - - - ■ - - - - - - - -
Italy (0.52) (5.81)*** 2.08 (6.47)*** 4.27* 10.74 (3.92)*** 1.92* 5.84 (7.41)*** (9.52)*** (2 .1 1 )
Japan (0.46)* 0.81** (3.29)*** 0.93*** (0.46) (1.39) 0.82 (4.84)*** (5.66) (0.13) (0.67) (0.54)
Malaysia (1.98)* (0.69) (2.93)* (0.69) (2.93)* (2.24) - - - * - -
M exico 10.08*** 9.78*** 10.23*** 20.14*** 20.44*** 0.30 8 .2 2 * 7.53* (0.69) 12.48 9.38* (3.10)
N etherlands (4.06)*** (4.06)*** (4.08)*** (2.87)*** 3.23 6 . 1 0 (5.43)*** (7.02)*** (1.59) - - -
N orw ay 22.73*** 16.01*** 24.19*** 20.07*** 26.36*** 6.29 7.78 15.52*** 7.74 - (9.35) -
N e w  Z ealand 2 . 2 0 25.38 (16.69)* (27.17)*** (27.17)*** 0 . 0 0 29.03*** (3.48) (32.51) - - -
Peru 11.82*** 4.07 16.27*** - - - 2.75 14.72* 11.97 5.38 32.23*** 26.85
Philippines 2.43 0 . 0 0 4.18 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - - - 5.68 6.94** 1.26
P oland 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - - - - - -
P ortugal 5.60* (0.80) 7.90** (5.77) (13.17) (7.40) (3.26) 5.86** 9.12 1 2 .6 6 13.23** 0.57
Russia - - - - - - - - - - - »
South  Africa (5.46)*** (3.37)** (7.21)*** (6.70)*** (7.18)*** (0.48) 12.67*** (7.07)* (19.74) (22.36)*** (1 1 .8 8 )*** 10.48
Singapore (9.96)*** (8.30)** (1 0 .0 0 )*** (5.75)* (9.85)*** (4.10) - - - (12.83)* (14.75)*** (1.92)
Sou th  K orea (1.63) 4.25*** (2.72)*** 0.89* (4.08)*** (4.97) 2.05 (1.49) (3.54) 6.37** (4.20)*** (10.57)
Spain (2.34) (1.89) (4.65)** (7.89) (17.69)*** (9.80) (1.99) (0 .1 2 ) 1.87 13.30 (7.52) (20.82)
Sw eden (2.32)*** (1.80)* (2.32)*** 1.90 (2.35) (4.25) (3.86) (3.36)*** 0.50 (19.84)** 5.95 25.79
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Crnss-T.kt Cross-List L m T L O T C I ¿-vii 2/3 Rule 144a
CL-NCL Pre-NCI. Post-NCI. PreJMCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre
Sw itzerland 11.30*** 8.83*** 12.78*** 14.60*** 14.21*** (0.39) 6.18*** 1 2 .1 0 ** 5.92 2.65 12.95*** 10.30
Taiw an (17.06)*** (17.06)** (17.06)** (17.06)** (5.29) 11.77 (17.06)** (17.06)** 0 . 0 0 19.93*** (4.71) (24.64)
T hailand (5.66) (3.64) (8.85) (3.64) (8.85) (5.21) - - - - - -
Turkey - - - - - - - - - - -
U K (1 .6 8 )*** (5.16)*** 1.89 (4.85)*** 3.38 8.23 (5.51)*** 0.41** 5.92 - - -
TOTAL 0.57*** (0 .0 1 )** 1.31* 1.63*** 4.46*** 2.83 (1.36)*** (1.80)*** (0.44) (3.72)*** (1.41)** 2.31
In this table, I calculate for each ADR Level the M edian  dividend payout difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period. Dividend-to-Cashflow 
is employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix. Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing. I test the equality o f medians 
between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic). *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. All firm level data is sourced 
from Worldscope and Datastream. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP 
Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on U.S. exchanges.
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Table 3.5: Testing for the presence o f a firm effect.
Variiihle. OT.S Whitediuba
119801
Rnpers H 9911
[Clustered by 
firm]
Fixed
Effects
(  SF Rogcn
SF
O T C 1.16*** 1.06*** 1.81*** 1 . 8 6 1.5603
E X C H 1  4 3 *** j  32*** 2  7 3 *** 2.33 1.9091
P O R T A L 2.25*** 2.24*** 4.42* 5.15 1.9644
M BA 0.0823*** 0.0766*** 0.1129** 0.1038 1.3718
R O E 0.0148*** 0.0147*** 0.0217*** 0.0162 1.4662
L n (Total 0.1934*** 0.1945*** 0.3513*** 0.4499 1.8164
Assets)
D eb t 0.0015 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0.0015 0.1333
F C F 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 1 *** 0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0.00013 2.0000
A D R  D iv 2 .2 1 *** 2.16*** 2.70*** 2.19 1.2217
SF Holers 
V J
1.7075
2.0682
1.9732
1.4739
1.4762
1.8062
2.0000
2.0000
1.2500
In this Table, I test for the presence of a firm effect in tire data using Petersens (2005) approach. Specifically, I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £ it =  +  T|jt, X it =  71 j +  Vit. I outline standard errors
generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White (1980) 
standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm and (4) 
firm fixed effects. In the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
Table 3.6: Testing for the presence of a time effect.
Variable Q1.S Wlrite-Huber
119801
Ropers 119933 
[Clustered by 
ysad
( S F  'I°  ‘- ‘Rogcn
S FV £)LS /
{ S h t o Rc.s )
I S B * * ,  J
O T C 1.16 1.06 1.35 1.1638 1.2736
E X C H 1.43 1.32 1 . 2 1 0.8462 0.9167
P O R T A L 2.25 2 .24 1.64 0.7289 0.7321
M BA 0.0823 0.0766 0.0829 1.0073 1.0822
R O E 0.0148 0.0147 0.0344 2.3243 2.3401
L n  (Total Assets) 0.1934 0.1945 0.1945 1.0057 1 . 0 0 0 0
D e b t 0.0015 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0667 1 . 0 0 0 0
F C F 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0
A D R  D iv 2 . 2 1 2.16 1.75 0.7919 0.8102
In this Tabic, I test for the presence of a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the independent 
variables and residuals are characterised by the following: Eit +  TJir > X it. =  |Xt +  V it . I outline standard errors generated 
by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White (1980) standard errors 
i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by time. In the remaining 
columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
Table 3.7: Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects.
Variable Ol.S Whitp-Hllher
(1980)
Rogers 119931 SE Rogers
V S^OLS J
SE Rogers
SE white y
OTC 
EXCH 
PORTAL 
MBA 
ROE 
Ln (Total Assets) 
Debt 
FCF 
ADR Div
1.16
1.43
2.25
0.0823
0.0148
0.1934
0.0015
0.0001
2.21
1.06
1.32
2.24
0.0766
0.0147
0.1945
0.0001
0.0001
2.16
1.80
2.72
4.38
0.1136
0.0217
0.3515
0.00016
0.00014
2.75
1.5517
1.9021
1.9467
1.3803
1.4662
1.8175
0.1067
1.4000
1.2443
1.6981
2.0606
1.9554
1.4830
1.4762
1.8072
1.6000
1.4000
1.2731
In this Table, I compare Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects. I compare these to standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), and (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. In the remaining columns, I compare Rogers (1993) 
standard errors to both (1) and (2).
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics for all firms (Covariates scaled by N et Sales)
Full Sample 
(N=3,418)
Cross-Listed
(N=496)
Non-Cross-Listed
(N=2,922)
Tests o f Difference 
(CL vs. NCI.)
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean M etinn Mean Median
Div-to-Earnings 37.83 31.01 34.21 30.00 38.19 31.12 6.15*** 7.20***
Div-to-Cashflow 20.26 14.53 18.24 15.25 20.49 14.46 5.89*** 2.45**
MBA 2.59 1.69 3.21 1.89 2.52 1 .6 6 -11.65*** -8.56***
ROE 1 2 . 0 2 9.93 1 1 . 8 6 1 1 . 8 8 12.04 9.77 0.52 -4.65***
Debt 217.54 0.2151 1.58 0.3514 238.57 0.2048 0.31 -20.78***
Total Assets (Log) 13.26 13.37 13.91 14.14 13.31 13.31 -25.03*** -25.43***
Earnings Volatility 7074.83 0.3710 11813.56 0.1078 6495 0.4728 -3.75*** 11.51***
Free Cash Flow 25.92 0.08 3.69 1 .1 28.46 0.07 0.53 -50.50***
ADR Dividend 0.0073 0 0.1506 0 - - - -
COGS 3268.17 0.7339 0.6550 0.6777 3619.66 0.7394 6.53*** 16.92***
Common Law 0.1755 0 0.4138 0 0.1696 0 -39.18*** -38.99***
Civil Law 0.3270 0 0.5861 0 0.3206 0 -34.52*** -34.39***
1
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics for Exchange-listed and non-Exchangc listed firms.
Cross-Listed Level 1 OTC Level 2 /3  Exchange Rule 144a Portal Tests o f Diff. Tests o f  Diff. Tests o f  Diff.
(N==496) <N==234) (N= 2 1 2 ) (N==50) (Exch vs. O T Q (Exch vs. Port) (OTC vs. Port)
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean/fMcdl Mean /fMedl Mean /(Medi
Div-to-Earn 34.21 30.00 36.03 33.10 31.98 25.35 34.64 27.56 3 2 2 *** -1.18 0.70
(6.17)*** (-1.64) (2.29)**
Dividen ds-to-CF 18.24 15.25 2 0 . 2 0 18.32 16.16 12.07 17.68 13.00 -1.45 2 4 3***
(8.64)*** (-1.54) (3.84)***
MBA 3.21 1.89 3.00 1 .8 8 3.87 2 . 2 0 1.71 1.11 -5.38*** 8.18*** 6.26***
(-5.53)*** (12.58)*** 9^ 74)***
ROE 1 1 . 8 6 1 1 . 8 8 12.05 12.32 1 2 .1 1 1 2 . 1 0 10.03 9.35 -0.67 1.57 1.75*
(-0.18) (3.09)*** (3.22)***
Debt 1.58 0.3514 0.8399 0.3056 2 . 6 6 0.3626 0.6989 0.6080 -0.90 0.44 0.38
(-1.67)* (-7.67)*** (-8.45)***
Total Assets (Log) 13.91 14.14 13.78 13.96 14.12 14.47 13.79 13.79 -5.87*** 3.79*** -0.07
(-5.99)*** (4.25)*** (0.44)
Earnings Vol. 11813.5 0.1078 13511 0.0995 8542.74 0.085 17371 0.7263 1.34 -1.43 -0.54
(-0.91) (-5.22)*** (-5.63)***
Free Cash Flow 3.69 1 .1 5.37 1.18 2.04 0.975 2.56 1.25 1.33 -1.35 0.55
(2.90)*** (-2.45)*** (-0.72)
ADR Dividend 0.1506 0 0.1812 0 0 . 1 2 1 2 0 0.1272 0 4.86*** -0.32 2.55**
(4.84)*** (-0.325) (2.55)**
COGS 0.6550 0.6777 0.6927 0.7195 0.5943 0.6145 0.7237 0.7418 8.25*** -5.53*** -2.57**
(15.02)*** (-11.89)*** (-2.93)***
Common Law 0.4138 0 0.5250 1 0.2967 0 0.3714 0 13.83*** -2.84*** 5.51***
(13.46)*** (-2.84)*** (5.47)***
Civil Law 0.5861 0 0.1812 0 0 . 1 2 1 2 0 0.1272 0 -13.83*** 2.84*** -5.51***
(-13.46)*** (2.84)*** (-5.47)***
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Table 3.10: T o b it analysis o f  dividend policy o f  cross-listed firms — D iv idend-to -E arn ings 
Variable________ Sign_____________________________________ Bggjgd T.LlLjI________________
[1] dy /  dx P] dy !  dx [3] dy /  dx dy 1 dx
ore: + /- -1 .2 2 -0.6742 -9.28 -5.12 -9.25 -5.10 -10.57 -5.79
[-0.59] [-4.2]*** [-4.2]*** [-4.8]***
EXCH + /- -7.38 -3.93 -19.96 -10.32 -19.84 -10.27 -20.07 -10.38
[-2.4]** [-5.4]*** [-5 3]*** [-5.5]***
PORTAL + /- -0.78 -0.43 -8.16 -4.51 -8.61 -4.74 -9.15 -5.03
[-0.15] [-1.56] [-1.60] [-1.71]*
Intercept 24.56 - -41.37 - -44.17 - -45.86 -
[5.44]*** [-1 0 ]*** [_5 3]*** [-5.6]***
MBA - . - -0.67 -0.39 -0.67 -0.38 -0.69 -0.40
[_4 3]*** [-4.3]*** [-4.4]***
ROE + - * 0.06 0.036 0.06 0.037 0.06 0.032
[2 .1]** [2 .1 ]** [2 .2 ]**
Log(Total + - - 6.32 3.66 6.29 3.65 6 . 1 2 3.58
Asset) [4.55]*** [6.46]*** [6.38]***
ADR + /- 16.71 10.65 16.59 10.56 16.85 10.75
Dividend [5.4]*** [5.26]*** [5.38]***
Anti-Director + * , 5.63 3.19 _ _
[3.77]***
Common Law + • - - - - - 5.65 3.32
|4.28]***
Industry Yes _ Yes _ Yes _ Yes _
Effects
Time Effects No - No - No - N o -
Observations 29691 - 21116 - 21116 - 21116 *
Censored Obs 5541 - 3312 - 3312 - 3312 -
Log -131195 - -94759 - -94734 - -94724 -
Likelihood
In this tabic I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates o f  the effect o f cross listing on the ordinar)'
dividend payouts o f cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. Dividends-to-Earnings is employed as the
dependent variable. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 
countries over the period from 1990-2002. Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and 
are defined in the Appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each specification T report results 
for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR 
[EXCH], or on the Portal under Rule 144a [PORTAL]. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are 
also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations. Z-stats reported for die Pooled Tobit. In 
columns 1-4 I include but do no t report the estimates o f the firm level means. In all but one specification, an F-Test 
suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. The marginal effects are calculated at die mean of the 
independent variables. For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the 
dummy variable x changes from 0  to 1 .
109
Table 3.11: Tobit Analysis o f dividend policy by legal origin -  Dividend-to-Earnings.
Variable Sign I’oukil Tobit
PI dy /  dx P] dy /  dx [3] dy j  dx [4] dy 1 dx
OTC*AD + /- -5.60 -3.01 -1 1 .1 1 -6.03 -7.11 -3.95 -10.37 -5.66
[-1.31] [-2.47]** [-1.53] [-2 .2 ]**
EXCH* AD + /- -6.45 -3.44 -22.42 -11.34 -18.41 -9.54 -21.09 -10.76
[-1 .2 2 ] [-3.2]*** [-2 .6 ]*** [-3.0]***
PORTAL*AD + /- 8.62 4.90 1.03 0.60 4.96 2.97 1.99 1.17
[0.74] [0.16] [0.77] [0.342]
Intercept 25.38 - -20.30 - -22.27 - -25.91 -
[5.63]*** [-4.6]*** [-0.82] [-0.95]
MBA - - - -0 . 6 6 -0.39 -0 .6 6 -0.39 -0 . 6 8 -0.39
[_4.3]*** [-4.2]*** [_4.3]***
ROE + - - 0.06 0.035 0.06 0.035 0.06 0.032
[2.04]** [2.3]** [2.3]**
Log(Total + - * 5.65 3.28 5.63 3.27 5.51 3.19
Asset) [5.84]*** [5.81]*** [5.71]***
ADR Dividend + /- » . 8.48 5.16 7.85 4.76 7.76 4.71
[2.85]*** [2.63]*** [2.63]**
Anti-Director + - - - - 4.71 2 . 6 8 - -
[3.02]***
Common Law + - - - - - - 4.85 2.84
13.69]***
Industry Yes Yes . Yes _ Yes
Effects
Time Effects No - No - No - No
Observations 29691 . 21116 - 21116 - 21116
Censored Obs 5541 3312 - 3312 - 3312
Log Likelihood -131210 - -94820 - -94804 * -94794
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates o f the effect o f  cross listing on die
ordinary dividend payouts o f  cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. Dividends-to-Earnings are employed as 
die dependent variable. The final sample is comprised o f  496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms 
from 40 countries over the period from 1990-2002. Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and 
Datastream and are defined in the Appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each 
specification I report results for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 
2 /3  Exchange Listed ADR [EX C H ], or on the Portal under Rule 144a [PORTAL]. In this specification I interact 
the ADR Dummies with an investor rights measure developed by LLSV [1998]. The ADR measure is 1 if  the firm is 
domiciled in a country where investors are poorly protected [AD<3]. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 
1% level, respectively. The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the 
errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations. Z-stats reported for the 
Pooled Tobit. In columns 1-4 I include bu t do no t report the estimates o f the firm level means. In all but one 
specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. . For the dummy variables the 
marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 3,12: Tobit Analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms - Dividend-to-Cashflow.
Variable Suai Pooled Tobit
[1 ] dy /  dx [2 ] dy 1 dx P] dy 1 dx [4] dy 1 dx
OTC + /- 1.91
[1,63]
1.08 -0.18
[-0.15]
-0.1065 -0 .2 1
[-0.18]
-0.1254 -2 .2 1
[-1.96]**
-1.28
EXCH + /- -3.33
[-2 .1 1 ]**
-1.79 -7.22
[-3.6]***
-3.93 -7.12
[-3.5]***
-3.88 -7.05
[-3.7]***
-3.88
PORTAL + /- -0.51
[-0.17]
-0.28 -1.84
[-0 .6 6 ]
-1.06 -2.38
[-0 .8 6 ]
-1.36 -3.34
[-1.15]
-1.91
Intercept 17.90
[5.29]***
- 2.09
[0.43]
- -0.92
[-0.19]
- -5.27
[-1 .1 2 ]
MBA ~ ■ ■ 0.0952
[1.36]
0.0559 0.1066
[1.54]
0.0628 0.0410
[0.61]
0.0243
ROE + - 0.0850
[5.72]***
0.0499 0.0864
[5.85]***
0.5087 0.0784
[5.42]***
0.0466
Log (Total 
Asset)
+
‘
1.37
[4.66]***
0.8085 1.40
[4.42]***
0.8255 1.03
[4.21]***
0.6131
ADR
Dividend
+ /- - * 6.71
[4.30]***
4.23 6.62
[4.26]***
4.18 6.87
[4.55]***
4.39
Anti-Director + - - - - 6.37
[7.98]***
3.58 * -
Common Law + - - - ~ * 9.66 
111.69]***
5.90
Industry
Effects
Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes -
Time Effects No - No - No - No -
Observations 27829 - 19769 - 19769 - 19769 -
Censored Obs 4486 - 2581 - 2581 - 2581 -
Log
Likelihood
-111761 -79922 -79810 -79546
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates o f die effect o f cross listing on the ordinary
dividend payouts o f cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. Dividends-to-Cashfiow is employed as the 
dependent variable. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 
countries over the period from 1990-2002. Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and 
are defined in the Appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each specification I report results 
for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-die-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR 
[EX C H ], or on the Portal under Rule 144a [PORTAL], *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are 
also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations. Z-stats reported for the Pooled T ob it In 
columns 1-4 1 include but do no t report the estimates o f the firm level means. In all but one specification, an F-Test 
suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1 % level. The marginal effects are calculated at die mean o f the 
independent variables. For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the 
dummy variable x changes fiom 0  to 1 .
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Table 3.13: Tobit Analysis o f Dividend Policy by legal origin -  Dividend-to-Cashfjow.
Variable1 Sien Ponied Tobit
p i dy /  dx P] dy /  dx [3] dy 1 dx [4] dy /  dx
OTC* AD + /- -2.40
[-0.97]
-1.30 -3.86
[-1.41]
-2.17 1.47
[0.53]
0 . 8 8 -2.39
[-0.83]
-1.38
EXCH* AD + /- -4.87
[-1 .8 6 ]*
-2.57 -10.72
[_3.4]***
-5.57 -5.38
[-1.69]*
-2.98 -7.99
[-2.55]**
-4.32
PORTAL*AD + /- -6.14
[-1.84]*
-3.19 -3.43
[-1.38]
-1.94 1.73
[0 .6 8 ]
1.04 -1.33
[-0.55]
-0.78
Intercept 15.78
[4.69]***
- 17.29
[1.26]
* 14.59
[1.06]
' 5.85
[0.43]
*
MBA * - ■ 0.0926
[1.31]
0.0544 0.0965
[1.38]
0.0568 0.0384
[0.56]
0.0228
ROE + - - 0.0832
[5,6]***
0.0488 0.0842
[5.7]***
0.0496 0.0774
[5.35]***
0.0460
Log(Total
Asset)
+ 1 .2 0
[4.11]***
0.7041 1 .2 2
[3.89]***
0.7151 0.8117
[3.99]***
0.4820
ADR Dividend + /- - - 5.65
[3.79]***
3.52 4.79
[3.22]***
2.97 4.33
[3.02]***
2.69
Anti-Director + - ■ ■ * 6.29
[7.53]***
3.53 “
Common Law + ■ ■ * ■ * ■’* 9.49
[11.59]***
5.80
Industry
Effects
Yes - Yes * Yes - Yes *
Time Effects No - No - No - No -
Observations 27829 - 19769 - 19769 - 19769 •
Censored Obs 4486 - 2581 - 2581 - 2581 -
Log Likelihood -111770 - -79939 - -79839 - -79573 -
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates o f the effect o f  cross listing on the ordinary
dividend payouts o f cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. Dividends-to-Cashflow is employed as the 
dependent variable. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 
countries over the period from 1990-2002. Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and 
are defined in die Appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each specification I report results 
for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR 
[EXCH], or on the Portal under Rule 144a [PORTAL]. In diis specification I interact the ADR Dummies with an 
investor rights measure developed by LLSV [1998]. The ADR measure is 1 if the firm is domiciled in a country where 
investors are poorly protected [AD<3]. *, **, *** Indicate significance at die 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. The 
pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by 
firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations, Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit. In columns 1-4 we 
include but do not report the estimates o f  the firm level means. In all but one specification, an F-Test suggests that they 
are joindy significant at the 1% level. . For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change 
in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 3.14: Befoie/After closely held shares for cross-listed firms.
Level 1 O l'C Level 2 /3  Exchange Rule 144a Poüid
Median CHS Median. CHS Median CHS
- 2 85,116 37,604 15,476
- 1 101,690 40,830 15,113
List Year 88,581 53,168 33,570
A[l,-2] 14,783 6,569 4,830
A[l,-1] [1,791] 3,343 5,193
A[2,-2] 871 [5,996] 32,574
A[2 ,-1] [15,703] [9,222] 32,937
A[3,-2] |16,346] 8,278 45,331
A[3,-l] [32,920] 5,052 45,694
A[4,-2] [15,499] 11,410 11,295
A [4,-1] [32,073] 8,184 11,653
A[5,-2] 592 |12,670] 11,295
A[5,-1] [15,982] [15,896] 11,658
Before 73, 830 44,266 10,080
After 80,707 48,453 23,484
Difference 6,877 4,187 13,404
In this table I report “before-after’ estimates o f Closely Held Shares [Firm Governance] for firms that cross-list in the
United States. I report the median closely held share value for firms that list either as Level 1 ADRs [n =  214], 
Exchange-Listed Level 2 /3  [n =  137] and Ordinary Lists, or that trade under Rule 144a on Portal [n =  49]. Closely 
Held Shares [CHS] are shares held by insiders and are provided by Worldscope. I calculate the change in CHS between 
the five year post-listing [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] period and the two years pre-listing [-2, -1] [A[1,-2], A[1,-1], A[2,-2], A[2,-l], 
A[3,-2], A[3,-1], A[4,-2], A[4,-l], A[5,-2], A[5,-l]].
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Table 3.15: Variable Descriptions
Variable -Sign Abbreviation Source Description
Dividends-to-Earnings N /A Div/Eam Worldscope Dividends per share represent the total amount o f  dividends declared during the year, 
Earnings per share represent the earnings for the year
Dividends-to-Cash flow N /A Div/CF Worldscope Dividends per share represent the total amount o f dividends declared during the year, Cash 
Flow per share represents the cash earnings per share o f  the company
Market-to-Book Assets - MBA Datastream Also called Discount to N et Asset Value, divides the market value by the net book value
Free-Cash-Flow + FCF/Net Sales Worldscope Earnings before Interest and Taxation [EBIT] + Depreciation Depletion & Amortization 
[DDA] — Capital Expenditures
D ebt • Debt/Net Sales Worldscope Total D ebt Represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. It is the sum of
long and short term debt.
Cost o f Goods Sold - COGS/Net Sales Worldscope COGS represents specific or direct manufacturing cost o f  labour and material in the 
production o f finished goods.
Return on Equity + ROE Worldscope EPS divided by the book growth per share [Expressed as a %]
EPS Volatility - EPS Worldscope The variance of the previous three years EPS
N et Sales N /A * Worldscope Represents Gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances
Log (Total Assets) + Log (Total Assets) Worldscope Total Assets represents the sum o f total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other
assets.
D (Law) + Common Law LLSV (2000) D=1 the firm originates from a Common Law Country
D (Investor Protection) + Anti Director LLSV(1998) D=1 if a firm originates in a country where investors are highly protected [Anti-director 
Rights >=median o f  3]
Industry Dummies N /A Worldscope Primary Standard Classification Codes [SIC].
ADR Dividend + /- ADR Dividend Bank o f New 
York
D=1 if a firm pays an ADR Dividend.
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Table 3.16: Correlation Coefficients and Variance Inflation Factors.
DivEarn DivCF COGS ROE Earn Vol. FCF D ebt MBA Log (TA) V IF (DE)
DivEarn 1 -
DivCF 0.5937*** 1 -
COGS -0.0116** -0.0315*** 1 1 .0 1
ROE 0.0206*** 0.1442*** -0.0446*** 1 1.08
Earn Vol. -0.0310*** -0.0443*** 0.0202*** -0.0233*** 1 1 .0 0
FCF -0.0029 -0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0084 0.0006 1 1.00
Debt -0.0070 -0.0060 -0.0005 -0.0116*** 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.5411*** 1 1 .0 1
MBA -0.0303*** 0.0159*** -0.0647*** 0.1730*** -0.0206*** -0.0065 -0.0028 1 1.06
Log (TA) 0.0984*** -0.0153*** -0.0288*** -0.1240*** 0.0206*** -0.0361*** -0.0598*** -0.0540*** 1 1.03
In this table I outline Pearson Correlation Coefficients for our dependent variables and all our independent variables. In addition, I outline employing both variants 
of our dependent variable, Variance-Inflation Factors (VIF’s). The Variance-Inflation Factors are defined as (1/(1 —R 2)) where R 2 is from a regression (pooled) 
of an explanatory variable on a constant and the remainder of the explanatory variables. ***, ** Represent significance at the 1 and 5% level of significance 
respectively. All of the variables are defined in Table 3.15.
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Figure 3.1: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
Figure 3.2: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) for OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
Figure 3.3: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for Low IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
Figure 3.4: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for High IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
116
Figure 3.5: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) for Low IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
Figure 3.6: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) for High IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL Firms
Figure 3.7: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for OTC Firms (Low & High IP) and NCL Firms
Figure 3.8: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for EXCH Firms (Low & High IP) and NCL Firms
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Figure 3.9: Median Dividends-to-Earnings (%) for PORTAL Firms (Low & High IP) and NCL Firms
| .----- .»,11.u .  ».-rr.j, i , , ,  ’ ■! |
Figure 3.10: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) for OTC Firms (Low & High IP) and NCL Firms
|  III,. * It 1 J
Figure 3.11: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) for EXCH Firms (Low & Pligh IP) and NCL Firms
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Chapter 4: Are Irish cross-listed firms worth more?
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter represents the first o f four, which examines the valuation benefits of 
international cross listings. In this Chapter, I examine the valuation benefits o f listing in the 
U.K., and the U.S. for a sample o f internationally listed Irish firms. The following motivates this 
Chapter.
Recently DKS (2004) document that in 1997, firms cross-listed in the U.S. are worth more 
than their counterpart non-cross-listed firms. They relate this cross-listing premium to the 
predictions o f the legal bonding hypothesis; firms are better able to fund their growth opportunities 
by voluntarily committing to better protect their minority investors under the U.S. legal regime. 
Interestingly, DKS (2004) report a negative cross-listing premium for Irish firms; non cross-listed 
Irish firms20 are valued more highly than Irish firms cross-listed in the U.S. Their results suggest 
that Irish firms trading in  the U.S. (or more precisely Insh firms listed on organised U.S. exchanges 
or Nasdaq21, either direcdy, or via Level 2/3 American Depositary Receipts are valued, relative to 
non cross-listed Irish firms, at a discount o f 5.51% in 1997, a result at odds with the predictions of 
the legal bonding hypothesis22. The goal o f this chapter is to shed more light on this issue.
In this chapter, I examine the value o f Irish firms trading abroad. M y approach differs 
from DKS (2004) in a number o f instances: first, the focus is on a single country, Ireland. I like 
Davis-Friday, Frecka, and Rivera (2005, pg. 29; DFR hereafter) focus on a single country because 
o f the “tendency o f previous studies to generalize based on multi-country samples” . From an
20 Although included in many multi-country studies, the study o f Irish cross-listed firms hits been largely neglected in 
academic studies. To the best o f  my knowledge, Cotter (2004) represents the only study that devotes a sizable 
proportion o f his work to the study o f Irish ADRs. Gallagher and Kicly (2005) examine the impact o f  a dual listing 
on the volume-volatility relationship for 14 Irish, trading in Dublin and London. Their sample of firms includes a 
number o f Irish firms that trade in the U.S. as ADRs, but the impact o f this ‘third-listing’ is no t addressed in their 
study. Buckland and Mulligan (1996) show that Irish firms that list in London are, relative to Irish firms that list 
solely on the lnsh Stock Exchange, significantly larger and have greater growth opportunities.
21 DKS (2004) do not report any results for Irish Level 1/Portal traded firms.
-- In a follow up paper, DKS (2006) examine the cross-listing premium in calendar time from 1997-2004. Exchange- 
traded Irish firms arc only worth less than non-cross-listed firms in 1997. In all other years, these firms are worth 
more, and statistically significantly so in m ost years. However, what remains unclear is whether listing causes value 
for Irish firms.
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analysis o f the summary statistics reported in  DKS (2004), it is obvious that their overall findings 
cannot be generalised to include Irish firms w ithout further study. I provide the further study. 
Second, I extend the cross-sectional approach o f DKS (2004) by  studying the time series 
behaviour o f value for a panel o f cross-listed Irish firms. In doing so, I can examine the 
dynamics o f the cross listing premium around the cross listing date using valuation metrics, given 
the obvious inadequacies o f a purely cross-sectional approach to do so. Like DKS (2004) I 
abstract from the traditional event study approach, and seek to answer these questions using 
valuation metrics (i.e. Tobin’s q). The use o f valuation metrics in  a panel data setting allows us to 
circumvent the problems associated w ith  using standard event studies. First, I can adequately 
control for self-selection. Event studies, by and large fail to do so. Second, I examine the ‘cross­
listing prem ium’ up to five years post-listing. In contrast, Kothari and W arner (2005) highlight 
the lim itations o f long-horizon event study methods. Finally, I examine the relative merits of 
listing abroad in different countries. I examine the relative valuation merits o f listing in London 
and in the United States for Irish firm and compare the valuation gains that accrue to Irish firms 
that list in the U.S., relative to those firms that list internationally, solely on the London stock 
exchange.
I explicidy acknowledge that cross listing abroad does not have to be associated w ith an 
appreciation of firm value to be successful (i.e. value enhancing). In fact, the possibility remains 
that cross listing may be value enhancing for a firm i.e. relative to non-cross-listed firms, even if  
that firm experiences a post-listing decline in value. This forms the basis o f w hat’s commonly 
referred to w ithin the literature as program evaluation. In response, I present fixed effects, 
pooled ordinary least squares (with M undlak (1978)) corrections, and difference-in-difference 
estimates o f the im pact o f listing on firm value. The first, and the latter are common program 
evaluation estimators (See W oodridge (2002), B lundell and Costa-Dias (2000, BC Hereafter)).
My results suggest that cross listing is associated w id i enhanced value for Level 2/3 issues. 
This result provides support in  favour o f the legal bonding hypothesis. This result is at odds with
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the findings of GLS (2005), and serves to reinforce the arguments put forth by DFR (2005) in 
respect o f the importance o f measuring the effects o f cross listing using single-country studies. In 
addition, I reach similar conclusions for a sub-set o f Irish firms that cross-list on the London Stock 
Exchange. Although the results remain by and large statistically insignificant, they do, nevertheless, 
exhibit considerable economic significance. I document the opposite effect for Level 1 issues. 
Interestingly, I find that Level 1 firms enjoy a valuation premium over Level 2/3 issues in the pre­
listing period. However, this is reversed in the post-listing period, as a result o f increasing and 
decreasing value, on the part o f Level 2/3 and Level 1 ADRs, respectively.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The data and empirical specification is outlined in the 
next two sections. Results are presented and discussed, and I end with some concluding remarks.
4.2 Data
I begin by obtaining a complete list o f Irish firms listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
(www.ise.ie), and a list of Irish equities dual-listed23 on the London Stock Exchange24. I provide a 
full list o f all-Irish firms listed in the United States in Table 4.1. I source U.S. listed Irish firms 
from the Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com), and cross-reference their records with 
information sourced from Deutsche Bank (www.adr.db.com), JP  M organ (www.adr.com), the 
N ew York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (www.nyse.com), and NASDAQ (www.nasdaq.com). For 
each firm, I provide both the date o f listing in the U .S., and the depositary receipt type. 
Furthermore, I provide, where relevant, the corresponding date in which each firm listed on the 
Irish Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange. Finally, in  the case o f Irish firms with
23 We should be clear in exactly how we define ‘Dual-Listing’. In this study, we define firms as dual-listed if  they are 
listed, in addition to their home market, on another foreign market. Hence, this involves a secondary listing o f a 
companies stock. This should not be confused with what are termed ‘Dual Listed Company Structures’ (DLCS). 
Bedi and Tennant (2002, pg. 7) define DLSC as “effectively mergers between two companies in which the 
companies agree to combine their operations and cash flows, but retain separate shareholder registries and identities. 
In this respect, a dual listing is quite different to cross listing” .
24 There are considerably more Irish firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, than in the U.S. At least on the 
face o f it, this is consistent with the findings o f  SS (2004): firms cross-list on geographically close markets to which 
they are familiar with. This tendency for firms to cross-list on culturally similar, and geographically close markets is 
also documented by PRZ (2002).
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either more than one depositary receipt program (e.g. A llied Irish Bank) or firms that transfer 
from one depositary receipt level to another (e.g. Jefferson Sm urfit Group), I classify firms in  
accordance w ith their first listing (in the U.S.) and ignore any subsequent changes. This is a 
standard approach taken in the literature.
To measure firm value, I follow DKS (2004), DKLN (2005), and KKZ (2005) and 
employ Tobin’s q, where Tobin’s q is defined as ((Book Value Total Assets - Book Value o f 
Equity + M arket Value o f Equity)/ (Book Value Total Assets)). For robustness sake, I employ a 
variant o f Tobin’s q, Relative q. Like GLS (2005), and Kalim ipalli and Ramchand (2006, KR 
Hereafter), I calculate Relative q as the value o f each international firm divided by the average 
value o f all domestic Irish firms. In the next section I present summary statistics for both 
measures.
I exclude all non-cross-listed financial firms, but contrary to other studies, I do not 
exclude cross-listed financial firms. If I were to do so, I would lose three Irish Banking firms 
listed in the U.S. Given the small size o f m y sample, it makes m ore sense to retain these firms. 
Second, I restrict my final sample to those firms with total assets greater than ten million U.S. 
dollars, as in doing so I maximise the sample size. DKS (2004) report results for firms with total 
assets greater than one hundred million U.S. dollars, but also find sim ilar results when they relax 
this constraint and employ all firms with total assets greater than ten m illion U.S. dollars. The 
standard approach in  the literature is to exclude all non-cross-listed firms w ith average total assets 
o f one hundred m illion U.S. dollars. This approach facilitates a greater comparison of large 
cross-listed firms to large non-cross-listed firms. However, given the small size o f our sample; I 
use ten million U.S. dollars as m y cut-off point.
In addition to my proxies for firm value, I source all additional firm-level variables from 
W orldscope. In m y econometric specifications, I control for growth opportunities at the firm 
and industry level. I use the average sales growth over the last two years (geometric average) to 
proxy for firms’ growth. I include, in accordance with DKS (2004) and HKZ (2005), the Global
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Industry q for each firm to control for an industry-level growth effect on firm value. I calculate 
Global Industry q as follows; first, I classify each firm into their corresponding industry based 
upon their primary standard industry classification. Then I calculate for each industry group, the 
yearly mean Global Industry q for each industry classification as the average value o f all firms 
w ithin that classification. I employ over 15,000 international firms from the W orldscope 
database to calculate both the mean and median Global Industry q for each year from 1986-2002. 
Finally, to remove the possibility o f outliers, I remove the top 1% o f observations for both 
Tobin’s q (and Relative q) and two-year average sales growth. The source, formal definition and 
calculation o f all variables employed in our analysis are presented in Table 4.9.
4.3 Univariate Statistics
N ext I compare the sample o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in  calendar and 
event tim e. In Table 4.2 I compare the value o f cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed 
firms in  each year from 1990 to 2003. I present two sets o f summary measures. First, for each 
listing type, I present mean and median value (q) for each year. In each column labelled 
‘difference’, I test whether the mean and median valuation differences between the cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms are statistically significant in each year using standard tests.
The summary measures presented in Table 4.2 suggest the following. First, Level 1 firms 
are worth less than non-cross-listed firms in almost every period (They are worth less in  every 
period if  I examine mean valuation differences). However, in  every year, the difference is not 
statistically different from 2ero. Next, the results for each set o f exchange-listed firms are similar. 
In the early years o f the sample, cross-listed firms are valued on a par w ith non-cross-listed firms. 
In most periods, cross-listed firms are valued less than non-cross-listed firms, but the valuation 
difference is statistically insignificant in  each period. In contrast, in  the remaining years, 
exchange cross-listed firms are worth more, and statistically so in some periods. For example, 
from 1999 onwards, the mean (and median) Level 2/3 exchange traded Irish firms is worth more
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than their counterpart non-cross-listed firm. The valuation prem ium  is statistically significant in 
two of the four years. For these firms, the largest mean valuation prem ium  occurs in 2002. Like 
DKS (2004), I find that exchange-traded Irish firms are valued the same as domestic Irish firms 
in 1997 (the valuation difference is negative, but insignificantly so. They document an 
insignificant discount o f 5.95%, similar to m y discount o f 5.51%).
Finally, from 1996 onwards, the median Irish firm listed in London is worth more than 
domestic Irish firms, although the valuation premium is only statistically different in  one year 
(1999 for both sets o f firms).
N ext I compare the value o f firms in event tim e. I begin by graphing value around the 
time of listing. I plot absolute and relative value, over an eleven-year period: five years pre-listing, 
the year o f listing, and up to five years post-listing. Unconditional m ean and median estimates 
are depicted in  Figures 4.1-4.4. I outline in  Tables 4.3, ‘before-after’ estimates o f absolute and 
relative value, respectively. In both, I calculate the change in value in each year up to five years 
post-listing relative to, two and one years prelisting, and the list year.
I begin by describing the evolution of absolute value for Level 2/3 issues. First, and in 
contrast to my earlier findings, Level 2/3 issues are, in  fact, less h ighly valued than Level 1 firms 
in the pre-listing period. It is only in  the post-listing period that Level 2/3 firms are w otth more 
than Level 1 firms. Furthermore, both sub-sets o f ordinary listings on the London Stock 
Exchange are more highly valued than Level 2/3 firms in the pre-listing period. This suggests 
that unlike previous international studies, Irish firms that list in  the U.S. are not worth more prior 
to listing. However, this result is comparable to those reported by D FR (2005) in their study of 
Mexican ADRs. A lthough they do not present pre-listing statistics, M exican exchange-listed 
ADRs are, worth significandy less than non-cross-listed firms (when value is measured as the 
Market Value o f Equity). Taken together, m y results highlight the importance o f employing 
single-country studies in order to examine the relative merits o f fisting for firms. Second, both 
the mean and median Level 2/3 issue appreciates significandy in  the post-listing period, a result
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consistent with die predictions o f the legal bonding hypothesis. Value continues to increase up 
to four-years post-listing: average value increases from 1.45 in the year o f listing to a high o f 2.45 
in the fourth year post-listing, an increase o f just under 69%. GLS (2005) document a fall in 
value for Level 2/3 firms, post-listing.
The value o f Level 1 issues is significandy different in the post-listing period. The trends 
outlined in Figures 4.1-4.2 and Table 4.3 suggest that value depreciates in the post-listing value. 
For example, the unconditional mean value outlined in  Figure 4.1 suggests that value begins to 
fall o ff one-year pre- listing, and continues to fall-off up to two-years post-listing. However, 
there does appear to be a leveling off in value thereafter.
N ext I examine the value o f both sub-sets o f firms listed in London25. Both sets o f firms 
are more highly valued than Level 2/3 firms in the pre-listing period. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that Irish firms, list on the London Stock Exchange after experiencing a run­
up in value. For example, in  Figure 4.2 the median value o f London (U.S.) firms appreciates by 
almost 13% in the year immediately preceding listing in London. Sim ilar to London (U.S.) firms, 
London firms also list after a run-up in  value, although this run-up in value appears to begin 
almost three-years pre-listing. Specifically, value appreciates by almost 26% in  the three-years 
prior to listing. For London (U.S.) firms, valuation continues to appreciate up to two-years post­
listing, but begins to fall o ff thereafter. In contrast, the value o f London firms appears to fall-off 
post-listing, suggesting that these firms time their decision to list on the London Stock Exchange. 
Finally, I find that value is statistically greater in the post-listing period for Level 2/3, London 
and London (U.S.) firms (See bottom column o f Table 4.6).
25 I identify two sub-sets o f Irish firms listed in London. First, I identify those firms with a listing in London, but 
not in the U.S., I .on Aon. Next, I augment this series with data from firms that list in London prior to listing in the 
U.S., London fU.S.l. The motivation for doing so is partly driven by my desire to examine the true effect o f listing in 
London for Irish firms. In my analysis, a sizable majority o f  Irish firms that list in the U.S. also trade on the London 
Stock Exchange. Furthermore, their London listing was initiated prior to listing in the U.S., in a period where data 
availability is poor. For example, Bank o f Ireland and Allied Irish Bank listed in London in 1959 and 1967, 
respectively. Consequently, my sample o f Irish firms that list in London is limited.
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In Table 4.3, I also examine the value o f cross-Ested firms relative to non-cross-Ested firms 
around the time of Esting. A Relative q value greater than 1 impEes, that cross-Ested firms are 
worth more than their counterpart non-cross-Ested firms. Less than 1 suggests the opposite. The 
data presented in Table 4.3 and Figures 4.3-4.4 suggests that Level 2/3 firms are only worth more 
than domestic firms after Esting in the U.S. This result is driven by the absolute appreciation in 
value that they experience after Esting. London (U.S.) firms are worth more than domestic firms in 
the run-up to Esting, and remain so post-Esting. Level 1 firms are worth less post-Esting, while 
London-Ested firms tend to be valued on a par, on average.
In summary, the results thus far suggest the following: first, exchange Esting in the U.S. 
and London is associated w ith a positive absolute and relative change in value. In contrast, 
trading over-the-counter in the U.S. coincides with lower absolute and relative value. In the next 
section, I examine whether these unconditional estimates are robust to the inclusion o f proxies 
for growth opportunities.
4.4 Standard Error Diagnostics
In the next three tables I test for the presence of a firm and time effect by using Petersen’s 
(2005) approach. The test procedure is outlined in Section 3.4. In this panel, the time dimension is 
long (1986-2002) but the number o f firms totals 69. Standard error estimates are outlined for the 
following independent variables; dummy variables for Level 1 [OTC], Level 2/3 [EXCH], and 
London ‘Ordinary’ Ests [LSE]. Global industry q [Industry q] and two-year geometric average sales 
growth [Sales Growth] represent two continuous independent variables. Tobin’s q is employed as 
our dependent variable. I begin by testing for the presence o f a firm effect in Table 4.4. In 
addition to outlining ordinary least squares, and White-Huber (1980) standard errors, I outiine in 
column 5, standard errors from firm fixed effects estimation. As outlined by Petersen (2005), firm 
fixed effects standard errors are superior to Rogers (1993) standard errors (clustered by firm) in the 
presence of a firm effect. In the remaining columns of Table 4.4, I outline the ratio o f Rogers
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(1993) to both  ordinary least squares, and W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors i.e. f SE*^
V SEols
SERoec„
The results from Table 4.4 suggest that there exists a sizable firm effect in the data. I 
document sizable differences between Rogers (1993) and White-Huber (1980) standard errors, a 
result indicative o f a sizable firm effect in the data. I find that both the ordinary least squares and 
W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors consistendy underestimate the ‘true’ standard error. For 
example, the White-Huber (1980) standard error is under half the standard error o f the Rogers 
(1993) standard error for the Level 2/3 [EXCH] dummy variables. The corresponding ordinary 
least squares standard error only serves to further underestimates die standard error.
I present Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by time in Table 4.5. I compare these 
standard errors to ordinary least squares, and W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors. The ratio of
SE
Rogers (1993) standard errors to both are presented in the rem aining columns,
The results are not supportive o f the existence o f a time effect in the data. In fact, for 
almost all o f the independent variables, the Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by time are 
almost numerically identical to the White-Huber (1980) standard errors. For example, the ratio of 
Rogers (1993) to White-Huber (1980) standard errors for the London Ordinary dummy variable is 
almost unity (0.9794).
In Table 4.6, I absorb the time effects by including tune fixed effects (dummies), and cluster 
by firm. I compare these standard errors to ordinary least squares, and White-Huber (1980) 
standard errors. The results are presented in the remaining columns. I find that both the ordinary 
least squares, and White-Huber (1980) dramatically underestimate the true standard error.
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N ext I examine whether the findings documented in the previous section are robust to 
the inclusion o f firm and industry controls. I attempt to address the endogeneity o f the cross 
listing decision in three ways. First, I control for growth opportunities at the level o f the firm 
(two-year average sales growth). Consequently, I estimate the following via ordinary least squares 
(with standard errors clustered by firm and time fixed effects):
qlt = a  + XJ3 + ^ O TC , + 52EXCH,t + 53LSE,t + + \ik (4.1)
Where q lt is Tobin’s q, X jt is a vector o f firm and industry control (two-year average sales growth 
and Global Industry q),O TC it,E X C H it,L S E lt are post-listing dummies for Level 1 over-the- 
counter, Level 2/3 exchange traded, and ‘ordinary’ lists on the London Stock Exchange, 
respectively. are time fixed effects, and (L f is a standard idiosyncratic error term.
Next, I provide two additional methods, which explicidy acknowledge the existence of 
selection bias. I estimate both fixed effects and difference-in-difference estimates o f the impact o f 
listing on firm value. I estimate two ‘variants’ of the fixed effects model. In the first, I estimate a 
standard two-way fixed effects model as follows:
q„ = «i + 8,OTCir + 52EXCHit + S3LSEit + qt + |0.,t (4.2)
Of are firm fixed-effects, which reflect differences across firms that are constant, but 
unobserved over time. In both the fixed-effects, and difference-in-difference specifications, I 
explicitly assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant. In addition to the fixed 
effects approaches, I estimate the following difference-in-difference estimate o f the impact of 
listing on firm value. The standard assumptions underlying the fixed effects estimator are 
assumed to hold. In this specification, I take care to ensure that given the panel nature o f our 
data, I do not associate the last observation o f one firm w ith  the first observation o f the next 
firm, when differencing both the dependent and independent (dummy) variables. I estimate the 
corresponding equation:
4.5 R egression  E stim ates
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Aqit =  8, + ^AOTC* + 52AEXCHit + 53APORTALlt + 54ALSEk + ek (4.3)
N ext I estimate a pooled version of 4.2 given m y concerns over violations o f strict 
exogeneity, arising from feedback effects from firm value to the cross-listing dummy variables. 
In this pooled specification, I follow Mundlak (1978) and specify the individual specific effects as 
a linear function o f the averages over time o f all the exogenous variables plus a random individual 
effect that is assumed to be independent o f the explanatory variables:
    1 T
a ,  = X ^  + a , , where X  = — ^  X lt . Substituting into Equation 4.2 yields the following:
T s=i
q,t = a  + x itp , + 8,OTCk + 52EXCHit + 53LSElt + x £  + \ik (4.4)
W here X k is a vector o f firm and industry control (two-year average sales growth and Global 
Industry q). Equadon 4.4 is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares yielding consistent 
estimates. Pooled estimation circumvents the problems associated w ith violations o f  the strict 
exogeneity assumption because estimation requires, inter alia, the less restrictive assumption o f 
contemporaneous exogeneity. This pooled approach also has the additional advantage over the 
fixed-effects approach in that all non-cross-listed firms are included. In the fixed-effects 
approach I estimate the within-effect i.e. the effect o f listing on value only for those firms that 
change from being non-listed to listed. This restriction o f using the fixed effects approach is 
voiced by L i and Prabhala (2005). Finally, I allow for the valuation effects to differ in each post­
listing period, and relax the homogenous effect o f listing and value that I imposed. For example, 
in the case o f the pooled ordinary least squares (with M undlak (1978) corrections), I estimate the 
following:
q,t = a  + X itp, + X  PtO T q t + £  frEXCH’ + £  PtLSE; + X £  + [lit (4.5)
s=o t=o t=a
W here I estimate the effect o f cross listing on value, up to five years post-listing. The results are 
presented in the next section.
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The fixed effects and difference-in-difference results are presented in  Table 4.7. I 
present, for comparison, ordinary least squares estimates o f the im pact o f cross-listing on firm 
value. In the remaining columns, I outline the estimates from the pooled ordinary least squares 
(with M undlak (1978) corrections), the fixed-effects, and difference-in-difference estimators, 
respectively.
I begin w ith a discussion o f the results presented in Table 4.7. I report the results 
corresponding to Equations 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. I estimate these equations separately for 1 .ondon — 
U.S. listed Irish firm s. For the ordinary least squares, and pooled ordinary least squares 
estimators, I present estimates w ith and w ithout firm and industry controls. I outline the total 
number o f firms employed in each regression, the R-squared, an F-stat for the significance o f all 
explanatory variables, and an F-stat testing for the joint significance o f the M undlak (1978) 
corrections (time-averages) for the pooled ordinary least squares. Finally, I indicate whether 
time-dummies are included (or not) in  each specification. Time-dummies are excluded from the 
pooled ordinary least squares estimator given the inclusion of the time-averaged (time-variant) 
explanatory variables. In the pooled ordinary least squares specification, the M undlak (1978) 
correction terms are included but not reported.
I begin by discussing the results by listing type outlined in  Table 4.7. The coefficient 
estimates for Level 1 firms are, by and large, sim ilar across the different econometric 
specifications. They suggest that cross listing in the U.S. does not cause value for these firms. 
For example, both the ordinary least squares, and pooled ordinary least squares estimates suggest 
that these firms are worth significantly lower post-listing, although this ‘cross-listing-discount’ 
loses its significance when I include firm and industry controls. However, in all specifications, 
the coefficient estimate for Level 1 firms remains economically significant. For example, the 
coefficient ranges from —0.2572 in the fixed effects specification to —0.5068 in the difference-in- 
difference specification. In both specifications, the coefficient estimates for the firm and industry
4.6. R esults
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controls are o f the correct sign, and sometimes significant. The significance o f the G lobal q 
measure is in  line w ith the findings documented by DKS (2004), and KKZ (2005). The 
coefficient estimates for both the fixed-effects, and difference-in-difference estimators, are 
consistent with those presented in the ordinary least squares specifications. In contrast, the 
results for exchange-listed AD Rs are suggestive o f an econom ically significant ‘cross-listing 
prem ium’ (albeit statistically insignificant). The results for both the ordinary least squares and 
pooled ordinary least squares estimates are quantitatively similar. In contrast, both the fixed 
effects, and difference-in-difference estimates are smaller, but positive. The results for Level 2/3 
exchange-listed firms, and the difference in post-listing value for Level 1 and Level 2/3 issues are 
consistent with the predictions o f the bonding hypothesis.
Finally, I present the results for both variants o f our London defined subset o f firms. 
Interestingly, I present differing results for London ‘O rdinary’ across the different estimators. 
For example, both the ordinary least squares, and pooled ordinary least squares estimates are 
negative (but insignificant), while the coefficient estimates for both the fixed-effects and 
difference-in-difference estimates are both positive, and m arginally insignificant (at least in the 
case o f the frxed-effects estimates). Finally, I estimate each o f the previous models for London 
U.S. firms. The results are largely dissimilar to those documented for London ‘Ordinary’ firms. I 
find that across all estimators, these firms are valued m ore highly in the post-listing period. 
A lthough statistically insignificant, the results suggest that I should be careful in  determining 
whether listing in the U.K. is value enhancing or not for Irish firms. M y results suggest that 
listing in London m ay w ell have proven to be value enhancing for firms, who listed in London 
prior to listing in the U.S. (and also too early for us to gather data). The results for London 
(U.S.) firms, although not as strong as in the previous section, do nevertheless im ply that listing 
in London is value enhancing. This result is in line w ith the findings o f Salva (2003) who relates 
the increased equity valuations that accrue to firms that list in London to enhanced governance. 
However, in the case o f Irish firms, it remains hard to reconcile our findings to enhanced
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governance, given the ‘governance’ similarities between the Irish and London stock exchanges. 
SS (2004) and Yang and Lau (2006, Y L Hereafter) offer some additional, and in  the case o f Irish 
firms, plausible explanations. Both emphasise the relationship between listing and familiarity. 
Specifically, SS (2004) conclude that the greatest cost o f capital gains from listing accrue to firms 
who list in  markets where there is a large cross product m arket trade. This finding suggests that 
Irish firms that are familiar to U.K. investors before listing in  the U.K. benefit as a result post­
listing. Y L (2006) conclude that Chinese firms w ith a listing in  H ong K ong enjoy two additional 
benefits to listing abroad relative to those Chinese firms that list in the U.S. H ong-K ong listed 
Chinese firms experience a significant enhancement o f their inform ation environment, and are 
less financially constrained. G iven the proxim ity o f Hong K ong to China (relative to the U.S.), 
the results are consistent w ith  the arguments put forth by SS (2004).
In Table 4.8, I examine the causal impact o f listing on value up to five years post-listing. 
The results are largely in line w ith those presented earlier. Consequentiy, I do not elaborate too 
much on the results. In summary the results suggest the following: first, the valuation-discount 
for Level 1 firms is increasing in the num ber o f years, post-listing. In contrast, I find that the 
valuation benefits to listing are not immediate for Level 2/3 exchange-listed ADRs. They do, 
however, materialise thereafter. This result is in stark contrast to die results that I later document 
for emerging market exchange-listed ADRs. In the case o f the latter, the valuation benefits o f 
listing are immediate, but transitory. The valuation benefits to London U.S. listings are 
immediate, and remain significant up to three-years post-listing (and positive, but insignificant, up 
to five years post-listing). Finally, the results for London ‘O rdinary’ firms are mixed; the 
coefficient estimates suggest both the existence o f both (albeit) a ‘cross-listing-prem ium’ and 
‘discount’ on differing periods, post-listing.
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In this Chapter, I examine the valuation effects o f listing abroad for a sample o f 
internationally listed Irish firms. This study is largely motivated by an irregularity in DKS (2004). 
In contrast to both the predictions o f their theoretical model, and their overall empirical findings, 
U .S. exchange traded Irish firms are valued less than their counterpart non-cross-listed firms.
The result is at odds w ith  the predictions o f the legal bonding hypothesis, and leaves us non-the 
w iser as to whether an international cross listing is value enhancing for Irish firms. I attempt to 
fill this void.
U sing a panel o f internationally listed Irish firms, and em ploying valuation metrics, I 
show that Irish firms that trade as Level 2/3 firms experience a sizable appreciation in value, 
post-listing. The result is robust to the inclusion o f firm and industry controls, and to a variety o f 
different estimators. A lthough the coefficient remains largely statistically insignificant, the 
m agnitude o f the coefficient displays sizable economic significance. This result is consistent with 
the predictions o f the bonding hypothesis, but is in contrast to the findings o f GLS (2005). 
Interestingly, I find that firms that trade over-the-counter, as Level 1 issues are more highly 
valued than exchange traded firms in the pre-listing period. However, this manifests into a 
valuation discount in  the post-listing period, given the depreciation in value experienced by these 
firms in the post-listing period. Finally, I present two sets o f results for London-traded Irish 
firms. I find that Irish firms that trade in  London, but not in  the U .S., appear to time their 
decision to list on the London Stock Exchange. The results are consistent w ith GLS (2005). In 
m y second sub-set o f ‘London’ firms, I augment our original sample o f ‘dual-listed’ firms w ith 
Irish firms that trade in  London, prior to listing in the U.S. In contrast to m y ‘dual-listed’ sample 
o f firms, listing in London is value enhancing. In line with D FR (2005), m y results also highlight 
the importance o f examining the effects o f international cross listing on a country-by-country 
basis.
4.7. C oncluding Remarks
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The results generated in this Chapter have some important implications for Irish firms considering 
listing abroad. First, and foremost, the results suggest that listing abroad, either in London, or on 
U.S. exchanges, is associated w ith enhanced value for Irish firms. In contrast, a non-exchange 
traded depositary receipt program (Level 1) does not provide enhanced value for these firms. This 
contrasts with K R (2006). They show using a sample o f internationally listed firms from India that 
there exists no significant valuation difference across depositary receipt levels. Exchange and non­
exchange traded depositary receipts gain equally from listing. W hile I cannot conclude that a non­
exchange traded depositary receipt does not provide some benefits for Irish firms, m y results do 
suggest that there are no additional benefits, at least in  tenns o f enhanced value.
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Table 4.1: U.S. Listed Irish firms by Domestic and International Listings
ComtKtnv LSE Listine List Date U.S. Listine List Date ISE Listine
Allied Irish Bank Overseas Listed 29/06/1967 NYSE
PORTAL
01/11/1990
24/04/1998
26/06/1967
Anglo Irish Bank Overseas Listed 22/02/1974 OTC 01/10/1994 22/02/1974
Arcon Overseas Listed 03/04/1995 OTC 26/08/1998 09/08/2004
Bank o f Ireland Overseas Listed 14/01/1959 NYSE 01/11/1995 14/01/1959
Conduit * - PORTAL 27/06/2000 06/04/2001 
Delist 2003
CRH Overseas Listed 05/02/1973 NASDAQ 23/07/1986 05/02/1973
Datalex - • OTC 26/04/2002 2 0 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 0
Elan Corporation Overseas Listed 18/11/1993 NYSE 26/01/1984 01/01/1989
Glanbia - - OTC 08/11/2002 01/03/1988
Glencar Mining - - OTC 01/09/1996 01/01/1983
Greencore Group * - OTC 26/04/1999 01/01/1991
Hibemia - - NASDAQ 01/10/1992 -
Icon - - NASDAQ 14/05/1998 26/04/1999
Iona - - NASDAQ 28/02/1997 19/12/1997
Jefferson Smurfit Group - - OTC 
NYSE- Delisted 
1995
04/09/2002 Delist 2002
Ryanair Hldgs Overseas Listed 16/07/1998 NASDAQ 28/05/1997 07/12/2001
Skillsoft - - NASDAQ
PORTAL
18/04/1995
06/10/1995
-
Trinity Biotech - NASDAQ 01/10/1992 24/05/1999
Trintech - - NASDAQ 22/09/1999 -
Waterford Wedgwood Overseas Listed 01/12/1986 NASDAQ 28/01/1987 11/06/2003
TTiis table outlines cross-listed Irish firms by listing type. Irish firms’ trade in London as ordinary shares (‘Ordinaries’, as 
opposed to depositary receipts). Level tissues trade over-the-counter as pink-sheet issues. Level 2 /3  ADRs are exchange-listed 
ADRs trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Elan trade on the NYSE as an ‘Ordinary5 fist. For each, I report the list date. All 
data is sourced directly from the Trish Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, the NYSE and NASDAQ, and is cross- 
referenced with information from the Bank o f New York, Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan, and Citibank.
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Table 4.2: Value o f  cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in calendar time.
Mean L cvsll Level 2 /3 London T.nn m.S.l
Year Level 1 NCL Difference Level 2 /3 N C L DlfittLDil London NCT. Difference LsmiU.S.) NCI Difference
1986 - 1.49 - 1.44 1.49 (0.05) - 1.49 - - 1.49 -
1987 * 1.94 - 1.49 1.94 (0.45) 2 .0 1 1.94 0.07 2 .0 1 1.94 0.07
1988 - 1.71 - 1.38 1.71 (0.33) 1.65 1.71 (0.06) 1.65 1.71 (0.06)
1989 - 1.73 - 1.46 1.73 (0.27) 1.81 1.73 0.08 1.81 1.73 0.08
1990 - 1.99 - 1.67 1.99 (0.32) 1.80 1.99 (0.19) 1.80 1.99 (0.19)
1991 - 1.73 - 1.76 1.73 0.03 1.50 1.73 (0.23) 1.50 1.73 (0.23)
1992 - 1.78 - 2.05 1.78 0.27 1.44 1.78 (0.34) 1.44 1.78 (0.34)
1993 . 1.56 - 1.77 1.56 0 .2 1 1.38 1.56 (0.18) 1.38 1.56 (0.18)
1994 1.05 1.83 (0.78) 2 . 2 0 1.83 0.37 1.52 1.83 (0.31) 1.64 1.83 (0.19)
1995 1.07 1.82 (0.75) 1 . 6 6 1.82 (0.16) 1.60 1.82 (0 .2 2 ) 1.76 1.82 (0.06)
1996 1.25 1.71 (0.46) 1.62 1.71 (0.09) 1.71 1.71 0 . 0 0 1.91 1.71 0 . 2 0
1997 1.35 1 .6 8 (0.33) 1.58 1 .6 8 (0 .1 0 ) 1.83 1 .6 8 0.15 1.87 1 . 6 8 0.19
1998 1.14 2 . 0 2 (0 .8 8 ) 2 .0 1 2 . 0 2 (0 .0 1 ) 1.95 2 . 0 2 (0.07) 2 . 2 0 2 . 0 2 0.18
1999 1.49 1.63 (0.14) 2.24 1.63 0 .6 1 * 2 . 0 2 1.63 0 .3 9 * 2.15 1.63 0 .5 2 * *
2 0 0 0 1.39 1.64 (0.25) 2.26 1.64 0 .6 2 * 1.79 1.64 0.15 1.92 1.64 0.28
2 0 0 1 1.34 1.78 (0.44) 2.28 1.78 0.50 1.99 1.78 0 .2 1 2 . 2 2 1.78 0.44
2 0 0 2 1.52 1.53 (0 .0 1 ) 2.42 1.53 0 .8 9 * * 1.89 1.53 0.36 2.25 1.53 0.72
Median Level 1 Level 2/3 London Lon ILT.5.1
Year Level 1 NCL Difference Level 2/3 NCT, D iffe r e n c e London NCT. Difference I.on rU.S.T NCI. Difference
1986 - 1.48 - 1.44 1.48 (0.04) - 1.48 - r 1.48 -
1987 - 1.70 - 1.49 1.70 (0 .2 1 ) 2 .0 1 1.70 0.31 2 .0 1 1.70 0.31
1988 . 1.60 . 1.38 1.60 (0 .2 2 ) 1.65 1.60 0.05 1.65 1.60 0.05
1989 1.64 - 1.46 1.64 (0.18) 1.81 1.64 0.17 1.81 1.64 0.17
1990 - 1.73 - 1.63 1.73 (0 .1 0 ) 1.73 1.73 0.00 1.73 1.73 0.00
1991 - 1.56 - 1.54 1.56 (0 .0 2 ) 1.48 1.56 (0.08) 1.48 1.56 (0.08)
1992 - 1.57 - 1.51 1.57 (0.06) 1.50 1.57 (0.07) 1.50 1.57 (0.07)
1993 - 1.43 - 1.34 1.43 (0.09) 1.42 1.43 (0 .0 1 ) 1.47 1.43 0.04
1994 1.05 1 .6 6 (0.61) 1.74 1 . 6 6 0.08 1.55 1 .6 6 (0 .1 1 ) 1.55 1 .6 6 (0 .1 1 )
1995 1.07 1.67 (0.60) 1.54 1.67 (0.13) 1.63 1.67 (0.04) 1.64 1.67 (0.03)
1996 1.25 1.60 (0.35) 1.46 1.60 (0.14) 1.62 1.60 0 . 0 2 1.67 1.60 0.07
1997 1.35 1 .6 6 (0.31) 1.61 1 .6 6 (0.05) 1.71 1 . 6 6 0.05 1.82 1 .6 6 0.16
1998 1.14 1.71 (0.57) 1.70 1.71 (0 .0 1 ) 1.95 1.71 0.24 2.08 1.71 0.37
1999 1.48 1.55 (0.07) 1.73 1.55 0.18 1.87 1.55 0 .3 2 * * 2 .0 1 1.55 0 .4 6 * *
2 0 0 0 1.45 1.61 (0.16) 1.74 1.61 0.13 1.71 1.61 0 . 1 0 1.75 1.61 0.14
2 0 0 1 1.30 1.44 (0.14) 1.97 1.44 0 .5 3 * 1.75 1.44 0.31 1.97 1.44 0.53
2 0 0 2 1.37 1.37 0.00 1 . 8 8 1.37 0 .5 1 * 1.60 1.37 0.23 1.69 1.37 0.32
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Table 4.3: ‘After-Before’ value o f cross-listed firms
¡'CYSU 1 -cvd 2 /3 L2 E I.s r .  find. Pre U.S.!
Value Relative Value Value Relative Value Value Relative Value Value Relative Value
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
- 2 1.60 1.29 0.94 0.78 1.51 1.29 0 . 8 8 0.81 1.53 1.39 0.84 0.81 1.75 1.63 0.96 0.96
-1 1.71 1.62 0.94 0.85 1.49 1.26 0.81 0.65 1.83 1.50 1.06 0.82 2.06 1.57 1.17 0.89
0 1.46 1.43 0.85 0.83 1.46 1.32 0.81 0.72 1 .8 6 1.71 1.05 0.91 2 .2 1 1.77 1.24 0.97
A(l,-2) (0.15) 0.34 (0.09) 0 . 2 0 0.52 0.17 0.18 0.04 0 . 2 0 0.27 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2 0.33 0.29 0 . 2 0 0 .0 1
A(l,-1) (0.26) (0 .0 1 ) (0.09) 0.13 0.54 0 . 2 0 0.25 0 . 2 0 (0 .1 0 ) 0.16 (0 .1 2 ) 0 .1 1 0 . 0 2 0.35 (0 .0 1 ) 0.08
A(2,-2) (0.42) (0.09) (0.28) (0.16) 0.83 0.31 0.53 0.17 0.47 0.26 0.30 0.09 0.48 0.28 0.30 0 . 1 0
A(2,-l) (0.53) (0.42) (0.28) (0.23) 0.85 0.34 0.60 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.09 0.17
A(3,-2) (0.30) (0.08) (0.13) 0 . 1 2 0 . 8 6 0.49 0.51 0.26 0.26 0 .2 1 0.16 0.15 0.30 0.08 0 .2 1 0 .0 1
A(3,-l) (0.41) (0.25) (0.13) 0.05 0 . 8 8 0.52 0.58 0.42 (0.04) 0 . 1 0 (0.06) 0.14 (0 .0 1 ) 0.14 0 . 0 0 0.08
A(4,-2) (0.34) (0.03) (0.24) (0.08) 0.95 0.71 0.60 0.38 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.09 0 . 0 0 0 .1 1 (0.04)
A(4,-l) (0.45) (0.36) (0.24) (0.15) 0.97 0.74 0.67 0.54 (0 .2 2 ) 0.03 (0.17) 0 . 0 2 (0.18) 0.06 (0 .1 0 ) 0.03
A(5,-2) (0 .2 2 ) (0.09) (0 .1 1 ) 0.05 0.32 0.37 0.73 0 .2 1 0.30 0.30 0 .2 1 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2 0.17 0 . 1 0 0 .0 1
A(5,-l) (0.33) (0.24) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .0 2 ) 0.34 0.30 0.80 0.37 0 . 0 0 0.19 (0 .0 1 ) 0.09 (0.19) 0.23 (0 .1 1 ) 0.08
Before 1.43 1.19 0.79 0 . 6 8 1.53 1.54 0.83 0 . 8 8 1.60 1.47 0.93 0.80 1.75 1.54 0.99 0.84
After 1.34 1.25 0.80 0.73 2 . 0 0 1 .6 8 1 .2 0 0.97 1.77 1 . 6 6 1 .0 2 0.93 1.97 1.72 1.14 0.98
D iff (0.09) 0.06 0 .0 1 0.05 0.47** 0.14** 0.37** 0.09*** 0.17 0 1 9 «** 0.09 0.13*** 0 .2 2 * 0.18*** 0.15* 0.14***
between the post and pre-listing period, and the change in q between the five year post-listing (1 , 2 , 3 ,  4 , 5 )  period and the two years pre-listing ( -2 ,  -1 ) [A ( l , - 2 ) ,  A ( l , - 1 ) ,  A (2 ,-2 ) ,  
A ( 2 , - l ) ,  A (3 ,-2 ) ,  A ( 3 , - l ) ,  A (4 ,-2 ) ,  A ( 4 , - l ) ,  A (5 ,- 2 ) ,  A ( 5 ,- l ) ] .  The mean (median) valuation differential is tested using the Satterwaite t-test and the Mann-Whitney test, respectively. 
*, **, *** Represents significance at the 10, 5, 1% level respectively.
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Table 4.4: Testing for the presence o f  a firm effect.
Yariahk OT.S Wliite-1 Tuher
(1980)
Rogers_(1993) 
[Clustered by 
firm]
Fixed
Effects
( S E  ^Rogers
S EV OLS y
(  s f  ^Rogers
S FV white y
OTC 0.2027 0.1069 0.2030 0.3559 1.0015 1.8990
E X C H 0.1026 0.1271 0.2601 0.1371 2.5351 2.0464
LSE 0.0985 0.0924 0.1331 0.1687 1.3513 1.4405
Industry  q 0.1698 0.3009 0.4516 0.1353 2.6596 1.5008
Sales G ro w th 0.5446 0.5458 0.5927 0.3707 1.0883 1.0859
In this Table, I test for the presence o f a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £ |t =  5 , "bT]it, X it =  +  Vit. I outline standard
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm 
and (4) firm fixed effects. In the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
Table 4.5: Testing for the presence o f  a tim e effect.
Variable OLS White-Huber
11980)
Rogers fl993't 
[Clustered by 
ysad
< s e ols j
f S E  ^°  Roger*
S FV. White y
O T C 0.2027 0.1069 0.0984 0.4854 0.9205
E X C H 0.1026 0.1271 0.1058 1.0312 0.8324
LSE 0.0985 0.0924 0.0905 0.9188 0.9794
In d u stry  q 0.1698 0.3009 0.2087 1.2291 0.6936
Sales G ro w th 0.5446 0.5458 0.7307 1.3417 1.3388
In this table, I test for the presence o f  a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: 8 it =  Yr +T)lt, X it =  Jlt + V ir . I outline standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
time. In the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
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Table 4.6: Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects.
Variable OT.S White-Huber
(19801
Rogers (1993)
^ SEOLs >
fS E  ^
SF v 'wiutc y
O T C  
E X C H  
LSE  
In d u stry  q 
Sales G ro w th
0.2027
0.1026
0.0985
0.1698
0.5446
0.1069
0.1271
0.0924
0.3009
0.5458
0.2056
0.2556
0.1439
0.5258
0.5848
1.0143
2.4912
1.4609
3.0966
1.0738
1.9233
2 . 0 1 1 0
1.5574
1.7474
1.0715
In this table, I compute Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects, I compare these to standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), and (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. In the remaining columns, I compare Rogers (1993) 
standard errors to both (1) and (2 ).
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Table 4.7: Cross-Listing abroad 2nd value for Irish firms
OLS POLS Fixed Effects 1TU2
(2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Level 1 -0.4672 -0.3077 -0.4685 -0.3251 -0.2572 -0.5068
[-2.85]*** [-1.50] [-2.93]*** [-1.63] [-1.79]* [1.55]
Level 2/3 0.2177 0.2558 0.2191 0.2415 0.0403 0.0919
[0.73] [1 .0 0 ] [0.74] [0.97] [0.39] [0.51]
London Ordinary -0.0096 -0.0290 -0.0072 -0.0395 0.1492 0.1329
[-0 .1 0 ] [-0 .2 0 ] [-0.08] [-0.28] [1.60] [0.65]
Global Industry q 1.27 1.25
[2.42]** [2.39]**
Log (1+Sales Growth) 0 . 6 6 0.69
11.13] [1.191
London -  U.S. List 0.1865 0.1836 0.1871 0.1744 0.1558 0.4245
[1.31] [1-141 [1.33] [1.09] [1.811* [1.061
Time Dummies Yes Yes No No Yes 1988
Time-Averages No No Yes Yes No No
R 2 0,0529 0.2426 0.0289 0 . 2 2 0 0 0.0231 0 . 0 0 1
P r >  F 3.98*** 3.46*** 1.76 2.27**
P r >  F  (T im e) • - 0.36 3.02** - -
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Table 4.8: Estimating the effect o f  listing on fitm value for Irish firms up to five years post-listing.
List t +  1 t  +  2 t  + 3 t +  4 t  +  5 Sales Growth Global q Time
Dummies
Time-
Averages
Rz Pr > F(Time)
Ol s
Level 1 -0.13 0.23 -0.37** -0.23 -0.23 -0.31** 0.76 1 30*** Yes No 0.28 .
Level 2/3 -0.16 -0.07 0.53 0.58 0.79* 0 . 6 6 0.76 1.30*** Yes No 0.28 -
LSE 0.14 -0.25 0.34 0 . 2 0 -0.18 -0.16 0.76 1.30*** Yes No 0.28 -
LSE U.S. 0.42 0.41 0.73** 0.50** 0.13 -0.09 0.76 1.30*** Yes No 0.28 -
POT.S
Level 1 -0 .2 2 * 0 . 2 0 -0.32** -0 . 2 2 -0.24 -0.28*** 0.77 1.29*** No Yes 0.26 0.00
Level 2/3 -0.06 -0.13 0.49 0.53 0.81* 0.61 0.77 1.29*** No Yes 0.26 0.00
LSE 0.11 -0.30 0.30 0 . 2 2 -0.16 -0.17 0.77 1,29*** No Yes 0.26 0.00
LSE U.S. 0.35 0.39 0.74** 0.52** 0.13 -0 . 1 0 0.77 1.29*** No Yes 0.26 0.00
Fired-Ffferts
Level 1 -0 . 2 2 -0.23 -0.50* -0.38 -0.28 -0.16 Yes No 0.03
Level 2/3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 0 -0.14 - 0.11 -0 . 0 2 -0 . 1 0 - - Yes No 0.03 -
LSE -0 . 1 2 -0.05 0 . 2 2 0 .0 1 -0.07 0.15 - - Yes No 0.03 -
LSE U.S. -0.06 -0 .0 1 0.08 -0.06 -0 .2 2 * -0 .0 1 - - Yes No 0.03 -
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Table 4.9: Variable Descriptions
Variable Expected
Sint
Source Description/Definition
Tobin's q N /A Worldscope Tobin’s q is calculated as follows:
((Book Value o f Total Assets -  Book Value o f  Equity) + Market Value o f Equity)/(Book Value o f Total Assets)
Relative Tobin’s q N /A Worldscope Relative Tobin’s q is calculated as the q o f  each firm divided by the average q o f  all domestic firms.
Global Industry q + Worldscope Global Industry q is defined as the average q o f all firms in the same industry. Firms are assigned to each industry based 
upon Primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. We use a sample o f over 14,000 firms from the Worldscope 
Database to calculate the Global q o f  each industry. Industry groups are classified as follows: Agriculture and Food (0100-
0999 & 2000-2111)
Mining & Construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399)
Textiles & Printing/Publishing (2200-2799)
Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899)
Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836)
Extractive (2900-2999,1300-1399)
Durable Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579)
Transportation (4000-4899)
Utilities (4900-4999)
Retail (5000-5999)
Banking & Financial Services (6000-6999)
Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379)
Computers (7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679)
Public Administration (9000+).
Two Year 
Average Sales 
Growth
+ Worldscope Geometric average o f annual sales over the last two years. Sales are expressed in Euro.
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Figure 4.1: Mean (Unconditional) Tobin’s q.
Year reL to List Year
[— »  ■ [ s i-  ■  u s e  ;.r  k i — iK - e x c h ]
Figure 4.2: Median (Unconditional) Tobin’s q.
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Figure 4.3: Mean Relative q.
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Figure 4.4: Median Relative q.
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Chapter 5: Does cross-listing really enhance value?
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, I examined the valuation effects o f listing abroad for a sample o f 
internationally listed Irish firms. The results suggest that exchange listing in both London and 
the U.S. proves value enhancing. In this Chapter, I examine whether cross listing is value 
enhancing for a sample o f cross-listed emerging market firms. I am m otivated to do so for a 
number o f reasons. First, while Chapter 4 highlights the im portance o f conducting single­
country studies, m y sample size is small. By collecting a larger sample o f cross-listed firms, I 
hope to attach both statistical and economic significance to m y results. Second, I attempt to 
resolve the ongoing debate on whether the greatest gains to listing accrue to em erging market 
firms. More specifically, the theoretical predictions of, amongst others, BB (2006) and DKS
(2004), and the empirical findings o f Mittoo (2003), RW  (2002) and LSZ (2005) together suggest 
that the greatest gains from exchange listing in the U.S. should accrue to firms from low- 
disclosure/weak investor protection countries. However, in  a recent paper, KKZ (2005) 
document cross-sectional evidence to the contrary. They find, in  contrast to the theoretical 
predictions o f BB (2006) that the valuation benefits from exchange cross listing in the U.S., 
accrue to firms that operate in high-disclosure/strong investor protection countries. They 
theorise that this result is at least partly explained, not in  terms o f the benefits o f listing, but in 
terms o f the associated costs o f listing. M ore specifically, they argue that while the incremental 
benefits o f listing should be greater for firms from low-disclosure/weak investor protection 
countries, the associated costs o f listing (e.g. in itial and continuing U.S. G .A.A.P. compliance) are 
also greater for these firms. Their argument concludes by theorising that the net benefit o f listing 
is greatest (weakest) for firms from high-disclosure (low-disclosure) countries.
In this chapter, I examine whether cross listing is value enhancing for a sample o f cross­
listed emerging market firms. Specifically, I extend the cross-sectional approach o f both DKS
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(2004) and KKZ (2005) and form a panel o f 504 cross-listed firms (and 4,563 non cross listed 
firms), and examine whether the benefits from listing, i f  they do materialise, persist in  the post­
listing period. In doing so, I am able to examine the long-term  benefits to listing using 
standardised valuation metrics, and not through non-selection corrected event studies (e.g. M iller 
(1999)).
To answer these questions, I employ a variety o f different estimators. I begin by 
presenting a simple firm fixed effects model. In addition, given my legitimate concerns over 
possible violations o f  strict exogoneity, I estimate a pooled variant o f  the fixed effects model, 
whereby I control for unobserved heterogeneity using standard M undlak (1978) corrections. 
Second, I estimate a variety o f selection-correction estimators. I assume both selection on 
observables, and selection on unobservables (private inform ation), and estimate different models 
accordingly. In the case o f the former, I employ propensity score matching m ethods26 (See 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) to match cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms based upon 
their identical propensity scores i.e. conditional probability o f receiving a treatment given ex-ante 
characteristics. For each type o f listing, I estimate the average effect o f the treatment on the 
treated for up to five years post-listing. Finally, I relax the assumption that selection is based 
upon observable factors only, and assume that the listing decision is in part privately motivated 
i.e. unobservable. Finally, I estimate a pooled treatment effects m odel along the lines o f Campa 
and Kedia (2002, CK Hereafter), DKLN (2005), Colak and W hited (2005, CW  Hereafter), and 
Villalonga and A m it (2006, VA Hereafter) and control for selection by including the generalised 
residual from a first stage probit i.e. the inverse m ills ratio, in  a second stage regression.
M y results for Level 2/3 firms are, albeit weaker, in  line w ith those documented by KKZ
(2005). It appears that given the costs o f listing (See Table 2.1 for an overview), firms from high-
26 Although previously under-utilized within finance literature, over the course o f the last few years numerous 
authors, conscious o f the endogeneity o f many financial decisions, have employed propensity score matching 
estimators. For example, propensity score matching estimators have been applied to issues relating to: (a) equity 
issuance (e.g. Cheng (2004)) (b) diversification discount (e.g. Ahn and Walker (2004), Villalonga (2004)), (c) financial 
development (e.g. Aivazian and Santor (2003)). In fact, the growing importance o f modeling self-selection in 
corporate finance has been recendy documented by LP (2005).
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disclosure countries reap greater valuation benefits from listing in tire U.S. However, in 
subsequent analysis, I find that the valuation gains from listing appear to be transitory. For 
example, the results from the distributed lag, and m atching models both suggest that the gains 
from listing are immediate, but not long lasting. This suggests that while the ‘cross-listing 
premium’ appears to persist in calendar time (See DKS (2006)), it fails to do so in event-time. 
Second, and in contrast w ith our results for Level 2/3 issues, I find that Level 1 firms from low- 
disclosure regimes experience, relative to Level 1 firms from high-disclosure regimes positive 
(less negative) valuation gains, post-listing. This result is robust to different classifications o f 
‘low-disclosure’ regimes. I can, at this stage, only theorise that this is explained in terms o f the 
costs and benefits o f listing. As before, the benefits to non-exchange listing should be greatest 
for firms form low-disclosure regimes. However, the costs associated w ith such depositary 
receipt programs are considerably less that the costs associated w ith an exchange-listing ADR. 
Consequently, the net benefits o f listing are positive for these firms. Finally, it is difficult to draw 
inferences on the relative merits o f cross listing for Rule 144a firms given their tendency to ‘time’ 
their decision to cross-list. However, I can infer that Rule 144a firms from high investor/English 
common law regimes experience the greatest fall in  value post-listing.
The Chapter proceeds as follows; in the next section I outline m y sample. N ext I outline 
some ‘before-after’ summary statistics. M y empirical specification is outlined in Section 4, and 
the results follow in Section 5. 1 end w ith some concluding remarks.
5.2 Data
I begin by sourcing a full list o f em erging market countries w ith firms cross-listed in the 
United States. For each, I identify those firms w id i a cross listing in the U.S. As in Chapter 4, all 
infonnation on cross-listed firms is sourced from the Bank o f N ew York, and cross-referenced 
with information sourced from Deutsche Bank (www.adr.db.com), JP  Morgan (www.adr.com), 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (www.nyse.com), and NASDAQ (www.nasdaq.com).
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From m y cross-listed sample o f firms: (1) I classify firms according to their first cross listing, and 
(2) classify simultaneous Level 1/Portal ‘listings’ as Level 1 issues. M y final sample (Table 5.1) is 
comprised o f 4,563 non-cross-listed, non-financial firms and 583 cross-listed firms. The cross­
listed sample is comprised o f 260 Level 1 firms, 142 exchange-listed Level 2/3 issues and 181 
firms that trade under R ulel44a. I supplement my original sample o f 4,563 non-cross-listed non- 
financial firms, w ith an additional 1,031 financial firms to ensure appropriate matches for our 
financial cross-listed firms. I do not include these financial firms in m y fixed-effects, pooled 
ordinary least squares (with M undlak (1978) corrections), and treatment effects models since the 
valuation ratios for financial firms are not comparable to those for non-financial firms. 
Furthennore, the elimination of financial firms facilitates a greater comparison o f firms across 
countries (See DKS (2004)). I do not exclude financial sector cross-listed firms. This is primarily 
motivated by the findings o f Bancel, Kalim ipalli, and Mittoo (2004, BK M  Hereafter) who 
document impressive post-listing performance for financial sector European Am erican 
depositary receipts. Finally, I only include firms w ith  average total assets greater than 100 million 
U.S. dollars. This latter approach facilitates a greater comparison between cross-listed and non 
cross-listed firms.
In Table 5.1 I outline by country the num ber o f non-cross-listed firms, and the number 
o f cross-listed firms listed in the United States by depositary receipt level. I exclude from my 
final sample firms domiciled in Russia, the Czech Republic and Indonesia because I deem the 
data to be o f insufficient quality. I provide the percentage that each country (i.e. number o f 
firms) contributes to the total number o f firms in  each depositary receipt level and adopt an 
identical approach for m y non-cross-listed sample. For example, taken together South Korean 
and M alaysian firms comprise alm ost 28% o f the non-cross-listed sample: Colombian firms 
contribute just over half o f 1%. H ong Kong firms provide the greatest number o f Level 1 firms 
(37.31%), w hile Argentina provide no firm. Brazil and Mexico equally provide the greatest share 
o f exchange Level 2/3 issues, while India and Taiwan supply the majority o f firms that trade in
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the U.S. under Rule 144a on the Portal. A n interesting feature evident from Table 5.1 is that 
across and within countries there exists significantly differing preferences for the different types 
o f depositary receipt listings. For example, the m ajority o f firms from Hong K ong trade over- 
the-counter as Level 1 issues. This contrasts notably with the preference o f Indian and 
Taiwanese firms for a Rule 144a ADR. In line w ith the findings o f  B Y  (2002), Israeli firms that 
are predominantly high-tech firms reveal a strong preference for exchange-listed depositary 
receipts.
I outline in Table 5.2 m y final sample by prim ary standard industry classification code. I 
classify all firms (with available primary standard industry classification codes) into one o f 14 
industries. They are (1) agriculture and food (0100-0999 and 2000-2111), (2) m ining and 
construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), (3) textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), 
(4) chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899), (5) pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), (6) extractive (2900-2999, 
1300-1399), (7) durable manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579), (8) transportation 
(4000-4899), (9) utilities (4900-4999), (10) retail (5000-5999), (11) banking or financial services 
(6000-6999), (12) services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), (13) computers (7370-7379, 3570- 
3579, 3670-3679), and (14) public adm inistration (9000+). I provide the percentage that each 
industry (i.e. number o f firms) contributes to the total number o f firms in each depositary receipt 
level, and in  m y non-cross-listed sample. For example, the majority o f our non cross-listed and 
Rule 144a sample is made up o f m anufacturing firms, with 27.37, and 30.9 respectively. The 
majority o f Level 1 firms are retail (19.62%). Level 2/3 issues are predominantly transportation 
finns.
I employ three different valuation ratios to analyse the impact o f cross listing on firm value.
I follow DKS (2004), DKLN (2005), and HKZ (2005) and employ Tobin’s q, where Tobin’s q is 
defined as before (See Chapter 4). To check for robustness, I supplement this measure w ith two 
additional valuation proxies employed by KS (2003, 2004): book-to-m arket o f assets and 
earnings-to-price ratios. The use o f valuation ratios instead o f returns provides a means of
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comparing firms across borders using a standardised metric (See KS (2004)). A ll variables are 
expressed in  local currency. A ll data is sourced from W orldscope and is collected on the 31st o f 
December from 1990 to 2003.
Like Chapter 4, I employ the following firm-level variables in m y empirical specifications: 
I use the average sales growth over the last two years (geometric average) and G lobal Industry q 
for each firm. To remove the influence o f possible outliers, I rem ove the top 1% o f observations 
for Tobin’s q, and two-year average sales growth, and remove the top and bottom  1% of 
observations for both, book-to-market o f assets, and earnings-to-price. N egative values o f 
Tobin’s q are set to missing. I oudine, in Table 5.3, the expected sign, the source, and a fuller 
definition o f all o f the firm-level variables just outlined.
I include the following country-level controls obtained from LLSV (1998) to control for 
differences in value across countries: a dummy variable indicating the legal origin o f each country. 
In each specification I employ the English law  dummy as m y reference group. Second, I employ 
the anti-director rights index, an equally weighted index o f 6 different shareholder rights, which 
ranges from a low  o f 0 to a high o f 5. A  higher rating implies a greater level o f investor 
protection. Mexico has an anti-director rights measure o f 1. In contrast, Chile, Hong Kong, 
India and South Africa score much higher w ith a rating o f 5. I also include a measure o f judicial 
efficiency, and accounting standards. The former, ranging from 0 to 10 is defined as producing a 
rating o f the “efficiency and integrity o f the legal environment as it affects business, particularly 
foreign firms”. A  higher rating o f each im plies both greater judicial efficiency, and a higher level 
o f accounting standards. Hong K ong scores a perfect rating o f 10, while Thailand scores a lowly 
3.25. The index o f accounting standards rates companies’ annual reports in 1990 for the 
inclusion or exclusion o f 90 specific items. This measure is unavailable for China, Hungary and 
Poland. Finally I include two additional country-level controls: country liquidity ratio and, a 
capital access ratio. A ll country-level control ratios are time-invariant.
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Finally, I employ a capital access ratio, developed by the M ilkens Institute. I source this 
variable from DKS (2004) and BK M  (2004). This variable quantifies the ability to source capital 
based upon the breath, depth and liquidity o f markets. The score ranges from 0 to 7, and is 
increasing in the ability o f firms to access capital. A ll country level variables are outlined in Table
5.4. Hong Kong, India, and Singapore score perfecdy on the Jud icia l Efficiency measure. Chile, 
H ong Kong, India, and South Africa are the highest rated emerging m arket firms when ranked in 
terms of anti-director rights.
5.2.1 Summary Statistics
I report in Tables 5.5-5.5(a), mean and m edian values o f the variables employed in the 
analysis. In Table 5.5, I calculate the means and medians o f all variables for all cross-listed and 
non cross-listed firms. In Table 5.5(a), I further sub-divide out cross-listed sample o f firms into 
Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a firms, respectively. In both Tables, I test for any significant 
mean and m edian differentials between each pairwise set o f firms. For example, in  Table 5.5, I 
report both t (mean) and z (median)-statistics in order to test for systematic differences between 
our mean and m edian cross-listed and non cross-listed samples, respectively.
First, the m ean and m edian non cross-listed firm tend to be m ore highly valued than cross­
listed firms. In fact, this result holds for all three-valuation metrics (although it is not statistically 
significant when I employ book-to-market value as m y valuation metric). Second, and in line 
w ith a variety o f earlier studies, I find that cross-listed firms tend to be larger (as measured by 
total assets), are more profitable (as measured by return on equity), and have greater sales growth 
(See CKS (2003), PRZ (2002)).
In Table 5.5(a), I compare non-cross-listed firms to each depositary level separately. Again, 
non cross-listed firms tend to be worth more. For example, median value (q) for non-cross- 
listed, Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a is 1.42, 1.34, 1.36, and 1.34, respectively. Interestingly, 
the mean and median valuation differentials between the different depositary receipt levels tend
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to be insignificant. Next, Level 2/3 firms tend to be larger, more profitable, and are growing 
faster than Level 1, and Rule 144a firms. For example, the m edian return on equity for 
exchange-listed firms is 10.26, compared to figures o f 8.91 and 9.36 for Level 1 and Rule 144a 
firms, respectively. A ll cross-listed firms tend to be larger and m ore profitable than non-cross- 
listed firms. An interesting feature from Table 5.5(a) is that there appears to be systematic 
differences between our non-exchange listed sample o f firms. Rule 144a firms are more 
profitable (although not significandy so), are larger, and are growing faster.
In the remaining rows o f  Table 5.5(a), I examine the differences in  country-level variables 
across the different sub-samples o f firms. First, French legal origin firms are more likely to 
cross-list on an organised exchange i.e. the means o f French law are significantly higher for firms 
that list as a Level 2/3 issue, compared to those that list either over-the-counter, or as a private 
placements. On the other hand, both English common and German civil law  firms tend to trade 
less frequently on organised exchanges. Specifically, the majority o f English common law  firms 
trade over-the-counter as Level 1 issues, while German civil law firms trade predominantly as 
private placements on the Portal.
N ext I compare the sample o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event 
time. In Table 5.6 I compare the value o f  cross-listed film s relative to non-cross-listed firms in 
each year from 1990 to 2003. I present two sets o f summary measures. First, for each listing 
type, I present mean and median value (q) for each year. In each column labeled ‘difference’, I 
test whether the mean and m edian valuation differences between the cross-listed and non-cross- 
listed firms are statistically significant in each year using standard tests. In the remaining 
columns, I outline yearly estimates o f the valuation difference between cross-listed and a matched 
sample o f non-cross-listed firms i.e. the cross-listing prem ium . A ll cross-listed firms are matched 
to non-cross-listed firms based upon size (total assets), growth (two-year sales growth), legal 
origin, and industry group using propensity score matching. L i and Zhao (2006, LZ Hereafter)
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adopt an identical approach in their study o f seasoned equity offerings. In the next section I 
outline the mechanics o f propensity score matching.
The summary measures presented in Table 5.6 are consistent w ith the findings o f DKS
(2006)27. Specifically, the m atching estimates suggest that exchange traded firms experience the 
largest cross-listing premium, relative to both Level 1 and Rule 144a cross-listed firms. N ext I 
find that the cross-listing prem ium tends to vary over time. For example, emerging market Level 
2/3 firms are worth more, but not statistically so in every period. The cross-listing prem ium is 
greatest for these firms in 1994. In contrast, for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, the valuation 
difference tends to vary from discount to premium over time.
I compare in Table 5.7, the value o f cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in  event 
time. In Panel A , I present for each listing type, the mean and m edian level o f value in an eleven 
year period around the time o f  cross-listing. I denote the listing year as Y ear 0, and compare the 
value o f cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in each year from five years pre-listing to five 
years post-listing. The mean and median difference between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
firms is calculated by taking the value o f each cross-listed firm in each year less the average 
performance o f non-cross-listed firms in the same year. Thus, I report the mean and median 
‘abnormal’ valuation between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. In Panel B, I supplement 
this w ith before-after m edian estimates for each variant o f our valuation metric. To facilitate a 
direct comparison between Tobin’s q and the other valuation ratios, I invert both earnings-to- 
price, and book-to-market value o f assets. To conserve space, I com ment only on the statistics 
for Tobin’s q. For each cross-listing sub-group, I calculate the change in value in each o f the five 
post-listing years, relative to each o f  three pre-listing years i.e. two-years (Year = -2), one year 
(Year = -1), and the list year (Year = 0). The value o f each depositary receipt level is depicted 
graphically in Figures 5.1-5.6.
27 DKS (2006) also examine the cross-listing premium across countries, stage o f economic development, and 
industry classification.
153
The results are consistent across both Panels and suggest the following. First, I find that 
Level 1 firms list after a period o f poor performance (i.e. falling value). Both the absolute and 
relative i.e. ‘abnormal’ value o f Level 1 firms, fall in every pre-listing period, and continues to fall 
post-listing. It appears that the greatest fall-off in value occurs in the pre-listing period. For 
example, over the course o f the eleven-year ‘w indow ’, the m ean Level 1 firm experiences an 
absolute decline in  value in the region o f 35%. However, 28% (or 74% o f the overall 
depreciation in value) occurs in the pre-listing period. Another interesting feature evident from 
Panel A  relates to the valuation difference between Level 1 and non-cross-listed firms. Unlike 
Level 2/3 firms (and probably Rule 144a firms if  I ignore their temporary ‘abnormal’ 
performance), Level 1 issues are worth significantly more than non-cross-listed firms (and Level 
2/3 firms) in the pre-listing period. Second, Rule 144a firms appear to ‘tim e’ their decision to 
trade in the U.S. Both the absolute and relative measures o f value, demonstrate that these firms 
experience a sizable appreciation pre-listing, which falls o ff post-listing. In fact, the fall-off is 
greater than the corresponding rise in value that occurs in the pre-listing period (i.e. the post­
listing value is significantly less than the pre-listing value, and the ‘abnonnal’ level o f value is 
significandy negative after five years post-listing). This result for Rule 144a firms is consistent 
w ith the findings o f GLS (2006). Finally, in contrast to the predictions o f the bonding 
hypothesis, exchange trading in the U.S. is not associated w ith a corresponding appreciation in 
firm value. However, unlike Level 1 firms, the fall-off in value appears not to begin in the pre- 
listing period. More specifically, in  the course o f the eleven-year event ‘w indow ’, the average 
exchange traded firm experiences a 16% depreciation in value. In the pre-listing period (Year = - 
5 to Year = 0), the mean value o f these firms only declines by 4%. Thus, it appears that, unlike 
Level 1 firms, Level 2/3 firms tend to experience the greatest fall-off in  value, post-listing. In the 
next section, I generate propensity score matches in  event time and estimate the average effect o f 
the treatment (listing) on the treated (cross-listed firms) for up to five years post-listing28.
28 In their study, LZ (2006, pg. 358) estimate separate propensity score models for each year. I carry out a similar
N ext I present by each listing type and country, pre and post-listing measure o f value. In 
Tables 5.8-5.11, I outline summary statistics related to each valuation metric. In Table 5.8, I 
present median q ratios for each country. For each I calculate the median q ratio for non-cross- 
listed and cross-listed firms over the full sample period. The m edian difference between cross­
listed and non-cross-listed firms is presented in column 4. In the rem aining columns o f Table 
5.8, I outline pre and post-listing median q ratios for all cross-listed, Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 
144a issues, respectively. In Tables 5.9 and 5.10, I undertake an identical analysis using book-to- 
market and earnings-to-price. The results are broadly similar across the valuation ratios. 
Consequently, I only discuss the results for q.
The summary statistics suggest sizable variation in value across countries. M edian q 
ranges from a low o f 0.75 for Brazil to a high o f  1.76 for Thailand. This range increases when I 
employ mean (unreported) rather than median q ratios. There exists a positive and statistically 
significant valuation differential between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms for 9 countries 
employed in our sample. I also document 6 statistically significant negative median differentials 
between both sets o f firms. For the rem aining four countries, I report a positive, but 
insignificant valuation difference.
I present in Table 5.12 a correlation coefficient matrix for all o f the firm and country- 
level variables employed. In the last column, I calculate variance-inflation factors in order to 
detect for any possible multicollinearity. In alm ost all instances the correlation coefficients are o f 
the correct sign, and are highly significant. For example, q is positively correlated w ith  G lobal 
industry q, accounting standards, judicial efficiency, anti-director rights, liquidity, and capital 
access, and is negatively correlated w ith the French civil law  dummy, which is in  line w ith 
predictions o f LLSV (2002). Second, I find that the country-level control variables are highly 
correlated w ith one another. For example, the anti-director rights measure and the level o f
exercise in Table 5.6. They refrain from estimating a pooled propensity score model over the entire period because 
o f  the year-by-year analysis provides a “flexible specification for business cycle” . Although I am aware o f  the 
limitations o f the pooled specification to adequately account for business cycle effects, I am primarily motivated in 
this paper to examine the valuation effects in event time, and no t in calendar time.
155
judicial efficiency measure are positively and significantly correlated (p = 0.63). In addition, the 
variance inflation factors for all o f the country level variables are large relative to those calculated 
for the firm-level variables, albeit perhaps not necessarily too harm ful (the general rule o f thumb 
is that m ulticollinearity is harm ful if  the V IF>10  (See Kennedy (2003)). G iven this, in  all 
regression specifications, I include these country-level controls separately29.
5.3 Estimation Methodology
Next I employ Petersens (2005) test procedure. The test procedure is outlined in  Section
3.4. I begin by testing for a firm effect. In Table 5 .1 3 ,1 present standard error estimates using each 
o f the before mentioned estimators for the following independent variables; dummy variables for 
Level 1 [OTC], Level 2/3 [EXCH], and Rule 144a [PORTAL] firms, two-year geometric average 
sales growth [Sales Growth], and Global Industry q [Industry q]. In all specifications, die 
independent variable is q. I document similar results when I employ either book-to-market or 
earnings-to-price as the valuation metric. As noted earlier, I present the standard error, and not the 
coefficient estimates.
The results from Table 5.13 suggest that there appears to be a firm effect in the data. 
The ratio o f Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm to W hite-H uber (1980) standard
errors f — ) are sizable different. For example, the standard errors o f each o f the depositary
receipt dummy variables clustered by firm are m ore than twice the W hite-Huber (1980) standard 
errors. For both continuous independent variables, diere is also evidence to suggest that both 
ordinary least squares and W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors consistently underestimate the 
‘true’ standard errors. In summary the evidence suggests the presence o f a firm effect in the 
data.
29 KKZ (2005) adopt a different approach. They form what they term an “investor rights factor” using factor 
analysis.
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N ext I test for the presence o f a time effect. I estimate Rogers (1993) standard errors 
clustered by time (year). In the last columns o f Table 5.14, I compare these standard errors to 
ordinary least squares, and White-Huber (1980) standard errors, respectively. Interestingly, the 
results from Table 5.14 differ across the independent variables. For example, for each depositary 
receipt dummy variable, the Rogers (1993) clustered by time and not the ordinary least squares, or 
the White (1980) standard errors, underestimate the ‘true’ standard error. In contrast, for both 
continuous independent variables, ordinary least squares, and ordinary least squares (with 
heteroscedastic corrections i.e. W hite (1980)) standard errors consistently underestimate the true 
standard error.
Finally, I account for both the firm and time effect, by including tim e fixed effects to 
absorb the time effect, and cluster by firm. The results are outlined in Table 5.15. I compare 
these standard errors to ordinary least squares, and W hite-H uber (1980) standard errors. The 
ratio o f Rogers (1993) standard errors to ordinary least squares and Wdiite-Huber (1980) standard
errors i.e.
^  SE-Rogcrs I
V S E q l s L
’
are outlined in the last and next to last columns o f Table 5.15. I
also report whether the coefficient estimates are statistically significant under the different 
estimators. I do so in order to highlight d ie importance o f correcdy adjusting standard errors for 
arbitrary within-cluster correlation. Failure to do so dramatically alters the conclusions that I 
draw from the analysis.
In this section I examine the effect o f cross listing on firm value. I begin with the 
following specification, whereby I m odel firm value as a function o f  firm characteristics:
qit =  80 + X itP + 5 tO T C k +  ô2EXCH,t +  0 3P O R T A L lt + c, +  u it (5.1)
W here X jt is a set o f exogenous observable characteristics o f the firm, O T C it, E X C H jt, 
P O R T A L jtare standard dummy variables that take the value o f 1 i f  the firm trades in  the 
United States as a Level 1, Level 2/3, or under Rule 144a on Portal, respectively. c ; is
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unobserved heterogeneity and Uit is a standard idiosyncratic disturbance term. Finally, 
{a, P, 81; 5, , 83} is a vector o f parameters to be estimated.
In line w ith, amongst others, DKS (2004), and LLM  (2003), I explicidy acknowledge the 
non-randomness o f the cross-listed sample, and m odel their decision to cross-list as follows:
cL*t = yzit +T|it
CLit = 1 if CL*t > 0 (5.2)
CLit = 0 if CL*t < 0
W here CLit is an unobserved latent variable, and Z it is a set o f observable firm-level 
characteristics that determine the decision to cross-list in the United States, and T|,t is a 
disturbance term. In addition, OTCj(,EXCHit,PORTALjt E CLit. Selection bias arises 
because o f the correlation between OTCit,EXCHjt,PORTALlt and u jr  This correlation
can arise in two instances i.e. (1) selection on observables which arises through correlation
between Z jt a n d u it, or (2) through selection on unobservables i.e. correlation between T|it 
a n d u it. Both instances render ordinary least squares estimates o f the effect o f cross listing on 
value, biased.
I use three different approaches in order to control for selection bias. First, I begin by 
exploiting the panel nature o f our sample and use a fixed-effects estimator to estimate equation 
(1). In doing so, I explicitly assume that the unobservables are time-invariant. In addition, I 
m ust assume that the unobservables, in  addition to being time-invariant, have no causal effect in 
precipitating cross listing (See LP (2005)).
Second, I estimate two treatment effects models. First I assume that the decision to 
cross-list in  the United States is a function o f observable firm-level characteristics. I m ake the 
strong assumption that the decision to cross-list is not driven by unobservable factors i.e. private 
information. I estimate the average effect o f the treatment on the treated (ATT) by matching
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those firms that cross-list w ith  a non-cross-listed firm w ith  a sim ilar propensity score. The ATT 
ts the difference in value between the cross-listed and matched non-cross-listed firm.
Third, I relax the assumption that the decision to cross-list is not driven by unobservable 
characteristics. I estimate a treatment effects model, whereby I augm ent the second stage 
equation with a selection correction term namely the inverse m ills ratio.
5.3.1 Fixed-Effects Estimation
I begin w ith a standard fixed-effects specification. I augm ent equation 5.1 with time- 
fixed effects and estimate the following two-way fixed effects m odel30:
q ,t = 5 0 + 5 ,O T C it + 5 2E X C H it + 5 3P O R T A L jt + a t + c ( + u t (5.3)
Where in addition to the variables and coefficients outlined earlier, 0Ct are standard time-fixed 
effects that account for contemporaneous correlation. Like Chapter 4 , 1 estimate a distributed lag 
version of 5.3:
q.t = 8. + ¿5 ,O T C - + ¿S .EX C H - + ¿5.PORTAL-, + c, + V .  (5.4)
s=0 t=0 t=0
W here O T C jt ,E X C H -t ,P O R T A t y  = 1  i f  f is s  years after the firm lists in  the U.S. Finally, 
and as I do in Chapter 4, I estimate a pooled version given our concerns over violations o f strict 
exogeneity11. I specify the individual specific effects as M undlak (1978) corrections:
c, =  X £  +  a., where X, = (5-5)
*  S = 1
Substituting 5.5 into equation 5.4 yields the following:
q it = 5 0 + X it|3 + 5 ,O T C t + 5 2E X C H it + 5 3P O R T A L it +  X £  +  (5.6)
30 The results from both the standard Hausman (1978) test, and Mundlak (1978) auxiliary regression specification 
confirm that in this instance a random effects specification is not appropriate.
31 I formally test for this possibility, following Wooldridge (2002), by inserting the one-year forwarded cross-listing 
variables as independent variables and testing whether their coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
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W here the variables are as before. X |( is a vector o f firm and industry control (two-year average 
sales growth and G lobal Industry q). Equation 5.6 is estimated using pooled ordinary least 
squares yielding consistent estimates. In addition to estimating both 5.4 and 5.6, I allow for the 
valuation effects to differ in each post-listing period; in  equations 5.4 and 5.6 I restrict the effects 
o f listing to be homogenous in  each post-listing period. For example, in  the cased o f the pooled 
ordinary least squares (with M undlak (1978) corrections), I estimate the following:
q , =  8„ + x „ p ,  + ¿ P . o t c ; , + ¿ p , e x c h ; ,  +  ¿ p . p o r t a l ' , ,  + x £  +  y ,  (5.7)
s=0 t=0 t=0
I also estimate a similar model using fixed-effects estimation. The vector X it remains unchanged 
from the previous specification.
5.3.2 Propensity Score M atching
I begin by oudining exacdy what I would like to measure. Let Aq = qCL — qNCL define
the valuation benefits o f listing for firms, where q rl denotes the valuation outcome o f cross 
listing, and CL e (OTC, EXCH, PORTAL),  qNCL denotes the unobservable counterfactual. I 
employ a propensity score-matching estimator to estimate qNCL ■ The notation is taken from BC
(2000).
I construct the counterfactual outcome by matching cross listing and non-cross-listing 
firms with similar observable characteristics, ex-ante. X  is a vector o f observable firm 
characteristics, which includes a set o f non-mutually exclusive observable characteristics that 
affect both (1) program participation, and (2) im pact upon the outcome variable q CL. The 
fundamental assumption underlying matching, the Conditional Independence Assum ption (CL\) 
relies crucially on the selection o f the appropriate vector o f observables. This assumption states 
that the assignment (D )  conditional on observable factors X is  independent o f potential firm
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values qCL,qNCL i.e. g iv e n X , one can use non-cross-listed (non-treated) firms to estimate the 
counterfactual, Y 0 . Given X ,  I estimate the effect o f the treatment on the treated (ATT), 
E (qcL  — q v c l I E  = The vector o f observable characteristics, X a re ; size (total assets),
sales growth (defined as the two-year average sales growth), legal origin, lagged firm value (q), 
and industry dummies based upon primary standard industry classification codes. I begin with a 
parsimonious probit model, whereby I match firms based on size and industry. In subsequent 
matches, I augment this w ith  sales growth, legal origin, and lagged q, respectively'2.
Firm value, q (L associated with cross listing in  the U.S. can be written as a function of
observables (T )  and unobservables U E :
q CL = S cl(T )  + U E (5.8)
W here (U E) = 0  and g E is a non-stochastic function. The m ean effect o f cross listing on firm 
value for each firm w ith  observable characteristics X  is given by:
E ( q CL — qNCL I d  = = g a X -^ -)— § n c l(-^ -) e  e ( u Cl  — e n c l | x , d  — i )  (5 .9)
And the average effect o f cross listing is given by:
M
fE( ^ - ^ | D r rX )dF (X .D ;l)  
!  I d F ( X ,D  = l )
C L
S is a subset o f the support o f X  given D  = 1 . Let I L denote the set o f indices for cross-listed 
firms an d q CL is as before. The causal effect o f cross listing on firm value for each f irm i, 
w h e re i€  I CL is obtained by comparing C]cl , the average value o f a cross-listed firm to the 
average value o f a matched non-cross-listed firm, q NCL where j £ I NCL ■ Each cross-listed firm is
32 The adoption o f two (or more) different specifications o f  the probit model acts as an important diagnostic check 
o f our model. Specifically, Deheija (2005) provides an empirical example demonstrating that the validity o f  the 
estimates o f  the impact o f  the treatment relies crucially on the robustness o f our estimates o f  the ATT to different 
specifications o f the probit model. Large changes in the estimated ATT resulting from small changes in the probit 
specification would rule against the use o f  propensity score matching in the given context.
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matched to its ‘nearest’ non-cross-listed firm and may be m atched to more than one non-cross- 
listed firm if  more than one is identified. The change in value for each firm is then given by:
qcL, -  E  WCL(i,j)qPCL| (5.11)
j^NCL
Where WCL (i, j) is a positive weight function such that the weight sum to 1. Aggregating across 
firms, the average effect o f cross listing on value is given by:
M ( C L , p , S ) = ^ - X q CLi -  J ]  WCL(l,j)qpNCL| (5.12)
C L  ¡elcL
NC1_ and N ncl is the number o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in Ir;I and INCL
respectively. I employ ‘Nearest-Neighbour’ matching to match the listed and non-listed firms.
Nearest-neighbour matching begins by defining a neighbourhood C (X t) for firm i w h e re i€  ICL. 
Neighbours are chosen for each f irm i such that for each non-cross-listed 
f irm ( je  I NCL,X j  e  C (X ,) ) -
5.3.3 Treatment Effects
In this section I outline a standard treatment effects model, whereby I correct for the 
probability o f listing based upon unobservable factors. This approach is similar, but not identical 
to the standard Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure33. I begin by referring to 
Equation 5.2. N ow I assume that the decision to cross-list in  the United States is a function of 
unobservable characteristics. CK (2002), CW  (2005), and VA (2006) estimate sim ilar ‘pooled 
Heckman’ models. Thus, the im pact on firm value conditional on being cross-listed in the 
United States as:
E(q,t | CL,t =  1) =  80 +  x it(3, + S,CLit +  E (u t I CL,t =  1) (5.13)
33 Technically, the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure is no t a treatment effects model. In addition to the
standard Heckman (1979) model, a treatment effects model includes, unlike the Heckman (1979) model, the
selection indicator from the first stage probit as a regressor in the second-stage regression.
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Given 5.2 and assuming that the eirors terms from both Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are bivariate 
normal, the unobservable component from equation 5.2, the generalised residual from the probit 
model is defined as:
E (q jt|C L it= l )  =  p a A ( p Z it) (5.14)
where:
X.(P4,) = ^ f ^  PIS)<KPzit)
The latter is commonly referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio. In the second-stage estimation, I 
add this selection-correction term, yielding the following:
+  x icPt +  s , C L it +  ^ , P 2 +  q  +  (5-16)
In addition, I specify the unobserved heterogeneity as in M undlak (1978) i.e.
    |  t
C( = + a ; , w h e r e  X [ = —  ^ X i t , and estimate the following:
T s=i
q it = S 0 + X jt(3, + 5 ,C L it + 4- X jS  + Dlt (5.17)
In their pooled ‘H eckm an’ specification, DKLN (2005) control for unobserved heterogeneity by 
estimating least squared dummy variable model, whereby, as the name suggests they include a 
dummy-variable for each firm34. Given the disadvantage o f using this approach in large samples, 
I specify the unobserved heterogeneity by including M undlak (1978) correction terms as an 
additional set o f regressors in Equation 5.17. The results for each estimation procedure are 
presented in the following section.
5.4 Results
The results are outlined in Tables 5.16-5.20. In Table 5.16, I present the results 
corresponding to equations 5.3, 5.6, and 5.17. For each depositary receipt level, I present ordinary
34 I would like to thank both Kathryn Dewenter and Walter Novaes for clarifying to me their estimation procedure.
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least squares, pooled ordinary least squares, firm fixed effects, and treatment effect estimates o f the 
impact o f cross listing on value. In all regressions, I only include those firms with average total 
assets greater than one hundred million U.S. dollars, calculated over the entire sample period, in 
order to facilitate a greater comparison between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. In Table 
5.17, I examine the valuation effects o f cross listing by level o f domestic investor protection. 
Finally, in Tables 5.18 and 5.19, I examine die distribution o f value in the post-listing period using 
estimates o f the average effect o f the treatment on the treated.
I begin with a discussion of the results presented in Table 5.16. First, unlike DKS (2004) 
and KKZ (2005), exchange cross-listed firms do not on average receive a higher valuation 
compared with non-cross-listed firms. Except for the fixed effect estimates, I find that on average 
listing in the U.S. is not associated with enhanced value. Given the violation of strict exogoneity 
for the firm fixed effects estimates I lend more credence to the least squares ordinary (with firm 
level controls for growth opportunities), pooled least squares, and treatment effect estimates.
Interestingly, I find that in  the treatment effects models, the inclusion o f the inverse mills 
ratio, increases the magnitude o f the estimated coefficient, and reduces its standard error. 
However, in both instances, the coefficient estimate for Level 2/3 firms remains statistically 
insignificant (albeit marginally so). The sign o f the inverse mills ratio is also interesting. Unlike 
DKS (2004), DKLN (2005), and BF (2006) the estimated coefficient is positive, and statistically 
different from 2ero. This suggests that the unobservable factors that govern the decision to 
exchange cross-list, also serves to impact positively on firm value.
Next I examine whether cross listing in  the U.S. confers any valuation benefits on non­
exchange-traded firms. The predictions from both the recognition and the legal bonding 
hypotheses suggest that listing in the U.S. should not be associated with enhanced value for these 
firms. M y results are consistent with these predictions. First, and in line w ith the event time 
‘performance adjusted’ valuation statistics presented earlier, Level 1 over-the-counter firms are 
valued similar to non-cross-listed firms. Although the signs differ across the different estimators, in
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all specifications, the estimated ‘Level T coefficient remains statistically insignificant. Y et again the 
sign o f the inverse mills ratio is positive, but in  this instance, insignificant I document similar 
findings for Rule 144a firms. The least squares and treatment effects estimates suggest that these 
firms are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms. In common with Level 2/3 
firms, I find that the coefficient estimate for the inverse mills ratio is significantly positive. In all 
regressions, I find that the industry growth rate, proxied by global industry q, and firm growth 
impact positively on firm value.
In Table 5.20, I present a series o f pooled least squares estimates with country controls. 
The results are the same as those just outlined: Level 1 firms are worth less (albeit insignificantiy), 
exchange-listed Level 2/3 issues are worth more, but insignificantiy so. The results for Rule 144a 
are as before. The sign o f the coefficient estimates for the country-level control variables are in line 
with m y prior expectations: relative to English common law firms, German and French civil law 
firms are worth less. This is entirely consistent with the findings o f LLSV (2002). Firm value is 
increasing in the index o f accounting standards, judicial efficiency, anti-director rights, overall 
market liquidity, and capital access. In all regressions the country/ level controls remain highly 
significant.
In summary, the results thus far that exchange-cross-listing in the U.S. does not appear to 
be associated with enhanced value for emerging market firms. In all specifications, I find that 
exchange-traded firms are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms. The results 
are in line with the summary measures that I presented earlier: in calendar, and event time, 
exchange-traded firms are valued on a par w ith non-exchange traded firms. Results for the non­
exchange-traded sample are in line with the predictions o f the recognition and bonding hypotheses; 
cross listing in the U.S. is not associated with enhanced value for these firms’5. In the following 
sections, I take the analysis a step further. First, I sub-divide each depositary receipt level by legal
35 When I employ book-to-market and earnings-to-price as our valuation metric, I reach stronger conclusions. For 
example, for both metrics we find that exchange-traded firms are worth more, and Rule 144a firms less. I find 
conflicting results for Level 1 firms.
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regime and examine the effects o f listing on value for each. Finally, I present conditional estimates 
of the effect o f listing on value in event time using matching and distributed lag methods.
Next I turn my attention towards examining the relative valuation benefits o f listing across 
different legal regimes. Over the last decade the evidence in respect to the benefits across different 
legal regimes/level o f investor protection has been mixed. For example, Miller (1999) documents 
empirical support in favour o f the theoretical predictions developed by BB (2006); the valuation 
effects o f [exchange] cross listing are larger the poorer the level o f investor protection in the 
domestic, non-U.S. economy. In contrast KKZ (2005) suggest that the valuation gains to exchange 
listing are greater for firms from high investor protection countries15. I examine the valuation 
benefits o f listing across different ‘investor protection regimes’ for all three listing levels. I adopt 
two approaches: in Panel A , I interact a ‘high investor protection’ dummy with each cross-listing 
dummy, and provide pooled ordinary least squares and ordinary least squares estimates. Country- 
level investor protection is defined in teim s of LLSV’s (1998) anti-director rights index. I present 
two sets o f results based upon above and below median domestic legal protection. In Panel B, I 
present a series o f pooled ordinary least squares estimates o f the im pact o f listing by sub-sets o f 
firms based upon legal characteristics. I employ three legal characteristics; anti-director rights 
index, judicial efficiency, and English common law . A ll variables are sourced from LLSV (1998) 
and are defined earlier. I estimate models for subsets o f firms classified in terms of being above or 
below the median value o f each index. The median values are calculated based upon the number of 
countries in the sample.
I begin w ith a discussion o f Panel A. In columns 1-3, I interact each listing dummy with a 
‘high investor protection’ dummy, where firms are classified as domiciled in a high protection 
regime of the anti-director rights measure is 4 or greater. Low investor protection firms have a 
ranking o f  3 and below. For example, Argentina, Chile, Flong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore,
35 BB (2006) also contends that firms from high investor protection countries are more likely to [exchange] cross-list 
in the U.S. K K Z (2005) find empirical support in favour o f this prediction. Using logit analysis they outline how 
high investor protection firms are more likely to list on an exchange than low investor protection firms. Low 
investor protection firms are more likely to list, either as a Level 1, or Rule 144a ADR.
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and South Africa have an anti-director rights index equal to 4 or above. In the remaining columns, 
I interact each listing dummy with the ‘low investor protection’ dummy.
I begin with a discussion of the results for ‘high investor protection’ firms. In line with my 
earlier findings, the joint coefficient estimates suggest that both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are 
worth less (albeit insignificantly so) in  the post-listing period. For example, the pooled ordinary 
least squares estimate (with firm controls) for Level 1 firms is -0 .13  (-0.0444 —0.0833). Though 
statistically insignificant, the negative valuation effects o f cross listing appear to be less severe for 
Level 1 firms from low investor protection countries. I document similar, but stronger results for 
Rule 144a firms: in line with my earlier findings, die (pooled ordinary least squares) coefficient 
estimates o f ‘Rule 144a’ and ‘Rule 144a*AD’ sum to —0.15. Unlike Level 1 firms, the coefficient 
estimates are oppositely signed suggesting that the valuation effects o f listing differ across different 
investor protection regimes. This result suggests that Rule 144a firms from low investor countries 
experience a positive and significant valuation effect, post-listing (‘Rule 144a’ = 0.1703**, ‘Rule 
144a*AD’ = -0.3240***). While this is consistent w ith the finding for Level 1 firms, low investor 
protection Rule 144a firms experience, in contrast, positive valuation effects, post-listing. M y 
findings for both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are similar across bodt sub-samples, and across the 
different econometric specifications.
Finally, I discuss the results for Level 2/3. The pooled ordinary least squares and ordinary 
least squares estimates suggest that Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms are worth more, albeit 
insignificantiy so, in  the post-listing period. There is weak evidence to suggest that, in contrast to 
both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, the greatest valuation gains o f listing accrue to high investor, not 
low investor protection firms. KKZ (2005) reach similar, albeit stronger conclusions (the 
coefficient on the interaction o f exchange list and low disclosure is significandy negative) in their 
analysis. The results are identical when I interact our listing dummies with ‘low investor protection’ 
dummies’.
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In order to examine whether my results are robust to the classification o f firms, I outline in 
Panel B, pooled ordinary least squares estimates o f the impact o f listing by sub-sets o f firms based 
upon legal characteristics. In almost every instance, the results documented in Panel B are in line 
w ith those in Panel A. For example, for all cross-listed firms, the previous results are replicated 
when I classify firms according to ‘Judicial Efficiency’. Furthermore, below median Rule 144a 
firms are worth more in the post-listing period. W hen I classify firms as ‘English Common Law’ or 
‘Non-English Common Law’. I find very differing results between the non-exchange depositary 
receipts. Non-English Common Law Level 1 and Rule 144a experience contrasting fortunes in the 
post-listing period; on the one hand, non-English Common Law Level 1 firms experience a 
statistically significant fall in value post-listing. In contrast, civil law  Rule 144a firms experience 
significandy enhanced value, post-listing. Finally, in  line with KKZ (2005), I document stronger 
conclusions than earlier when I classify exchange-listed depositary receipts as English common law, 
or not. The results suggest that the benefits to exchange listing in the United States only accrue to 
firms with an English Common law tradition. Tins finding is consistent with the prevailing view 
that the benefits to exchange cross listing is greatest for those firms w ith the lowest initial costs o f 
compliance, and continued adherence to U.S. G.A.A.P. So while on theoretical grounds the 
benefits to exchange listing in the United States should be greatest for firms from low disclosure 
regimes (e.g. BB (2006)), the costs associated with such only serve to render the perceived net 
benefits neutral, or even negative37. In contrast, my results suggest that the greatest benefits to a 
non-exchange U.S. listing accrue to firms domiciled in  low disclosure regimes. Although the results 
are weak for Level 1 firms, I document statistically significant enhanced value in the post-listing 
period for low-disclosure domiciled Rule 144a firms.
Finally, I examine whether the valuation gains/losses from listing in the U.S. are equally 
distributed in the post-listing period (as I assume in my dummy variable construct in equations 5.3,
37 Bris, Cantale, and Nishiotis (2005) quote the example in their paper that ITV, the British T.V. broadcaster 
deregistered its stock from U.S. markets in 2005 because the reporting obligations imposed by the SEC were “very 
cosdy”. ITV calculate the monetary saving as $13 million USD over a two-year period.
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5.6, and 5.7) or whether differences exist in post-listing event time. To do so, I provide two sets of 
estimates. First, I outline in Table 5.18, estimates o f the average effect o f the treatment on the 
treated (ATT) for all listed firms, up to five-years post-listing. Finally I estimate pooled ordinary 
least squares distributed lag model. The results are presented in  Table 5.19.
In Table 5.18, I outline up to five years post-listing, the average effect o f the treatment on 
the treated for a matched sample o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. In Panels A, B and C I 
estimate the ATT based upon different propensity score (probit) specifications. In Panel D, I test 
die robustness o f our findings to different pre-listing match dates. I begin with a discussion of 
Panels A, B, and C. In Panels A-C, I estimate for all cross-listed, and for each different cross-listing 
level, different first-step probit specifications. In the second-step, I estimate for each year up to 
five years post-listing, the average effect o f the treatment on die treated. For each year, I provide 
the number o f cross-listed firms, and the corresponding number o f matched non-cross-listed firms. 
For example, in Panel A , I estimate the ATT on the year o f listing by matching 367 cross-listed 
firms to 301 non-cross-listed firms. The number o f matches tends to decrease as I employ a less 
parsimonious probit specification in Panels B and C. DKLN (2005) experience a similar situation 
in their study. In all probit specifications, I include time dummies in order to match firms (within 
our panel data structure) in the same year, and impose a common support condition to improve the 
quality o f our matches. In Panels A-C, I match firms on the year o f listing.
I begin with a discussion o f the results reported in Panel A. Here, I model the decision to 
list as a function o f firm size and industry membership. The results from the first-stage probit 
models suggest that for each depositary receipt, firm size is an important determinant o f listing in 
the U.S. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g. PRZ (2002), CKS (2003)). In the second- 
stage, I estimate die average effect o f listing on listed firms for each year up to five-years, post­
listing. First, I find that for all listed firms [Cross-List], the valuation benefits to listing in the U.S. 
materialise immediately: in the year, and the year immediately following listing. Thereafter, die
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‘cross-listing- premium’ dissipates: after two years o f listing, cross-listed are no longer valued greater 
than non-cross-listed firms.
The results for Level 2/3 issues are similar. The causal effect o f  listing on value is 
immediate, but transitory. For example, in the year o f listing, the m ean valuation difference 
between exchange-listed and non-listed firms is a statistically significant 0.412. In contrast, in the 
year immediately post-listing, the valuation difference is an insignificant 0.193. Thereafter, the 
valuation difference decreases further, and remains statistically insignificant. Next I find no 
(significant) valuation effect for Level 1 firms. They are valued more highly in the year o f listing, 
but die difference is statistically insignificant (albeit only marginally). In all subsequent years, Level 
1 firms are valued on a par with non-cross-listed firms. As outlined earlier, I exercise caution in 
interpreting the findings for Rule 144a firms. In fact, the results in Panels B-C, lend further 
evidence to the market-timing hypothesis. In Panel A , I find that these firms enjoy a significant 
‘valuation premium’ over non-cross-listed firms. I consciously do not term this a ‘cross-listing 
premium’ because the evidence is more consistent with market timing, and not bonding, 
segmentation, or liquidity hypotheses. The subsequent value o f these firms lends further credence 
to this argument. For example, in the years immediately following listing, these firms experience a 
dramatic decline in value relative to a matched sample o f non-cross-listed firms. In fact, the decline 
is so severe that the significant ‘valuation premium’ o f 0.577 documented in  the year o f listing, 
evolves into a statistically significant ‘valuation discount’ after five years o f listing (-0.192).
To shed further light on this, I match these firms with corresponding non-cross-listed 
firms, in different pre-listing periods. I hypothesise that if  these firms do time their decision to list 
in the U.S., the valuation difference between Rule 144a and a matched sample o f non-cross-listed 
firms on the year o f listing should be increasing in the number o f years prior to listing that I match 
these firms. Thus, I match Rule 144a firms with non-cross-listed firms in three different periods in 
the pre-listing period; the list year, two-years, and four-years pre-listing. A ll firms are matched on 
firm size, growth, and legal origin. In the case o f Level 1 and Level 2/3 exchange listed firms, I
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match these firms on the list year, one and two-years, pre-listing. The results are presented in Panel 
D. The results for Rule 144a firms are largely supportive o f the market-timing hypothesis: relative 
to a matched sample o f films, Rule 144a firms experience a run-up in value in the years 
immediately prior to listing. Consistent with the market timing hypothesis, and regardless o f the 
pre-listing matching period, these firms experience a sizable decline in  value, post-listing. In 
addition, the results for both Level 1 and Level 2/3 issues are robust to the choice o f pre-listing 
matching period.
In Panels B and C, I augment die original first-stage probit specification w id i additional 
firm and country level variables that determine participation in U.S. capital markets. In Panel B, I 
model the decision to list as a function of size, industry, growth (two-year average sales growth), 
and legal origin (French and Gernian civil law). In Panel C, I augment this specification with lagged 
q, which is consistent w id i the earlier arguments concerning the impact o f feedback effects on the 
decision to cross-list. The results presented in Panel B are largely similar to those presented in 
Panel A. For all cross-listed firms, I again document immediate but transitory ‘cross-listing premia1. 
Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms experience a similar trend in value. However, there does exist 
some important differences in the estimates outlined in Panel B, relative to those documented in 
Panel A. First, exchange-listed issues are not worth significantiy m ore in the listing year. The 
estimates coefficient is positive (0.315), but insignificant. However, although the valuation premia 
are insignificant in  all subsequent post-listing time periods, they are, however, o f a magnitude 
greater than those documented earlier. For example, in the fifth year o f listing, the valuation 
difference is 0.147. compared to an earlier figure o f 0.024. In the case o f Rule 144a firms, I again 
document a decline in value, post-listing. However, the documented decline in value is not 
immediate, and only materialises in the fourth year after listing. Finally, for Level 1 firms, I 
document, like earlier, no significant valuation differences in the post-listing period.
In Panel C, I include lagged q as an additional determinant o f listing in the U.S. The results 
for Level 1 firms are similar to those documented earlier. For Level 2/3 firms, the valuation
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premium in the year o f listing disappears. In fact, I find no significant valuation difference in any 
post-listing period. In the case o f Rule 144a firms, I find no valuation difference in the year o f 
listing, given the inclusion o f lagged q in the participation equation. W ith the exception o f two- 
years post-listing, there exists no significant valuation premium or discount in the post-listing 
period.
Finally, in Table 5.19, I estimate distributed lag models by level o f investor protection38. I 
classify firms as domiciled in either high or low investor protection countries. In columns 1-3, I 
estimated distributed lag models for ‘high investor protection’ firms. In the remaining columns, I 
present estimates for ‘low investor protection’ firms. For both sets o f firms, I provide two sets o f 
estimates. First, I estimate the distributed lag model for all firms. N ext for each set o f firms I only 
include those with similar levels o f domestic investor protection. Thus, for ‘high investor 
protection’ firms I only include non-cross-listed firms also from ‘high investor protection’ 
countries. I adopt the same approach for ‘low investor protection’ firms.
I begin with a discussion o f the results for ‘high investor protection’ firms. Consistent with 
the findings documented in Table 5.18, there is evidence to suggest that the greatest valuation gains 
to exchange-listing in the U.S. accrue to firms that trade on domestic markets where investors are 
highly protected. In contrast to the matching estimates (and unreported distributed lag models for 
all firms), the gains to listing are longer lasting. More specifically, the valuation gains last up to two 
years post-listing, and remain positive (but insignificantly so) up to five years post-listing. This 
contrasts notably with the matching estimates where in some instances; the valuation gains only
38 In unreported results I also estimate distributed lag models for our full set o f firms. The conditional estimates are 
by and large consistent with the ‘unconditional’ time-series plots outlined in Figures 5.1-5.6, and the before-after 
median statistics presented earlier, and are largely similar to the matching estimates presented earlier. More 
specifically, I find that for Level 2 /3  firms the valuation effects o f listing are immediate, but transitory. This is in line 
with Figures 5.1 and 5.2; value, as measured by q, is positive (but insignificant) only in the year immediately following 
listing. Level 1 firms remain valued at a statistically insignificant discount in every post-listing period. In addition, 
the magnitude o f the cross-listing discount is increasing in the num ber o f years post-listing. Finally, one should 
exercise caution in interpreting the findings for Rule 144a firms. The time-series behaviour in value experienced by 
these firms in the pre and post-listing periods, as outlined in Figures 5.1-5.6, provides anecdotal evidence consistent 
with the market-timing hypothesis (e.g. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006, HJW Hereafter)). In effect, it 
remains difficult to separate these transitory valuation effects from the true effect o f  listing on value, because the 
upward trend in value, and the fall-off thereafter, is probably no t found for comparable, non-cross-listed firms.
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accrue on the listing year, and were insignificantly negative after five years o f listing. The results 
also contrast with the findings for ‘low investor protection’ exchange traded firms documented in 
the remaining columns o f Table 5.19. When I compare these firms to a corresponding sample o f 
non-cross-listed firms (from ‘low investor protection’ regimes), I find that they are worth on 
average less, and in some instances statistically significantly less. A lthough the valuation differences 
for ‘high investor protection’ firms are insignificandy different from zero in the post-listing period 
(i.e. when I compare these firms to non-cross-listed firms from ‘high investor protection’ regimes), 
the results, nevertheless are consistent with the findings o f KKZ (2005): exchange-traded firms that 
trade domestically on markets where investors are highly protected39 experience the greatest 
valuation gains from listing in the U.S.
Finally I examine the post-listing valuation effects for non-exchange traded firms. W hen I 
compare these firms to non-cross-listed ‘high investor protection’ domiciled firms, I reach similar 
conclusions to earlier. First, the results for Rule 144a firms suggest that cross-listed firms from 
‘high investor protection’ regimes experience the greatest fall-off in  value post-listing. In contrast, 
while firms from ‘low  investor protection’ regimes also experience a fall-off in value post-listing, 
relative to their counterpart non-cross-listed firms, the valuation difference is always positive (albeit 
not always significandy so). This suggests that Rule 144a firms from ‘high investor protection’ 
regimes experience the greatest fall-off in value. Finally, for Level 1 firms, I find very litde 
difference across the different investor protection regimes. There does appear to be slighdy better 
performance by high investor protection firms, but the differences are very small. Consequendy, 
the conclusions drawn for Level 1 firms are the same that I drew from the analysis presented in 
Table 5.18.
35 When I compare these firms to non-cross-listed “high investor protection’ firms, the valuation differences are not 
significandy different from zero. In fact, the difference is negative (but insignificant) after five years o f listing, which 
is in line with the matching estimates. The results are consistent given that in the matching estimates we also match 
firms based upon legal origin.
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In this chapter I examine the valuation gains to cross listing in  event time for a panel o f 
emerging m arket firms cross-listed in the U.S. I abstract from the traditional event-study 
approach, and examine the relative valuation effects o f cross listing using valuation metrics. I 
explicitly account for selection-bias, by estimating the effect o f listing on value firm fixed-effects, 
matching, and treatment effect estimators. M y m ain findings are as follows. First, and perhaps, 
m ost importantly is that w hile the ‘cross-listing prem ium ’ docum ented by DKS (2004, 2006) 
persists in calendar time for exchange-traded firms, it fails to persist in  event time. Results from 
both my matching and distributed lag estimates suggest that the valuation gains to listing are 
immediate, but short-lived. More precisely, I find that the greatest gains to exchange listing occur 
on the year o f listing, but fall-off thereafter. I do however uncover some evidence to suggest 
that, in line w ith KKZ (2005), die magnitude o f the ‘cross-listing prem ium ’ for exchange-listed 
firms is positively related to the level o f investor protection domestically. This result is probably 
best explained in  terms o f the costs associated w ith exchange listing, which in relative terms are 
larger for firms trading in  countries where investors are poorly protected. The results suggest 
that at least in the context o f emerging market firms, cross listing does not cause value. In effect, 
there is no ‘cross listing prem ium ’. In a related paper, C larkson, Nowland, and Ragunathan 
(2006, pg. 17, CN R Hereafter) conclude in  their study o f internationally listed Asian firms that 
“there is no such thing as a cross listing prem ium ”.
For non-exchange traded depositary receipts, I document in  line with previous studies, no 
such valuation effects. There is some evidence diat suggests that the greatest gains to listing accrue 
to non-exchange traded firms from low-disclosure regimes. However, for both sets o f firms, the 
valuation gains remain statistically indifferent from zero.
5.5 C oncluding Remarks
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Table 5.1: Sample Description.
Country Nt:i. s it: r> % Level i % Level 2/3 % Rule 144a °A Total CL Samnlc
Argentina 60 7 1.31 0 0.00 11 7.75 5 2.76 16 76
Brazil 246 29 5.39 26 10.00 25 17.61 3 1.66 54 300
Chile 113 35 2.48 2 0.77 17 11.97 2 1.10 21 134
China 89 4 1.95 8 3.08 12 8.45 4 2.21 24 113
Colombia 27 6 0.59 1 0.38 1 0.70 4 2.21 6 33
Hong Kong 540 167 11.83 97 37.31 7 4.93 1 0.55 105 645
Hungary 23 4 0.50 2 0.77 1 0.70 9 4.97 12 35
India 278 23 6.09 5 1.92 9 6.34 50 27.62 64 342
Israel 83 16 1.82 1 0.38 8 5.63 0 0.00 9 92
Korea 636 74 13.94 4 1.54 7 4.93 20 11.05 31 667
Malaysia 638 153 13.98 12 4.62 0 0.00 0 0.00 12 650
Mexico 71 14 1.56 18 6.92 25 17.61 11 6.08 54 125
Peru 45 8 0.99 3 1.15 1 0.70 1 0.55 5 50
Philippines 110 70 2.41 5 1.92 1 0.70 6 3.31 12 122
Poland 56 15 1.23 1 0.38 1 0.70 11 6.08 13 69
Singapore 407 67 8.92 19 7.31 1 0.70 1 0.55 21 428
South Africa 313 151 6.86 37 14.23 8 5.63 3 1.66 48 361
Taiwan 404 60 8.85 0 0.00 6 4.23 42 23.20 48 452
Thailand 296 98 6.49 14 5.38 0 0.00 1 0.55 15 311
Turkev 128 30 2.81 5 1.92 1 0.70 7 3.87 13 141
T o ta l 4,563 1,031 100% 260 100% 142 100% 181 100% 583 5,146
This table outlines the final. The final sample is arrived at after imposing the following restrictions on our original sample: (1) I exclude all firms with missing SIC data (2) All firms 
with total assets less than $10 Million, and (3) financial firms (SIC beginning with 6 )(non-cross-listed only). To enable matching for financial cross-listed firms, I include a set o f 
non-cross-listed financial firms (outlined in column 3). These firms are not included in out valuation regression analysis. All firms are obtained from the Worldscope Country Lists. 
All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. 
Rule 144a ADRs trade on Portal; Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ.
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Table 5.2: Sample Description by Industry Classification.
Industrv Classification NCI, % Level 1 % Level 2 /3 % S E C  H u le
144a
Si T o ta l C L % Sample %
Agriculture and Food 370 8 .1 1 1 0 3.85 5 3.52 8 4.42 23 3.95 393 7.64
Mining and Construction 335 7.34 2 0 7.69 9 6.34 3 1 .6 6 32 5.49 367 7.13
Textiles and Pub. 538 11.79 19 7.31 7 4.93 8 4.42 34 5.83 572 1 1 . 1 2
Chemicals 2 1 1 4.62 2 0.77 8 5.63 15 8.29 25 4.29 236 4.59
Pharmaceuticals 85 1 .8 6 3 1.15 2 1.41 4 2 .2 1 9 1.54 94 1.83
Extractive 56 1.23 3 1.15 4 2.82 3 1 .6 6 1 0 1.72 6 6 1.28
Durable Manufacturers 1249 27.37 41 15.77 17 11.97 56 30.94 114 19.55 1363 26.49
Transportation 265 5.81 26 1 0 . 0 0 45 31.69 1 0 5.52 81 13.89 346 6.72
Utilities 95 2.08 5 1.92 5 3.52 7 3.87 17 2.92 1 1 2 2.18
Retail 583 12.78 51 19.62 8 5.63 1 0 5.52 69 11.84 652 12.67
Banking and Financial 0 0 . 0 0 45 17.31 17 11.97 23 12.71 85 14.58 85 1.65
Services 363 7.96 19 7.31 3 2 .1 1 6 3.31 28 4.80 391 7.60
Computers 404 8.85 16 6.15 1 2 8.45 28 15.47 56 9.61 460 8.94
Public Administration 9 0 . 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 9 0.17
4 ,5 6 3 100% 2 6 0 100% 142 100% 181 100% 5 8 3 100% 5,1 4 6 100%
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Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions.
Variable Expected Sign Source Descrip tjon/Definitjon
Tobin’s q N /A Worldscope (Book Value o f Total Assets — Book Value o f Equity + Market Value o f  Equity)/(Book Value o f Total Assets)
Earnings to Price N /A Worldscope = (1 /P E  Ratio)
Price Earnings Ratio =  Market Price/Eamings per Share
Book to Market N /A Datastream =(1/MBA)
Market to Book Assets =  Market Value Assets/Book Value o f Assets
Geometric Average Sales + Worldscope Two-Year Geometric Average Sales
Total Assets ($) + Worldscope Represents the sum o f  total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets.
Law + LLSV (2000) English, German, and French Law Dummies
Anti-Director Rights + LLSV (1998) An index aggregating the shareholder rights which ranges from 0 to 6 .
Liquidity Ratio + BKM (2004) Dollar Value o f Shares divided by Average Market Capitalization
Capital Access Ratio + BKM (2004) The Capital Access Index identifies quantitative and qualitative measures o f the ability' o f an entrepreneur to raise 
capital (developed by the Milken Institute Capital Studies Group).
Accounting Index + LLSV (1998) Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90
items.
Judicial Efficiency + LLSV (1998) Assessment o f the “efficiency and integrity o f  the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign 
firms” produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation.
Global Industry q + Worldscope Median Global Industry q
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Table 5.4: Country Level Variables.
Country Enelish Law French Law German Law Scandinavian 
1 aw
Anti-Director
Rights
Efficiency
judicial
Accounting
Standards
Capital Access Liquidity Ratio
A rgentina 0 1 0 0 4 6 . 0 0 45 4.154 0.50
Brazil 0 1 0 0 3 5.75 54 3.706 0 . 8 6
Chile 0 1 0 0 5 7.25 52 4.451 0 .1 1
C hina N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A
C olom bia 0 1 0 0 3 7.25 50 3.649 0 . 1 0
H o n g  K ong 1 0 0 0 5 1 0 . 0 0 69 5.373 1.13
H ungary N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A
India 1 0 0 0 5 8 . 0 0 57 3.907 0.43
Israel 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 . 0 0 64 4.521 0.26
K orea 0 0 1 0 2 6 . 0 0 62 4.519 1 .8 8
Malaysia 1 0 0 0 4 9.00 76 4.714 0.73
M exico 0 1 0 0 1 6 . 0 0 60 3.774 0.38
Peru 0 1 0 0 3 6.75 38 4.021 0.26
Philippines 0 1 0 0 3 4.75 65 4.137 0.35
P oland N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A
Singapore 1 0 0 0 4 1 0 .0 0 78 5.220 0.50
Sou th  Africa 1 0 0 0 5 6 . 0 0 70 4.423 0.19
Taiw an 0 0 1 0 3 6.75 65 4.775 4.62
T hailand 1 0 0 0 2 3.25 64 4.560 0.38
Turkey 0 1 0 0 2 4.00 51 3.556 1.30
This table summarizes all o f the country level variables employed in our analysis. The following variables are sourced from LLSV (1998): English, French, German and 
Scandinavian Law Dummies, Anti-Director Rights, Efficiency o f Judicial System, and Accounting Standards. The And-Directors Rights measure is oft cited as an accurate measure 
o f  the degree o f investor protection in a country. It is an aggregation o f six different shareholder rights (See LaPorta (1998) for a formal definition). The Accounting Standards 
Index is created for each country by examining the annual reports o f firms for the inclusion or exclusion o f 90 specific items. The Capital Access Ratio and the Liquidity Ratio are 
sourced from Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) and Bancel, Kamilipalli and Mittoo (2004).
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Table 5.5: Summary Statistics for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
Full Sample 
(N=5,146)
Cross-Listed
(N=583)
Non-Cross-Listed
(N=4,563)
Tests o f Difference 
(CL vs. NCL)
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Tobins q 1 .6 6 1.41 1.59 1.35 1.67 1.42 5.77*** 7.43***
Book-to-Market 1.36 1 .1 2 1.37 1.14 1.36 1 .1 2 -0.77 -1.43
Eamings-to-Price 0.0775 0.0613 0.0861 0.0714 0.0767 0.0602 -7.31*** -12.09***
ROE 6.42 8.32 7.88 9.38 6 .2 1 8.13 -3.20*** -5.04***
Sales Growth (%) 27.97 2 0 .1 2 31.36 23.58 27.45 19.47 -4.65*** -5.61***
Total Assets (Log) 8.25 8 .2 0 8.98 8.97 8.16 8 .1 2 -70.45*** -60.71***
English Law 0.5497 1 0.5132 1 0.5520 1 4.96*** 4.96***
French Law 0.1906 0 0.2997 0 0.1837 0 -18.83*** -18.79***
German Law 0.2174 0 0.1115 0 0.2242 0 17.41*** 17.37***
Judicial Efficiency 7.32 6.75 7.38 6.75 7.32 6.75 -1.81* -1.34
Capital Intensity 4.57 4.56 4.47 4.42 4.57 4.56 13.19*** 13.54***
Liquidity Ratio 1.16 0.73 0.9626 0.5000 1.17 0.73 10.55*** 14.47***
Anti-Director 3.55 4 3.75 4 3.55 4 -10.36*** -13.62***
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Table 5.5(a): Summary Statistics for Exchange-listed and non-Exchangc listed firms.
Non Cross-Listed 
(N =4,563)
Level 1 OTC 
(N=260)
Level 2 /3  Exchange 
(N=142)
Rule 144a Portal 
(N=181)
Tests o f  Diff. 
(Exch vs. OTC)
Tests o f Diff. 
(Exch vs. Port)
Tests o f  Diff. 
(OTC vs. Port)
Variables Mean Median dean Median Mean Median Mean Median M ean/ (Medl Mean /  (Med1 Mean /  f Mcdl
Tobins q 1.67 1.42 1.57 1.34 1.59 1.36 1.62 1.34 -0.74
(-0.33)
-0 .8 8
(-0.65)
-1.93*
(-0.96)
Book-to-Market 1.36 1 .1 2 1.39 1.15 1.18 0.90 1.48 1.28 4.78***
(5.16)***
-6.77***
(-7.78)***
-2.48**
(-3.47)***
Eamings-to-Price 0.0767 0.0602 0.0877 0.0763 0.0773 0.0645 0.0884 0.0694 4.04***
(4.38)***
-3.55***
(-2.96)***
0 .1 2
(1.29)
ROE 6 .2 1 8.13 7.50 8.91 8.58 10.26 7.93 9.36 -0.98
(-1.84)*
0.57
(2.30)**
-0.44
(0.55)
Sales Growth (%) 27.45 19.47 24.97 18.66 39.65 28.80 34.55 26.38 -7.29***
(-7.90)***
2.33**
(2.47)**
-5.32***
(-5.99)***
Total Assets (Log) 8.16 8 .1 2 8.85 8.80 9.28 9.29 8.99 8.92 -13.81***
(-13.32)***
9.89***
(9.94)***
-5.35***
(-4.96)***
English Law 0.5520 1 0.7614 1 0 .2 1 0 2 0 0.3528 0 32.82***
(28.06)***
-7.41***
(-7.32)***
26.09***
(23.81)***
French Law 0.1837 0 0.2006 0 0.6100 0 0.2386 0 -23.86***
(-21.83)***
19.27***
(17.88)***
-2.63***
(-2.63)***
German Law 0.2242 0 0.0059 0 0.0810 0 0.2848 0 -11.36***
(-11.12)***
-12.24***
(-11.86)***
-27.11***
(-24.58)***
Judicial Efficiency 7.32 6.75 7.98 1 0 6.79 6 6.82 6.75 13.90***
(11.81)***
-0.57
(-7.12)***
16.32***
(13.82)***
Capital Intensity 4.57 4.56 4.77 4.71 4.17 4.15 4.18 3.91 24.58***
(20.21)***
-0.32
(-3.84)***
28.90***
(22.47)***
Liquidity Ratio 1.17 0.73 0.7598 0.8600 0.6591 0.38 1.49 0.43 4.18***
(13.78)***
-13.08***
(-13.72)***
-18.42***
(-4.25)***
Anti-Director 3.55 4 4.13 5 3.14 3 3.55 3 17.61***
(16.38)***
-6.42***
(-5.81)***
12.15***
(12.03)***
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Table 5.6: Comparison of cross-listed and non-cross-listed Sims by year.
Mean Lcv.cl.J. Level 2 /3 HhIp 144a
Year Level 1 NCI. Difference l’roti Score Level 2/3 Difference Proti Score link' 144a N'Cl. Difference PtoD Score
1990 1.49 1.71 (0 .2 2 ) (0 .2 0 ) 1.42 1.71 (0.29) - - 1.71 - -
1991 1.40 1.85 (0.45)** (0.57)** 1 .6 6 1.85 (0.19) - 1.17 1.85 (0 .6 8 ) -
1992 1.78 1.83 (0.05) (0.06) 1.81 1.83 (0 .0 2 ) - 1.82 1.83 (0 .0 1 ) -
1993 1.83 1.89 (0.06) (0.31) 2 .1 1 1.89 0 .2 2 - 1.77 1.89 (0 .1 2 ) 0.64**
1994 1.81 2.09 (0.28)** (0.26) 2.05 2.09 (0.04) 0.70** 2.61 2.09 0.52*** 0.67**
1995 1.75 1 .8 6 (0 .1 1 ) 0 .2 0 1 .6 8 1 .8 6 (0.18) 0.03 1.96 1 .8 6 0 .1 0 0.19
1996 1.73 1.83 (0 .1 0 ) 0.32 1.79 1.83 (0.04) 0.19 1.70 1.83 (0.13) (0.18)
1997 1.79 1.79 0 .0 0 0.51** 1.96 1.79 0.17 0.32 1.76 1.79 (0.03) 0.16
1998 1.42 1.45 (0.03) 0.33** 1.44 1.45 (0 .0 1 ) 0.26* 1.50 1.45 0.05 0.18
1999 1.53 1.53 0 .0 0 (0.07) 1.61 1.53 0.08 0 .2 2 1.60 1.53 0.07 0 .0 0
2 0 0 0 1.52 1.51 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 1.70 1.51 0.19** 0.41* 1.64 1.51 0.13** 0 .1 0
2 0 0 1 1.38 1.37 0 .0 1 (0.05) 1.42 1.37 0.05 0.16 1.37 1.37 0 .0 0 0.19*
2 0 0 2 1.41 1.42 (0 .0 1 ) 0.03 1.38 1.42 (0.04) 0.37** 1.43 1.42 0 .0 1 0.09
2003 1.51 1.52 (0.01) (0.02) 1.51 1.52 (0 .0 1 ) 0.32** 1.54 1.52 0 .0 2 0 .2 1
A ll 1.56 1.62 (0.06)*** 0.05 1.59 1.62 (0.03) 0.07 1.62 1.62 0 .0 0
Median LcvelJL Level 111 Rule 144»
l a c Level l NCI. Difference Level 2/3 NCL DlffttGUEX Rule 144a N C I. Difference
1990 1.40 1.48 (0.08) 1.42 1.48 (0.06) - 1.48 *
1991 1.30 1.65 (0.35)*** 1.57 1.65 (0.08) 1.17 1.65 (0.48)
1992 1.40 1.63 (0.23) 1 .8 6 1.63 0.23 1.76 1.63 0.13
1993 1.67 1.67 0 .0 0 2 .2 0 1.67 0.53 1.71 1.67 0.04
1994 1.70 1.84 (0.14)* 1.99 1.84 0.15 2.40 1.84 0.56***
1995 1.56 1 .6 8 (0 .1 2 )* 1.64 1 .6 8 (0.04) 1.84 1 .6 8 0.16
1996 1.43 1.61 (0.18) 1.63 1.61 0 .0 2 1.51 1.61 (0 .1 0 )
1997 1.54 1.52 0 .0 2 1.70 1.52 0.18** 1.53 1.52 0 .0 1
1998 1 .2 0 1 .2 2 (0 .0 2 ) 1.28 1 .2 2 0.06 1.26 1 .2 2 0.04
1999 1.27 1.34 (0.07) 1.36 1.34 0 .0 2 1.35 1.34 0 .0 1
2 0 0 0 1.29 1.28 0 .0 1 1.39 1.28 0 .1 1 * 1.31 1.28 0.03
2 0 0 1 1 .2 1 1 .2 2 (0 .0 1 ) 1.25 1 .2 2 0.03 1 .2 1 1 .2 2 (0 .0 1 )
2 0 0 2 1.23 1.27 (0.04) 1 .2 0 1.27 (0.07)** 1.24 1.27 (0.03)
2003 1.36 1.36 0 .0 0 1.29 1.36 (0.07) 1.38 1.36 0 .0 2
A ll 1.33 1.38 (0.05)*** 1.36 1.38 (0 .0 2 ) 1.34 1.38 (0.04)
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Table 5.7: Comparison of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in event time.
Panel A Ixvcl OTC Level 2 /3 Exchanec Rule 144a
Mean Median Mean Median Mean jVlt'dlan
Level 1 Difference Level 1 Difference Level 2 /3  Difference Level 2 /  3 Difference Rule 144a Difference Rule 144a Difference
-5 2.32 0.71*** 1.72 0.35*** 1.77 0.16 1.57 0 .2 0 1.56 (0.05) 1.33 (0.04)
-4 1.89 0.28*** 1.64 0.26*** 1.62 0 .0 1  . 1.43 0.05 1.65 0.04 1.35 (0.03)
-3 1.77 0.16** 1.52 0.14** 1.75 0.14 1.48 0 .1 0 1.90 0.29*** 1.53 0.15
- 2 1.73 0.12* 1.52 0.14 1.73 0 .1 2 1.53 0.15 2.25 0.64*** 1 .8 6 0.48***
-1 1.78 0.17** 1.54 0.16* 1.75 0.14 1.50 0 .1 2 2.07 0.46*** 1.65 0.27**
0 1 .6 8 0.07 1.43 0.06 1.70 0.09 1.46 0.09 2.18 0.57*** 1.85 0.48***
1 1.59 (0 .0 2 ) 1.37 (0 .0 1 ) 1.62 0 .0 1 1.38 0 .0 0 1.95 0.34*** 1.74 0.37***
2 1.56 (0.05) 1.38 0 .0 0 1.57 (0.04) 1.32 (0.06) 1.71 0 .1 0 1.46 0.09**
3 1.58 (0.03) 1.37 0 .0 0 1.62 0 .0 1 1.41 0.03 1.64 0.03 1.46 0.08
4 1.59 (0 .0 2 ) 1.32 (0.06) 1.56 (0.05) 1.33 (0.05) 1.51 (0 .1 0 ) 1.28 (0.10)*
5 1.50 (0 .1 1 ) 1.28 (0.10)** 1.48 (0.13) 1.31 (0.07) 1.44 (0.17)** 1.27 (0.11)**
All Pre 1.87 0.27*** 1.59 0.22*** 1 .6 6 0.05 1.45 0.08 1.89 0.28*** 1.43 0.06***
All Post 1.56 (0.06)*** 1.33 (0.05)*** 1.59 (0 .0 2 ) 1.36 (0 .0 2 ) 1.62 0 .0 1 1.34 (0.04)
Difference (0.31)*** (0.26)*** (0.07) (0.09) (0.27)***
Panel B bevel 1 OTC Level 2 /3  Exchanec llu lU M a
Tobin’s a 1/BM 1/E P Tobin’s q 1/BM 1/EP Tobin’s q 1/BM 1/E P
-2 1.52 1 .0 1 13.81 1.49 1.95 17.00 1 .8 6 0 .8 8 24.21
-1 1.54 1.09 12.90 1.49 1.32 18.32 1.65 1.09 20.62
0 1.48 1.14 14.60 1.45 1.36 2 0 .1 2 1 .8 6 0.93 2 0 .2 0
A(l,-2) (0.06) (0.005) (0.65) (0.13) (0.719)* (2.64) (0.18) (0.064) (8.00)***
A(l,-1) (0 .1 2 ) (0.085) 0.25 (0.13) (0.09) (3.95) 0.03 (0.277) (4.41)***
A(2,-2) (0.14) (0.030) 0.49 (0.17) (0.694)* (0.28) (0.44)*** (0.153) (9.51)***
A(2,-l) (0.16)** (0.049) 1.40 (0.17) (0.065) (1.59) (0.23)*** (0.365) (5.91)***
A(3,-2) (0.14)* (0.048) (1.51)** (0 .1 0 ) (0.95)** (0.50) (0.46)*** (0.043) (11.00)***
A(3,-l) (0.16)** (0.128) (0.60) (0 .1 0 ) (0.32) (1-81) (0.25)*** (0.257) (7.41)***
A (4,-2) (0.19) (0.109) (1.60)* (0.17) (1.00)*** (1.55) (0.60)*** (0.187) (12.21)***
A(4,-l) (0.21)*** (0.189) (0.69) (0.17) (0.367)** (2 .8 6 ) (0.39)*** (0.40)* (8.61)***
A(5,-2) (0.24)** (0.223) (2.12)* (0.24) (1.04)*** (4.10) (0.60)*** (0.037) (11.11)***
A(5,-l) (0.26)** (0.303)** (1 -2 1 ) (0.24) (0.411)** (5.42) (0.39)*** (0.25) (7.51)***
Before 1.59 1.09 14.30 1.47 1.48 17.10 1.46 0.8599 19.50
After 1.35 0.8678 12.70 1.34 1.19 14.95 1.34 0.7778 13.70
Difference (0.24)*** (0.22)*** (1.60)*** (0.13) (0.45)*** (2.15)** (0.12)*** (0.0821) (5.80)***
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Table 5.8: Median Tobin’s a  for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms over the sample period.
Counter NCI. Cross-List CL-NCL Cross-List Level 1 Level 2 /3 Rule 144a
Tobin’s q Full Period Full Period Full Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List
Argentina 1.32 1.33 0 .0 1 1.59 1.26 N /A N /A 1.62 1.29 1.51 1.17
Brazil 0.75 0.72 (0.03) 0.61 0.78 0.59 0.70 0.64 0.85 N /A 0.80
Chile 1.58 1.72 (0.14) 1.83 1.69 1.24 1 .1 2 1 .8 6 1 .6 8 3.17 1.97
China 1.19 1.13 (0.06) 1.17 1 .1 2 1.17 1.14 N /A 1 .1 2 N /A 1 .1 1
Colombia 1.25 1.30 0.05 1.26 1.30 1.19 1 .0 2 1.47 1.05 1.82 1.33
I long Kong 1.48 1.44 (0.04) 1.72 1.38 1.70 1.37 2.38 1.59 N /A 2 .2
Hungary 1.38 1.61 0.23 2.17 1.56 2.45 1.38 N /A 2.32 2.03 1.55
India 1.29 1.42 0.13 2 .1 2 1.31 2.49 1.99 2.06 1.37 2.17 1.28
Israel 1.49 1.67 0.18 1 .2 1 1.75 1.18 1.1 1.33 1.78 N /A N /A
Korea 1.19 1 .2 1 0 .0 2 1.23 1 .2 1.29 1.25 1.62 1.47 1.18 1.16
Malaysia 1.62 1.72 0 .1 0 2.14 1.39 2.14 1.39 N /A N /A N /A N /A
Mexico 1 .2 2 1.32 0 .1 0 1.32 1.29 1.36 1.56 1.42 1.29 1.27 1.13
Peru 1.08 1.24 0.16 1 .8 8 1.17 1.67 1.14 2.06 1.44 N /A 1.78
Philippines 1.29 1.42 0.13 1.52 1.37 1.52 1.25 1.51 1.37 1.49 1.46
Poland 1.45 1.19 (0.26) 1 .1 1 1.23 1.08 1.18 N /A 1.23 1.16 1.25
Singapore 1.62 1.37 (0.25) 1.44 1.36 1.51 1.35 N /A 1.72 1.14 1.15
Sth Africa 1.57 1.81 0.24 2.17 1 .6 6 2.39 1 .6 6 1 .8 6 1.79 1.52 1.47
Thailand 1.76 2.07 0.31 2.57 1.84 N /A N /A 3.31 2.14 2.4 1.82
Taiwan 1.41 1.77 0.36 2.19 1.54 2.19 1.64 N /A N /A N /A 1 .2 2
Turkey 1.74 1.46 (0.28) 1.51 1.44 3.44 1.49 N /A 1.89 1.32 1.36
Full Sample 1.41 1.38 (0.03) 1.53 1.34 1.59 1.34 1.47 1.33 1.45 1.34
In this table I outline median Tobin’s q for both our non-cross-listed and cross-listed sample for the full sample period. All firm level data is sourced from Worldscope and 
Datastream. Tobin’s q defined as [(Book Value o f Total Assets — Book Value o f Equity + Market Value o f Equity)/Book Value o f Total Assets]. For the cross-listed sample I 
calculate valuation ratios for the pre and post-listing period. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. ate obtained from the Bank o f  New York, and cross-referenced with 
data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on PORTAL; Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on 
the NYSE or NASDAQ. All valuation ratios are calculated after removing the top 1% o f observadons to remove possible outliers.
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Table 5.9: Median Book-to-Market for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
Countrv NCI. Cross-] ,ist ClQii -List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3
Full Period Full Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-list Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-last
Argentina 1 .0 2 0.76 0.4694 0.9712 N /A N /A 0.4694 1.04 0.5347 0.8371
Brazil 1.69 1.35 1.85 1.15 1.85 1 .6 6 1 .2 2 0.9523 N /A 1.25
Chile 0.9909 0.5681 0.4310 0.6212 2.26 3.42 0.4301 0.6097 0.3571 0.5569
China 0.8333 1.18 1.19 1.17 1.19 0.9174 N /A 1.17 N /A 1.75
Colombia 1.98 1.35 0.8849 1.40 1.06 5.23 0.3831 1 .8 8 2 .1 2 1.35
Hong Kong 1 .1 1 1.03 0.7117 1.13 0.7462 1.15 0.3067 0.8771 N /A 0.6451
Hungary 1.37 0.7782 0.6622 0.9803 0.5319 1.47 N /A 0.4338 0 .6 6 6 6 0.9049
India 0.6849 0.9389 0.3466 1 .2 1 0.2774 0.5871 0.3134 0.3333 0.3731 1.35
Israel 0.7692 0.6219 0.8503 0.5935 1 .0 2 1.25 0.5780 0.5847 N /A N /A
Korea 1.54 1 .0 2 0.9803 1.13 0.8518 1 .0 0 0.8333 0.9523 1 .0 2 1.17
Malaysia 0.8333 0.6645 0.4832 0.7547 0.4832 0.7547 N /A N /A N /A N /A
Mexico 1.15 1 .0 1 0.7462 1.15 0.8934 1 .0 0 0.6172 1.19 0.7637 1.15
Peru 1.31 0.6756 0.4658 0.7382 0.4777 1.09 0.4273 0.6579 N /A 0.6333
Philippines 1.23 0.8695 0.8193 0.8771 0.8193 0.9259 0.5464 0.7936 2 .2 2 0.7633
Poland 1.04 0.8928 1 .1 1 0.800 5.55 1.42 N /A 0.9342 1 .0 0 0.7812
Singapore 0.8264 0.8300 0.5681 0.8849 0.5681 0.8928 N /A 0.6902 N /A N /A
Sth Africa 1.58 1.81 2.17 1 .6 6 2.42 1 .6 6 1 .8 6 1.80 1.52 1.47
Thailand 1.76 2.08 2.61 1.85 N /A N /A 3.31 2.14 2.44 1.83
Taiwan 0.9345 0.4842 0.2681 0.6097 0.2681 0.5524 N /A N /A N /A 0.7359
Turkey 0.5882 0.6024 0.3773 0.7092 0.1364 0.6594 N /A 0.3759 0.4807 0.7936
Full Sample 1.17 1.16 0.9615 1.20 0.9523 1.21 0.7519 0.9900 1.22 1.35
In this table I outline mean and median Book to Market ratios for non-cross-listed and cross-listed firms. All firm level data is sourced from VVorldscope and Datastream. For 
cross-listed firms, I calculate valuation ratios pre and post-listing. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced 
with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on PORTAL: Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  
trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ. All valuation ratios are calculated after removing the top 1% of observations to remove possible outliers.
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Table 5.10: Median Earnings-to-Pncc for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
Country NCI. CmsfcLkl Cross tLiSI Level i OTC I .cvrl 2/3 Rule 144a
Full Period Full Period Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-List Pre-List Post-!.ist
Argentina 0.0611 0.0840 0.0740 0.0858 N /A N /A 0.0851 0.0801 0.0004 0.0896
Brazil 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0544 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0892 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0360 0.0478 0.0952 N /A 0.1030
Chile 0.0778 0.0606 0.0730 0.0532 0.0640 0.0045 0.0730 0.0523 0.0711 0.0854
China 0.0877 0.0813 0.0892 0.0775 0.0892 0.0694 N /A 0.0926 N /A 0.0518
Colombia 0.0763 0.0523 0.0735 0.0485 0.0738 0.1302 0.0767 0.0717 0.0003 0.0380
Hong Kong 0.0934 0.0847 0.0813 0.0869 0.0833 0.0877 0.0005 0.0207 N /A 0.1694
Hungary 0.0990 0.0769 0.0689 0.0892 0.0934 0.1298 N /A 0.0502 0.0680 0.0952
India 0.0378 0.0651 0.0458 0.0917 0.0512 0.0656 0.0358 0.0437 0.0464 0.1041
Israel 0.0420 0.0794 0.0952 0.0736 0.0641 N /A 0.1063 0.0736 N /A N /A
Korea 0.0778 0.0632 0.0579 0.0724 0.0387 0.0662 0.0546 0.0735 0.0628 0.0746
Malaysia 0.0588 0.0500 0.0514 0.0487 0.0514 0.0487 N /A N /A N /A N /A
Mexico 0.0546 0.0647 0.0421 0.0746 0.0003 0.0588 0.0454 0.0813 0.0533 0.0980
Peru 0.0194 0.0003 0.0006 0.0171 0.0005 0.1861 0.0078 0.0427 N /A N /A
Philippines 0.0609 0.0606 0.0598 0.0606 0.0289 0.0606 0.0584 0.0131 0.0892 0.0628
Poland 0.0552 0.0498 0.0245 0.0511 0 .0 2 2 2 0.1233 N /A N /A 0.1053 0.0534
Singapore 0.0568 0.0502 0.0371 0.0588 0.0374 0.0602 N /A N /A 0.0549 0.0371
Sth Africa 0.1041 0.0724 0.0588 0.0826 0.0584 0.0826 0.0423 0.0657 0.1064 0.1031
Thailand 0.0473 0.0468 0.0422 0.0557 N /A N /A 0.0474 0.0272 0.0414 0.0583
Taiwan 0.0826 0.0749 0.0501 0.0843 0.0501 0.0854 N /A N /A N /A 0.0236
Turkey 0.0704 0 .1 0 0 1 0.0680 0.1136 0.0312 0.1063 N /A 0.0823 0.1369 0.1219
Full Sample 0.0641 0.0666 0.0540 0.0746 0.0602 0.0784 0.0467 0.0662 0.0512 0.0735
In this table I outline mean and median Earnings-to-Price ratios for non-cross-listed and cross-listed firms. All firm level data is sourced from Worldscope and Datastream. For 
cross-listed firms, I calculate valuation ratios, pre and post-listing. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and cross-referenced 
with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP  Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on PORTAL, Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  
trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ. All valuation ratios are calculated after removing the top 1% o f observations to remove possible outliers.
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Table 5.11: Median before-after valuation differentials for cross-listed firms by listing type.
CiiuaLn' Cioss-Lisl Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule ,144a
BM EP 4 BM EP 4 BM EP 4 BM EP
Argentina (0.33) 0.50 0.0118 - - • (0.33) 0.57 (0.005) (0.34) 0.30 0.0892
Brazil 0.17 (0.70) 0.0890 0 .1 1 (0.19) 0.0358 0 .2 1 (0.27) 0.0474 - - -
Chile (0.14) 0.19 (0.0198) (0 .1 2 ) 1.16 (0.0595) (0.18) 0.18 (0.0207) (1 .2 0 ) 0 .2 0 0.0143
China (0.05) (0 .0 2 ) (0.0117) (0.03) (0.27) (0.0198) - - - - - -
Colombia 0.04 0.52 (0.0250) (0.17) 4.17 0.0564 (0.42) 1.50 (0.005) (0.49) (0.77) 0.0377
H ong Kong (0.34) 0.42 0.0056 (0.33) 0.40 0.0044 (0.79) 0.57 0 .0 2 0 2 - - -
Hungary (0.61) 0.32 0.0203 (1.07) 0.94 0.0364 - - - (0.48) 0.24 0.0272
India (0.81) 0 .8 6 0.0459 (0.50) 0.31 0.0144 (0.69) 0 .0 2 0.0079 (0.89) 0.98 0.0577
Israel 0.54 (0.26) (0.0216) (0.08) 0.23 - 0.45 0 .0 1 (0.0327) - - *
Korea (0.03) 0.15 0.0145 (0.04) 0.15 0.0275 (0.15) 0 .1 2 0.0189 (0 .0 2 ) 0.15 0.0118
Malaysia (0.75) 0.27 (0.0027) (0.75) 0.27 (0.0027) * - - - - -
Mexico (0.03) 0.40 0.0325 0 .2 0 0 .1 1 0.0585 (0.13) 0.57 0.0359 (0.14) 0.39 0.0447
Peru (0.71) 0.27 0.0165 (0.53) 0.61 0.1856 (0.62) 0.23 0.0349 - - -
Philippines (0.15) 0.06 0.0008 (0.27) 0 .1 1 0.0317 (0.14) 0.25 (0.0453) (0.03) (1.46) (0.0264)
Poland 0 .1 2 (0.31) 0.0266 0 .1 0 (4.13) 0 .1 0 1 1 - - - 0.09 (0 .2 2 ) (0.0519)
Singapore (0.08) 0.32 0.0217 (0.16) 0.32 0.0228 - - - 0 .0 1 - (0.0178)
South Africa (0.51) (0.51) 0.0238 (0.73) (0.76) 0.0242 (0.07) (0.06) 0.0234 (0.05) (0.05) (0.0033)
Taiwan (0.73) (0.76) 0.0135 - - - (1.17) (1.17) (0 .0 2 0 2 ) (0.58) (0.61) 0.0169
Thailand (0.65) 0.34 0.0342 (0.55) 0.28 0.0353 - - - - - •
Turkey (0.07) 0.33 0.0456 (1.95) 0.52 0.0751 - - - 0.04 0.31 (0.015)
Total (0.19) 0.24 0.0206 (0.25) 0.26 0.0182 (0.14) 0.24 0.0195 (0 .1 1 ) 0.13 0.0223
In this table I calculate the median difference in value between the post and pre-listing period for all cross-listed. Level 1, Level 2/3, and SEC Rule 144a ADRs, respectively, 
Tobin’s q, book-to-market o f assets, and earnings-to-price is employed as valuation metrics. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f  New 
York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on PORTAL; Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink 
sheet issues, and Level 2 /3  trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ. All valuation ratios are calculated after removing the top 1% o f  observations to remove possible outliers
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Table 5.12: Correlation Coefficient Matrix and Variance Inflation Factors.
Tobin s Level 1 Level
2/3
Rule
144a
Global q Sales
Gth
French
Law
German
Law
Acc Stds Judicial
E ff
Anti-
Director
Liquidity Capital
Access
VIF
Tobin’s q 1 -
Level 1 -0.02** 1 1.07
Level 2 /3 -0.006 -0.03** 1 1.07
Rule 144a 0.0031 -0.04*** -0.03*** 1 1.07
Global ^ 0.31*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 1 1.04
Sales Gth 0 .0 1 2 -0.04*** -0.0005 -0.02** 0 .11*** 1 1 . 1 0
French Law -0.20*** -0.03*** 0.14*** 0 .0001 -0.041*** 0.20*** 1 3.71
German Law 0.03** -0.13*** -0.06*** 0.02*** 0.029*** -0.10*** -0.38*** 1 5.44
Acc Stds 0.21*** 0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.037*** -0.15*** -0.70*** 0.0026 1 3.63
Judicial Eff. 0.15*** 0 .11*** -0.03*** -0.031*** 0.036*** -0.12*** -0.39*** -0.27*** 0.53*** 1 2.40
Anti-Director 0.20*** 0.12*** -0.04*** 0 .0 0 1*** 0.006 -0.09*** -0.19*** -0.51*** 0.24*** 0.63*** 1 2.65
Liquidity 0.08*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.023*** 0.05*** -0.018* -0.33*** 0.83*** 0.08*** -0 .11*** -0.30*** 1 3.24
Capital Access 
__
0.20*** 0 .11*** -0.09*** -0 .11*** 0.055*** -0.19*** -0.69*** 0.17*** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 1 3.51
In this tabic I outline Pearson Correlation Coefficients for our dependent variables and all our independent variables. In addition, I outline employing both variants o f  our 
dependent variable, Variance-Inflation Factors (VIF’s). The Variance-Inflation Factors are defined as (1/(1  —R ')) where R~ is from a regression (pooled) o f  an explanatory' 
variable on a constant and the remainder o f  the explanatory variables. ***, ** Represent significance at the 1 and 5% level o f significance respectively.
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Table 5.13: Testing for the presence of a firm effect.
Variable OT.S White-Huber
119801
Rogers M9931 
[Clustered by 
firml
Í  S E W "  1 Rogers )
< S E O I S  J v S E XV| m c  J
OTC 0.0292 0.0280 0.0610 2.0922 2.1827
EXCH 0.0359 0.0333 0.0679 1.8924 2.0397
PORTAL 0.0314 0.0298 0.0613 1.9491 2.0543
Sales Growth 0.0462 0.0580 0.0849 1.8377 1.4638
Industry q 0.0328 0.0376 0.0580 1.7683 1.5442
In this table, I test for the presence o f a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £it =  C,t +  T]ir, X if = TZy +  Vit. I outline standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
firm. In tire remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
Table 5.14: Testing for the presence of a time effect
Vanahk OL.S Whii£-Hnh£i
/19am
Rogers /19931 
[ChisfprpH hv
js a d
(  SE^ ) ( S F  ^J  Rogers
V S E OI^  j < S E wlutt j
OTC 0.0292 0.0280 0.0254 0.8705 0.9081
EXCH 0.0359 0.0333 0.0270 0.7525 0.8111
PORTAL 0.0314 0.0298 0.0180 0.5723 0.6032
Sales Growth 0.0462 0.0580 0.2433 5.2662 4.1948
Industry q 0.0328 0.0376 0.0749 2.2835 1.9941
Tn this table* I test for the presence o f a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £ it == y t + T |it, X it =  JXt + V (t . I outline standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
time. In the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
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Table 5.15: Rogers (1993) clustered by firm with time fixed effects.
■Variable OT„S White-1 lubcr 
(1980) ( S E W . )  
S E ou; J
(  s e  ^Utters
SFV White >
OTC 0.0292 0.0280 0.0610 2.0905 2.1809
EXCH 0.0359 0.0333 0.0669 1.8645 2.0096
PORTAL 0.0314 0.0298 0.0601 1.9110 2.0141
Sales Growth 0.0462 0.0580 0.0830 1.7965 1.4310
Industry q 0.0328 0.0376 0.1089 3.3201 2.8994
In this table, I compare Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects. I compare these to standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), and (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedastidty. In the remaining columns, I compare Rogers 
(1993) standard errors to both (1) and (2).
189
Table 5.16: Impact of cross listing on firm value by listing type.
bevel 1 OTC Level 2 /3 SEC Rule 144a
OLS POLS Fixed
Effects
TE TE OLS POLS Fixed
Effects
TE TE OLS POLS Fixed
Effects
TE TE
Level 1 -0.0257 -0.0244 0.0148 0.0654 0.0678
Level 2/3
[0.51] [0.48] [0.55] [0.85] [0.89]
0.0345 0.0339 0.0865 0.1469 0.1507
Rule 144a
[0.65] [0.64] [2.27]** [1.57] [1.61]
0.0282
[0.61]
0.0315
[0 .6 8 ]
-0.1734
[4.98]***
0.0396
[0.57]
0.0418
[0.59]
Global q 1.04 1.04 1 .1 0 1 .1 0 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.04 1.04 1 .1 2 1 .1 1
Sales Growth
[1 2 .2 ]***
0.14
[1 2 .2 ]***
0.14
[7.75]***
0.44
[7.76]***
0.44
[12.3]***
0.14
[12.3]***
0.13
[7.55]***
0.50
[7.57]***
0.49
[12 3]*** 
0.14
[12.3]***
0.13
[7.96]***
0.42
[7.93]***
0.41
Lambda (A)
[2.09]** [2.04]** [3.90]***
0 .0 1 0
[3.80]***
0 .0 1 0
[2.05]** [2 .0 1 ]** [4.43]***
0.0366
[4.27]***
0.0359
[2.07]** [1.99]** [3.70]***
0.0658
[3.65]***
0.0652
[1.17] [1.05] [5 4 9 ]*** [5.37]*** [5.62]*** [5.57]***
Time Dummies Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
R 2 0.1017 0 .1 0 0 0 0.0654 0.0864 0.0805 0.1017 0 .1 0 0 0 0.0655 0.0980 0.0917 0.1017 0.0995 0.0628 0 .1 0 2 0 0.0904
P r > F 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
In this table, I estimate ‘Heckman5 style two-step estimates o f the impact o f  listing on value for cross-listed firms. The treatment effects regressions are estimated as three separate regressions based 
upon the different ADR sub-sample o f  firms. For each ADR level, we estimate a first-stage probit model where the decision to list is determined in terms o f size (Log (Total Assets)), and Legal Origin 
(French, German). To satisfy the exclusion restrictions, these variables are excluded in the second-stage regressions. All variables are defined in the appendix. I present two different versions o f  the 
treatment effects models; in the first, I do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. Time dummies are included in this specification. In the second specification, I specify unobserved heterogeneity as 
Mundlak (1978) corrections (i.e. time averages o f  the explanatory variables), and exclude time dummies. Finally, I include for each ADR level, ordinary least squares, pooled ordinary least squares (with 
Mundlak (1978) corrections), and fixed effect estimates o f the impact o f listing on firm value. The first stage probit estimates are available from the author upon request. ***, **, * Represents 
significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.
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Table 5.17: Pooled ordinary least squares valuation regressions based upon legal characteristics.
Panel A Ilk li Investor Protection 7 .Í1W invfs'lnr Pm trrtion
POI s PO I S OI.S POLS POT.S OÎ.S
Level 1 -0.1167 -0.0444 -0.0459 -0.1252 -0.1280 -0.1278
11.2 0 ] [0.37] 10.38] [2.16]** [1.60] [1.59]
Level 2 /3 0.0697 0.0223 0 .0 2 1 2 0.0041 0.0506 0.0622
[0.87] [0.28] [0.27] [0.05] [0.48] [0.59]
Rule 144a 0.2233 0.1703 0.1694 -0.1535 -0.1532 -0.1380
[3.38]*** [2.14]** [2.13]** [2 .1 1 ]** [1.62] [1.43]
Level 1*AD -0.0093 -0.0833 -0.0833 0.0081 0.0836 0.1009
[0.08] [0.58] [0.58] [0.07] [0.58] [0.70]
Level 2/3* AD -0.0677 0.0304 0.0294 0.067 -0.0278 -0.0215
[0.60] [0.23] [0 .2 2 ] [0.60] [0 .2 1 ] [0.16]
Rule 144a* AD -0.3784 -0.3240 -0.3245 0.3778 0.3240 0.3276
[3.85]*** [2.62]*** [2.62]*** [3.85]*** [2.62]*** [2.60]***
Global Industry q 1 .2 2 1 .2 2 1 .2 2 1.03
[9.62]*** [9.63]*** [9.61]*** [16.08]***
Log (Sales Growth) 0.0797 0.0806 0.078 0.034
[0.85] [0 .8 6 ] [0.83] [0.36]
High/Low AD 0.3178 0.4010 0.4016 -0.3179 -0.4011 -0.4022
[12.691*** [11.971*** 112.0 1 ]*** [12.70]*** [11.98]*** [11.87]*”
Panel B Anti-Director Rights Index ludida) Efficiency English Common Laiv
Above Median Below .Median Above Median Below Median Prudish Non-F.nplish
(1) (2) (3) (4) £5) (6) (8) (9) (1 0 ) (11) (1 2 )
Level 1 
Level 2/3 
Rule 144a 
Global Industry q 
Log (Sales Gth)
-0 .1 1 1 1
[1.89]*
0.0322
[0.41]
-0.1296
[1.77]*
-0.1298
[1.59]
0.0757
[0.71]
-0.1196
[1.23]
0 .8 6
[5.06]***
0.15
11.04]
-0.1345
[1.36]
0.0512
[0.64]
0.2088
[3.19]***
-0.0698
[0.56]
-0.0065
[0.08]
0.1403
[1.81]*
1.42
[8.15]***
0.18
[1.481
-0.1311
[1.98]**
0.1245
[1.17]
-0.0966
[1.29]
-0.1440
[1.48]
0.1883
[1.40]
-0.0827
[0.83]
0.95
[5.36]***
-0.0055
[0.03]
-0.0053
[0.07]
0.0096
[0.16]
0.1598
[2.47]**
0.0228
[0.25]
-0.0379
[0.58]
0.0899
[1.17]
I.31 
[7.62]***
0 .1 2
II.03]
-0.0815
[1.33]
0.3609
[2.31]**
-0.1601
[1.93]*
-0.0797 
[0.95] 
0.4099 
[2.33]*** 
-0.1573 
[1.35] 
0.92 
[5.22]*** 
0.29 
11.891'
-0.2652
[3.58]***
0.0594
[1.04]
0.1960
[3.23]***
-0.2150 
[2 .0 2 ]** 
0.0714 
[1.04] 
0.1604 
[2.29]** 
1.28 
p .58]*** 
0.065 
[0.60]
P r > F  (T im e) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
R 2 0.0801 0.1080 0.0307 0.1066 0.0844 0.1153 0.0359 0.0927 0.0805 0.1043 0.0339 0.0980
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Table 5.18: Estimates of the Average Effect of the Treatment on the Treated (A'l'l).
Panel A Cross-List Load 1 .QIC Lvvl'I 2/3 p rrn SRC Rule 144a
ATT
M
Prohit ATT Matches Probit A H Matches Probit ATT Matches Probit a h Matches
Sales Growth List 0.344 367/301 0.171 171/133 0.412 73/69 0.577 123/115
[4.65]*** [1.60] [2.78]*** [4.55]***
Size t +  1 0.2997 0.155 398/380 0.2145 -0.014 178/173 0.3309 0.193 76/73 0.2442 0.232 142/135
[17.37]*** 12.43]** ]9.67]*** [0.16] [9.64]*** [1.47] [9.71]*** [2.06]**
t +  2 0 .0 0 0 383/359 0.024 164/159 0.074 70/69 -0.031 140/132
[0 .0 0 1 ] [0.29] [0.64] [0.32]
German Law t +  3 -0.007 362/335 0.076 149/136 0.039 65/61 0.040 134/127
[0.113] [0.79] [0.341] [0.48]
French Law t +  4 0.052 337/313 0.144 136/126 0 .1 0 0 54/54 0.036 1 2 2 / 1 1 2
[0.895] [1.59] [0.751] [0.412]
t + 5 -0.054 328/314 0 .0 0 2 124/120 0.024 48/42 -0.192 114/110
[1.053] [0 .0 2 ] [0.153] [2.45]**
Industry Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo -  R- - 0.2231 - - 0.1977 - - 0.2363 • - 0.1785 - -
Squared
Log - Likelihood - -1506 - - -822 - - -385 - - -647 - -
LR (Chi) - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - * 0 .0 0 0 - -
Panel B Cross-List Level 1 OTC Tevel 2 /3  Exch SRC Rule 144a
AUiX) Probit I A H  1 Matches Probit 1 A H  1 Matches Probit 1 A H  1 Matches Probit 1 A H  1 Matches
Sales Growth List 0.6327 0.322 162/133 0.4549 -0 .1 2 1 79/66 0.8785 0.315 32/28 0.8711 0.418 51/51
[2.55]** [3.03]*** [1.33] [0.76] [2 .0 1 ]** [1.13] [2.39]** [2.08]**
Size t  +  1 0.3424 0 .1 0 2 197/194 0.3166 -0.019 90/89 0.3520 0.153 38/36 0.2056 0.217 68/65
[11.53]*** [1.14] [7.87]*** [0.16] [5.89]*** [0.89] [4.73]*** [1 .2 1 ]
q,_, t  +  2 -0.055 187/180 0.066 79/75 0.123 38/36 0 .2 1 1 69/67
[0.61] [0.51] [0.97] [1.45]
German Law t +  3 -0.2096 0.108 173/162 -1.26 0.136 70/67 -0.2929 0.184 34/33 0.4095 0.289 65/61
[2.07]** [1.25] [3.76]*** [1 .0 2 ] [1.33] [1.07] [2.91]*** [2.26]**
French Law t + 4 0.1025 0.077 145/139 -0.0992 -0.044 56/54 0.4354 0.061 27/26 0.1218 -0.025 56/54
[0.94] [0 .8 6 ] [0.64] [0.27] [2.32]** [0.29] [0.69] [0.18]
t  +  5 0 .0 1 1 138/127 0.140 52/51 0.147 23/22 -0.068 48/46
[0.128] [1 .1 1 ] [0.91] [0.51]
Industry Dummies • Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo — R-Squared - 0.2656 - - 0.3207 - - 0.3058 . - 0.1757 - -
Log - Likelihood - -592 - - -301 - * -142 - - -259 - •
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LR (Chi) - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - -
Panel C Cross-1 .ist 1-cvcll OTC Level 2 /3  Pitch SRC Rule 144a
ATT (A Probit 1 ATT 1 Matches Prohit i ATI | Matches Prnbir 1 a h Matches Prnbir 1 A l l  I Matches
Sales Growth List 0.6344 0.166 155/125 0.5203 -0.064 76/57 0.8216 0.092 30/28 0.8490 -0.050 49/46
[2.44]** [1.34] [1.48] [0.40] [1.79]* [0.30] [2.23]** [0.19]
Size t + 1 0.3731 -0.009 175/170 0.3416 0.068 80/77 0.3681 -0.229 31/29 0.2350 0.332 63/61
[11.70]*** 10.09] [7.95]*** [0.63] [5.89]*** [0.98] [5.01]*** [2 .2 2 ]**
q,., t + 2 0.1344 0.014 176/170 0 .0 1 1 1 -0.130 75/72 0.1277 0.074 36/35 0.1891 0.164 65/64
[3.02]*** [0.16] [0.17] [0.94] [1.46] [0.63] [3.13]*** [1.24]
German Law t  +  3 -0.1913 -0.006 161/150 -1.27 -0.016 69/64 -0.1917 -0 .0 0 1 27/26 0.4264 0.085 61/59
[1.78]* [0.06] [3 74]*** [0.13] [0.83] [0.005] [2 .8 8 ]*** [0.60]
French Law t + 4 0.1726 0.105 134/130 -0.0639 0.237 53/49 0.4990 -0.123 26/26 0.1677 -0.052 50/50
[1-52] [1.08] [0.40] [1.49] [2.55]** [0.59] [0.92] [0.39]
t + 5 0.052 127/122 0.131 50/48 0.044 2 1 / 2 0 0.019 44/41
|0.61] [0.99] [0.24] [0.17]
Industry Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo — R-Squared - 0.2729 - - 0.3266 - - 0.3123 - - 0.1809 - -
Log - Likelihood - -547 - - -280 - - -132 - - -243 - -
LR (Chi) - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - - 0 .0 0 0 - -
Panel D CtosfeList U-vcl 1 OTC Level 2 /3  Exch SJiCM e_L4da
ATT ill Two-Pre 1 One-Pte I List Two-Pre 1 Onc-Pre 1 List Twt>-Pre 1 One-Pre 1 List Fonr-Pre 1 T ac-T re  | List
Sales Growth List 0.330 0.289 0.322 -0.109 0.150 -0 .1 2 1 0.278 0.553 0.315 0.619 0.641 0.418
[2.80]*** [2.71]*** [3.03]*** [0.64] [0.99] [0.76] [1.38] [2.43]** [1.13] [2.90]*** [3.41]*** [2.08]**
Size t + 1 0.032 0.046 0 .1 0 2 -0.069 -0.076 -0.019 0.143 0.088 0.153 0.315 0.439 0.217
[0.30] [0.49] [1.14] [0.48] [0.56] [0.16] [0.64] [0.47] [0.89] [1.62] [2.47]** [1.2 1 ]
German Law t  +  2 -0.044 0.007 -0.055 -0.141 -0.182 0.066 -0 .1 1 1 -0.075 0.123 0.086 0 .1 1 1 0 .2 1 1
[0.50] [0.08] [0.61] [0.85] [1.25] [0.51] [0.64] [0.52] [0.97] [0.60] [0.64] [1.45]
French Law t + 3 -0.090 0.035 0.108 0.182 -0.129 0.136 -0.273 -0.310 0.184 0.188 -0.075 0.289
[0.82] [0.38] [1.25] [1.17] [0.78] [1 .0 2 ] [1 .1 1 ] [1.37] [1.07] [1.44] [0.44] [2.26]**
t +  4 0.106 0.018 0.077 0.214 0.227 -0.044 0.187 0.009 0.061 -0.170 0.048 -0.025
[1 .0 2 ] [0.19] [0 .8 6 ] [1.15] [1.43] [0.27] [0.89] [0.53] [0.29] [1 .0 2 ] [0.31] [0.18]
t +  5 -0.007 -0.053 0 .0 1 1 0.026 0 .1 0 2 0.140 0.236 0.284 0.147 0.031 0.041 -0.068
[0.07] [0.54] [0.128] [0 .1 1 ] [0.57] [1 .1 1 ] [1 .2 0 ] [1.59] [0.91] [0 .2 0 ] [0.35] [0.51]
Industry Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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In Table 5.18, I estimate the Average Effect o f  the Treatment on the Treated (A IT) for cross-listed emerging market firms. In Panels A and B 1 employ diftcrem probit 
specifications in order to generate the propensity to list for each 6 rm i.e. the propensity scores. All matches arc based upon 'Nearest Neighbour’ Matching, and all firms are 
matched on the year o f listing ((P (CI-=1 j Xt=o). My probit specifications are as follows: Panel A; I employ firm size, and industry dummies based upon primary SIC codes, firm 
growth and legal origin dummies (French and German Law). In Panel B, I augment the probit from Panel A with one-year lagged Tobin’s q. In Panel C, I replicate our probit 
specification from Panel A, and estimate the AT! for each different valuation proxy. Finally, in Panel D, we examine whether our results are robust to the time in which we match 
firms by matching firms on the year o f listing (P (CL=1 ]X,so). one-year pre-listing (P (C L=l J and two-years pre-listing (((P (CL=1 ¡Xsj). ’l"ho variables arc outlined in the 
appendix. In each specification the common support condition is imposed. I estimate the ATT on the year o f  listing (t) and up to 5 years post-listing (t+5). 1 also outline the 
number o f matched cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms for each time period (ATT (t)). Absolute values o f t-stats are reported m sijuare brackets under the ATI' estimates.
**, ’ Represents significance a t 1, 5, and 10% respectively.
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Table 5.19: Pooled least squares estimates of the impact of Cioss-ksanq bv level of investot protection.
High Investor Protnrnnn LowJuMcstQt-EroKtagdi
All Firms Hifth IP Only AH Firms Low TP Only
Level 1 e 0.1954** 0.1622 0.0136 -0.1034 -0.3878*** -0.4072*** -0 .2 1 2 1 ** -0.1977*
Level l t-i 0.0726 0.0934 -0.0945 -0.1396 -0.3467*** -0.2622* -0.1995** -0.0637
Level 11-2 0.0479 0.1307 -0.1154 -0.0747 -0.4642*** -0.4100*** -0.3241*** -0.2347**
Level It-3 0.0467 -0.0411 -0.1035 -0.2471** -0.2734** -0.1739 -0.1379 0.0086
Level l t-4 0.0729 0.0548 -0.0618 -0.1413 -0.1556 -0.0752 -0.0428 0.0776
Level l t-5 0.0217 0 .1 0 0 1 -0.1071 -0.0707 -0.3274*** -0.2252* -0.1992* -0.0732
Level 2/3, 0.2586** 0.3586* 0.1004 0.1361 -0.0459 -0 .1 0 0 1 0.1125 0.0853
Level 2/3,-i 0.2805** 0.3850** 0.1369 0.1887 -0.1944** -0.3095*** -0.0427 -0.1064
Level 2 / 3,-2 0 .2 1 2 1 * 0.4731*** 0.0691 0.2525 -0.2292*** -0.3266*** -0.0984 -0.1587***
Level 2 / 3,.3 0.1828 0.3119 0.0507 0.0944 -0.0736 -0.2299** 0.0643 -0.0841
Level 2 / 3,.4 0.1069 0.1514 -0.0189 -0.0257 -0.0436 -0.2406** 0.0729 -0.1114
Level 2/3,-s 0.0606 0.1239 -0.0647 -0.0304 -0.1350 -0.2827*** -0 .0 1 2 1 -0.1275
SEC Rule 144a, 0.6266*** 0.5807** 0.4562** 0.3131 0.4127*** 0.1157 0.5914*** 0.3251**
SEC Rule 144a,.t 0.2199* 0.2124 0.0460 -0.0438 0.2885** 0.1573 0.4607*** 0.3452***
SEC Rule 144a,-2 -0.0320 0.1340 -0.1954* -0.0854 0.1013 0.0573 0.2466*** 0.2418**
SEC Rule 144a,-3 -0.0614 -0.0129 -0 .2 0 0 0 *** -0.2079** 0.0945 0.0444 0.2339** 0.2115*
SEC Rule 144a,-4 -0.1161 0.0528 -0.2434*** -0.0811 -0.0039 -0.0705 0.1105 0.0685
SEC Rule 144a,.3 -0.1521*** -0.0649 -0.2747*** -0.2103** -0.0531 -0.0684 0.0729 0.0838
Global Industry q 1.24 0.87 1.23 1.41
(9.64)*** (5.15)*** (9.57)*** (8.14)***
Ln (Sales Growth) -0.055 0.1360 -0.0451 0.1681
(0.57) (0.95) (0.46) 0-45)
Year Dummies No No No No No No No No
Industry Dummies No No No No No No No No
R 2 0.051 0.0922 0.0814 0.1084 0.0595 0.0892 0.0391 0.1083
Pr >  F 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Pr > F  (Lags)
Level 1 0.130 0.137 0.109 0.039** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0.146
Level 2/3 0.170 0.187 0.634 0.763 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 0 0 *** 0 .0 2 0 **
Rule 144a 0 .0 0 0 *** 0.248 0 .0 0 0 *** 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.245 0 .0 0 0 *** 0.036**
Pr > F (Time) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
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Table 5.20: Pooled least squares estimates o f the impact o f cross-listing with country controls
(1) (2) (3) (fl (5) (6) (71
Level 1 -0.0115 -0.0980 -0.0613 -0.0663 -0.0844 0.0211 -0.0784
[0.17] [1.43] [0.87] [0.92] [1.17] [0.30] [1.07]
Level 2/3 0.0253 0.1578 0.1275 0.0295 0.0538 0.0342 0 .1 2 2 1
[0.37] [2.49]** [1.89]* [0.47] [0.87] [0.51] [1.95]*
SEC Rule 144a 0.0227 0.0219 0.0741 0.0141 -0.0132 -0.0123 0.0911
[0.37] [0.33] [1.13] [0 .2 2 ] [0.21] [0.19] [1.39]
Global Ind. q 1 .2 2 1 .1 2 1.08 1.14 1 .2 1  1.16 1.04
[9.55]*** [8.96]*** [8.60]*** [8.94]*** [9.60]*** [9.26]*** [8.36]***
Log (Sales Gth) 0.05 0.13 0 .1 1 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.16
[0.53] [1.33] [1.15] [0.44] [0.41] [0.62] [1 .6 6 ]*
French Law -0.47 
[1 2 .2 0 ]***
German Law -0.31
[7.80]***
Accounting Stds 0.0204
[9.93]***
Judicial Efficiency 0.0730
[7.56]***
Anti-Director 0.1447
[12.05]***
Liquidity Ratio 0.0477 
[3 73]***
Capital Access 0.3392
[9.34]***
Year Dummies No No No No N o No No
Industry Dummies No No No No N o No N o
R- 0.0878 0.1426 0.1246 0.1125 0.1349 0.0910 0.1254
Pr > F (Time) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0  0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Pr > F 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0  0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
In this table I report pooled ordinary least squares (with Mundlak corrections) estimates o f the impact o f cross-listing on firm 
value for a sample o f cross-listed emerging market firms over the period from 1990-2003. Tobin’s q is employed as our 
valuation proxy. In all specifications, the Mundlak (1978) correction terms (i.e. linear function o f averages over time of the 
exogenous variables) are included but no t reported. We do, however, test for the joint significance o f  the Mundlak (1978) 
corrections using a standard F-test ( P f  >  F  (T im e )). All variable are defined in the appendix. O ur standard errors are robust 
to clustering by firm. Absolute values o f  t-stats are reported in square brackets under the coefficient estimates. ***t **, * 
Represents significance at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. A constant is included but no t reported.
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Figure 5.1: Mean Tobin’s q ‘Around’ List Year
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Figure 5.4: Median (1/BM) ‘Around’ List Year
Yen ltd  id Lin Yen
* ♦ -  OTC ........ ■■'II *  ' ■ • • i
Figure 5.5: Mean (1/EP) ‘Around’ List Year
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Figure 5.6: Median (1/EP) ‘Around’ List Year
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Chapter 6: Is there a cross listing premium for non-exchange  
traded depositary receipts?
6.1. Introduction
In this Chapter I examine the valuation effects o f listing on firm value for non­
exchange traded depositary receipts. In the previous chapter, I uncovered w eak evidence that 
non-exchange traded firms from low  disclosure regimes outperform  their counterpart high 
disclosure firms post-listing. Here, I examine this further by extending our sample to include 
non-exchange traded firms from both developed and em erging m arket countries. M y final 
sample is made up o f 728 Level 1/Rule 144a firms from 39 countries. I begin by examining 
non-exchange traded firms in both calendar and event time. M y results suggest that non­
exchange traded firms tend to be worth less than domestic firms in  calendar time. In event 
time, I show that Level 1 firms tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed firms, only in the 
pre-listing period. These firms list after a period o f deteriorating firm performance, which is 
not reversed after listing in the U.S. Consequently, Level 1 firms are valued at a discount 
relative to non-cross-listed firms after listing in the U.S. Rule 144a firms are only worth more 
than non-cross-listed firms in the period imm ediately around the time o f listing. These firms 
‘tim e’ their decision to list.
I replicate the analysis from Chapter 5, and show that listing does not cause value for 
non-exchange traded firms from either developed or emerging markets. However, I find that 
Rule 144a firms from a high-disclosure regime experience the worst post-listing decline in value 
relative to non-cross-listed firms.
Finally, I examine the absolute and relative behaviour o f value o f  non-exchange traded 
firms by (1) stage o f economic development (emerging and developed) and high and low investor 
protection (2) legal origin (English common law, Scandinavian, French and German civil law), (3)
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level o f investor protection (proxied by LLSV (1998) anti-director rights index), and finally (4) 
industry membership (defined in terms o f prim ary standard industry classification code). I show 
that while the absolute value o f non-exchange traded firms differs substantially across different 
sub-categories o f  firms in the post-listing period, the conclusions that I draw for the entire 
sample o f firms applies. Listing in the U.S. does not cause value for non-exchange traded firms.
6.2. Data
In this Chapter, I augment my sample from Chapter 5 w ith  a comprehensive fist o f 
developed market firms that trade in the U .S., either ‘over-the-counter’ via a Level issue, or on 
Portal trading under Rule 144a. Unlike GLS (2005), I do not attempt to identify a firms’ first 
‘international’ listing. For example, in  our final sample I include a num ber o f Irish firms whom 
listed abroad (in London), prior to listing in the U.S. This approach is largely influenced by m y 
inability to identify each firm ’s initial international listing. A ll inform ation on cross-listed firms is 
sourced from the Bank o f N ew York, and is cross-referenced w ith data from Deutsche Bank 
(www.adr.db.com), and JP  Morgan (www.adr.com ). M y final sample, outlined in  Table 6.1 is 
comprised o f 10,912 firms from 39 different countries. This figure includes 10,184 domestic 
firms, 505 Level 1 firms, and 223 Rule 144a firms. From my original cross-listed sample o f firms: 
(1) I classify firms according to their first depositary receipt level, and (2) classify simultaneous 
Level 1/Portal ‘listings’ as Level 1 issues. I only include those firms w ith  average total assets 
greater than 10 million U.S. dollars over the entire sample period in order to facilitate a greater 
comparison across both sub-sets o f firms. Finally, I exclude all firms w ith m issing prim ary (4- 
digit) standard industry classification codes.
I outline in Table 6.1, the number o f non-cross-listed firms, and the number o f cross­
listed firms listed in the United States. I exclude from m y final sample firms domiciled in Russia, 
the Czech Republic and Indonesia because o f insufficient quality. I provide the percentage that 
each country contributes to each depositary receipt level and adopt an identical approach for my
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non-cross-listed sample. The m ajority o f our non-cross-listed sample is domiciled in the U.K. 
There also exists a sizable difference across countries in their contribution to each depositary 
receipt level. For example, H ong K ong, Australia, U.K., and South Africa provide the majority 
o f Level 1 issues, w ith 97 (19.21%), 61 (12.08%), 51 (10.10%), and 37 (7.33%) programs, 
respectively. Together, they supply just fewer than 47% o f the entire sample o f Level 1 firms. In 
contrast, Argentina and Taiwan provide none. Sim ilar trends are observed for private placement 
issues. The majority o f these firms originate in India (50), Taiwan (42), and South Korea (21). 
Jo intly, they provide just over 50% o f the entire sample. Belgium , Denmark, Israel, Malaysia, and 
N ew Zealand provide no firm. A n interesting feature evident from Table 6.1 is that across and 
w ithin countries there exists significantly differing preferences for each listing type. For example, 
the m ajority o f firms from Hong K ong trade over-the-counter as Level 1 issues. This contrasts 
notably w ith the preference o f Indian and Taiwanese firms to generate funds via a private 
placement.
Like Chapter 4 and 5, value is proxied using Tobin’s q. A ll additional data is sourced 
from W orldscope and is gathered on the 31st o f December at the end o f each year from 1990 to 
2003. To check for robustness, I employ Relative q as I do in Chapter 4. Relative q  serves to 
focus on the w ithin-country variation in corporate valuation, and thus facilitates a greater 
comparison o f value across countries. In addition to the sample description outlined in  Table
6.1, I provide the median value for each country, and depositary receipt level. Unreported m ean 
values are also calculated, and the general findings remain unchanged. Unsurprisingly, large 
differences in corporate value are evident across countries. Chua, Eun, and Lai (2006) examine 
the distribution o f corporate valuation globally. Their analysis suggests that the variation in 
corporate value (measured using country-level Tobin’s q (CTQ)) is driven by cross-sectional 
differences in  corporate governance, growth options, GDP growth, and capital market openness. 
For example, the median value for domestic U.K. firms is 1.77, compared to a value o f just 0.76 
for Brazilian firms. Another interesting feature arising from Table 6.1 concerns the difference in
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value across the different depositary receipt levels, w ithin countries. These differences do not 
appear to be systematically related to either depositary receipt level. For example, Level 1 firms 
from Australia, France, India, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey enjoy sizable valuation 
premiums over their counterpart Rule 144a firms. In contrast, Rule 144a firms from Chile, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland are valued m ore highly than Level 1 firms 
from the same country.
As in  Chapter 4 and 5, I em ploy the follow ing firm-level variables in  the empirical 
specifications: I use the average sales growth over the last two years (geometric average) and 
Global Industry q for each firm. I rem ove the top 1% o f observations for Tobin’s q, and two- 
year average sales growth. Negative values o f Tobin’s q are set to missing.
6.3 Univariate Statistics
6.3.1. Comparison of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event time.
I begin by comparing the value o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in both calendar 
and event time. The results are outlined in Table 6.2. In Panel A , I compute mean and median 
value for each depositary receipt level and for non-cross-listed firms, in  each year from 1990-2003. 
The valuation difference D (q) is calculated as the mean (median) valuation difference between 
firms listed in the U.S., and all firms not listed in the U.S. Like DKS (2004, 2006), the valuation 
differences are calculated based upon a sample o f firms whose average total assets, calculated over 
the entire sample period is greater than one hundred million United States dollars. This approach 
facilitates a greater comparison between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, since cross-listed 
firms tend to larger. DKS (2004, 2006) adopt a similar approach, but for each year their analysis is 
performed on a country-by-country basis. In Panel B, I compare the value o f cross-listed and non- 
cross-listed firms in event time. I outline the mean and median value o f cross-listed firms in an 
eleven-year event window around the time o f listing: five years pre-listing [Year = -5, -1], the year 
o f listing [Year = 0], and five years post- listing [Year = +1, +5], This analysis is performed using
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Tobin’s q, Industry-adjusted q, and Relative q. The Industry-adjusted q is calculated as follows: for 
each firm, I subtract from the value o f each firm, the average value o f its industry group, over the 
entire sample period. Each firm is classified into a particular industry based upon its primary four­
digit standard industry classification code. The Industry-adjusted q is calculated using data from 
over 15,000 firms from the Worldscope database. Finally, I compare the value o f cross-listed to 
non-cross-listed firms in  event time by computing Relative q. A  Relative q greater than 1 suggests 
that cross-listed firms are worth more than their counterpart non-cross-listing firms. Less than 1 
suggests the opposite.
I begin with a discussion of the results presented in Panel A. Here I present mean and 
median valuation differences between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in calendar time. I 
begin with Level 1 firms. The most discernible trend is that over the sample period, these firms are 
valued at a discount relative to non-cross-listed firms. In 11 o f the 14 years o f our sample, non- 
cross-listed firms are worth more than Level 1 firms. Seven o f the valuation differences are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. These figures also suggest that the valuation discounts 
increased as the decade progressed: the discount increased in every year from 1997 to 2000. In the 
years prior to 1997, there existed no valuation differences between both sets o f firms. The results 
are robust to the calculation o f a mean or median valuation difference. Rule 144a firms tend to be 
worth less on average. In every year but two, the average Rule 144a firm is worth less than firms 
not trading in the U.S. O f the 12 valuation discounts, 10 are significantly different from zero. 
Finally, and especially from 1996 onwards, the Valuation discount’ remains remarkably constant.
Overall the year-to-year comparisons demonstrate large valuation differences between 
cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. For both, non-cross-listed tend to be worth more, and in 
m ost years the valuation differences are statistically significant. The valuation discount 
experienced by Level 1 firms has become more pronounced as the decade progressed. The mean 
(and median) Rule 144a firm is worth less in almost every period, and this valuation discount has 
remained largely constant from 1996 onwards.
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In Panel B I calculate the value o f cross-listed firms in event time. For each set o f non­
exchange traded firms, I outline the mean and median absolute value o f cross-listed firms. Next I 
compare the value o f cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms by outlining the evolution o f Relative q 
around the time of cross listing. In effect, both Relative q and Industry-adjusted q serve as 
measures o f the mean and median “abnormal” valuation of cross-listed (relative to non-cross-listed, 
and relative to industry counterparts in  the case o f Industry-adjusted q) in the same (event) year. 
This analysis is intended to uncover whether cross-listed firms are worth more pre-listing, and 
whether the valuation difference widens post-listing. The results suggest that Level 1 firms tend to 
cross-list during a period of declining firm value. Value decreases significantly leading up to the list 
year (Year = 0). For example, in the list year, Level 1 firms are worth on average 12.5% less than 
they were five years pre-listing (Year = -5). The decline in value experienced in the pre-listing 
period continues post-listing, and the magnitude o f the decline is similar to that experienced pre­
listing. For example, after five years o f listing (Year = +5), the average Level 1 firm has declined in 
absolute value by an additional 13.75%. Similar conclusions are reached when I employ Industry- 
adjusted q.
Next I examine whether this trend is specific to cross-listed firms alone, or whether the 
trends outlined are characteristic o f the whole marketplace. To shed light on this, I outline the 
evolution o f both Relative q and Industry-adjusted q in the remaining columns o f Panel B. Because 
o f the similar findings between the two measures, I focus on the trends suggested by Relative q. 
First, in terms of our average Relative q measure, Level 1 firms are worth more than non-cross- 
listed firms in every pre-listing year. However, in line with the unconditional estimates the 
valuation premium decreases in every year approaching the list year. Consistent with before, the 
value o f listing firms continues to fall. After five years o f listing (Year = +5), Level 1 firms are 
worth on average less than non-cross-listed domestic firms. Over the eleven-year event window, 
the average Level 1 firm has experienced a fall in value o f around 25% relative to domestic firms.
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The Industry-adjusted loss in  value is even greater. These unconditional results are not supportive 
o f the premise that listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced value for Level 1 firms.
The value o f Rule 144a firms is outlined in  the rem aining columns o f Panel B. In 
contrast to Level 1 firms, Rule 144a firms tend to time their listing in  the U.S. Rule 144a firms 
experience a run-up in value pre-listing, followed by a fall-off thereafter. For example, in  the pre­
listing period, the value o f a Rule 144a firm appreciates on average by 32%. In the post-listing 
period, the fall-off in value is even greater (almost 38%). These trends are also evident in the 
relative valuation measures. These measures suggest that it is only in the period around the time 
o f listing that Rule 144a firms are w orth more than domestic firms. In every other period, the 
average Rule 144a firm is worth less. In addition, the valuation difference around the time of 
listing appears to owe much to market tim ing rather than from any valuation effect from listing.
The last three rows o f Panel B summarise m y general findings. The value o f Level 1 firms 
depreciates in  both the pre and post-listing periods. The net effect is that, after trading in the U.S., 
these firms are no longer valued at a premium relative to domestic firms. Now, domestic firms are 
valued more highly. Rule 144a firms ‘time1 their listing in the U.S. (See W ebb (1999), HJW  (2006)). 
The run-up in value pre-listing is more than offset by a fall-off thereafter. In line with the year-to- 
year analysis, Rule 144a firms tend to be less highly valued than domestic firms.
6.3.2. C om parison o f  lis tin g  firm s by category.
I examine the absolute value o f both depositary receipt levels by (1) stage o f economic 
development (emerging and developed) and high and low investor protection (2) legal origin 
(English common law, Scandinavian, French and German civil law), (3) level o f investor 
protection (proxied by LLSV (1998) anti-director rights index), and finally (4) industry 
membership (defined in terms o f primary standard industry classification code). The results are 
presented in Tables 6.3-6.6. I outline in  each Table, the percentage change in the value in each 
year up to five years post-listing, relative to the pre-listing periods for each listing level, and for
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each sub-category. In Table 6.7, I summarise m y earlier findings by presenting m edian before- 
after estimates for each sub-category. In the remaining columns o f Table 6 .7 ,1 examine the value 
o f each category, relative to both their domestic and industry counterparts, using both Relative 
and Industry-adjusted q. Both measures allow us to exam ine whether the unconditional 
estimates provided in Tables 6.3-6.6 are common to listing firms alone, or whether the 
demonstrated trends are market-wide, industry-wide, or both.
6.3.3. V aluation  by Stage o f  E co n o m ic  D evelop m en t and D isc lo su re L evel.
I outline in Table 6.3 the behaviour o f corporate value for both depositary receipt levels by 
stage o f economic development and disclosure level. Listed firms are classified as either 
developed or emerging, and high or low  disclosure domiciled firms. I classify firms as either high 
or low disclosure domiciled firms if  their anti-director rights measure is 4 or greater40. The anti­
director rights measure is sourced from LLSV (1998). In each column, I outline the absolute 
median value for each category for each year up to five-years pre-listing. In the remaining rows 
o f Table 6.3, I calculate the change in value for each year up to five-years post-listing, relative for 
each year in the three-year pre-listing (-2, -1, 0) period. Finally, in  each column labelled ‘ %A ’ I 
calculate the corresponding percentage change in q over the same period.
Lets begin with Level 1 firms. There exists a significant difference between developed and
em erging market, and between high and low  investor protection domiciled Level 1 firms.
Specifically, the fall-off in value in  the post-listing period is greatest for emerging market, and low
investor protection firms alike. For example, relative to the list-year, emerging market firms are
worth 13.51 per cent less, after the fifth year o f listing. Over the same period, developed market
firms only depreciate by a mere 1.20 per cent. Similarly, over the same period, low  investor
protection domiciled (cross-listed) firms are worth almost 5% less. The corresponding figure for
40 Although similar, there are notable differences between the developed and emerging, and high and low investor 
protection classification.
Level 1 firms trading in high-investor protection regimes is exactly 14%. The overall trends 
suggest that after a period o f initial poor performance, value begins to appreciate after three years 
o f listing for developed m arket firms. In contrast, value falls in every post-listing period for 
em erging market firms. Level 1 firms from high-investor protection are worth, relative to the list 
year, less in every period in the post-listing period (i.e. up to five years post-listing). In contrast, 
the decline in  value for low-investor protection is not imm ediate (for example after one year o f 
listing the median Level 1 firm is actually worth more) and not as severe, as outlined earlier.
The results for Rule 144a firms are presented in the rem aining columns o f Table 6.3. 
Sim ilar to Level 1 firms, there exists a significant difference in corporate value for both emerging- 
developed market and high-low protection domiciled firms, in the pre and post-listing periods. 
Similar to Level 1 firms, the fall-off in value in the post-listing period is again greatest for 
emerging market firms. In almost every year post-listing, em erging m arket firms are worth less 
relative to both the two-year pre-listing period, and the list year41.
Finally, there also exists a discernible difference in  the post-listing behaviour o f value for 
Rule 144a firms domiciled where investors are protected differently. Firms from high-investor 
protection regimes experience the greatest depreciation in post-listing value. For example, after 
five years o f trading in the U .S., high -investor protection domiciled Rule 144a firms are worth 
almost 61% less than then listing year value. W hile low-investor protection firms also experience 
a significant fall-off also, the magnitude o f the depreciation is less.
6.3.4. V aluation  b y  L eg a l O rigin.
I outline in Table 6.4 the evolution o f corporate value for Level 1, and Rule 144a firms, by 
legal origin. I classify each firm in accordance with their legal origin as defined in LLSV (1998).
41 In addition, both Figure 6.5 and Table 6.4 outline significantdy different behaviour in value in the pre-listing 
period. Specifically, while both sets o f firms appear to ‘time5 their decision to list in the U.S., the ‘run-up5 in value 
occurs much earlier in the pre-listing period for emerging m arket firms. It is evident from Figure 6.5 that emerging 
market firms experience a run-up in value that begins four-years pre-listing. In contrast, developed market firms 
experience a run-up in value just one-year pre-listing.
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Firms are classified as either English common, or French, German, or Scandinavian civil law. In 
general, investors are better protected in English common law jurisdictions. To conserve space, I 
only present the percentage change (% A ) in value for all firms over regular intervals in both the pre 
and post-listing periods.
I begin w ith  a discussion o f  Level 1 firms. The m ost striking feature from Table 6.4 (and 
Figure 6.8) is that the behaviour o f value for Level 1 issues as a whole, appears to be driven 
almost entirely by English common law  firms. In contrast, civil law  firms exhibit no fall-off in 
value in the pre or post-listing period. In fact, in  the case o f  Scandinavian civil law  firms, value 
begins to appreciate two-years post-listing (See Figure 6.8). Relative to English common law 
firms, French and German civil law  firms exhibit a very small fall-off in  value in the post-listing 
period. Specifically, in the fifth year o f listing, English common law  firms are worth, relative to 
the list year, 14.04 per cent less. The corresponding figures for French, German, and 
Scandinavian firms exhibit a fall o f 3.94, 2.68, and a rise in  value o f 6.06 percent, respectively.
The results for Rule 144a firms are outlined in the rem aining columns o f Table 6.4. 
Similar to the results presented for Level 1 firms, value differs gready across legal regimes. First, 
and unlike English common, French and German civil law  firms, Scandinavian civil law  firms 
experience a very m odest depreciation in value, post-listing. In contrast, both English common, 
and French civil law firms experience a run-up in  value beginning up to four years pre-listing. 
French civil law firms list after a run-up in value, which begins one-year pre-listing. Like Level 1 
firms, English common law  firms experience the greatest fall-off in  value in  the post-listing 
period. Unlike German civil law  Level 1 firms, Rule 144a firms experience a sim ilar fall-off in 
value in the post-listing period as that experienced by English common law firms. For example, 
after five years o f listing, relative to list year value, Scandinavian civil law  firms experience a 
modest drop in  value in the region o f 7.59%. English common, and French and German civil 
law  firms experience m ore dramatic declines in value, in the region o f 44.75, 25.27, and 30.22 
percent, respectively.
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Next I examine, by level o f investor protection, value around the time of listing. I employ 
LLSV ’s (1998) anti-director rights index to proxy for investor protection. The anti-director rights 
index ranges from 0 to 5, where 5 constitutes the highest level o f investor protection. The results 
are presented in Table 6.5 (and Figures 6.9 and 6.10).
I begin w ith Level 1 firms. In this case it is very difficult to identify any systematic 
differences in  value around listing. For example, the fall-off in value in the post-listing period is 
similar for firms with an anti-director rights index o f 0, 1, 2, 4, and 5. A fter five years o f listing, 
these firms depreciate in value, relative to the initial year o f listing, by 12.36, 18.47, 11.32, 11.83, 
and 12.88 percent, respectively. The value o f firms w ith the highest ranking o f investor 
protection is consistent w ith our findings for English common law  firms. This is not surprising 
given that investors enjoy the best protection under English com mon law  regimes. Firms w ith an 
anti-director rights index o f 3 experience the smallest decline in value post-listing. The following 
countries have an anti-director rights index o f 3, w ith the num ber o f Level 1 firms in brackets: 
Israel (1), Brazil (26), Colombia (1), France (16), Peru (3), Phillipines (5), Portugal (2), Taiwan (0), 
Finland (2), and Sweden (6). In the next Chapter, I further this analysis. I examine on a country- 
by-country basis, the causal effects o f listing on value: I compare the absolute value o f cross­
listed firms (as I do here) to the value o f non-cross-listed firms. I return to a discussion o f the 
results in the next Chapter.
I present the results for Rule 144a firms in the rem aining columns o f Table 6.5. Like 
before, it is difficult to identify any specific trends in  value across the different levels o f investor 
protection. For example, firms domiciled in countries w ith  the highest level o f investor 
protection (anti-director rights index=5). and those w ith  average protection (anti-director rights 
index=3) experience a run-up in value beginning up to four-years pre-listing. Consistent with my 
earlier findings, the former experiences the greatest loss in  value post-listing. Those firms 
domiciled in  countries w ith the weakest level o f investor protection (anti-director rights index—1.
6.3.S. Valuation by Level of Investor Protection.
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the data for firms w ith  an anti-director rights index o f 0 is poor) list after a period o f  excellent 
performance, in the year immediately prior to listing. They do not experience the same dramatic 
fall-off in value. In contrast, firms w ith  an anti-director rights measure o f  2 and 4 respectively, 
experience a very m oderate run-up in value im m ediately prior to listing. This appreciation in 
value is not offset post-listing. For example, relative to value one-year pre-listing, these firms are 
still worth more after five years o f  listing.
6.3.6. V aluation  by Industry T ype.
I outline, the value o f cross-listed firms by prim ary standard industry classification. The 
results are depicted in  Tables 6.6-6.7. I begin w ith a discussion o f the results for Level 1 firms 
outlined in Table 6.6 (and Figures 6.11-6.12). In Table 6 .6 ,1 outline the median value o f Level 1 
firms for each year pre-listing, up to five years pre-listing. In  the rem aining rows (and for Rule 
144a firms in Table 6.7), I present the change in firm value in each year up to five years post­
listing, relative to two and one year pre-listing, and the list-year. In Figures 11-14, the value o f 
cross-listed firms over time is depicted; in Figures 6.11-6.12, I outline the value o f Level 1 firms 
classified as SIC code 2-7, and 8-13, respectively. The results for Rule 144a firms are presented 
in Figures 6.13-6.14. Industry codes 1 and 14 are excluded from both because o f insufficient 
data.
I begin w ith  Level 1 firms. First, there appears to be no discernible pattern across the 
different industry classifications. I can, nonetheless, identify some o f  the main trends in the data. 
First, as outlined in the last column o f Table 6 .6 ,1 find that the change in  value is negative for the 
m ajority o f  Level 1 issues post-listing: in the first year o f listing, 8 o f the 13 industry classes are 
worth less, relative to two-years pre listing. Furthermore, value depreciates further as the number 
o f years post-listing increases; e.g. after five-years o f listing, almost every industry class is worth 
less relative to the year imm ediately prior to listing (11 out o f 13 industry classes). Second, I am 
able to identify those industries w ith  the most, and least impressive unconditional post-listing
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performance (underperformance). Both Level 1 ‘Extractive’, and ‘U tility’ firms experience die 
most impressive post-listing performance. In contrast, the least im pressive unconditional post­
listing performance is experienced by Chemical, Pharmaceutical, Transportation, Retail, and 
Services. In the next section I examine whether these unconditional results are robust to the 
inclusion o f firm and control level controls.
The value o f Rule 144a firms by industry is outlined in Table 6.7 (and Figures 6.13-6.14). 
Like Level 1 firms, there appears to be no discernible pattern across the different industry 
classifications. However, I am able to identify some o f the most salient points. First, like Level 1 
firms, the vast majority o f Rule 144a firms are worth less post-listing. For example, after five 
years o f listing, 9 o f the 12 industry classes are worth less. Second, and perhaps more interesting, 
I find that o f the 12 industry classes (with available data), exactly h alf exhibit very little evidence 
o f market timing. In contrast, the rem aining industry classes appear to time their listing in the 
U.S. (Pharmaceutical, D urable M anufacturers, Textiles, Services, Computers, and Retail). 
Finally, I find that the greatest post-listing underperformance is experienced by those industry 
classes that experience the greatest run-up in value, pre-listing.
6.3.7. C om parison  o f  listed  firms to their d om estic  and industry counterparts.
The results from the previous two sections can be summarized as follows: first, listing in 
the U.S. is associated with lower value for both sets o f cross-listed firms on an absolute and 
relative basis. For both, firms domiciled in emerging market and high investor protection 
regimes experience the greatest absolute loss in value. For Level 1 firms, listing in  the U.S. is 
associated w ith a fall in value for all different levels o f investor protection. A fter five years o f 
listing, the level o f depreciation ranges from 7.63%  to 18.47% relative to the list year. For Rule 
144a firms, the greatest fall-off in value is experienced by firms domiciled in countries with an 
anti-director rights measure o f 1, 3, and 5. The fall-off in value is not specific to any particular 
level o f investor protection.
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In Tables 6.8 and 6.9, I further examine these trends. First, I summarize m y findings 
from earlier and present a series o f before-after estimates for both sets firms. N ext I augment 
these measures by examining the performance o f cross-listed firms, relative to both their 
domestic and industry counterparts, by presenting before-after estimates using Relative q and 
Industry-adjusted q, respectively.
The results for Level 1 firms are in Table 6.8. They suggest that on an adjusted basis, 
listed firms experience a greater fall-off in  value relative to both their domestic and industry 
counterparts. When I classify firms as either emerging/developed, h igh/low investor protection, 
by legal origin, and by anti-director rights measure, each set o f firms is w orth less relative to their 
domestic counterparts, and in  some instances, and the differences are statistically different. For 
example, both developed and emerging market firms are both outperformed by their domestic 
counterparts around the time o f listing. English common and Scandinavian civil law  firms are 
also worth less on a relative basis. Finally both high/low protection domiciled Level 1 firms also 
experience a loss in  value relative to domestic firms.
On an Industry-adjusted basis, the post-listing performance o f listed firms is less severe. 
Scandinavian civil and developed m arket firms outperform their industry around the time of 
listing. Furthermore, albeit not statistically different, five o f the six anti-director rights 
classifications are now positive. In contrast, em erging and high-investor protection firms are still 
outperformed.
The results for Rule 144a firms are outlined in Table 6.9. On a relative basis, developed 
market, high investor protection, English common, and French and German civil law  firms are 
outperformed. Furthermore, the appreciation in value experienced by Scandinavian civil law 
firms is no different than that experienced by domestic firms. In summary, other than French 
civil law  firms, listing in the LI.S. is associated w ith a fall in value. Rule 144a firms w ith an anti- 
director rights measure o f 3 and 5 are also outperformed after listing in the U.S., although the 
absolute fall-off in value is considerably less when compared to the performance o f then
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domestic counterparts. On an Industry-adjusted basis, m y conclusions rem ain largely unchanged. 
Their industry counterparts outperform English common law  and em erging m arket firms. In 
contrast, French civil, and developed m arket firms continue to gain value post-listing.
6.4 Regression Estimates.
I test for the presence o f a firm and time effect in Tables 6.10-6.12. I present standard 
error estimates for the following independent variables; dummies for Level 1 [OTC], Rule 144a 
[PORTAL] firms. The following firm and country controls are also employed: G lobal industry q 
[Global q], two-year average sales growth [Sales Growth], and [GDP growth].
In Table 6.10 I test for the presence o f a firm effect. The test procedure is oudined in 
Section 3.4. I present Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm , and compare these to 
ordinary least squares and W hite-H uber (1980) standard errors. The sizable differences between 
Rogers (1993) and W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors are evidence in favour o f a sizable firm 
effect. For all independent variables, the W hite-H uber (1980) standard errors are considerable 
smaller than the Rogers (1993) standard errors. For example the ratio o f Rogers (1993) to White- 
Huber (1980) for the Level 1 dummy is 2.1097.
I present in Table 6.11 estimates o f Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by year. 
Interestingly, there appears to be a sizable time effect in the data. Specifically, there exists a 
sizable difference between the Rogers (1993) and W hite-Huber (1980) standard errors. For 
example, in the case o f Sales and GDP growth the magnitude o f the differences are 4.60, and 
5.54, respectively. For the remaining independent variables, the W hite-H uber (1980) standard 
errors are considerably smaller than those documented by Rogers (1993). In Table 6.12 I present 
Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm, and absorb the tim e effect by including time 
fixed effects. Y et again I find sizable differences between Rogers (1993) and W hite-H uber (1980) 
standard errors.
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I documented in  previous sections evidence that d ie absolute value o f non-exchange- 
traded firms fall after listing in the U.S. Listing is associated w ith a fall in value, irrespective o f 
the classifications that I employ. The majority o f firms also experience a loss in value on a 
relative-adjusted basis. In this section, I complement the analysis presented in Tables 6.8-6.9, by 
presenting regression estimates o f the impact o f listing on value. I begin estimating the 
following:
q* =  Po +  X J J ,  +  P 2P o s tk +  a ; +  +  |I,t (6.1)
W here q it is Tobin’s q, X lt is a vector o f firm and industry control (two-year average sales 
growth and G lobal Industry q). are time fixed effects, 0C1 unobserved heterogeneity, and p„ is 
a standard idiosyncratic error term. {a ,P 1;P2,P3} is a vector o f parameters to be estimated. 
P o stit is a post-listing dummy which is one the year o f listing, and one thereafter. The inclusion 
o f firm growth opportunities is a first attempt to address the endogeneity issue o f cross listing. 
N ext I estimate regressions o f the following form:
qit =  Po + X  A  + P 2P o s t,t + P3L is tit + a, + q, + m  (6.2)
q it = P„ + X itp, + P2P o s t jt + P3P re it + a  + + ]Lk (6.3)
W here P reit, L istit , represent the pre, and full period listing dummies, respectively. P ref[ is a
pre-listing dummy, which is one in every period prior to listing, and finally, L istlt is a listing
dummy which is one in every period for all cross-listing firms. Equation 6.2 allows us to examine 
whether the act o f listing itse lf is associated with greater value for cross-listed firms. Finally in 
Equation 6.3 I compare the value o f  cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms in  the pre and post­
listing periods. Each equation is estimated using ordinary least squares (with standard errors 
clustered by firm). T im e-fixed effects are included to account for contemporaneous correlation.
N ext I estimate the causal effect o f  listing on value for cross-listed firms. I address the 
endogeneity issue in two ways. First, as mentioned earlier I estimate Equation 6.1 with controls
2 1 4
for growth opportunities at the level o f the firm. Second, I estimate firm-fixed effect regressions, 
which control for endogeneity arising from time-invariant firm  characteristics (but not 
endogeneity arising from time-variant firm characteristics). Consequently, I estimate the 
foEowing:
qjt= a  + p2P°stit + St + c i + ^ it (6.4)
W here c is unobserved heterogeneity. I also estimate a variant o f our firm-fixed effects m odel 
because o f our concerns regarding violations o f strict exogeneity (See Chapters 4 and 5 for an 
overview o f the M undlak (1978) corrections). The equation is as foUows:
q,t = a  + X,tp, + P2Postlt + X £  + |Xlt (6.5)
Equation 6.5 is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares w ith standard errors clustered at the 
level o f the firm. Time-fixed effects are excluded because o f the inclusion o f the M undlak (1978) 
time-averaged correction terms.
Finally I examine the value o f cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms in each 
period up to five-years post-listing. GLS (2005) perform a simEar approach but their ‘year- 
dummy’ is interpreted relative to an eariier pre-listing period, and not relative to non-cross-listed 
firms. I am more interested in examining the relative, rather than the absolute value o f cross­
listed firms. I estimate the foEowing:
S ____
qit = a  + X itp, + PtPost't + X £  + uit (6.6)
s= 0
6.5 Results.
The results are outlined in Tables 6.13-6.16. In Table 6.13, I present estimates 
corresponding to Equations 6.1-6.3. In Panel A, I outline results for our full sample o f firms. In 
Panel B, I restrict the analysis to those firms with average total assets o f at least one hundred 
m illio n  U .S . doUars over the entire sample period. In the remaining tables, I only include large 
firms. In Table 6.14, I replicate this analysis for differing sub-sets o f non-exchange traded firms. I
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present results for developed, emerging, high and low investor protection categories, respectively. 
Table 6.15 contains our firm-fixed effect estimates. Finally in Table 6.16, I estimate the effect o f 
listing on value on a distributed yearly basis up to five years post-listing.
I begin by discussing the results in Panel B of Table 6.13. The results for both sets o f firms 
corresponding to Equation 6.1 are presented in columns (1) and (7). In columns (2) and (8) I 
augment the original specification with firm and industry controls. First, the results suggest that 
there exists no valuation difference between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms post-listing. In 
both specifications the firm and industry controls are highly significant and are o f the correct sign. 
N ext I examine whether the act o f listing is associated with higher or lower value. To do so, I 
include a ‘lis t in g  Dummy’, which equals one in every period if  the firm cross-lists at any point 
during our sample period. The results are outlined in columns 2-4 and 8-9 for Level 1 and Rule 
144a firms, respectively. First, the results suggest that Level 1 firms tend to be worth more than 
non-cross-listed firms, on average. In contrast, Rule 144a firms tend to be valued on a par with 
non-cross-listed firms. O f greater interest, the coefficient estimate on the (Post-Listing] dummy is 
negative and highly significant for Level 1 firms. Taken together, this suggests that while Level 1 
firms tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed firms on average, they lose value relative to non­
cross-listed firms after listing in the U.S. Rule 144a firms tend to be valued similar relative to non- 
cross-listed firms, and the act o f listing is not associated with a fall in value relative to non-cross- 
listed firms.
I provide estimates corresponding to Equation 6.3 In the remaining columns. I include the 
‘Pre’ and ‘Post’ list dummies in the same equation to examine the value o f both sets o f firms, 
relative to non-cross-listed firms, in the period around listing. The results for Level 1 firms are 
consistent with our earlier findings: these firms tend to be worth more pre-listing. Given the fall- 
off in value after listing in the U.S. (Columns (3-4)), they are not worth more than non-cross-listed 
firms post-listing (Columns (1-2)). Rule 144a firms tend to be worth marginally more pre-listing, 
although the difference is not statistically significant.
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In summary, my results thus far suggest the following. First, trading in  the U.S. is not 
associated with enhanced value for either set o f firms. Level 1 firms tend to be worth more on 
average, although the act o f listing does not contribute to this valuation premium. Private 
placement firms are valued similar to non-cross-listed firms on average. In the next section, I 
examine whether these results manifest for differing sub-categories o f both firms. I present the 
results in Table 6.14.
Here, I provide estimates for developed, emerging, high and low investor protection sub­
samples. For all, I only report estimates with all firm and industry controls included. The results 
for Level 1 firms are in line w ith the summary statistics presented earlier. First, emerging market 
firms experience the greatest loss in  value. In contrast to developed market firms, when I include 
the [Listing Dummy], the coefficient estimate on the [Post List] dummy for emerging market firms 
is negative and statistically significant. The corresponding coefficient for developed market firms is 
slightly negative, but it is not statistically different from zero. In the remaining columns, I compare 
the value o f developed and emerging market firms pre and post-listing. In line with expectations, 
developed market firms tend to be worth more post-listing, although the difference remains 
statisticaEy insignificant (p=0.33). In contrast, emerging market firms are worth more pre-listing, 
although yet again, the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.24).
N ext I examine the value o f Level 1 firms from high and low investor protection regimes. 
Consistent with my earlier findings, Level 1 firms from low-investor protection regimes tend to 
perform better post-listing. Both sets o f firms tend to be worth more on average [List D ummy is 
positive and significant for both]. However, Level 1 firms domiciled in countries where investors 
are highly protected experience the greatest decline in  value post-listing. Finally, while both sets of 
firms are worth more pre-listing, Level 1 firms from low-investor protection regimes are still worth 
more post-listing.
The results for Rule 144a firms are similar to those o f Level 1 firms. Unlike developed 
market firms, emerging market firms are worth significandy less after listing in the U.S.
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Interestingly, Rule 144a firms tend to be worth less on average relative to domestic firms. 
Emerging market firms tend to be valued on a par w ith their domestic counterparts. However, 
after listing in the U.S., developed market firms experience an increase in value; emerging market 
firms tend to experience the opposite. Consistent w ith this, emerging market firms tend to be 
worth more prior to listing in the U.S. In contrast, developed market firms are worth more. In 
both instances, the differences are statistically different from zero (i.e. p=0.06 and 0.08, 
respectively). Finally, when I classify Rule 144a firms as either high or low  investor protection 
domiciled, the results are largely similar to those presented for Level 1 firms. High disclosure firms 
tend to experience the greatest loss in value after listing in the U.S. In contrast, low  disclosure 
firms do not lose value relative to their domestic counterparts after listing in  the U.S. Finally, and 
consistent with these arguments, Rule 144a firms are more highly valued in  the pre, relative to the 
post-listing period.
In addition to controlling for growth opportunities at the firm level (previous section), I 
address the endogeneity o f the listing decision in this section by estimating firm-fixed effect 
regressions. I present fixed-effect estimates for both sets o f firms. I tend to lend more credence to 
the pooled ordinary least squares estimates given my concerns over possible violations o f strict 
exogeneity. I estimate regressions for our full sample o f firms, and then for each o f the same 
categories employed in the earlier analysis.
The results for both sets o f firms are in line w ith those outlined for equation 6.1 with firm- 
level controls included. First, listing in the U.S. does not cause value for both sets o f non-exchange 
traded depositary receipt firms. Furthermore, regardless o f the classification o f firms, I find that 
listing does not cause value for Level 1 firms. The sign o f the coefficients on the listing dummy for 
each classification are in line w ith those documented earlier, but all remain statistically indifferent 
from zero. For example, Level 1 firms from both developed and low-investor protection firms are 
worth more, but insignificantly so. In contrast, the sign on the listing dummy is negative for firms 
domiciled in emerging and high-investor regimes. In all specifications, the firm, industry, and
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country controls are correctly signed, and significandy different from zero. In summary, m y results 
suggest that listing in the U.S. does not cause value for Level 1 firms, regardless o f the 
classifications that I employ.
The results for Rule 144a firms are outlined in  the bottom panel o f Table 6.15. For the 
majority o f the sub-categories, listing in the U.S. does not cause value. However, there is one 
notable exception: the results suggest that listing in the U.S. is associated with significandy lower 
value for firms domiciled in high-investor protection regimes. This result is in line w ith those I 
outlined earlier for these firms. In summary, I find that in  general, listing in the U.S. is not 
associated with enhanced (relative) value for both sets o f non-exchange-traded firms.
Finally in Table 6.16, I examine the distribution o f the valuation gains/losses to listing for 
each set o f firms. For the full sample, Level 1 firms are valued on a par w ith non-cross-listed firms. 
For each remaining sub-group, I reach similar conclusions. The results for Rule 144a firms are 
outlined in the remaining columns. For the full sample o f firms, Rule 144a firms are worth 
significandy more in  the year o f listing, and the year immediately after [Year — +1], They are 
valued at a significant discount in two of the remaining four years. There exist contrasting fortunes 
for firms from high and low disclosure regimes. Firms domiciled in  low disclosure regimes are 
worth more in the first three years, post-listing. Thereafter, they are valued on a par with domestic 
firms. In contrast, Rule 144a firms from high-disclosure regimes are valued significandy less than 
domestic firms after two years o f listing, and in every period thereafter. This is in line with die 
findings I documented for these firms earlier.
6.6 Concluding Rem arks
In this Chapter, I examine whether listing abroad enhances value for non-exchange traded 
depositary receipts. In general, a non-exchange listing in the U.S. has been the prefered method 
o f entry onto U.S. capital markets for non-U.S. firms. However, hitherto, the extant literature
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suggests that trading in the U.S. does n ot enhance value for these firms. I examine the valuation 
effects o f  listing for these firms in detail.
I replicate the analysis from Chapter 5, and show that listing does not cause value for non­
exchange traded firms from either developed or emerging markets. However, I find that Rule 144a 
firms from a high-disclosure regime experience the worst post-listing decline in value relative to 
non-cross-listed firms.
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics by Country (Median).
Countiy Domestic & Level 1 26 Rule 144a 26 Sample 26 Tobins y 
Domestic
Tobias g
Level 1
Tobins q 
Rule 144a
1 Argentina 55 0.54 0 0 .0 0 5 2.24 60 0.55 1.33 - 1.25
2 Australia 819 8.04 61 12.08 4 1.79 884 8 .10 1.85 1.98 1.47
3 Austria 75 0.74 1 0 1.98 2 0.90 87 0.80 1.38 1.56 1.31
4 Belgium 92 0.90 2 0.40 0 0 .0 0 94 0 .86 1.51 1.53 -
5 Brazil 2 2 2 2.18 26 5.15 3 1.35 251 2.30 0.76 0.67 0.80
6 Chile 94 0.92 2 0.40 2 0.90 98 0.90 1.61 1.18 2.01
7 China 8 8 0 .86 8 1.58 4 1.79 1 0 0 0.92 1.19 1.14 1.12
8 Colombia 23 0.23 1 0 .20 4 1.79 28 0.26 1.32 1.17 1.34
9 Denmark 119 1.17 4 0.79 0 0 .0 0 123 1.13 1,50 1.07 -
1 0 Finland 104 1.02 2 0.40 2 0.90 108 0.99 1.49 1.44 1.32
11 France 719 7.06 16 3.17 5 2.24 740 6.78 1.53 1.65 1.24
1 2 Germany 695 6.82 2 1 4.16 3 1.35 719 6.59 1.53 1.34 1.35
13 Greece 248 2.44 2 0.40 5 2.24 255 2.34 1.99 1.78 1.34
14 Hong Kong 534 5.24 97 19.21 1 0.45 632 5.79 1.48 1.43 2 .20
15 Hungary 2 0 0 .2 0 2 0.40 8 3.59 30 0.27 1.42 1.45 1.65
16 India 216 2 .1 2 5 0.99 50 22.42 271 2.48 1.64 2.42 1.34
17 Ireland 30 0.29 4 0.79 1 0.45 35 0.32 1.63 1.27 1.88
18 Israel 83 0.82 1 0 .20 0 0 .00 84 0.77 1.50 1.16 -
19 Italy 171 1.68 5 0.99 7 3.14 183 1 .68 1.40 1.31 1.39
2 0 Japan 682 6.70 23 4.55 0 0 .0 0 705 6.46 1.65 1.63 -
21 Korea 631 6 .20 4 0.79 21 9.42 656 6.01 1.20 1.30 1.18
2 2 Malaysia 629 6.18 1 2 2.38 0 0 .0 0 641 5.87 1.62 1.72 -
23 Mexico 63 0.62 18 3.56 11 4.93 92 0.84 1.28 1.45 1.24
24 Netherlands 132 1.30 15 2.97 2 0.90 149 1.37 1.61 1.85 1.86
25 Norway 134 1.32 8 1.58 3 1.35 145 1.33 1.56 1.24 1.33
26 New Zealand 52 0.51 4 0.79 0 0 .0 0 56 0.51 1.75 1.24 *
27 Peru 40 0.39 3 0.59 1 0.45 44 0.40 1 .10 1.16 1.78
28 Phillipines 108 1.06 5 0.99 6 2.69 119 1.09 1.29 1.33 1.47
29 Poland 55 0.54 1 0 .20 11 4.93 67 0.61 1.47 1.11 1.23
30 Portugal 31 0.30 2 0.40 3 1.35 36 0.33 1.33 1.23 1.86
31 Singapore 404 3.97 19 3.76 1 0.45 424 3.89 1.62 1.39 1.15
32 South Africa 305 2.99 37 7.33 3 1.35 345 3.16 1.57 1.83 1.47
33 Spain 97 0.95 4 0.79 2 0.90 103 0.94 1.56 1.28 1.66
34 Sweden 264 2.59 6 1.19 1 0.45 271 2.48 1.63 1.36 1.85
35 Switzerland 169 1.66 5 0.99 1 0.45 175 1.60 1.38 1.58 2.28
36 Taiwan 401 3.94 0 0 .00 42 18.83 443 4.06 1.76 - 1.96
37 Thailand 295 2.90 14 2.77 1 0.45 310 2.84 1.41 1.79 1 .22
38 Turkey 127 1.25 5 0.99 7 3.14 139 1.27 1.74 1.56 1.33
39 U.K 1,158 11.37 51 10.10 1 0.45 1 ,2 1 0 11.09 1.77 1.82 1.76
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Countrx Domestic °A Ls.vel.1 A Euk 144a % Sample °A Tobins q
Domestic
Tobias^ 
Level 1
Tobins q 
Rule 144a
Total 10,184 100% 505 100% 223 100% 10,912 100% 1.55 1.54 1.37
In this table I report by country the number o f domestic (non-cross-listcd), Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. I report by country, the number o f domestic, Level 1, and Rule 144a 
firms. For each category o f  firms, I also calculate the percentage (%) contribution o f each country to the overall sample. In the remaining columns, I outline the Median q for each 
category o f firms. All firms are obtained from the Worldscope Country Lists. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and 
cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on Portal and Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues. 
Tobin’s q is calculated as [(Book Value o f  Total Assets — Book Value o f Equity + Market Value o f Equity)/Book Value o f Total Assets].
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Table 6.2: Value o f cross-listed and non-cross-listed films by year and in event time.
Panel A Leve M l 144a
Large Mean Median Mean Median
Year Level 1 NCI. Dfo) I cvcl 1 NCL D(?) Rule 144a NCL
G
M sJM a LiCL DC?)
1990 1.67 1.78 (0 .1 1 ) 1.58 1.58 0.00 1.03 1.78 (0.75)* 1.03 1.58 (0.55)*
1991 1.72 1.87 (0.15) 1.53 1.64 (0 .1 1) 1 .2 2 1.87 (0.65)* 1.17 1.64 (0.47)**
1992 1.81 1.75 0.06 1.53 1.53 0.00 1.72 1.75 (0.03) 1.50 1.53 (0.03)
1993 2 .0 0 1.91 0.09 1.80 1 .6 6 0.14 1.73 1.91 (0.18) 1.62 1 .6 6 (0.04)
1994 2.04 2 .0 1 0.03 1.73 1.73 0.00 2.52 2 .0 1 0.51*** 2 .2 1 1.73 0.48***
1995 1.87 1.90 (0.03) 1.63 1 .6 6 (0.03) 1.93 1.90 0.03 1.83 1 .6 6 0.17
1996 1 .8 6 1.95 (0.09) 1.59 1.67 (0.08)* 1.76 1.95 (0.19)** 1.53 1.67 (0.14)***
1997 1.89 2 .0 1 (0.12)* 1.61 1 .6 8 (0.07) 1.85 2 .0 1 (0.16)* 1.58 1 .6 8 (0.10)***
1998 1.59 1.81 (0.22)*** 1.36 1.48 (0.12)*** 1.56 1.81 (0.25)*** 1.30 1.48 (0.18)***
1999 1.73 2 .0 0 (0.27)*** 1.45 1.57 (0.12)*** 1.73 2 .0 0 (0.27)*** 1.38 1.57 (0.19)***
2 0 0 0 1.75 2.05 (0.30)*** 1.45 1.56 (0.11)*** 1.76 2.05 (0.29)*** 1.32 1.56 (0.24)***
2 0 0 1 1.57 1 .6 8 (0.11)** 1.36 1.42 (0.06)*** 1.42 1 .6 8 (0.26)*** 1.23 1.42 (0.19)***
2 0 0 2 1.61 1.67 (0.06)* 1.40 1.44 (0.04)*** 1.46 1.67 (0.21)*** 1.27 1.44 (0.17)***
2003 1.76 1.84 (0.08)* 1.52 1.56 (0.04)*** 1.58 1.84 (0.26)*** 1.38 1.56 (0.18)***
ALL 1.74 1.87 (0.13)*** 1.50 1.55 (0.05)*** L67 1.87 (0.20)*** 1.36 1.55 (0.19)***
Panel B 1 -eve I 1 Rule 144a
Mean Median Mean Median
Tobin’s i? Relative q Ind Adj q Tobin’s q Relative q Ind Adj q Tobin’s q Relative q Ind Adj q Tobin’s q Relative q Ind Adj q
-5 2.16 1.17 0.35 1.71 0.98 (0.03) 1.65 0.93 (0.16) 1.33 0 .8 6 (0.43)
-4 2.09 1.09 0 .2 2 1.67 0.98 (0.23) 1.59 0 .8 8 (0.25) 1.33 0.84 (0.46)
-3 1.99 1.07 0.17 1.61 0.92 (0.19) 1 .8 6 0.98 (0.03) 1.53 0.89 (0.36)
- 2 1.97 1.07 0.14 1.61 0.91 (0 .2 0 ) 2.17 1.09 0.25 1.72 0.93 (0 .1 2 )
-1 1.99 1.06 0.16 1.62 0.91 (0.17) 2.14 1.04 0.29 1.64 0.91 (0.18)
0 1.89 1.04 0.09 1.58 0.89 (0 .2 2 ) 2.18 1.08 0.32 1 .8 6 0.97 (0.07)
1 1.78 1 .0 0 (0.03) 1.53 0.89 (0.26) 1.96 1.06 0.09 1.70 0.92 (0 .2 2 )
2 1.79 0.97 (0.03) 1.53 0.87 (0.27) 1.82 0.97 (0.06) 1.47 0 .8 8 (0.31)
3 1.73 0.97 (0.06) 1.47 0.84 (0.27) 1.67 0.92 (0.19) 1.43 0.83 (0.37)
4 1.70 0.96 (0 .1 0 ) 1.46 0.85 (0.28) 1.58 0.89 (0 .2 0 ) 1.30 0.81 (0.41)
5 1.63 0.92 (0 .1 2 ) 1.39 0.83 (0.32) 1.58 0.87 (0.18) 1.28 0.80 (0.40)
Pre 1.99 1.08 0.17 1.65 0.93 (0.16) 1.87 0.98 0.03 1.38 0.89 (0.36)
Post 1.74 0.95 (0.03) 1.50 0.83 (0.25) 1.67 0.93 (0.12) 1.36 0.83 (0.34)
Difference (0.25)*** (0.13)*** (0,20)*** (0.15)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.20)*** (0.05)** (0.15)*** (0.02)** (0.06)*** 0.02
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Table 6.3: Value of listed firms by stage of economic development and level of investor protection.
l .i \ d l lin k 144a
Dev %A Emcig %A 1 imh P %A 1 .my I1 %A Orv %A [liner;- %A Hip-h P %A l .n v  I1 %A
-5 1.76 - 1.70 - 1.93 - 1.35 - 1.09 - 1.34 - 1.46 - 1.31
-4 1.71 - 1.64 - 1.85 - 1.36 - 1 .1 1 - 1.40 - 1 .6 6 - 1.32 -
-3 1.70 - 1.53 - 1.84 - 1.3 - 1.14 • 1.69 - 1 .8 8 - 1.32 -
- 2 1.71 - 1.54 - 1.75 . 1.38 - 1 .1 1 - 1 .8 6 - 2.23 - 1.38 -
-1 1.71 - 1.57 - 1.84 - 1.36 - 1 .2 2 - 1.65 - 1.77 - 1.55 -
0 1.67 1.48 - 1.71 - 1.34 - 1.77 - 1 .8 8 - 2.06 - 1.84 -
A(l,-2) (0.06) (3.51) (0.08) (5.19) (0 .1 0 ) (6.06) (0 .0 2 ) (1.47) 0.51 45.95 (0 .1 1 ) (5.91) (0.54) (31.95) 0.34 19.77
A(l,-1) (0.06) (3.51) (0 .1 1 ) (7.01) (0.19) (11.52) 0.00 0.00 0.40 32.79 0 .1 0 6.06 (0.08) (4.73) 0.17 9.88
A(1,0) (0 .0 2 ) (1 .2 0 ) (0 .0 2 ) (1.35) (0.06) (3.64) 0 .0 2 1.47 (0.15) (8.47) (0.13) (6.91) (0.37) (21.89) (0 .1 2 ) (6.98)
A (2,-2) (0.09) (5.26) (0.14) (9.09) (0.13) (8 .0 2 ) (0.03) (2 .2 2 ) 0.44 39.64 (0.40) (21.51) (0.83) (59.29) 0.13 8.61
A(2 ,-l) (0.09) (5.26) (0.17) (10.83) (0 .2 2 ) (13.58) (0 .0 1 ) (0.74) 0.33 27.05 (0.19) (11.52) (0.37) (26.43) (0.04) (2.65)
A(2,0) (0.05) (2.99) (0.08) (5.41) (0.09) (5.56) 0 .0 1 0.74 (0 .2 2 ) (12.43) (0.42) (22.34) (0 .6 6 ) (47.14) (0.33) (21.85)
A(3,-2) (0.13) (7.60) (0.16) (10.39) (0.18) (11.46) (0.07) (5.34) 0.33 29.73 (0.44) (23.66) (0.91) (68.94) 0 .1 0 6.76
A(3,-l) (0.13) (7.60) (0.19) (1 2 .1 0 ) (0.27) (17.20) (0.05) (3.82) 0 .2 2 18.03 (0.23) (13.94) (0.45) (34.09) (0.07) (4.73)
A(3, 0) (0.09) (5.39) (0 .1 0 ) (6.76) (0.14) (8.92) (0.03) (2.29) (0.33) (18.64) (0.46) (24.47) (0.74) (56.06) (0.36) (24.32)
A(4,-2) (0.07) (4.09) (0 .2 0 ) (12.99) (0 .2 0 ) (12.90) (0.08) (6.15) 0.28 25.23 (0.58) (31.18) (0.98) (78.40) (0.05) (3.76)
A(4,-l) (0.07) (4.09) (0.23) (14.65) (0.29) (18.71) (0.06) (4.62) 0.17 13.93 (0.37) (22.42) (0.52) (41.60) (0 .2 2 ) (16.54)
A(4, 0) (0.03) (1.80) (0.14) (9.46) (0.16) (10.32) (0.04) (3.08) (0.38) (21.47) (0.60) (31.91) (0.81) (64.80) (0.51) (38.35)
A(5,-2) (0.06) (3.51) (0.26) (16.88) (0.25) (16.67) (0 .1 0 ) (7.81) 0.25 22.52 (0.59) (31.72) (0.95) (74.22) (0.09) (6.98)
A(5,-l) (0.06) (3.51) (0.29) (18.47) (0.34) (22.67) (0.08) (6.25) 0.14 11.48 (0.38) (23.03) (0.49) (38.28) (0.26) (20.16)
A(5,0) (0.02) (1.20) (0.20) (13.51) (0.21) (14.00) (0.06) (4.69) (0.41) (23.16) (0.61) (32.45) (0.78) (60.94) (0.55) (4264)
In this table I outline by stage of economic development and level of investor protection, the behaviour of Median Tobin’s q for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. I 
calculate both the % difference in value between the post and pre-listing period and the change in q between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the 
three years pre-listing (-2, -1, 0) [A(l,-2), A(l,-1), A(l, 0), A(2,-2), A(2,-l), A(2, 0), A(3,-2), A(3,-l), A(3, 0), A(4,-2), A(4,-l), A(4, 0), A(5,-2), A(5,-l), A(5, 0)] 
based upon median values of Tobin’s
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Table 6.4: % Change in value for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms by legal origin.
I.CVll 1 Rule 144a
English
Common
I-aw 
%A
French
Civil Law
%A
German
Civil T.iiw 
%A
Scandinavian 
Civil Law
%A
Negative English 
Common 
I.aw
%A
French 
Civil Law
%A
German
GiyiLLaw
%A
Scandinavian 
Civil Law 
%A
Negative
-5 2.28 1 .2 0 1.49 1.32 - 1.41 1.26 1.44 - -
-4 2.16 1 .2 2 1.43 1 .2 1 . 1 .6 6 1.25 1.45 1.32 -
-3 2 .0 1 1.29 1.50 1.27 - 1 .8 8 1.24 1.83 1.24 -
- 2 1.80 1.36 1.50 1.25 - 2.30 1.28 2.26 1 .11 -
-1 1.90 1.27 1.52 1.43 - 1.77 1.34 1.67 1.23 -
0 1.71 1.27 1.49 1.32 . 2.19 1 .8 6 1.82 1.45 -
A(l,-2) (8.33) (6.62) (2 .0 0 ) 7.20 3 /4 (23.91) 26.56 (20.80) 22.52 2 /4
A(l,-1) (13.16) 0 .0 0 (3.29) (6.29) 3 /4 (1.13) 20.90 7.19 10.57 1/4
A(l, 0) (3.51) 0 .0 0 (1.34) 1.52 2 /4 (20.09) (12.90) (1.65) (6 .2 1 ) 4 /4
A(2,-2) (1 0 .0 0 ) (8.82) 2.67 4.80 2 /4 (40.43) 14.84 (28.76) 27.03 2/4
A(2,-l) (14.74) (2.36) 1.32 (8.39) 3 /4 (22.60) 9.70 (3.59) 14.63 2 /4
A(2, 0 ) (5.26) (2.36) 3.36 (0,76) 3 /4 (37.44) (20.97) (11.54) (2.58) 4 /4
A(3,-2) (12.78) (11.03) (6 .0 0 ) 1 2 .0 0 3 /4 (43.91) 7.03 (29.20) 27.93 2 /4
A(3,-l) (17.37) (4.72) (7.24) (2 .1 0 ) 4 /4 (27.12) 2.24 (4.19) 15.45 2 /4
A(3, 0) (8.19) (4.72) (5.37) 6.06 3/4 (41.10) (26.34) (12.09) (2.07) 4 /4
A(4,-2) (13.33) (8.09) (9.33) 25.60 3 /4 (49.57) 3 .1 2 (39.82) 18.02 2 /4
A(4,-l) (17.89) (1.57) (10.53) 9.79 3/4 (34.46) (1.49) (18.56) 6.50 3 /4
A (4, 0) (8.77) (1.57) (8.72) 18.94 3 /4 (47.03) (29.03) (25.27) (9.66) 4 /4
A(5,-2) (18.33) (10.29) (3.33) 1 2 .0 0 3/4 (47.39) 8.59 (43.81) 20.72 2 /4
A(5,-1) (22.63) (3.94) (4.61) (2 .1 0 ) 4 /4 (31.64) 3.73 (23.95) 8.94 2 /4
A(5,0) (14.04) (3-94) (2 .6 8 ) 6.06 3 /4 (44,75) (25.27) (30.22) (7.59) 4 /4
In this tabic I outline by legal origin, the behaviour o f Tobin’s q for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. Firms are classified as English Common Law, French, German, or Scandinavian 
Civil Law. I calculate both the % difference in value between the post and pre-listing period and the change in q between the five year post-listing (X, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the 
three years pre-listing (-2, -1, 0) [A(l,-2), A(l,-1), A(l, 0), A(2,-2), A(2,-l), A(2, 0), A(3,-2), A(3,-l), A(3, 0), A(4,-2), A(4,-l), A(4, 0), A(5,-2), A(5,-l), A(5, 0)] based upon 
median values o f  Tobin’s q.
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Table 6.5: % Change in value for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms by anti-director rights measure.
Level 1 Rule 144a
(0) (1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) N egative (0) (1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) N egative
%A %A %A %A %A %A %A %A %A %A %A %A
-5 1.44 1.27 1.82 1.15 1.74 2.19 - 1.38 1.15 1.17 2 .0 2 1.32 1.76 -
-4 1.59 1.34 1.95 1.17 1.72 1.97 - 1.52 1 .1 0 1.19 1.97 1.32 1.72 -
-3 1.51 1.52 1.56 1.14 1.63 1.98 - 1.59 1.16 1 .2 2 2.23 1.49 1.96 *
-2 1.58 1.41 1.57 1.14 1.71 1.79 - 1.67 1 .2 2 1 .2 1 2 .6 8 1 .21 2.47 -
-1 1.76 1.53 1.47 1.16 1.80 1.89 - 1.46 1.29 1 .2 2 2 .2 2 1 .2 2 2.30 -
0 1.78 1.57 1.59 1.18 1 .8 6 1.63 - - 1.85 1.33 2.14 1.45 2 .2 0 -
A(l,-2) 10.76 1.42 0.00 (3.51) 2.92 (12.85) 3 /6 9.58 22.95 9.09 (30.22) 15.70 (27.93) 2 / 6
A(l.-l) (0.57) (6.54) 6.80 (5.17) (2 .2 2 ) (17.46) 5 /6 25.34 16.28 8 .2 0 (15.77) 14.75 (22.61) 2 / 6
A(1,0) (1.69) (8.92) (1.26) (6.78) (5.38) (4.29) 6 / 6 - (18.91) (0.75) (12.62) (3.45) (19.09) 5/5
A(2,-2) 4.43 (4.96) 1.27 (5.26) 2.34 (13.41) 3 /6 (0.60) 18.05 12.40 (33.58) 19.01 (43.32) 3/6
A(2 ,-1) (6.25) (12.42) 8.16 (6.90) (2.78) (17.99) 5/6 (13.70) 12.40 11.48 (19.82) 18.03 (39.13) 3/6
A(2, 0 ) (7.30) (14.65) 0.00 (8.47) (5.91) (4.91) 5 /6 - (21.62) 2.56 (16.82) (0.69) (36.36) 4/5
A (3,-2 ) (5.06) (9.22) (3.18) (7.02) (2.34) (14.53) 6 / 6 (4.79) 8 .2 0 8.26 (39.55) 17.36 (46.96) 3 /6
A(3,-l) (14.77) (16.34) 3.40 (8.62) (7.22) (19.05) 5 /6 8.90 2.33 7.38 (27.03) 16.39 (43.04) 2 / 6
A(3,0 ) (15.73) (18.47) (4.40) (10.17) (1 0 .2 2 ) (6.13) 6 / 6 - (28.65) (1.50) (24.30) (2.07) (40.45) 5/5
A (4,-2) (1.90) (12.06) 5.10 (2.63) (5.26) (16.20) 5 /6 1.80 2.46 1.65 (46.27) 14.88 (52.63) 2 / 6
A(4,-l) (11.93) (18.95) 12.24 (4.31) (1 0 .0 0 ) (20.63) 5 /6 16.44 (3.10) 0.82 (35.14) 13.93 (49.13) 3/6
A(4, 0) (12.92) (2 1 .0 2 ) 3.77 (5.93) (12.90) (7.98) 5 /6 - (32.43) (7.52) (32.71) (4.14) (46.82) 5/5
A(5,-2) (1.27) (9.22) (10.19) (4.39) (4.09) (20.67) 6 / 6 10.18 (90.82) 4.13 (46.27) 12.40 (48.58) 3 /6
A(5,-l) (11.36) (16.34) (4.08) (6.03) (8.89) (24.87) 6 / 6 26.03 (6 .2 0 ) 3.28 (35.14) 11.48 (44.78) 3 /6
A(5, 0) (12.36) (18.47) (11.32) (7.63) (11.83) (1 2 .8 8 ) 6 / 6 - (34.59) (5.26) (32.71) (6 .2 1 ) (42.27) 5 /5
In this table I outline by industry type, the behaviour o f Tobin’s q for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. The Anti-Directors Rights measure is taken from LLSV (1998) and ranges from 
0 to 5. I calculate both the % difference in value between the post and pre-listing period and the change in q between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the three 
years pre-listing (-2, -1, 0) |A(l,-2), A(l,-1), A(l, 0), A(2,-2), A(2,-l), A(2, 0), A(3,-2), A(3,-l), A(3, 0), A(4,-2), A(4,-l), A(4, 0), A(5,-2), A(5,-l), A(5, 0)] based upon median 
values o f Tobin’s q.
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Table^ ó^ MedianvalueJb^ LeveMj&^ iJíLilliiEÍSl
0 ) (2 ) (3) « (5) (6) (7) (3) (9) (1 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) (13) (14) Neg
-5 2.81 1.50 1.91 1.45 3.02 2 .1 1 2.06 2.99 2.58 1.71 1.18 1.58 1.82 - -
-4 1.85 1.28 1.95 1.49 2.52 1.55 1.75 2.83 2.71 1.56 1 .2 0 1.61 2.17 - -
-3 1.84 1.42 1.56 1.43 2 .0 1 1.73 1.69 2.03 1.71 1.58 1 .2 1 1.65 2.17 - -
- 2 2 .0 2 1.54 1.71 1.48 3.17 1.64 1.59 1.69 1.61 1.80 1.23 1.54 1.80 - -
-1 1.95 1.84 1.74 1.39 2.34 1.54 1.59 1.52 1 .6 6 1.80 1.33 1.69 1.95 - -
0 2.05 1.48 1.59 1.39 2.30 1 .6 8 1.55 1.58 1.77 1.76 1.30 1.69 1.51 1.71 -
A(l,-2) (0.03) 0.05 (0.16) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .6 8 ) 0.05 (0 .1 1 ) (0.36) 0.35 (0 .1 0 ) 0.06 0.15 (0.33) - 8/13
A(lf-l) 0.04 (0.25) (0.19) 0.08 0.15 0.15 (0 .1 1 ) (0.19) 0.30 (0 .1 0 ) (0.04) 0 .0 0 (0.48) - 7/13
A(l, 0 ) (0.06) 0 .1 1 (0.04) 0.08 0.19 0 .0 1 (0.07) (0.25) 0.19 (0.06) (0 .0 1 ) 0 .0 0 (0.04) 0.13 7/14
A(2,-2) - (0.09) (0.17) (0.06) (0.84) 0.24 (0.03) (0.36) 0.40 (0 .1 2 ) 0.09 0 .0 1 (0.24) - 8 / 1 2
A (2,-1) - (0.39) (0 .2 0 ) 0.03 (0 .0 1 ) 0.34 (0.03) (0.19) 0.35 (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0.14) (0.39) - 9 /12
A(2, 0 ) - (0.03) (0.05) 0.03 0.03 0 .2 0 0 .0 1 (0.25) 0.24 (0.08) 0 .0 2 (0.14) 0.05 0.55 5/13
A(3,-2) - 0.04 (0.04) (0.49) (1.38) 0.08 (0.07) (0.17) 0.27 (0.31) 0 .1 0 (0 .2 2 ) (0.36) - 8 / 1 2
A(3,-l) - (0.26) (0.07) (0.40) (0.55) 0.18 (0.07) 0 .0 0 0 .2 2 (0.31) 0 .0 0 (0.37) (0.51) - 8 / 1 2
A(3, 0) - 0 .1 0 0.08 (0.40) (0.51) 0.04 (0.03) (0.06) 0 .1 1 (0.27) 0.03 (0.37) (0.07) * 7/12
A (4,-2) - 0.23 (0.06) (0.37) (1.16) (0.26) (0 .0 1 ) (0.42) 0.09 (0.38) 0.05 (0.07) (0.25) - 9/12
A(4,-l) - (0.07) (0.09) (0.28) (0.33) (0.16) (0 .0 1 ) (0.25) 0.04 (0.38) (0.05) (0 .2 2 ) (0.40) - 1 1 / 1 2
A(4, 0) - 0.29 0.06 (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) 0.03 (0.31) (0.07) (0.34) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .2 2 ) 0.04 * 8 / 1 2
A(5,-2) (0 .6 8 ) 0.14 (0 .1 2 ) (0.42) (1 .1 1 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0.17) (0.24) 0.14 (0.47) (0.03) (0.25) (0.28) - 11/13
A(5,-l) (0.61) (0.16) (0.15) (0.33) (0.28) 0 .0 0 (0.17) (0.07) 0.09 (0.47) (0.13) (0.40) (0.43) - 11/13
A(5,0) (0.71) 0 .2 0 0 .0 0 (0.33) (0.24) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0 .0 2 ) (0.43) (0 .1 0 ) (0.40) 0 .0 1 - 10/13
In this table I outline by industry type, the behaviour o f Tobin’s q for Level 1 ÓTC (International) firms. The industries are defined as following; (1) Agriculture and Food [0199- 
0999] (2) Mining and Construction [1000-1999, exd. 1300-1399] (3) Textiles and Publishing [2200-2799] (4) Chemicals [2800-2824, 2840-2899] (5) Pharmaceuticals [2830-2836] (6) 
Extractive [2900-2999, 1300-1399] (7) Durable Manufacturers [3000-3999, excl. 3570-3579, 3670-3679] (8) Transportation [4000-4899] (9) Utilities [4900-4999] (10) Retail [5000- 
5999] (11) Banking and Financial [6000-6999] (12) Services [7000-8999, excl. 7370-7379] (13) Computers [7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679] (14) Public Administration [9000+]. I 
calculate the mean (median) difference in value between the post and pre-listing period and the change in q between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the three 
years pre-listing (-2, -1, 0) lA(l,-2), A(l,-1), A(l, 0), A(2,-2), A(2,-l), A(2, 0), A(3,-2), A(3,-l), A(3, 0), A(4,-2), A(4,-l), A(4, 0), A(5,-2), A(5,-l), A(5, 0)]. The mean (median) 
valuation differential is tested using the Satterwaite t-test and the Mann-Whitney test, respectively. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, 1% level respectively.
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Table 6.7: Median value fot Rule 144a firms bv industry.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7) (S) (9) (1 0 ) (1 1) (12) (13) (14) Neg
-5 . 1.14 2.62 1.41 1.48 1.34 1.29 1.58 1.93 1 .2 1 1.07 - 2.23 - -
-4 . 1.07 1 .8 8 1.46 2.32 1.54 1.28 1.70 1.49 1.33 1.06 1.34 2 .0 2 - -
-3 - 1.14 1.80 1.40 2.08 1.45 1.63 1.78 1.36 2.70 1 .1 1 2 .2 1 2.35 - -
- 2 - 1.24 2.57 1.38 2 .2 2 1.45 2.26 2.25 1.37 2 .0 0 1 .1 2 3.26 3.14 - -
-1 - 1 .2 2 2.08 1.54 2.15 1.37 2 .1 1 1.96 1.09 2.27 1 .1 2 3.43 2.07 - -
0 - 1.14 1.80 1.55 2.61 1.46 2 .1 0 2.07 1.29 2.13 1 .1 2 2.06 2.48 - -
A(l,-2) - (0.17) (0.96) 0.25 0.39 0.07 (0.67) (0.30) (0.13) (0.06) (0 .0 2 ) (1.06) (0.82) 9/12
A(l.-l) - (0.15) (0.47) 0.09 0.46 0.15 (0.52) (0 .0 1 ) 0.15 (0.33) (0 .0 2 ) (1.23) 0.25 - 7/12
A(l. 0) (0.07) (0.19) 0.08 0 .0 0 0.06 (0.51) (0 .1 2 ) (0.05) (0.19) (0 .0 2 ) 0.14 (0.16) - 8 / 1 2
A (2,-2) - 0 .0 0 (1.06) (0.09) 0.48 (0.03) (0.80) (0.59) 0 .0 0 (0 .2 2 ) 0 .0 1 (0.70) (1.31) - 8 / 1 2
A(2,-l) - 0 .0 2 (0.57) (0.25) 0.55 0.05 (0.65) (0.30) 0.28 (0.49) 0 .0 1 (0.87) (0.24) - 7 /12
A(2, 0) 0 .1 0 (0.29) (0.26) 0.09 (0.04) (0.64) (0.41) 0.08 (0.35) 0 .0 1 0.50 (0.65) - 7 /12
A(3,-2) - 0 .0 2 (1 .1 2 ) (0.16) 0.23 (0.09) (0 .8 6 ) (0.63) (0.04) (0.32) (0 .0 2 ) (1 .0 0 ) (1.26) - 9 /12
A(3,-1) - 0.04 (0.63) (0.32) 0.30 (0 .0 1 ) (0.71) (0.34) 0.24 (0.59) (0 .0 2 ) (1.17) (0.19) - 9 /12
A(3, 0 ) - 0 .1 2 (0.35) (0.33) (0.16) (0 .1 0 ) (0.70) (0.45) 0.04 (0.45) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .2 0 ) (0.60) - 1 0 / 1 2
A (4,-2) - (0.14) (1.29) (0.25) 0.16 (0.13) (0.97) (0.85) (0 .0 2 ) (0.34) 0 .0 0 (1.48) (1.29) * 1 0 / 1 2
A (4,-1) (0 .1 2) (0.80) (0.41) 0.23 (0.05) (0.82) (0.56) 0.26 (0.61) 0 .0 0 (1.65) (0 .2 2 ) - 9 /12
A(4, 0) - (0.04) (0.52) (0.42) (0.23) (0.14) (0.81) (0.67) 0.06 (0.47) 0 .0 0 (0.28) (0.63) - 1 0 / 1 2
A(5,-2) - (0.04) (1.32) (0 .2 2 ) 0.33 (0.25) (0.89) (0.89) (0.04) (0.41) 0.03 (1.57) (1.38) - 1 0 / 1 2
A(5,-l) - (0 .0 2 ) (0.83) (0.38) 0.40 (0.17) (0.74) (0.60) 0.24 (0 .6 8 ) 0.03 (1.74) (0.31) * 9 /12
A(5,0) - 0.06 (0.55) (0.39) (0.06) (0.26) (0.73) (0.71) 0.04 (0.54) 0.03 (0.37) (0.72) - 9 /12
In this table I outline by industry type, the behaviour o f Tobin’s q for Rule 144a firms. The industries are defined as following; (1) Agriculture and Food [0199-0999] (2) Mining 
and Construction [1000-1999, excl. 1300-1399] (3) Textiles and Publishing [2200-2799] (4) Chemicals [2800-2824, 2840-2899] (5) Pharmaceuticals [2830-2836] (6) Extractive 
[2900-2999, 1300-1399] (7) Durable Manufacturers [3000-3999, excl. 3570-3579, 3670-3679] (8) Transportation [4000-4899] (9) Utilities [4900-4999] (10) Retail [5000-5999] (11) 
Banking and Financial [6000-6999] (12) Services P000-8999, excl. 7370-7379] (13) Computers [7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679] (14) Public Administration [9000+]. I calculate 
both the mean (median) difference in value between the post and pre-listing period and the change in q between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the three years 
pre-fisong (-2, -1, 0) [A(l,-2), A(l,-1), A(l, 0), A(2,-2), A(2,-l), A(2, 0), A(3,-2), A(3,-l), A(3, 0), A(4,-2), A(4,-l), A(4, 0), A(5,-2), A(5,-l), A(5, 0)]. The mean (median) 
valuation differential is tested using the Satterwaite t-test and the Mann-Whitney test, respectively. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5,1%  level respectively
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Table 6.8: Median value of Level 1 films before and after cross listing.
Tobin's q Relative tj latlust[¥.Admstcd.n
befen- After Diff Before Afluí Diff Before After Diff
All 1.65 1.50 (0.15)+** 0.93 0.83 (0.10)*** (0.16) (0.25) (0.09)***
Legal .Origin
English Common 1.98 1.56 (0.42)*** 1 .0 0 0.82 (0.18)*** 0.17 (0.18) (0.35)***
French Civil 1.30 1.36 0.06* 0.91 0.89 (0 .0 2 ) (0.40) (0.33) 0.07*
German Civil 1.48 1.45 (0.03) 0 .8 8 0 .8 6 (0 .0 2 ) (0.40) (0.34) 0.06
Scandinavian Civil 1.26 1.31 0.05 0.78 0.71 (0.07)* (0.53) (0.43) 0.10*
Economic Development
Developed 1.69 1.64 (0.05) 0.96 0.85 (0.11)*** (0.18) (0.13) 0.05*
Emerging 1.61 1.35 (0.26)*** 0.90 0.82 (0.08)*** (0.15) (0.34) (0.19)***
investor Protection
High 1.84 1.55 (0.29)*** 0.94 0.81 (0.13)*** 0.0026 (0.19) (0.19)***
Low 1.36 1.37 0 .0 1 0.93 0 .8 8 (0.05)** (0.41) (0.37) 0.04
Investor Protection
Anti-Director Right =  0 1.39 1.57 0.18* 0.93 0.90 (0.03) (0.31) (0.14) 0.17*
Anti-Director Right = 1 1.39 1.35 (0.04) 0.84 0.85 0 .0 1 (0.43) (0.38) 0.05
Anti-Director Right =  2 1.60 1.58 (0 .0 2 ) 1.05 0.94 (0.11)** (0.25) (0.13) 0 .1 2
Anti-Director Right — 3 1.16 1 .2 0 0.04* 0.89 0.83 (0.06)*** (0.56) (0.53) 0.03
Anti-Director Right = 4 1.71 1.65 (0.06) 0 .8 6 0.83 (0.03)** (0.16) (0.14) 0 .0 2
Anti-Director Right = 5 1.95 1.50 (0.45)*** 0.99 0.80 (0.19)*** 0.17 (0.24) (0.41)***
Industry
Agriculture & Food 2.09 1.35 (0.74)** 0.97 0 .6 8 (0.29) 0.36 (0 .2 2 ) (0.58)*
Mining & Construction 1.58 1.67 0.09 0.87 0.87 0 .0 0 (0.03) (0.04) (0 .0 1 )
Textiles & Publishing 1.71 1 .6 6 (0.05) 1.06 0.93 (0.13)*** (0.08) (0 .0 1 ) 0.07
Chemicals 1.37 1.75 0,38 0.81 0.92 0 .1 1 (0.32) 0.13 0.45
Pharmaceuticals 2.59 2 .1 1 (0.48)** 1.33 1.18 (0.15) 0 .1 2 (0.28) (0.40)**
Extractive 1.71 1.71 0 .0 0 0 .8 8 0.84 (0.04) (0.18) (0.25) (0.07)
Durable Manufacturers 1.69 1.48 (0.21)*** 0.98 0.82 (0.17)*** (0.06) (0.25) (0.19)***
Transportation 2 .1 1 1.34 (0.77)*** 1.09 0.79 (0.30)*** 0.15 (0.42) (0.57)***
Utilities 2 .1 1 1.60 (0.51)* 0.87 0,95 0.08 0.50 (0.04) (0.54)**
Retail 1 .6 6 1.53 (0.13) 0.92 0 .8 6 (0.06)* (0.18) (0.27) (0.09)*
Banking and Financial 1 .2 2 1.27 0.05 0.73 0.74 0 .0 1 (0.32) (0.28) 0.04
Services 1.61 1.49 (0.12)*** 0.92 0.85 (0.07)*** (0.43) (0.54) (0.11)***
Computers 1.78 1.48 (0.30)*** 0.99 0.82 (0.17)*** (0.29) (0.58) (0.29)***
Public Administration - 1.84 - - 0.96 - -
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Table 6.10: Testing for the presence of a firm effect.
Variable OLS Wliite-Huba
619801
Rogeis (1923)
[Clustered by 
firm]
S^KoBer* 'I (  s f  ^Rogers
 ^ S E o u s  J S F\ White
Level 1 
Rule 144a 
Global q 
Sales Growth 
GDP Growth
0.02599
0.1157
0.1928
0.0374
0.2034
0.02498
0.01018
0.02785
0.04718
0.1877
0.0527
0.0202
0.0397
0.0599
0.2922
2.0277
0.1746
0.2059
1.6016
1.4366
2.1091
1.9843
1.4255
1.2696
1.5567
In this table, I test for the presence o f a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £ |t =  +T]it, X it =71; + V (t. I outline standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
firm. In the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2)*
Table 6.11: Testing for the presence of a time effect.
Variable OI.S S'TiileJisber
619801
EQga£X1222)
[Cluatersdby
ysad
f  e c  V
Kogcis
v s e ols y S F  V White /
Level 1 
Rule 144a 
Global q 
Sales Growth 
GDP Growth
0.02599
0.1157
0.1928
0.0374
0.2034
0.02498
0.01018
0.02785
0.04718
0.1877
0.0432
0.0107
0.0559
0.2173
1.04
1.6622
0.0925
0.2899
5.8102
5.1131
1.7294
1.0511
2.0072
4.6058
5.5408
In this table, I  test for the presence o f  a firm effect in the data using Petersens (2005) approach. I assume that the 
independent variables and residuals are characterised by the following: £ it =  Yt +  T}it, X |t =  Jlt + V it . I outline standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic or within group clustering adjustment), (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, (3) Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by 
time. Tn the remaining columns, I compare (3) to both (1) and (2).
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Table 6.12: Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects.
Y .ir u  h lr OT-S Miits-Jlubsi
119801
Rogers 119931 ( SE ''IRogers
S F
fSE  ^Rogers
S F  V White /
Level 1 0.02599 0.02498 0.0527 2.0277 2.1097
Rule 144a 0.1157 0.01018 0.0203 0.1755 1.9941
Global q 0.1928 0.02785 0.0466 0.2417 1.6732
Sales Growth 0.0374 0.04718 0.0604 1.6150 1.2802
GDP Growth 0.2034 0.1877 0.3217 1.5816 1.7139
In this table, I compute Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm with time fixed effects. I compare these to standard 
errors generated by (1) ordinary least squares (with no heteroscedastic o r within group clustering adjustment), and (2) White 
(1980) standard errors i.e. standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. In the remaining columns, I compare Rogers 
(1993) standard errors to both (1) and (2).
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Table 6.13: Regression estimates for Level 1 & Rule 144a firms.
A (A® Level 1 & Domestic Firms Kuk. 144a & D.omestic_Ekms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) (8 ) (5) (10) (U) (12)
Post-Listing Dummy -0.14 -0.03 -0.29 -0.24 -0.14 -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.26 -0.03 -0.16 -0.17
[-4.10]*** [-0.63] [-5.10]*** [-2.81]*** [-3.90]*** [-0.44] [-3.13]*** [-2.63]*** [-2.87]*** [-0.27] [-3.05]*** [-2 .6 8 ]***
Pre-Listing Dummy 0.15 0 .2 2 0 .1 0 -0.15
[2.56]*** [2.56]** [1 .1 2 ] [-1.92]*
Listing Dummy 0.15 0 .2 2 0 .1 0 -0.15
[2.56]*** [2.56]** [1 .1 2 ] [-1.92]*
Sales Growth 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 .0 1 1 .0 1 1 .0 1
[16.03]*** [15.89]*** [15.89]*** [16.15]*** [16.19]*** [16.19]***
Global Industry q 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.90
[19.21]*** [19.20]*** [19.20]*** [19.68]*** [19.69]*** [19.69]***
Log (1+GDP Grth) 3.02 3.01 3.01 3.08 3.08 3.08
|13.29]"* [13.27]*" [13.27]*** [13.531"* [13.551*** [13.551***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. o f Firms 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,607 10,329 10,329 10,329 10,329 10,329 10,329
R-Squarcd 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.19
B (Large) Level 1 & Domestic Firms Rule 144a & Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) U) (8 ) (9) (1 0) 0 1 ) (1 2 )
Post-Listing Dum -0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 -0 .2 1 -0.19 -0 .0 1 0 .0 2 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 2 -0.05 -0.05 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 2
[0.41] [0.25] [3.57]*** [3.18]*** [0.16] [0.48] [0.31] [0.90] [1.69]* [1.58] [0.69] [1.32]
Pre-Listing Dummy 0.05 0.05 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
[3.38]*** [3.41]*** [1.31] [0.85]
Listing Dummy 0 .2 0 0 .2 1 0 .1 2 0.07
[3.38]*** [3.41]*** [1.31] [0.85]
Sales Growth 0 .8 8 0.87 0 .8 6 0.87 0 .8 8 0 ,8 8
[15.69]*** [15.63]*** [15.63]*** [15.16]*** [15.69]*** [15.69]***
Global Industry q 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57
[13.62]*** [13.64]*** [12.77]*** [13.63]*** [13.63]***
Log (1+GDP Grth) 3.23 3.24 3.24 3.32 3.24 3.24
[21.95]*** [21.95]*** [21.95]*** [21.33]*** [21.92]*** [21.92]***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No o f  firms 5,271 5,271 5,271 5,271 5,271 5,271 4,877 4,877 4,877 4,877 4,877 4,877
R-Squared 0 .1 2 0.17 0 .1 2 0.17 0.0925 0.17 0 .1 2 0.17 0 .1 2 0.17 0 .1 2 0.17
H 0 : P re  =  Post 0 .1 2 0.39 0 .1 1 0.08*
233
Table 6.14: Listing by stage of economic development and disclosure level.
Large Level 1 & Domestic Firms Rule 144a & Domestic Firms
Developed Emcreum Developed Emerging
(1) (2 ) (3) 0 ) (2) (3) 0 ) (2) (3) (i) (2) (3)
Post-Listing Dummy 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0 .0 2 -0.23 -0 .0 1 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04
[1.60] [1 .0 0 ] [1 .6 6 ]* [0.39] [2.62]*** [0 .1 1 ] [0.84] [2.23]** [0.83] [2 .0 1 ]** [1.82]* [1.91]*
Pre-Listing Dummy 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0 .0 1
[2 .1 2 ]** [2.50]** [2 .2 1 ]** 10.72]
Listing Dummy 0.17 0 .2 2 -0.32 0.07
[2 .1 2 ]** [2.50]** [2 .2 1 ]** [0.72]
Sales Growth 1.32 1.31 1.31 0.39 0.37 0.37 1.32 1.32 1.32 0.40 0.40 0.40
[13.68]*** [13.74]*** [13.74]*** [6.05]*** [5.83]*** [5.83]*** [13.65]*** [13.69]*** [13.69]*** [6 .1 2 ]*** [6 .1 1 ]*** [6 .1 1 ]***
Global Industry q 0 .6 8 0 .6 8 0 .6 8 0.43 0.44 0.44 0 .6 8 0 .6 8 0 .6 8 0.43 0.43 0.43
[11.42]*** [11.42]*** [11.42]*** p  64]*** [7.68]*** [7.68]*** [11.34]*** [11.33]*** [11.33]*** [7.66]*** [7.67]*** [7.67]***
Log (1+GDP Grth) 4.31 4.32 4.32 2.27 2.30 2.30 4.29 4.29 4.29 2.28 2.28 2.28
[12.70]” * 112.72]*** 112.72]*** [12.13]” * [12.251*** |12.25]*** [1264]'** [12.62]” * [1262]*** [12.18]” * [1 2 .2 1 ]*” 1 12.2 1 1 ' ”
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of firms 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,627 2,627 2,627 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,627 2,627 2,627
R-Squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.24
H0 : P re-P ost = 0 0.33 0.24 0.06* 0.08*
Disclosure Level 1 & O' UIH!liD£_FilUL Rule 144a & C .u a K it it im o i
High Disclosure I .ow Disclosure Mich Disclosure Low D iidosm :
0 ) (2 ) (3) (1 ) (2 ) (3) (D (2 ) 0 ) (2 ) (3)
Post-Listing -0 .0 2 -0 .2 2 -0 .0 1 0 .1 2 -0.07 0 .1 2 -0 .1 1 -0.17 -0 .1 0 0 .0 1 -0 .0 1 0 .0 1
Dummy [0.37] [2.99]*** [0 .1 2 ] [1.99]** [0 .6 8 ] [2.08]** [3.17]*** [2.29]** [3.00]*** [0 .6 8 ] [0.44] [0.94]
Pre-Listing Dummy 0.05 0.05 0.03 0 .0 1
[2.67]*** [2 .1 2 ]** [0 .8 8 ] [0.72]
Listing Dummy 0 .2 2 0.19 0 .2 1 0.08
[2.67]*** [2 .1 2 ]** [0 .8 8 ] [0.94]
Sales Growth 1.16 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.60 0.60 1.17 1.17 1.17 0.62 0.61 0.61
[12.34]*** [12.32]*** [12.32]*** [9.48]*** [9.43]*** [9 43]*** [12.40]*** [12.42]*** [12.42]*** [9.45]*** [9.42]*** [9.42]***
Global Industry q 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.55
[9.72]*** [9.75]*** [9.75]*** [9.86]*** [9.86]*** [9.86]*** [9.71]*** [9 72]*** [9.72]*** [9.85]*** [9.68]*** [9.68]***
L og  (1+G D PG rth) 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.14 3.15 3.15 3.23 3.23 3.23
111.26]” * 111.26)” * [11.26]*** 118.85]*” |18.81]*"*“ [18.81]*** [11.38]*** [11.39]*** [11.39]*** [18,83]” ' [18.71]*” |18.71]” *
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of firms 2,528 2,528 2,528 2,743 2,743 2,743 2,528 2,528 2,528 2,743 2,743 2,743
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R-Squared 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.23 0.23 0.23 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.23 0.23 0.23
H 0 : P r e - P o s t  = 0 0 .2 0 0.19 0.99
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Table 6.15: Firm-fixed effect estimates of the impact of listing on firm value.
Level 1 All Developed Emenaiie liigh iJistlaa iit: 1 .taw Disclosure
FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS
Post-Listing Dummy -0.06 0 .0 2 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.005 -0.08 -0.06 -0 .0 0 2 0.03
[2.73]*** [0.38) [2.09]** [1 .2 1 ] [0.85] [0.08] [2.63]*** 11.25] [0.07] [0.46]
Sales Growth 0.74 1.26 0.31 1.16 0.59
[11.99]*** [12.80]*** [4.13]*** [12.18]*** [7.72]***
Global Industry q 0 .6 8 0.73 0.58 0.62 0 .6 8
[15.27]*** [1 2 .0 1 ]*** [9.12]*** [9.86]*** [10.92]***
Log (1+GDP Grth) 1.53 2.90 2.04 1.83 1.65
[6.131*** ¡6.29]*** 17,501*** [4.14]*** [6.64]***
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Time Averages 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 *** • 0 .0 0 ** - 0 .0 0 ***
N o of firms 5,271 5,271 2,644 2,644 2,627 2,627 2,528 2,528 2,743 2,743
R-Squared 0 .0 2 0.07 0 .0 1 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.08 0 .0 2 0.08
Rule 144a All Developed Biwtping Hififl Disclosure I />w Disclosure
FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS FE POLS
Post-Listing Dummy -0.08 0 .0 2 0.04 -0.006 0.03 0 .0 1 -0.18 -0.08 -0.06 0.03
[6.43]*** [0.37] [1.13] [0.16] [0.85] [0.50] [7.10]*** [3.49]*** [4.84]*** [1.57]
Sales Growth 0.74 1.25 0.31 1.16 0.58
[1 2 .0 2 ]*** [12.75]*** [4.13]*** [12.23]*** [7.71]***
Global Industry q 0 .6 8 0.73 0.58 0.62 0 .6 8
[15.27]*** [11.98]*** [9.12]*** [9.79]*** [10.91]***
Log (1+GDP Grth) 1.53 2.97 2 .0 0 1.98 1.61
[6.13]*** [6.40]*** [7.36]*** [4.45]*** |6.49]*'*
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes N o
Firm Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Time Averages - 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 *** - 0 .0 0 ***
N o o f  firms 5,271 5,271 2,644 2,644 2,627 2,627 2,528 2,528 2,743 2,743
R-Squared 0 .0 2 0.07 0 .0 1 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.08 0 .0 1 0.08
In this table, I present firm fixed effect and pooled ordinary least squares estimates o f  the impact o f listing on value for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. For each set o f firms, I generate 
results for the entire sample [All], stage of economic development [Developed] and [Emerging], and level o f  disclosure [High Disclosure] and [Low Disclosure]. In the fixed effect 
specification, time fixed-effects are included to account for contemporaneous correlation. Mundlak (1978) time-averages arc included, but not reported. I report the number o f firms, 
and the R-squares for each. ***, **, and *, represents significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6.16: Impact of listing on value up to five years post-listing.
Level 1 Ruk L44a
All Develop F.merg High Low All Develop F.merg Uigli bow
[Year = 0] 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.04 0 .1 0 -0.03 0.15 0 .1 1 0.13
[1.43] [1.61] [0.48] [0.63] [0.44] [3.23]*** [0.73] [4.18]*** [1.62] [3.93]***
[Year =  1] -0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 -0 .0 1 -0 .1 1 0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0 .1 0
[0.18] [0.13] [0.07] [0.14] [1.61] [1 .6 8 ]* [0.52] [2.60]*** [1.42] [3.63]***
[Year =  2] -0 .0 1 0.04 -0 .0 2 -0.05 -0.08 -0 .0 0 1 0.05 0 .0 1 -0 .1 2 0.08
[0.23] [0.64] [0.35] [0.80] [0.89] [0.03] [0.61] [0.45] [4.35]*** [2.31]**
[Year = 3] -0 .0 2 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0 .1 1 -0.05 -0.03 -0 .0 2 -0.15 0.03
[0.41] [0.72] [0.57] [0.57] [1.37] [2.76]*** [0.78] [0.99] [6.44]*** [1.16]
[Year = 4] -0 .0 1 0.05 0 .0 1 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 0 .0 1 -0.03 -0 .1 1 0 .0 1
[0 .2 2 ] [0.55] [0.15] [0.41] [1.18] [2.18]** [0 .2 1 ] [1.44] [3.78]*** [0.44]
[Year = 5] -0.07 -0 .0 2 -0.04 -0 .1 0 -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0 .0 0 2 -0.06 -0.004
[1.37] [0.30] [0.64] [1.61] [1.99]** [1.33] [0.48] [0.06] [1 .2 1 ] [0.16]
Log (1 +Sales Grth) 0.74 1.25 0.31 1.16 0.59 0.73 1.25 0.30 1.16 0.57
[1 2 .0 1 ]*** fl 2.81]*** [4,14]*** [12.18]*** [7.77]*** [11.94]*** [12.78]*** [4.04]*** [12.14]*** [7.56]***
Global Industry q 0 .6 8 0.73 0.58 0.62 0 .6 8 0 .6 8 0.73 0.57 0.62 0.67
[15.27]*** [11.97]*** [9.12]*** [9.91]*** [10.91]*** [15.27]*** [11.97]*** [9.14]*** [9.86]*** [10.90]***
GD P Growth 1.53 2.94 2.04 1.81 1.64 1.52 2.96 2.04 1.92 1.60
[6.131*** |6.341*** 17.501*** |4.09|*** |6.601**‘ [6 .111*** 16.36]*** |7.491*** [4.31]*** [6.441***
Year Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
No. Firms 5,271 2,644 2,627 2,528 2,743 5,271 2,644 2,627 2,528 2,743
Time Averages 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 *** 0 .0 0 ***
R-Squared 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
In this table, I present pooled ordinary least squares estimates o f the impact o f listing on value up to five years post-listing, [Year = 0] is the list year, and [Year - 1] is one year post­
listing. For Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, I present estimates for the full sample [All], stage o f economic development [Develop] and [Emerg], and level o f investor protection [High] and 
[Low]. Mundlak (1978) corrections are included but not reported. The firm level variables are defined in the text. ***, **, and * represents significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Mean & Median Value o í Portal Firms
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Figure 6.2: Mean & Median Value of Level 1 Firms
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Figure 6.3: Mean & Median Relative Value of Rule 144a Portal Firms
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Figure 6.4: Mean & Median Relative Value of Level 1 Firms
Figure 6.5: Median Value of Emerging & Developed Market Portal Firms
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Figure 6.6: Median Value of Emerging & Developed Market Level 1 Firms
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Figure 6.7: Median Value o f Portal Firms by Legal Origin
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Figure 6.8: Median Value of Level 1 Firms by Legal Origin
Figure 6.9: Median Value of Level 1 Firms by Level of Investor Protection
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Figure 6.10: Median Value of Portal Firms by Level of Investor Protection
[  - • — - . A D R !   A D R 2   X ----- A D M  " X  A D R 4  ■-  A D R a |
Figure 6.11: Median Value of Level 1 Firms by Industry Type (2-7)
Figure 6.12: Median Value of Level 1 Firms by Industry Type (8-13)
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Figuie 6.13: Median Value o f  Rule 144a Firms by Industry Type (2-7)
Figure 6.14: M edian V alue o f  Rule 144a F irm s by Industry  T ype (8-13)
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Chapter 7: What firms from which countries gain most from non­
exchange listing in the U.S?
7.1 Introduction
I n  th e  p re v io u s  C h a p te r , I p r e s e n te d  a  c o m p re h e n s iv e  analysis o f  th e  v a lu a t io n  e ffe c ts  o f  
lis tin g  fo r  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re ce ip ts . T h e  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . d o e s  
n o t  p ro v id e  v a lu e  fo r  L ev e l 1 a n d  R u le  14 4 a  firm s . I r re s p e c tiv e  o f  th e  s u b -c a te g o r ie s  th a t  I  em p lo y , 
I a m  u n a b le  to  c o n c lu d e  th a t  lis tin g  cau ses v a lu e  fo r  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip ts . T h is  
is in te re s t in g  g iv e n  th a t  u n t i l  re ce n tly , L e v e l 1 is su e s  p ro v e d  to  b e  th e  m o s t  a ttra c t iv e  f o rm  o f  e n try  
fo r  n o n -U .S . o n  to  U .S . c ap ita l m a rk e ts42.
I n  th is  c h a p te r  I  e x am in e  w h e th e r  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . v ia  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tr a d e d  d e p o s ita ry  
re c e ip t  p ro g ra m s  is a sso c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  fo r  fo re ig n  f irm s . I  a b s t ra c t  f r o m  th e  “ te n d e n c y  
o f  p re v io u s  s tu d ie s  to  g e n e ra liz e  b a se d  o n  m u lt i-c o u n try  sa m p le s”  D F R  (20 0 5 , pg . 29). H o w e v e r , 
u n lik e  D F R  (2005), m y  fo c u s  is n o t  o n  a s ing le  c o u n try  (M ex ico  in  th e  case  o f  D F R  (2005)), b u t  o n  a 
h o s t  o f  c o u n tr ie s . I  e x am in e  o n  a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try  b a s is , th e  re la tiv e  v a lu a tio n  m e r i ts  o f  lis tin g  
fo r  a sa m p le  o f  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  f irm s  f ro m  3 9  d if fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s . I n  e ffe c t, I  a t te m p t  to  
id e n tify  th o s e  c o u n tr ie s  f o r  w h ic h  tra d in g  in  th e  U .S . p ro v e s  v a lu e  e n h a n c in g .
F irs t ,  I  c o m p a re  c ro ss - lis te d  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , in  b o th  c a le n d a r  t im e  a n d  e v e n t  tim e. 
I n  lin e  w ith  D K S  (2004 , 20 0 6 ), I  f in d  th a t  in  g e n e ra l, n o n -e x c h a n g e  tr a d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip ts  are  
n o t  w o r th  m o r e  th a n  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts .  I n  fac t, I  d o c u m e n t  th e  o p p o s ite :  n o n -c ro s s -  
l is te d  f irm s a re  w o r th  m o r e  th a n  c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s  in  m o s t  p e r io d s ,  a n d  s ig n ifican tly  so  in  m a n y  
in s tan c es . W h e n  I  c o m p a re  b o th  se ts  o f  f irm s  in  e v e n t  tim e , I f in d  th a t  L ev e l 1 f irm s  te n d  to  b e  
w o r th  m o re  th a n  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , b u t  o n ly  in  th e  p re - l is t in g  p e r io d . T h e i r  d e c is io n  to  lis t in  
th e  U .S . c o in c id e s  w ith  a p e r io d  o f  d e te r io ra t in g  firm  v a lu e . V a lu e  c o n tin u e s  to  fall p o s t- lis tin g .
42 In 2005, sponsored global depositary receipts surpassed the num ber o f Level 1 American Depositary Receipts for the 
first time, to become the m ost prom inent type o f depositary receipt program (See Bank o f New York (2006)).
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P o s t- l is t in g , L ev e l 1 f irm s  are  v a lu e d  a t  a  d is c o u n t  re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s . I n  c o n tra s t ,  
R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  ‘t im e ’ th e ir  d e c is io n  to  tra d e  in  th e  U .S: a n  e v e n  g re a te r  d e c lin e  p o s t- l is tin g  fo llo w s  a 
ru n -u p  in  v a lu e  p re -lis tin g . C o n se q u e n tly , R u le  1 44a  f irm s  a re  o n ly  w o r th  m o re  th a n  d o m e s tic  firm s 
in  th e  y ears  im m e d ia te ly  b e fo re  a n d  a f te r  lis ting .
N e x t  I  e x a m in e  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  p o s t- l is t in g  g a in s / lo s s e s  fo r  b o th  L e v e l 1 a n d  R u le  
14 4 a  firm s . W h ile  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  is p re d o m in a n t ly  m a d e  u p  o f  n o n -U .S . f irm s  th a t  e x p e r ie n c e  an  
a b so lu te  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- l is tin g , I  a m  ab le  to  id e n tify  a  s e c tio n  o f  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  g a in s in  
v a lu e . W h ile  p o s i t iv e  a b so lu te  g a in s d o  n o t  su g g e s t th a t  lis tin g  c au ses  v a lu e  (a lo n g  th e  sa m e  lin es, 
n e g a tiv e  p o s t- l is t in g  v a lu e  d o e s  n o t  n ecessa rily  su g g e s t th a t  l is tin g  d o e s  n o t  c au se  v a lu e ), th e y  d o , 
n e v e r th e le s s , su g g e s t th a t  so m e  f irm s  g a in  f ro m  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . I  a t te m p t  to  id e n tify  th e s e  f irm s 
b y  e x a m in in g  th e  re la tiv e  v a lu a tio n  m e rits  o f  lis tin g  o n  a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try  basis.
M y  re su lts  s h o w  th a t  a L e v e l 1 d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  is a s so c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  fo r  th e  
av erag e  f irm  f ro m  c e r ta in  c o u n tr ie s  e.g. M e x ico . W h ile  I  a m  u n a b le  to  a tta c h  s ta tis tic a l s ig n ifican ce  
to  o u r  f in d in g s , lis tin g  v ia  a  L ev e l 1 d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  p ro g ra m  g e n e ra te s  a n  e co n o m ic a lly  s ig n ific a n t 
‘c ro ss  l is tin g  p r e m iu m ’ f o r  firm s f ro m  a m o n g s t  o th e rs  A u s tr ia  a n d  T h a ila n d . I n  c o n tra s t ,  I 
d o c u m e n t  e c o n o m ic a lly  a n d  sta tis tica lly  s ig n if ic a n t ‘c ro ss  l is tin g  d is c o u n ts ’ fo r  o th e r s  e.g. f irm s  f ro m  
B raz il, C h ile , a n d  C h in a . F irm s  f ro m  a m o n g s t  o th e rs ,  H u n g a ry , M alaysia , S in g a p o re , a n d  S p a in  a re  
a lso  w o r th  less  (re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  f irm s) b u t  n o t  sta tis tica lly  so . I  d o c u m e n t  s im ila r t r e n d s  fo r  
R u le  1 44a  firm s. T ra d in g  in th e  U .S . u n d e r  R u le  14 4 a  is a s so c ia te d  w ith  a  ‘c ro s s  lis tin g  d is c o u n t’ fo r 
th e  m a jo r ity  o f  firm s. F o r  ex am p le , f i rm s  f ro m  F ra n c e , G e rm a n y , N o rw a y , In d ia , F in la n d , 
S in g a p o re , S p a in , a n d  th e  U .K . e x p e rie n c e  th e  g re a te s t  lo sses. I  d o c u m e n t  o n ly  4  s ta tistica lly  
s ig n if ic a n t ‘c ro ss  lis tin g  p re m ia ’: R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  f ro m  C h ile , P e ru ,  P o r tu g a l,  a n d  S w itz e rlan d . O f  
th e  re m a in d e r , o n ly  I ta lia n  f irm s  a re  v a lu e d  e c o n o m ic a lly  h ig h e r  th a n  d o m e s tic  I ta lia n  firm s.
F in a lly , m y  re su lts  a lso  h ig h lig h t s iz ab le  d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  th e  d if fe re n t  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t 
p ro g ra m s  w i th in  th e  sa m e  c o u n try . F o r  e x a m p le , th e  fo r tu n e s  o f  R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  f ro m  P e r u  a n d  
C h ile  c o n tr a s t  n o ta b ly  w ith  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  th e ir  L ev e l 1 c o u n te rp a r ts :  R u le  1 4 4 a  P e ru v ia n  a n d
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C h ile a n  f irm s  a re  w o r th  m o re  p o s t- l is tin g . I n  c o n tra s t ,  L ev e l 1 f irm s  a re  w o r th  c o n s id e ra b ly  less. I n  
th e  case  o f  firm s fro m  M e x ico , N o rw a y , In d ia , a n d  th e  N e th e r la n d s ,  th e  ro le s  a re  re v e rse d .
T h e  re s t  o f  th e  c h a p te r  is o rg a n is e d  as fo llow s. I n  S e c tio n  7 .2 , I o u tlin e  th e  d e p o sita ry  re c e ip t 
m a rk e t  in  th e  U .S ., w ith  spec ia l a tte n tio n  p lac ed  o n  th e  n o n -e x c h a n g e  p ro g ra m s . I n  S e c tio n  7 .3 , I 
m o tiv a te  th e  p ap er. S e c tio n  7 .4  en ta ils  a  d e sc rip tio n  o f  th e  da ta . S e c tio n s  7.5 a n d  7 .6  in c o rp o ra te  th e  
u n iv a ria te  a n d  re g re ss io n  analysis, respec tive ly . I e n d  w ith  so m e  c o n c lu d in g  rem ark s .
7.2 U.S. Capital Markets and non-exchange traded ADRs
N o n -U .S . firm s can  tra d e  in  th e  U .S ., e ith e r  d irec tly  o r  as a n  A m e r ic a n  D e p o s i ta ry  R e ce ip t. 
T h e r e  a re  f o u r  d is t in c t  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  lis tin g  types: a L ev e l 1 o v e r - th e -c o u n te r  is su e  tra d in g  o n  
N a s d a q , a  L ev e l 2 e x c h a n g e -tra d in g , a n d  L e v e l 3 e x c h a n g e - tra d in g  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  w i th  c ap ita l-  
ra is in g  e n ti t le m e n ts  in  th e  U .S ., a n d  finally  a p r iv a te -p la c e m e n t is su e  tra d in g  o n  th e  P O R T A L  to  
q u a lif ied  in s t i tu t io n a l  b u y e rs  u n d e r  R u le  1 44a43, a lth o u g h  th e  p r iv a te  p la c e m e n t  m a rk e t  is g en era lly  
less-liq u id  th a t  th e ir  c o u n te r p a r t  n a tio n a l  e x ch a n g es  (See C h a p te r  2  fo r  a n  o v e rv iew ).
U n lik e  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tr a d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip ts , L e v e l 2 / 3  e x c h a n g e - tra d e d  firm s tra d e  o n
o rg a n is e d  U .S . e x ch a n g es  a n d  c o m m it  to  s izab le  d isc lo su re , re g u la to ry , a n d  leg a l re q u ire m e n ts . T h e
c o s ts  a sso c ia ted  w ith  su c h  a re  la rg e , b u t  tire  b e n e f its  fo r  th e s e  f irm s  a re  p e rc e iv e d  to  b e  g re a te r  th a n
th o s e  th a t  a cc ru e  to  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  firm s (See C h a p te r  2  fo r  a d e ta ile d  lis t o f  th e  b e n e f i ts  fo r
L ev e l 2 / 3  d e p o s ita ry  re ce ip ts ) . I n  c o n tra s t ,  th e s e  e ffe c ts  a re  g e n era lly  sm a ll fo r  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d
firm s. F o r  ex am p le , H a il  a n d  L e u z  (20 0 4 , H L  H e re a f te r )  d o c u m e n t  g re a te r  c o s t  o f  c ap ita l g a in s  fo r
e x c h a n g e - tra d e d  f irm s . L e v e l 1 f irm s  a lso  e x p e rie n c e  a d e c lin e  in  th e  c o s t  o f  cap ita l, a lb e it m u c h
sm alle r. R u le  144a  firm s  e x p e rie n c e  a n  in c re a se  in  th e ir  c o s t  o f  c ap ita l, p o s t- lis tin g . In te re s tin g ly ,
th e re  is n o w  a d e b a te  e m e rg in g  o n  w h e th e r  th e  c o s ts  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a n  e x c h a n g e  c ro ss  l is tin g
o u tw e ig h  th e  o b v io u s  b e n e f its .  I n  th is  re g a rd , K K Z  (2005) e x a m in e  th e  re la tiv e  v a lu a t io n  b e n e f its
o f  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . fo r  n o n -U .S . firm s tra d in g  in  h ig h  a n d  lo w  in v e s to r  p r o te c t io n  re g im es . T h e ir
43 Fenn (2000) and Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2002) examine the development o f the private placement m arket i.e. Rule 
144a for domestic and foreign issuers, respectively.
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analysis su g g ests  th a t  th e  g re a te s t  g a in s  to  a n  e x ch a n g e  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . a c c ru e  to  th o s e  f irm s  
d o m ic ile d  w h e re  in v e s to rs  a re  b e t te r  p ro te c te d .  T h e y  th e o r iz e  th a t  th e  lo w e r  v a lu a tio n  g a in s  fo r  
firm s  f ro m  lo w  d isc lo su re  re g im es  a re  d r iv e n  b y  th e  c o s ts  a s so c ia te d  w i th  in it ia t in g  a n d  su s ta in in g  a 
L ev e l 2 /3 -d e p o s ita ry  re ce ip t. T h e  re la tiv e  c o s ts  o f  l is tin g  are  g re a te r  fo r  th e s e  firm s.
I f  I  ap p ly  th e s e  a rg u m e n ts  to  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  f irm s , th e y  su g g e s t th a t  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . 
v ia  a  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  m a y  b e  v a lu e  e n h a n c in g , a t  le a s t f o r  so m e  firm s. 
A lth o u g h  th e  b e n e f i ts  a sso c ia te d  w ith  su c h  a p p e a r  to  b e  lo w , th e  a s so c ia te d  c o s ts  a re  a lso  so 44. T h is  
lin e  o f  re a s o n in g  su g g ests  th a t  th e  b e n e f i ts  to  lis tin g  m ay  b e  su ff ic ie n tly  la rg e  fo r  so m e  firm s  in  o rd e r  
to  o u tw e ig h  th e  co sts . I n  th is  re g a rd , H L  (2004) f in d  th a t  f o r  e ac h  d e p o s i ta ry  re c e ip t  lev e l, lis tin g  in  
th e  U .S . is a sso c ia te d  w ith  a n  ab ility  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  f irm s  to  e x p lo i t  th e ir  c u r re n t  g ro w th  
o p p o r tu n it ie s ,  a n d  g e n e ra te  n e w  o n es . C o n se q u e n d y , lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . v ia  a  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  
d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  p ro g ra m  m a y  w e ll b e  a sso c ia te d  w ith  v a lu e  f o r  s o m e  firm s .
7.3 Motivation
T h e  m o tiv a tio n  b e h in d  th is  s tu d y  is p ro v id e d  in  a  se rie s  o f  re g re s s io n  e s tim a te s  p re s e n te d  in  
T a b le  6 .13 . I n  su m m ary , m y  re su lts  su g g e s t d ia t  f o r  b o th  L e v e l 1 a n d  R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s , c ro ss  lis tin g  
in  th e  U .S . is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a n  in c re a se  in  f irm  v a lu e . L e v e l 1 f irm s  a re  w o r th  m o re  o n  av erag e, 
b u t  th e  a c t o f  l is tin g  d o e s  n o t  c o n tr ib u te  to  th is  V a lu a tio n  p r e m iu m ’. R u le  144a  firm s te n d  to  ‘t im e ’ 
th e ir  d e c is io n  to  tra d e  in  th e  U .S ., a n d  a re  w o r th  less, b o th  o n  av erag e , a n d  p o s t- lis tin g . T h e s e  
f in d in g s  h a v e  b e e n  la rg e ly  re p lic a te d  in  a n u m b e r  o f  m u lt i-c o u n try  s tu d ie s  e.g. D K S  (2004 , 2 0 0 6 ), 
a n d  H L  (2004). H o w e v e r ,  th e re  a re  so m e  e x c e p tio n s . F o r  e x a m p le , in  h is  s tu d y  M ille r  (1999) 
d o c u m e n ts  p o s itiv e  (an d  la rg e ly  s ig n ifican t)  a b n o rm a l  r e tu rn s  a ro u n d  th e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  o f  lis tin g  
f o r  L ev e l 1 f irm s , b u t  n e g a tiv e  (b u t  in s ig n if ic an t)  fo r  R u le  1 4 4 a  firm s . D T T  (2005) e x a m in e  th e
44 KR (2006) provide similar arguments m their study. They suggest that while the major advantage for foreign firms 
that trade as non-exchange traded depositary receipt programs is the low cost o f  such issues (relative to Level 2/3 
depositary receipts), such programs also suffer from the major disadvantage o f  trading on less liquid markets than Level 
2 /3  firms do. They conclude, “W hether this is relevant depends on the relative costs o f additional disclosure versus the 
benefits o f additional liquidity”. In their analysis they suggest that this is no t relevant. They conclude, “Hence the lack 
o f complete disclosure and trading venue (PORTAL and DOSM) associated with Rule 144a and Reg S offers does not 
put them at a relative disadvantage”.
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im p a c t  o f  l is tin g  o n  a n u m b e r  o f  a c c o u n tin g  v a ria b le s  f o r  L e v e l 1 f irm s  f r o m  se v e n  c o u n tr ie s  (i.e. 
H o n g  K o n g , U n i te d  K in g d o m , A u s tra lia , J a p a n , S o u th  A frica , G e rm a n y , a n d  B razil). T h e y  
c o n c lu d e , “ . . . s o m e  firm s  b e n e f i t  f ro m  a p re se n c e  in  th e  U .S . O T C  m a rk e t,  e v e n  th o u g h  U .S . 
G .A .A .P . a c c o u n tin g  a n d  d isc lo s u re  re q u ire m e n ts  a re  n o t  m e t” . I n  a  s im ila r  v e in , th e  f in d in g s  o f  K R  
(2006) su g g e s t th a t  fo r  a sa m p le  o f  I n d ia n  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  f irm s , “ th e  la c k  o f  c o m p le te  
d isc lo su re  a n d  tra d in g  v e n u e  (P O R T A L  a n d  D O S M ) a sso c ia te d  w ith  R u le  1 44a  a n d  R e g u la tio n  S 
o f fe rs  d o e s  n o t  p u t  th e m  a t a  re la tiv e  d isa d v a n ta g e ” . I n  e ffe c t, w h a t  th e  la te r  s tu d ie s  h ig h lig h t  is th e  
“ te n d e n c y  o f  p re v io u s  s tu d ie s  to  g e n e ra liz e  b a s e d  o n  m u lt i -c o u n try  sa m p le s”  (D F R  (2005)). 
A d m itte d ly , I  a m  liab le  to  th e  sa m e  ch arg e s  in  C h a p te r  6. I n  th is  C h a p te r  I e n d e a v o u r  to  a d d re ss  
th is  issu e . D F R  (2005) c irc u m v e n t  th e  p ro b le m s  in h e re n t  in  m u lt i - c o u n try  s tu d ie s , b y  e x a m in in g  in  
d e p th ,  th e  im p a c t  o f  a  U .S. l is tin g  f o r  a sa m p le  o f  f irm s  f ro m  o n e  c o u n try , M e x ico . I  a d o p t  th e  sam e  
a p p ro a c h , b u t  fo r  a sa m p le  o f  n o n -e x c h a n g e  t r a d e d  A D R s  f ro m  39  d if fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s .
7.4 Do all non-exchange traded firms experience a fall in value post-listing?
I n  th e  p re v io u s  C h a p te r , I  e x a m in e d  w h e th e r  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . w a s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a 
c o r re s p o n d in g  a p p re c ia t io n  in  v a lu e  (re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  firm s) fo r  a  sa m p le  o f  n o n -e x c h a n g e  
tra d e d  f irm s  f ro m  39  c o u n tr ie s . I n  lin e  w ith  D K S  (2004 , 200 6 ), G L S  (2 0 0 6 ), a n d  H L  (2 0 0 4 ), lis tin g  
in  th e  U .S . is n o t  a sso c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  fo r  th e se  f irm s .
In  th is  se c tio n  I  f u r th e r  th e  analysis, a n d  e x am in e  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  v a lu e  in  th e  p o s t- l is tin g  
p e r io d  f o r  b o th  se ts  o f  firm s. F o r  b o th  se ts  o f  n o n -e x c h a n g e  tr a d e d  f in n s  I  c a lcu la te , re la tiv e  to  th e  
l is t  y e a r [Y ear =  0], th e  c h a n g e  in  q f o r  e a c h  f irm  u p  to  f iv e  y ea rs  p o s t- l is tin g , N e x t  I e x am in e  
d if fe re n t  in te rv a ls  o f  th e  e n tire  d is tr ib u tio n . I  c a lcu la te  th e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  
(re la tiv e  to  th e  lis t year) u p  to  fiv e  y ears  p o s t- l is tin g . I s u p p le m e n t  th is  b y  ca lcu la tin g  th e  I s', 2 5 'h, 
7 5 th, a n d  9 9 *  p e rc e n tile s , re sp ec tiv e ly . I a lso  ca lcu la te  th e  m in im u m  a n d  m a x im u m  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  
fo r  e ac h  p o s t- l is t in g  year. I n  th e  re m a in in g  ro w s  o f  e ac h  T a b le  (T ab le s  7 .1 -7 .2 ), I  c a lcu la te  th e
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n u m b e r  o f  f irm s  w ith  p o s it iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  c h a n g e  v a lu e  in  e a c h  y e a r  p o s t- l is tin g  re la tiv e  to  th e  lis t 
year.
I  re p lic a te  th is  analysis fo r  d if fe re n t  su b -se ts  o f  e ac h  se t o f  firm s: f irs t, I  p e r fo r in  th e  analysis 
f o r  th e  w h o le  sa m p le  o f  firm s. N e x t  I re p lic a te  th e  analysis f o r  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  
p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e , re sp ec tiv e ly . I a m  c a re fu l in  ex ac tly  h o w  I  in te r p r e t  th e s e  fin d in g s . T h e  
e s tim a te s  a re  b a se d  u p o n  c h an g e s  in  th e  a b so lu te  lev e l o f  v a lu e  f o r  c ro s s - lis te d  firm s. C o n se q u e n tly , 
th e  re su lts  r e p o r te d  in  th is  se c tio n  h a v e  n o  c au sa l in te rp re ta tio n . I  w ill e la b o ra te  m o r e  o n  th is  is su e  
in  th e  n e x t  se c tio n . I  o u tlin e  th e  re su lts  f o r  th e  fu ll s a m p le  o f  L e v e l 1 f irm s  in  T a b le  7 .1 . I n  T a b le s  
7 .1 a  a n d  7 .1 b , th e  re su lts  a re  p re s e n te d  f o r  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  p e r fo rm a n c e , 
re sp ec tiv e ly . I  p re s e n t  th e  re su lts  fo r  R u le  1 4 4 a  firm s  in  T a b le  7 .2 .
I b e g in  w ith  th e  re su lts  fo r  L ev e l 1 f irm s . I o u tlin e  in  T a b le  7 .1 , th e  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  (re la tive  
to  lis t year) f o r  e ac h  y e a r u p  to  fiv e  y ears p o s t- l is tin g . I n  th e  re m a in in g  c o lu m n s  o f  T a b le  7 .1 , I 
c a lcu la te  th e  av erag e  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  fo r  e ac h  p e rc e n tile  o f  th e  o v e ra ll  d is tr ib u tio n . I n  lin e  
e x p e c ta tio n s , th e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  L ev e l 1 f irm  e x p e rie n c e s  a n  a b so lu te  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- l is tin g , 
a n d  th e  m a g n itu d e  o f  th e  d e c lin e  is in c re a s in g  in  th e  n u m b e r  o f  years. T h e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  firm  
e x p e rien c e s  a  lo ss  in  v a lu e  in  th e  re g io n  o f  8 .68  a n d  6 .5 8 %  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r io d , re sp ec tiv e ly . T h e  
av erag e  n u m b e r  o f  f irm s  w ith  n e g a tiv e  a b so lu te  p o s t- l is tin g  p e r fo rm a n c e  is  a lm o s t  168 f irm s , o r  ju s t  
o v e r  6 1 %  o f  th e  availab le  sam p le . 9 9 %  a n d  7 5 %  o f  th e  sa m p le  o f  firm s e x p e rie n c e  a n  av erag e  
d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  o f  61 .7 7 , a n d  2 0 .8 1 %  o r  b e tte r ,  p o s t- l is tin g . A l th o u g h  a  s iz ab le  m a jo r ity  o f  L ev e l 1 
f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  a  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g , n o n e th e le s s , th e r e  a re  L ev e l 1 f irm s  fo r  w h o m  lis tin g  
is a s so c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  a b so lu te  v a lue . I  f in d  th a t  a t le a s t  2 5 %  o f  th e  o v e ra ll  sa m p le  o f  L ev e l 1 
f irm s  e x p e r ie n c e  a b so lu te  v a lu a tio n  g a in s  p o s t- lis tin g . T h e s e  f irm s  e n jo y  a n  av erag e  g a in  in  v a lu e  in  
th e  re g io n  o f  5 .9 1 % . I n  fa c t, a lm o s t  3 9 %  o f  L e v e l 1 f irm s  (109) e x p e r ie n c e  p o s itiv e  v a lu a tio n  g a in s 
p o s t- lis tin g .
T o  sh e d  m o re  l ig h t o n  th is , I re p lic a te  th e  analysis fo r  L e v e l 1 f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  (ab so lu te ) 
p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e . T h e  re su lts  a re  o u tlin e d  in  T a b le  7 .1a. F irs t ,  a f te r  fiv e  y ears  o f  lis tin g , th e
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m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  L ev e l 1 f irm  is  w o r th  2 4 .9 2  a n d  1 2 .9 9 %  m o re ,  re sp ec tiv e ly . T h e  av erag e  c h a n g e  
in  v a lu e  fo r  th e s e  f irm s  is in  th e  re g io n  o f  19 .20  a n d  1 0 .5 8 % , re sp ec tiv e ly . L ik e  b e fo re , a  sm all 
p r o p o r t io n  o f  f irm s  e n jo y  s izab le  v a lu a t io n  g a ins. Spec ifica lly , a t  le a s t  2 5 %  o f  f irm s  e x p e r ie n c e  
av era g e  g a in s  in  v a lu e  in  th e  r e g io n  o f  2 5 .4 5 % . T h e  sm a lle s t a v e ra g e  p o s t- l is tin g  v a lu a tio n  g a in  is 
2 .4 % , w h ile  th e  la rg e s t av erag es 1 1 7 .3 0 %  o v e r  th e  p o s t- l is tin g  p e r io d . T h e s e  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  
t r a d in g  in  th e  U .S . is a sso c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  fo r  s o m e  firm s , b u t  a t th is  s tag e  I  a m  u n a b le  to  
d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  lis tin g  ac tually  c au ses  v a lu e  f o r  th e s e  f irm s . I n  th e  n e x t  se c tio n , I  try  to  id e n tify  
th o s e  c o u n tr ie s  w i th  p o s i t iv e  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e  (re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  firm s). I n  T a b le  
7 .1 b , I  p e r fo r m  th e  sa m e  analysis f o r  L ev e l 1 f irm s  w ith  n e g a tiv e  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e . T h e  
a v erag e  fa ll-o f f  in  v a lu e  fo r  th e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  L ev e l 1 f irm  is 1 9 .9 8  a n d  1 6 .7 3 % , re sp ec tiv e ly . 99  
p e rc e n t  o f  f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  a n  av erag e  d e p re c ia t io n  in  v a lu e  o f  a lm o s t  6 7 %  o r  b e t te r  p o s t- lis tin g .
I n  su m m ary , f o r  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  L ev e l 1 f irm s , lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . is  a sso c ia te d  w ith  a n  
a b so lu te  lo ss  in  v a lu e . H o w e v e r ,  I  a m  ab le  to  id e n tify  a p r o p o r t io n  o f  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  p o s t ­
l is tin g  p e r fo rm a n c e , w h ic h  su g g ests  th a t  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w ith  lo w e r  v a lu e  fo r  all 
firm s.
N e x t  I re p lic a te  in  T a b le  7 .2 , th e  sa m e  analysis fo r  R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  as a  w h o le . I n  T a b le s  
7 .2 a -b , I p r e s e n t  th e  re su lts  fo r  R u le  1 44a  firm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  p e r fo rm a n c e , 
re sp ec tiv e ly . I b e g in  w ith  a  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  re su lts  p re s e n te d  in  T a b le  7 .2 . T h e  t r e n d s  e v id e n t  fo r  
R u le  14 4 a  f irm s  a re  s im ila r  to  th o s e  id e n tif ie d  fo r  L ev e l 1 f irm s . F irs t ,  a s iz ea b le  m a jo r ity  o f  R u le  
14 4 a  f irm s  (7 1 .2 %  o n  av erage) e x p e rie n c e  n e g a tiv e  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e . B o th  th e  m e a n  
(2 1 .0 0 % ) a n d  m e d ia n  (2 2 .7 9 % ) f irm  e x p e rie n c e s  a m u c h  la rg e r  d e p re c ia t io n  in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g . 
T h is  is  n o t  su rp r is in g  g iv e n  th e ir  te n d e n c y  to  t im e  th e ir  lis tin g . 99  a n d  75  %  o f  th e  sa m p le  
ex p e rie n c e  a d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  in  th e  re g io n  o f  7 4 .3 2 %  o r  3 3 .8 4 %  o r  b e tte r ,  re sp ec tiv e ly . A  sm all 
p r o p o r t io n  (o n  av erag e  2 8 .8 % ) o f  f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  p o s i t iv e  v a lu a tio n  g a in s  p o s t- lis tin g . U n lik e  
L ev e l 1 f irm s , th e  m a g n itu d e  o f  th e  g a in s  a p p e a rs  to  b e  sm alle r: 2 5 %  o f  R u le  144a  f irm s  e x p e rien c e  
av erag e  p o s t- l is tin g  g a in s  o f  0 .6 4 8 %  o r  b e t te r ,  c o m p a re d  to  5 .9 1 %  f o r  L e v e l 1 issu es.
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I re p lica te  th e  analysis fo r  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r fo rm a n c e . T h e  re su lts  a re  
o u tlin e d  in  T a b le  7 .2a. T h e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  R u le  144a  f irm  e x p e r ie n c e  a v a lu a t io n  g a in  in  th e  
re g io n  o f  1 4 .0 8 % , a n d  8 .6 8 % , re sp ec tiv e ly . 2 5 %  o f  th e  f irm s  a p p re c ia te  b y  1 9 .8 1 %  o r  b e tte r ,  p o s t ­
lis ting . A  sin g le  f irm  e x p e rie n c e s  a n  av erag e  p o s t- l is t in g  g a in  o f  6 8 .9 8 % . I n  T a b le  7 .2 b , I  p r e s e n t  
o u r  re su lts  fo r  f irm s w ith  n e g a tiv e  p o s t- l is tin g  p e rfo rm a n c e . T h e  a v e ra g e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  firm  
e x p e rie n c e  a b so lu te  d e c lin e s  in  v a lu e  o f  2 6 .7 4  a n d  2 5 .1 6 % , re sp ec tiv e ly . 7 5 %  o f  f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  a 
fa ll in  v a lu e  in  th e  re g io n  o f  3 9 .9 4 % , o r  b e tte r .  T h e  w o r s t  p e r fo r m in g  firm s  e x p e rie n c e  a n  av era g e  
d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  in  th e  re g io n  o f  7 7 .7 3 % .
In  su m m a ry  th e  re su lts  f ro m  th is  se c tio n  su g g e s t th a t  f o r  b o th  L e v e l 1 a n d  R u le  144a  f irm s , 
lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . is n o t  n e ce ssa rily  a sso c ia ted  w ith  a n  a b so lu te  fa ll in  v a lu e . T h e  m e a n  a n d  m e d ia n  
c ro ss - lis te d  f irm  e x p e rie n c e s  a  fa ll in  v a lu e , p o s t- l is tin g . H o w e v e r ,  I a m  a b le  to  id e n tify  a p r o p o r t io n  
o f  firm s th a t  e x p e rien c e  p o s i t iv e  p o s t- l is tin g  p e rfo rm a n c e . I n  th e  n e x t  se c tio n , I  b e g in  m y  c o u n try -  
b y -c o u n try  analysis. T h is  analysis is in te n d e d  to  e x am in e  w h e th e r  I  c a n  id en tify  th o s e  c o u n tr ie s  fo r  
w h ic h  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . p ro v e s  to  v a lu e  e n h a n c in g , in  a re la tiv e  sense .
7.5 Comparison of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms by country.
I p r e s e n t  in  T a b le  7 .3 , th e  av erag e  v a lu e  o f  T o b in ’s q  fo r  b o th  c ro ss - lis te d  a n d  n o n -c ro s s -  
lis te d  (N C L ) f irm s  o v e r  th e  e n tire  sa m p le  p e r io d  i.e. A ll (q) f o r  e a c h  c o u n try . I  c a lcu la te  th e  av erag e  
v a lu e  fo r  b o th  se ts  o f  f irm s , p re  a n d  p o s t- lis tin g . I n  th e  re m a in in g  c o lu m n s , I  c a lcu la te  th e  m e a n  
v a lu a tio n  d iffe re n c e  (D  (q)) b e tw e e n  c ro ss - lis te d  a n d  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  (N C L ) firm s , o v e r  th e  e n tire  
sam p le  p e r io d , a n d  fo r  e ach  su b -p e r io d . T h e  m e a n  v a lu a t io n  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  c ro ss - lis te d  a n d  
n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s  is c a lc u la te d  as th e  d iffe re n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  a v e ra g e  v a lu e  o f  l is te d  firm s a n d  
th e  av era g e  v a lu e  o f  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , o v e r  th e  e n tire  sa m p le  p e r io d . U n r e p o r te d  m e d ia n  
v a lu a tio n  d iffe re n c e s  y ie ld  s im ila r  f in d in g s . D K S  (2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 ) a d o p t  a n  id e n tic a l a p p ro a c h , b u t  o n  a 
yearly  b a s is  f ro m  1997  to  2 0 0 4 . I n  s u b s e q u e n t  analysis, I e x a m in e  th e  v a lu a tio n  d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  
c ro ss - lis te d  a n d  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  firm s o n  a yearly  b a s is  fo r  all firm s.
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L e ts  b e g in  w ith  th e  re su lts  fo r  L ev e l 1 firm s. T h e  f irs t  n o ta b le  fe a tu re  is th a t  th e re  ex is ts  
s iz ab le  v a r ia tio n  in  th e  v a lu a tio n  d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  c ro s s - l is te d  a n d  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  firm s a c ro ss  
c o u n tr ie s . F o r  e x am p le , o v e r  th e  e n tire  sa m p le  p e r io d , I id e n tify  1 6 -v a lu a tio n  p re m ia , a n d  2 1 - 
v a lu a tio n  d isc o u n ts . I  d e lib e ra te ly  d o  n o t  te rm  th e se  ‘c ro ss - lis tin g  p re m ia  o r  d is c o u n ts ’ b e c a u se  a t 
th is  stage, I  c a n n o t  se p a ra te  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  lis tin g  i.e. th e  ‘c ro s s  l is tin g  p r e m ia /d i s c o u n ts ’ f ro m  th e  
‘v a lu a tio n  p r e m ia /d is c o u n ts ’. I re tu rn  to  th is  later. T h e  la rg e s t ‘v a lu a t io n  p re m ia ’ is e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  
I n d ia n  L ev e l 1 f irm s , fo llo w e d  b y  T h a ila n d , a n d  th e  N e th e r la n d s ,  re sp ec tiv e ly . I L e s e  firm s e n jo y  a 
v a lu a tio n  p re m iu m  o f  4 7 .5 6 , 2 6 .9 5 , a n d  1 4 .9 0 % , re sp e c tiv e ly  o v e r  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s . I n  
c o n tra s t ,  L ev e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  C hile , D e n m a rk , I re la n d , Is ra e l, N o rw a y , N e w  Z e a la n d , P o la n d , 
S in g a p o re , S pa in , S w ed e n , a n d  T u rk e y  a re  v a lu e d  a t a s izab le  d is c o u n t  re la tiv e  to  th e ir  d o m e s tic  
c o u n te rp a r ts .  D a n is h  L e v e l 1 f irm s  a re  v a lu e d  a t a  d is c o u n t  o f  2 8 .6 6 %  re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  
D a n is h  firm s. O v e ra ll, L ev e l 1 firm s are  v a lu e d  a t a sm all d is c o u n t  (0 .6 5 % ).
I  d o c u m e n t  s im ila r f in d in g s  fo r  R u le  144a firm s: 14  a re  v a lu e d  a t a p re m iu m , w h ile  th e  
r e m a in in g  19 a re  v a lu e d  a t a  d isc o u n t. T h e  la rg e s t ‘v a lu a tio n  p re m ia ’ a re  e n jo y e d  b y  f irm s  f ro m  
S w itz e rlan d , H o n g  K o n g ,  P e ru ,  S w ed e n , C h ile , P h illip in es , a n d  Ire la n d . T h e  la rg e s t p re m ia  a cc ru e  to  
f irm s f ro m  S w itz e r lan d  (6 5 .2 0 % ), a n d  H o n g  K o n g  (4 8 .6 4 % ). I n  c o n tra s t ,  s iz ab le  ‘v a lu a tio n  
d is c o u n ts ’ a cc ru e  to  a m o n g s t  o th e rs , f irm s  f ro m  A u s tra lia  (2 0 .5 4 % ), F ra n c e  (1 8 .9 5 % ), G re e c e  
(3 2 .6 6 % ), In d ia  (1 8 .2 9 % ), N o rw a y  (1 4 .7 4 % ), P o la n d  (1 6 .3 3 % ), S in g a p o re  (2 9 .0 1 % ), a n d  T u rk e y  
(23 .56% ). A ll to g e th e r , R u le  1 4 4 a  firm s a re  v a lu e d  a t  a g re a te r  d is c o u n t  (1 1 .6 1 % ) th a n  L ev e l 1 firm s.
T h e  fin a l n o ta b le  fe a tu re  re la te s  to  th e  v a lu a tio n  d if fe re n c e s  th a t  ex is t b e tw e e n  L ev e l 1 a n d  
R u le  144a  f irm s f ro m  th e  sa m e  c o u n try . F o r  e x am p le , A u s tra l ia n  L e v e l 1 f irm s  a re  m o re  h ig h ly  
v a lu e d  (3 4 .7 0 % ) th a n  th e ir  c o u n te r p a r t  R u le  144a  firm s. S im ila r  re la tio n s  e x is t fo r  L ev e l 1 firm s 
f ro m  A u s tr ia  (1 9 .0 8 % ), F in la n d  (9 .0 9 % ), In d ia  (8 0 .5 9 % ), S o u th  A fr ic a  (2 4 .4 9 % ), T h a ila n d  (4 6 .7 2 % ), 
a n d  T u rk e y  (1 7 .2 9 % ). O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , R u le  14 4 a  f irm s  f ro m  C h ile  (7 0 .3 3 % ), C o lo m b ia  
(1 4 .5 3 % ), H o n g  K o n g  (5 3 .8 5 % ), I re la n d  (4 8 .0 3 % ), P e r u  (5 3 .4 4 % ), S w ed e n  (3 6 .0 2 % ), a n d  
S w itz e rlan d  (4 4 .2 0 % ) a re  m o re  h ig h ly  v a lu e d  th a n  th e ir  c o r re s p o n d in g  sa m p le  o f  L ev e l 1 firm s.
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T h e s e  figu res ra ise  o n e  in te re s t in g  q u e s tio n : h o w  m u c h  o f  th e  v a lu a t io n  d if fe re n c e s  th a t  e x is t 
b e tw e e n  th is  su b -s e t  o f  f irm s  a re  d r iv e n  b y  th e  a c t o f  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S ?  I n  th e  r e m a in in g  se c tio n s  o f  
T a b le  7 . 3 , 1 b e g in  to  a n sw e r  th is  q u e s tio n .
I ca lcu la te  fo r  e ac h  c o u n try , th e  m e a n  v a lu a tio n  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  c ro ss - lis te d  a n d  n o n ­
c ro ss - lis te d  firm s in  b o th  th e  p r e  a n d  p o s t- l is t in g  p e r io d s . T h is  d a ta  c o n s t itu te s  u n c o n d it io n a l  
e s tim a te s  o f  th e  p o s s ib le  im p a c t  o f  l is tin g  o n  f irm  v a lue . C o n se q u e n tly , th is  r e p re s e n ts  th e  f irs t 
in s ta n c e  in  th is  p a p e r  in  w h ic h  I  m a y  leg itim a te ly  te rm  th e  v a lu a t io n  d if fe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  c ro ss - lis te d  
a n d  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , a  ‘c ro ss  l is tin g  p re m iu m 5. I  b e g in  w ith  a  d is c u s s io n  o f  L e v e l 1 f irm s . O n  
e x a m in a tio n , I a m  a b le  to  id e n tify  a  n u m b e r  o f  t r e n d s  n o t  e v id e n t  f ro m  th e  su m m a ry  s ta tis tic s  
p re s e n te d  earlier. F irs t ,  a  la rg e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  L ev e l 1 f irm s  th a t  u ltim a te ly  tra d e  in  th e  U .S . a re  m o re  
h ig h ly  v a lu ed : p re -lis tin g , f irm s  f ro m  2 0  c o u n tr ie s  a re  v a lu e d  a t  a  p r e m iu m  re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s -  
lis te d  firm s. T h e  re m a in in g  17 tra d e  a t  a d isc o u n t. N o ta b ly ,  th e re  ex is ts  o n ly  13 lis tin g  p re m ia  p o s t-  
lis tin g . T h is  su g g ests  th a t  fo r  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  L ev e l 1 f irm s , l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . is a s so c ia te d  w ith  a  fall 
in  f irm  value.
T o  s u p p le m e n t  th is  analysis, I  p re se n t ,  in  T a b le  7 .4 , m e d ia n  b e f o re  a n d  a f te r  v a lu a tio n  
d iffe re n c e s  fo r  all c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s . I c a lcu la te  b e fo re -a f te r  e s tim a te s  o f  a b so lu te  a n d  re la tiv e  q. 
B o th  v a lu a tio n  m e a su re s  a llo w  u s  to  id e n tify  th e  fo llo w in g : f irs t  b y  an a ly s in g  a b so lu te  b e fo re -a f te r  
e s tim a te s , I  a m  ab le  t o  id e n tify  th o s e  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e /n e g a tiv e  c h an g e s  in  a b so lu te  p e r fo rm a n c e  
p o s t- lis tin g . H o w e v e r ,  th is  te lls  u s  n o th in g  a b o u t  th e  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  fo r  c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s  re la tiv e  
to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , a n d  th u s  p ro v id e s  n o  in fo rm a t io n  o n  th e  re la tiv e  v a lu a tio n  m e r its  o f  l is tin g  
fo r  c ro ss - lis te d  firm s. O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  b e fo re -a f te r  m e a su re  o f  R e la tiv e  q a llo w s u s  to  
e x am in e  w h e th e r  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . is v a lu e  e n h a n c in g  fo r  c ro s s - lis te d  (re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - lis te d )  
firm s. T o  illu s tra te  th is  p o in t  fu r th e r ,  c o n s id e r  th e  fo llo w in g : th e  a b so lu te  b e fo re -a f te r  v a lu e  fo r  
L ev e l 1 firm s f ro m  S w itz e r la n d  is a  p o s it iv e  a n d  s ta tis tica lly  s ig n if ic a n t 0 .31 . H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  I 
e x am in e  th e  d if fe re n c e  re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  Sw iss f irm s , th e  d if fe re n c e  is a sta tis tica lly  in s ig n if ic a n t 
0 .03. T h is  su g g ests  th a t  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . v ia  a  L e v e l 1 d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  p ro g ra m  f o r  Sw iss firm s is
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asso c ia ted  w ith  a n  in c re a se  in  a b so lu te  v a lu e  fo r  l is te d  f irm s , b u t  a  m u c h  sm a lle r , in s ig n if ic a n t 
in c re ase , re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  f irm s45. T h is  su g g ests  th a t  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . is  n o t  v a lu e  e n h a n c in g  fo r  
th e s e  firm s. I n  th e  n e x t  s e c tio n  I  e x am in e  th is  fu r th e r  b y  p ro v id in g  a series  o f  c o n d it io n a l  re g re s s io n  
e s tim a te s . I n  th e  r e m a in d e r  o f  th is  se c tio n  I  p ro v id e  a  m o re  d e ta ile d  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  re su lts  
p re se n te d  in  T a b le  7 .4 4il.
F o r  L ev e l 1 is su e s , e le v e n  c o u n tr ie s  e x p e rie n c e  a n  a b so lu te  in c re a s e  in  v a lu e  a f te r  lis tin g  in  
th e  U .S ., fiv e  o f  w h ic h  a re  s ta tis tica lly  d if fe re n t  f ro m  z e ro . A ll  o f  th e  re m a in in g  c o u n tr ie s  b a r  o n e  
(N o rw e g ia n  f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  n o  c h a n g e  in  va lue) e x p e r ie n c e  a n  a b s o lu te  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e , o f  w h ic h  
e ig h te e n  a re  s ig n ifican tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro m  ze ro . N e x t  I  e x a m in e  w h e th e r  th e s e  p o s i t iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  
c h an g e s  in  v a lu e  a re  d i f fe re n t  f ro m  th o s e  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  d o m e s tic  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s . F o r  
ex am p le , i t  m a y  w e ll b e  th e  case  th a t  d o m e s tic  f irm s  a lso  e x p e r ie n c e d  th e  sa m e  in c re a s e  in  v a lu e  as 
th a t  e x p e rie n c e d  b y  c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s , a n d  th u s  l is tin g  is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w ith  v a lu e  fo r  c ro ss - lis te d  
f irm s. O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , fo r  th o s e  f irm s  w h o  e x p e r ie n c e  a  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- l is tin g , th is  d o e s  
n o t  n ecessa rily  su g g e s t th a t  lis tin g  is n o t  a sso c ia te d  w ith  v a lu e  f o r  th e s e  firm s. I  e la b o ra te  o n  th is
p o in t  fu r th e r . L e t  a  b e  th e  c o e ff ic ie n t e s tim a te  is g iv e n  b y  th e  d if fe re n c e  in  tw o  b e fo re -a f te r  
e s tim a te s  [ ( q j r  _ 4 cl) ~ ( 4 ncl- c1nci.)L  f ro m  th e  fo llo w in g  re g re s s io n  sp e c ifica tio n : 
Aqit =  5 ,+ a (A D if) + A ek w h e re  D  a s ta n d a rd  d u m m y  w h ic h  is 1 in  th e  y e a r  o f  lis tin g , a n d  th e re a f te r , 
5 t is a n  in te rc e p t  g iv e n  b y  a  t im e  (year) d u m m y  (i.e. n o te  th a t  th e  d if fe re n c e d  in te r c e p t  (c o n s ta n t)  is 
d iffe re n c e d  o u t) , a n d  A is th e  d iffe re n c e  o p e ra to r .  N o w ,  le ts  b e g in  w ith  th e  case  w h e re  L ev e l 1 
f irm s  e x p e rie n c e  a n  a b so lu te  in c re a se  in  v a lu e  a f te r  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . (i.e. f irm s  f ro m  e le v en  d if fe re n t 
c o u n trie s ) . I n  th is  in s ta n c e (q j“ ' - q £ " )  > 0 ■ L is tin g  cau ses v a lu e  fo r  th e s e  f irm s , i f  a n d  o n ly  i f
45 This line o f  reasoning is identical to the theory underlying difference-in-difference estimators (See BC (2000), and 
Wooldridge (2002) for a review). For example, let q be the value o f the firm with corresponding pre and post-listing
values q Pre & q Posf. Then, die absolute change in q for cross-listed firms (treatment group) around the time o f  listing is 
given by the before-after estimate denoted as (q£°St — 4 cl ) ■ The corresponding change for the non-cross-listed (non­
treatment) group of firms is given by (q^cL “  SIncl ) • The corresponding D ID  estimate OC is the difference in two 
differences i.e. the difference in two before-after estimates given by [(q^sl —c1cl )~ (T ncl ~  Tncl)] *
46 I reach similar conclusions when I employ mean valuation ratios. The data is outlined in Table 7.8.
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~ 4 cl ) > (qNci. “ Sncl) ■ F o r  th e  m a jo rity  o f  L ev e l 1 firm s (q^” ' - q ^ J )  is  n eg a tiv e . H o w e v e r ,  th is  
d o e s  n o t  su g g e s t t h a t  l is tin g  c a n n o t  c au se  v a lu e  fo r  firm s. C o n s id e r  th e  fo llo w in g : as b e fo re  
(qS“ -qS.‘) is n eg a tiv e . N o w ,  le ts  s u p p o s e  that(q£,“ L -q^ci.) is ah °  n eg a tiv e . T h e re fo re ,  i f  
jqc“ 1 — qg.'| ^ mcl- c1ncl| > lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . c au ses  v a lu e  f o r  c ro s s - l is te d  firm s. C o n se q u e n tly , a 
n e g a tiv e  (q£“ ‘ -  qJJ)) d o e s  n o t  im p ly  th a t  lis tin g  d o e s  n o t  c au se  v a lu e . H o w e v e r ,  i f  th e  “b e fo re -a f te r ’ 
e s tim a te s  fo r  d o m e s tic  f irm s , g iv e n  b y  (qJ£L -q ^ 'c i.) ls al so  n e g a tiv e , b u t  less  th a n  th a t  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y
c ro ss - lis ted  firm s i.e. |q i ! S . - q N a |< |qcL, “ tla!l> D if f e r  e n c e - In -D if fe re n c e  e s tim a te  a < 0 ,  a n d  th u s
h s tin g  d o e s  n o t  c au se  v a lu e . I n  th e  re m a in d e r  o f  th is  se c tio n , I e x a m in e  th is  is su e  f u r th e r  b y  
e x a m in in g  th e  c h a n g e  in  b o th  a b so lu te  a n d  re la tiv e  v a lu e  a ro u n d  h s tin g . I n  th e  n e x t  se c tio n , I 
e x a m in e  w h e th e r  th e s e  d if fe re n c e s  a re  r o b u s t  to  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  c o n tro ls  f o r  g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s .
I  f in d  d ra t  o n ly  fiv e  c o u n tr ie s  w i th  p o s i t iv e  a b so lu te  c h a n g e s  in  v a lu e  e x p e rie n c e  a 
c o r re s p o n d in g  p o s i t iv e  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  f irm s . O n ly  f irm s  f ro m  F ra n c e , J a p a n , 
M ex ico , P o la n d , a n d  S w itz e r la n d  a re  v a lu e d  m o re  h ig h ly  re la tiv e  to  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts  a f te r  
h s tin g  in  th e  U .S . O f  th e  re m a in d e r  o f  th e  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  a b so lu te  c h an g e s  in  v a lu e , w h e n  
c o m p a re d  to  d o m e s tic  f irm s , th e  v a lu a tio n  d if fe re n c e  is re v e rse d . F o r  ex am p le , b o th  B e lg iu m  a n d  
B raz il e x p e r ie n c e  a n  a b s o lu te  in c re ase  in  v a lu e  p o s t- l is tin g . H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  I c o m p a re  f irm s  to  th e ir  
d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts ,  h s t in g  is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e . Specifica lly , th e  a b so lu te  
c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  fo r  f irm s  f ro m  B e lg iu m  a n d  B ra z il is 0 .1 8  a n d  0 .1 1 , re sp ec tiv e ly . I n  c o n tra s t ,  th e  
re la tiv e  c h a n g e  is g iv e n  b y  (0 .03) a n d  (0 .11 ), re sp ec tiv e ly . I n  b o th  su b -p e r io d s  (i.e. p re  a n d  p o s t  
h stin g ), b o th  se ts  o f  c ro s s -h s te d  firm s a re  w o r th  le s s  th a n  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  
v a lu a tio n  d is c o u n ts  w id e n  p o s t- lis tin g , a n d  th u s  su g g e s ts  th a t  h s t in g  is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  
v a lu e  f o r  th e s e  f irm s47. N e x t  I tu r n  m y  a t te n tio n  to  th o s e  f irm s  w h e re  (q£“ ' - q £ . ')  < 0 •
L e v e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  D e n m a rk  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d  e x p e rie n c e  th e  la rg e s t a b so lu te  d e c lin e  in  
v a lu e  a f te r  h s t in g  in  th e  U .S ., w i th  a fa ll-o f f  i n  v a lu e  in  th e  re g io n  o f  7 1 .4 3  a n d  6 9 .6 4 % , resp ec tiv e ly .
47 These unconditional results for these countries are replicated in a series o f regressions in the next section. 1 will 
elaborate more in the next section.
I t  a p p e a rs  th a t  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts  d id  n o t  e x p e r ie n c e  s u c h  a  d ec lin e . F o r  e x am p le , p r e ­
lis tin g , D a n is h  L ev e l 1 f irm s  w e re  v a lu e d  a t  a lm o s t d o u b le  d o m e s tic  D a n is h  f irm s  (R e la tiv e  q — 
1.98). P o s t- l is t in g , th is  v a lu a t io n  p re m iu m  h a d  d im in ish e d  in to  a s izab le  v a lu a t io n  d is c o u n t  (R e la tiv e  
q — 0 .63 ). I  f in d , w i th  fe w  e x c e p tio n s  th a t  th is  t r e n d  is la rg e ly  re f le c te d  a c ro ss  o u r  e n tire  sa m p le  o f  
L ev e l 1 firm s. L e v e l 1 f irm s  f ro m , a m o n g s t  o th e rs  G re e c e  (A R e lq  f ro m  1 .19  to  0 .6 7 ), H u n g a ry  
(A R e lq f ro m  1.33  to  0 .89 ), I ta ly  ( A R e lq f ro m  1.21 to  0 .8 4 ), S o u th  A fr ic a  ( A R e lq f r o m  1.21 to  0 .89 ), 
a n d  T u rk e y  ( A R e lq f ro m  1.96  to  0 .76) a lso  e x p e rien c e  a c o n s id e ra b le  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  re la tiv e  to  th e ir  
d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts .  F u r th e rm o re ,  firm s f ro m  C h in a , F in la n d , H o n g  K o n g ,  I re la n d , S o u th  K o re a , 
M alaysia, S w ed en , a n d  th e  U .K ., to  n a m e  b u t  a  few , a re  w o r th  le s s  th a n  d o m e s tic  f irm s  in  b o th  su b ­
p e r io d s . F o r  th e s e  f irm s , v a lu a t io n  d is c o u n t  in c re a se s  a f te r  t r a d in g  in  th e  U .S . F irm s  f ro m  
C o lo m b ia  ( A R e lq f ro m  0 .8 8  to  1 .04 ), Is ra e l ( A R e lq f ro m  0 .6 0  to  0 .7 2 ), J a p a n  ( A R e lq f ro m  0 .8 3  to  
0 .9 0 ), M e x ico  ( A R e lq f ro m  1.00  to  1 .11), N e th e r la n d s  ( A R e lq f r o m  0 .7 6  to  1 .05), P h illip in e s  
( A R e lq f ro m  0 .7 8  to  0 .8 1 ), P o la n d  (A R e lq f ro m  0 .53  to  0 .8 0 ), P o r tu g a l  ( A R e lq f ro m  0 .85  to  0 .89 ), 
a n d  S w itz e r lan d  ( A R e lq f r o m l .1 2  to  1.15) p ro v id e  th e  e x c e p tio n s , e v e n  g iv en  th e  fa c t th a t  m a n y  o f  
th e s e  f irm s e x p e rie n c e  a n  a b so lu te  d e c lin e  in  v a lu e  p o s t  lis tin g . C o n se q u e n tly , fo r  m a n y  o f  th e s e  
firm s |qc“ ' - q c " | < |‘1ncl. _'9 k c l|)  a n d  th u s  l is tin g  c rea te s  v a lu e  fo r  th e s e  f irm s . F in a lly , fo r  o u r  e n tire
sa m p le  o f  L ev e l 1 f irm s , lis tin g  is a sso c ia ted  w ith  a fa ll in  v a lu e  re la tiv e  to  d o m e s tic  f irm s 
(A R e lq f ro m  0 .93  to  0 .83).
N e x t  th e  re su lts  fo r  R u le  144a  f irm s are  o u tlin e d  in  th e  re m a in in g  c o lu m n s  o f  T a b le  7.7. 
T h e  m e d ia n  firm  f ro m  tw e lv e  c o u n tr ie s  e x p e rie n c e s  a fall in  v a lu e  a f te r  t r a d in g  in  th e  U .S . T h e  
re m a in in g  firm s ( f ro m  te n  c o u n tr ie s )  a p p re c ia te  in  v a lu e 48. F irm s  f ro m  S p a in  (6 1 .9 4 % ), In d ia  
(41 .62% ), C h ile  (3 8 .0 5 % ), H u n g a ry  (2 8 .1 9 % ), a n d  T a iw a n  (2 5 .3 0 % ) e x p e rie n c e  fire g re a te s t  lo sse s. 
W ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  S p a n ish  f irm s  ( A R e lq f ro m  1 .94  to  0 .8 2 ), th e  fa ll-o f f  in  v a lu e  is o f  a  m u c h  
sm alle r m a g n itu d e  re la tiv e  to  th e ir  c o u n te rp a r t  d o m e s tic  f irm s . I n  c o n tra s t ,  tr a d in g  in  th e  U .S . is
48 Our sample o f Rule 144a firms is reduced because of the lack o f data for some countries in the pre-listing period.
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a sso c ia ted  w ith  a n  a p p re c ia t io n  in  v a lu e  fo r  f irm s  f r o m  G re e c e  (1 0 2 .6 3 % ), H o n g  K o n g  (9 2 .9 8 % ), 
A u s tra lia  (7 2 .5 4 % ), I ta ly  (4 5 .8 7 % ) a n d  S w itz e rlan d  (3 5 .2 3 % ). H o w e v e r ,  w i th  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  firm s 
f ro m  S w itze rlan d , th e s e  f irm s  a lso  o u tp e r fo rm  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts  p o s t- l is tin g . F o r  
ex am p le , firm s f ro m  H o n g  K o n g  a re  v a lu e d  m o r e  h ig h ly  th a n  d o m e s tic  f irm s  p o s t- lis tin g , a f te r  
b e in g  v a lu e d  a t a  c o n s id e ra b le  d is c o u n t  p re -lis t in g  (A R e lq  f ro m  0 .5 8  to  1 .38).
O n  c lo se r  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  d a ta  th e re  ex is ts  s iz ab le  v a r ia tio n s  in  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  l is tin g  
b e tw e e n  a n d  w ith in  c o u n tr ie s . T h e  so u rc e  o f  th e  v a r ia tio n  ex is ts , f irs t, b e tw e e n  c o u n tr ie s , s e c o n d  
a c ro ss  th e  d if fe re n t  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  leve ls w ith in  th e  sa m e  c o u n try ,  a n d  finally , w ith in  e ac h  
d if fe re n t d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  leve l. T h e  f irs t  issu e  h a s  b e e n  d isc u sse d  in  th e  p re v io u s  se c tio n . I 
d iscu ss  th e  v a r ia tio n s  th a t  e x is t  b e tw e e n  th e  d if fe re n t  d e p o s ita ry  r e c e ip t  lev e ls  fo r  e a c h  c o u n try  n e x t. 
T h e  m o s t  n o ta b le  d if fe re n c e s  o c c u r  fo r  f irm s  f ro m  G re e c e , A u s tra lia , C o lo m b ia , H o n g  K o n g , 
H u n g a ry , Italy , P o rtu g a l, S p a in , S o u th  A frica , a n d  T u rk ey . F o r  e x a m p le , w h ile  b o th  se ts  o f  l is te d  
f irm s  d e p re c ia te  in  v a lu e , A u s tra lia n  R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  e x p e r ie n c e  th e  la rg e s t fa ll in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g . 
In te re s tin g ly , a n d  u n lik e  th e ir  L e v e l c o u n te rp a r t  f irm s , R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  g a in  in  v a lu e  re la tiv e  to  
d o m e s tic  f irm s , d e sp ite  th e  d ra m a tic  fa ll-o ff  in  v a lu e  th a t  th e y  e x p e rien c e . S im ila r t r e n d s  o c c u r  fo r 
Ita lian , H u n g a r ia n , S o u th  A fr ic a n , a n d  T u rk is h  R u le  14 4 a  issu e s . R u le  144a  firm s  f ro m  G re e c e , 
H o n g  K o n g  e x p e rie n c e , u n lik e  L ev e l 1 f irm s , a n  a b so lu te  in c re a s e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g . 
C o n se q u e n tly , u n lik e  L e v e l 1 f irm s , th ey  g a in  v a lu e  re la tiv e  to  n o n -  c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s  a ro u n d  th e  
t im e  o f  listing .
F ina lly , I  e x a m in e  in  T a b le  7 .5 , th e  b re a th  o f  th e  v a lu a tio n  g a in s f ro m  l is tin g  w ith in  
c o u n trie s . I  c a lcu la te  fo r  e a c h  c o u n try , a n d  fo r  e ac h  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  level, th e  m e a n , m e d ia n , 
m in im u m  a n d  m a x im u m  le v e l p e rc e n ta g e  c h a n g e  in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g . I  p r e s e n t  in  th e  re m a in in g  
c o lu m n s , th e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  f irm s  w ith  p o s i t iv e  a n d  n e g a tiv e  c h an g e s  in  v a lu e  p o s t- lis tin g . 
Specifically , I  c a lcu la te  th e  d if fe re n c e  in  v a lu e  o f  e ac h  f irm  b e tw e e n  th e  p re  a n d  p o s t- l is tin g  p e r io d s . 
I  f in d  th a t  o n ly  3 6 %  a n d  2 4 %  o f  L ev e l 1 a n d  R u le  1 4 4 a  firm s  re sp ec tiv e ly  a re  w o r th  m o re  p o s t ­
lis ting . T h is  is  in  lin e  w ith  m y  o rig in a l f in d in g s  th a t  lis tin g  v ia  a n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry
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re c e ip t  p r o g r a m  is  in  g e n e ra l a sso c ia ted  w i th  a  d e c re a se  in  v a lu e . T h e  m a jo r i ty  o f  L e v e l 1 firm s f ro m  
a m o n g s t  o th e rs ,  C h in a , D e n m a rk , F ra n c e , G e rm a n y , H o n g  K o n g ,  Ita ly , J a p a n , M alaysia , M e x ico , 
N e th e r la n d s ,  S in g a p o re , S o u th  A frica , T h a ila n d , a n d  th e  U .K . a re  w o r th  less  in  a b so lu te  te rm s  p o s t ­
lis tin g . In  c o n tra s t ,  L e v e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  B raz il, N e w  Z e a la n d , S w e d e n  a n d  S w itz e r la n d  are  w o r th  
m o re . I n  th e  case  o f  R u le  1 44a  f irm s , th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  f irm s  a re  w o r th  le s s  a f te r  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . 
T h e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e s e  firm s are  f ro m  In d ia , K o re a ,  a n d  T a iw a n .
I n  su m m ary , m y  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  l is tin g  v ia  a n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t 
p ro g ra m  is v a lu e  e n h a n c in g  fo r  f irm s , f ro m  c e r ta in  c o u n tr ie s . I n  p a r tic u la r , i t  a p p e a rs  th a t  L e v e l 1 
f irm s  f ro m  C o lo m b ia , J a p a n , M e x ico , P o la n d , a n d  S w itz e r la n d  a n d  R u le  1 44a  f irm s  f ro m  G re e c e , 
H o n g  K o n g , A u s tra lia , a n d  I ta ly  e n jo y  s iz ab le  v a lu a t io n  g a in s  f ro m  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . I n  th e  n e x t  
se c tio n , I  e x a m in e  v ia  re g re ss io n  analysis w h e th e r  th e s e  re su lts  a re  r o b u s t  to  c o n tro ls  fo r  g ro w th  
o p p o r tu n it ie s .
7.6 Regression Analysis and Results
I n  o rd e r  to  e x a m in e  th e  re la tio n  b e tw e e n  c ro ss  lis tin g  a n d  v a lu e , I  e s tim a te  p a n e l  re g re ss io n s  
o f  th e  f o rm  o u tlin e d  in  C h a p te rs  4-6:
q,t = a  + X,t5 + PCL,t + Year, + c; + uit (7.1)
W h e re  e a c h  v a r ia b le  is as b e fo re . I e s tim a te  se p a ra te  re g re ss io n s  fo r  b o th  L ev e l 1 a n d  R u le  144a 
firm s. I ex p lic itly  a c k n o w le d g e  th e  e n d o g e n e ity  o f  th e  c ro ss  l is tin g  d e c is io n , a n d  a t te m p t  to  e s tim a te  
th e  c au sa l e f fe c t  o f  l is tin g  o n  v a lu e  b y  a d d re s s in g  th e  e n d o g e n e ity  issu e  in  tw o  w ays: w i th  f irm  leve l 
c o n tro ls  f o r  g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s ,  a n d  w i th  f irm -f ix e d  effec ts .
F irs t ,  I  c o n tro l  fo r  g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s  a t  th e  lev e l o f  th e  firm . I  c a lcu la te  f irm  g ro w th  
o p p o r tu n it ie s  as th e  tw o -y e a r  g e o m e tr ic  a v e ra g e  sa les g ro w th . I t  m a y  w e ll b e  th e  case  th a t  th e  
v a lu a tio n  im p ro v e m e n ts  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  s o m e  l is te d  f irm s  m a y  w e ll  h a v e  b e e n  a n tic ip a te d . E q u a t io n  
7.1 is e s tim a te d  v ia  o rd in a ry  le a s t  sq u a res . T h e  s ta n d a rd  e r ro rs  a re  c lu s te re d  b y  f irm , a n d  I in c lu d e  
tim e  fix ed  e ffe c ts  in  o rd e r  to  a c c o u n t  f o r  c o n te m p o ra n e o u s  c o rre la tio n .
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N e x t  b e c a u se  o f  m y  c o n c e rn s  o v e r  v io la t io n s  o f  s tr ic t  e x o g en e ity , I  e s t im a te  th e  fo llo w in g :
q it = a  +  X jt5  +  (3CLit +  CX , + u ,t C7-2)
    |  T
W h e re  X i a re  M u n d la k  (1978) c o r re c tio n s  i.e. X , =  — /L  X lt .
T  s —i
I  o u tlin e  in  T a b le  7 .6 , c o e ff ic ie n t  e s tim a te s  o f  th e  im p a c t  o f  l is t in g  b y  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  
leve l, fo r  e ac h  in d iv id u a l c o u n try . F o r  e ac h  sp e c if ic a tio n  (E q u a tio n  7.1 a n d  7 .2 ), I  p ro v id e  th e  
c o e ff ic ie n t e s tim a te  o f  th e  c ro ss  lis tin g  d u m m y , th e  n u m b e r  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s ,  a n d  th e  c o e ff ic ie n t o f  
d e te rm in a tio n  (i.e. R 2). F irm  a n d  in d u s try  c o n tro ls  a re  in c lu d e d  (a n d  M u n d la k  (1978) c o r re c tio n  
te rm s  fo r  o u r  p o o le d  o rd in a ry  lea s t sq u a re s  e s tim a te s)  b u t  a re  n o t  re p o r te d .  I  b e g in  b y  e x a m in in g  
th e  re su lts  fo r  L ev e l 1 firm s. F irs t ,  i t  is im p o r ta n t  th a t  I  s tre ss  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  e x a m in in g  b o th  th e  
s ta tis tic a l a n d  e c o n o m ic  s ig n ific a n ce  o f  o u r  re su lts . Spec ifica lly , b e c a u se  I  a m  c a rry in g  o u t  th e  
analysis o n  a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try  b a s is , th e  n u m b e r  o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  v a r ie s  s iz ab ly  a c ro ss  c o u n tr ie s . 
C o n se q u e n tly , w h ile  in  s o m e  in s ta n c e s  I a m  u n a b le  to  a tta c h  sta tis tica l s ig n if ic a n ce  to  o u r  fin d in g s , 
th e  m a g n itu d e  o f  th e  c o e ff ic ie n t e s tim a te s  a re  su c h , th a t  i t  is im p o s s ib le  to  a rg u e  th a t  v a lu a tio n  
d if fe re n c e  is n o t  e c o n o m ica lly  s ig n if ic a n t  F o r  e x am p le , o n ly  L e v e l  1 f irm s  f ro m  M e x ico , 
N e th e r la n d s ,  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d  a re  w o r th  s ig n ifican tly  m o re  th a n  th e ir  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts  a f te r  
l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . T h e  re su lts  a re  c o n s is te n t  w i th  th o s e  d o c u m e n te d  e a rlie r  fo r  b o th  M e x ico  a n d  th e  
N e th e r la n d s .  In te re s tin g ly , th e  in c lu s io n  o f  f irm  a n d  in d u s try  c o n tro ls  su g g e s ts  th a t  L ev e l 1 firm s 
f ro m  N e w  Z e a la n d  are  n o w  w o r th  s ig n ific a n tly  m o r e  th a n  d o m e s tic  f irm s . I f in d  th a t  g iv e n  o u r  
c o n tro ls  fo r  e n d o g e n e ity , L e v e l 1 f irm s  f r o m  C o lo m b ia , J a p a n , P o la n d , a n d  S w itz e r la n d  a re  n o  
lo n g e r  v a lu e d  m o re  h ig h ly  re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  firm s. I n  th re e  o f  th e  fo u r  cases, th e  e s tim a te d  
c o e ff ic ie n t is n e g a tiv e , a n d  s ta tis tica lly  d i f fe re n t  f ro m  z e ro . T h e  ‘c ro ss  l is tin g  d is c o u n t’ r e p o r te d  fo r  
L ev e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  S w itz e r la n d  is e c o n o m ic a lly  s ig n ifican t, a lb e it n o t  s ta tis tica lly  so. L e v e l 1 firm s 
f ro m  In d ia  e n jo y  th e  la rg e s t ‘c ro ss  lis tin g  p r e m iu m ’, b u t  th e  v a lu a tio n  d if fe re n c e  is n o t  d if fe re n t
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f ro m  z e ro 49. L ev e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  A u s tr ia , F in la n d , F ra n c e , N o rw a y , a n d  T h a i la n d  e n jo y  a  sizab le  a n d  
e c o n o m ica lly  s ig n ific a n t lis tin g  p re m iu m  o v e r  th e ir  c o u n te rp a r t  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  d o m e s tic  firm s. I n  
c o n tra s t ,  I  f in d  tw e lv e  sta tis tica lly  s ig n if ic a n t ‘c ro ss  lis tin g  d is c o u n ts ’. L is tin g  in  th e  U .S . is n o t  v a lu e  
e n h a n c in g  fo r  L ev e l 1 f irm s  f r o m  a m o n g s t  o th e rs , B razil, C h ile , C h in a , H o n g  K o n g ,  Ita ly , S w ed e n , 
a n d  T u rk ey . F o r  all c o u n tr ie s , th e  c o e ff ic ie n t  e s tim a te s  a re  in  l in e  w i th  th e  s u m m a ry  m e a su re s  
p re s e n te d  in  T a b le  7.4: re la tiv e  to  n o n -c ro s s - l is te d  f irm s , c ro ss  lis te d  f irm s  f ro m  th e s e  c o u n tr ie s  lo se  
v a lu e  a ro u n d  th e  t im e  o f  lis ting . F irm s  f ro m  C h ile  e x p e rie n c e  th e  la rg e s t ‘c ro s s  l is tin g  d is c o u n t’. 
F ina lly , I  f in d  th a t  L e v e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  P e ru , S p a in , M alaysia , a n d  G re e c e  e x p e r ie n c e  a sta tis tica l, b u t  
e c o n o m ic  ‘c ro ss  lis tin g  d is c o u n t’. I n  su m m a ry , th e  re su lts  f r o m  T a b le  7 .6  su g g e s t th a t  fo r  th e  
m a jo r i ty  o f  f irm s , n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d in g  in  th e  U .S . is n o t  a s so c ia te d  w i th  e n h a n c e d  v a lue . H o w e v e r ,  
th e re  a re  so m e  n o ta b le  e x c e p tio n s .
N e x t  I  tu rn  m y  a tte n tio n  to w a rd s  R u le  1 44a  firm s. T h e  re su lts  a re  o u tlin e d  in  th e  re m a in in g
c o lu m n s  o f  T a b le  7.6. T h e  c o n c lu s io n s  th a t  I  d re w  fo r  L ev e l 1 f irm s can , b y -an d -la rg e  b e  re p lica ted
h e re . F o r  th e  m a jo rity  o f  R u le  144a firm s, t ra d in g  in  th e  U .S . d o e s  n o t  e n h a n c e  value . R u le  144a
p ro g ra m s  are  a sso c ia ted  w ith  lo w e r  v a lu e  (rela tive  to  d o m e s tic  firm s) fo r  th e  average  firm  f ro m  19
d iffe re n t c o u n trie s , 11 o f  w h ic h  are  b o th  eco n o m ica lly  a n d  sta tistica lly  sign ifican t. F irm s  f ro m  F ra n c e ,
G e rm a n y , N o rw a y , In d ia , F in la n d , S in g ap o re , S p a in , a n d  th e  U .K . e x p e rien c e  th e  g re a te s t lo sses. In
c o n tra s t ,  I  d o c u m e n t  o n ly  4  sta tistically  s ig n ifican t ‘c ro ss  lis tin g  p re m ia ’: C hile , P e ru , P o rtu g a l, a n d
S w itzerland . O f  th e  re m a in d e r , o n ly  Ita lian  firm s a re  v a lu ed  e co n o m ica lly  h ig h e r  th a n  d o m e s tic  Ita lian
firm s. F inally , th e  re su lts  a lso  h ig h lig h t s izab le  d iffe ren ces  b e tw e e n  th e  d if fe re n t d e p o sita ry  re ce ip t
p ro g ra m s  w ith in  th e  sam e  c o u n try . F o r  ex am p le , th e  fo r tu n e s  o f  R u le  144a firm s f ro m  P e ru  a n d  C h ile
c o n tra s t  n o ta b ly  w ith  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  th e ir  L ev e l 1 c o u n te rp a r ts :  R u le  144a P e ru v ia n  a n d  C h ilean
firm s a re  w o r th  m o re  p o s t- lis tin g . In  c o n tra s t ,  L ev e l 1 firm s a re  w o r th  co n sid e ra b ly  less. I n  th e  case
o f  firm s f ro m  M ex ico , N o rw ay , In d ia , a n d  th e  N e th e r la n d s , th e  ro le s  a re  rev ersed . I n  th is  in s tan c e ,
L ev e l 1 firm s ex p erien c e  th e  g re a te s t  ga in s f ro m  listing. F inally , I  f in d  th a t  fo r  firm s f ro m  Spain ,
4'J The p-value for the coefficient on the cross listing dummy for Indian firms is 0.22. In both specifications, both firm 
and industry growth rates are highly significant.
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S in g ap o re , a n d  S w itzerlan d , th e  ga ins f ro m  lis tin g  are  c o n s is te n t a c ro ss  th e  d if fe re n t  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t 
levels. F o r  ex am p le , th e  o rd in a ry  lea s t sq u a res c o effic ien t e s tim a te s  fo r  S p a n ish  L ev e l 1 a n d  R u le  144a 
f irm s are (0.21) a n d  (0.18), respectively .
F inally , I  try  a n d  id en tify  a p a tte rn  in  th e  data. Specifically , I  e x am in e  w h e th e r  firm s lis tin g  
ch o ices  a re  c o rre la ted  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  p o st-lis tin g ?  F o r  ex am p le , i t  m a y  w e ll b e  th e  case  th a t  
f irm s f ro m  a  p a rticu la r  c o u n try  m ay  lis t a f te r  a  f irm  fro m  th e  sam e  c o u n try  ex p erien ces  p o s t- lis tin g  
v a lu a tio n  gains. F o r  ex am p le , g iv en  th a t  th e  m ajo rity  o f  A u s tra lia n  f irm s tra d e  o v e r- th e -c o u n te r  as 
L ev e l 1 issues (R efer to  T ab le  2 .3), a L ev e l 1 issu e  m ay  b e  a sso c ia ted  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  fo r  th e se  
firm s. O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  d e c is io n  to  list m ay  b e  d r iv e n  in  te rm s  o f  th e  co sts , r a th e r  th a n  th e  
b e n e f its  f ro m  listing . Specifically , K K Z  (2005) sh o w  u s in g  lo g it  analysis th a t  firm s f ro m  a lo w  
d isc lo su re  re g im e  are  less likely to  ex ch a n g e  c ro ss  list. T h is  su g g ests  th a t  th e  c o s ts , a n d  n o t  necessarily  
th e  p o te n tia l  b e n e fits  f ro m  lis ting , in f lu e n ce  f irm s lis tin g  d ec isio n , g iv en  th a t  o n  th e o re tic a l g ro u n d s , 
th e se  firm s h a v e  th e  m o s t  to  g a in  f ro m  lis tin g  (See B B  (2006)). I f  th is  is th e  case, it su g g ests th a t  l is tin g  
c h o ice  a n d  va lue  m ay  n o t  b e  co rre la ted .
T o  ex am in e  th e se  issu es I  re p ro d u c e  th e  m a in  p o in ts  T a b le  2 .3  in  T a b le  7.7. F lere , I p re se n t  
th e  b re a k d o w n  o f  e ach  d e p o sita ry  re c e ip t level b y  co u n try . I  su m m a rise  th e  re su lts  f ro m  T ab le  7.6, 
a n d  in d ica te  w h e th e r  d ie  re su lts  in d ic a te  a  c ro ss  lis tin g  p re m iu m  o r  d isc o u n t. W h e re  th e  
p re m iu m /d is c o u n t  a re  eco n o m ica lly , b u t  n o t  statistically  s ig n ifican t, th e  te x t  is d e p ic ted  in  b o ld . 
F inally, I  o u tlin e  in  c o lu m n  2, w h e th e r  f irm s a re  f ro m  h ig h  o r  lo w  d isc lo su re  reg im es, b a se d  u p o n  
L L S V  (1998) a n ti-d ire c to r  r ig h ts  in d ex . F irm s  tra d e  d o m es tica lly  in  h ig h  d isc lo su re  reg im es i f  th e ir  
c o u n try s ’ a n ti-d ire c to r  r ig h ts  in d e x  is 4  o r  g reater. I n  c o lu m n  3, I  p re d ic t,  b a se d  u p o n  th e  fin d in g s o f  
K K Z  (2005), w h e th e r  th ese  f irm s are  m o re  o r  less likely to  e x ch a n g e  c ross-list. B a se d  o n  th e ir  
analysis, firm s f ro m  lo w  d isc lo su re  reg im es a re  less likely to  e x ch a n g e  list, a n d  th u s  m o re  likely to  n o n ­
e x ch an g e  lis t (Level 1 /R u le  144a).
I  b e g in  b y  ex am in in g  w h e th e r  firm s lis tin g  ch o ices a re  c o rre la te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  v a lu e  p o s t ­
listing. I f  tiiis p ro p o s i t io n  w e re  to  h o ld , I  w o u ld  e x p ec t th a t  f irm s f ro m  A u stra lia , A u s tria , B elg ium ,
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B razil, G e rm an y , H o n g  K o n g , J a p a n , M alaysia, M e x ico , N o rw a y , N e w  Z ea la n d , S in g ap o re , S o u th  
A frica , a n d  T h a ila n d  g a in  m o s t  f ro m  a L ev e l 1 issue. Sim ilarly, R u le  144a  issu es d o m ic ile d  in  
C o lo m b ia , G reece , H u n g a ry , In d ia , M alaysia, P o la n d , P o rtu g a l, T a iw a n , a n d  T u rk e y  w o u ld  a lso  b e  
ex p ec te d  to  g a in  f ro m  tra d in g  in  th e  U .S. F irm s  f ro m  P e ru  a n d  th e  P h illip in es  a re  equally  likely  to  
tra d e  e ith e r o v e r- th e -c o u n te r  o r  u n d e r  R u le  144a. T h e  re su lts  a re  m ix e d . F o r  ex am p le , fo r  L ev e l 1 
issu es, I  f in d  o n ly  o n e  sta tistica lly  s ig n ifican t p re m iu m  (N e th e r lan d s ) , a n d  fo u r  eco n o m ica lly  s ig n ifican t 
p re m iu m s  (A ustria , N o rw a y , N e w  Z ea la n d , a n d  T h a ilan d ). I n  c o n tra s t ,  th e  re m a in d e r  tra d e  a t a 
d is c o u n t a f te r  listing. F o r  ex am p le , w h ile  all M alaysian  firm s tra d e  in  th e  U .S . as L ev e l 1 issu es, o u r  
re su lts  su g g est th a t  th e se  f irm s d o  n o t  g a in  in  v a lu e  f ro m  d o in g  so  (a lth o u g h  th e  d is c o u n t  is n o t  
statistically  sign ifican t). L lo w ev er, I d o  u n c o v e r  statistically  sig n ifican t lis tin g  d isc o u n ts  fo r  firm s fro m  
B razil, G e n n a n y  a n d  H o n g  K o n g .
T h e  results fo r Rule 144a firms are m ore  encouraging. In  this instance, I identify 7 listing prem ia (out 
o f  9), o f  w hich 2 are statistically significant. O n  the  o ther hand , firms fro m  India, Malaysia, and T urkey, w h o  list 
predom inandy as Rule 144a issues, trade at a statistically significant discount. In  sum m ary, m y results provide 
m ixed evidence in support o f  th e  p roposition  that listing choice and post-listing value are correlated.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
I n  th is  c h a p te r  I e x a m in e  o n  a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try  b asis , th e  re la tiv e  v a lu a tio n  g a in s o f  n o n ­
e x c h a n g e  tra d in g  in  th e  U .S . fo r  a sa m p le  o f  f irm s  f ro m  3 9  c o u n tr ie s . I  a m  p rim a rily  m o tiv a te d  b y  
th e  te n d e n c y  o f  m u lt i-c o u n try  s tu d ie s  to  g e n e ra lise  th e ir  re su lts . G iv e n  th e  p o p u la r i ty  o f  n o n ­
e x c h a n g e  p ro g ra m s  fo r  n o n -U .S . f irm s , i t  seem s p lau s ib le  to  a rg u e  th a t  th is  f o rm  o f  d e p o s ita ry  
re c e ip t  p ro g ra m  m u s t  p r o v e  b e n e fic ia l fo r  so m e  firm s. I try  a n d  id e n tify  th e s e  firm s.
U s in g  v a lu a t io n  m e tr ic s , I a t te m p t  to  e x a m in e  th e  cau sa l e f fe c t  o f  lis tin g  o n  f irm  v a lu e . I 
c o n tro l  fo r  th e  e n d o g e n e ity  o f  th e  c ro ss - lis t in g  d e c is io n  b y  f irs t, c o n tro l l in g  fo r  g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s  
a t  th e  lev e l o f  th e  firm , a n d  se c o n d , I  e m p lo y  a v a r ia n t  o f  a  f irm -f ix e d  e ffe c ts  m o d e l, w h ic h  is ro b u s t  
to  v io la tio n s  o f  s tr ic t  ex o g en e ity .
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M y  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  c ro ss  l is tin g  cau ses v a lu e  f o r  L e v e l 1 f irm s  f ro m  M e x ico , 
N e th e r la n d s ,  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d . F u r th e rm o re ,  w h ile  I  a m  u n a b le  to  a t ta c h  s ta tis tica l s ig n ific a n ce  to  
o u r  fin d in g s , lis tin g  v ia  a  L e v e l 1 d e p o s i ta ry  re c e ip t  p ro g ra m  g e n e ra te s  a n  e co n o m ic a lly  s ig n if ic a n t 
‘c ro ss  l is tin g  p re m iu m ’ f o r  c e r ta in  f i rm s  e.g. A u s tr ia  a n d  T h a ila n d . I n  c o n tra s t ,  f irm s  f ro m  B ra z il  
a n d  S w ed e n  are  a m o n g s t  th o s e  fo r  w h ic h  I d o c u m e n t  e c o n o m ic a lly  a n d  s ta tis tica lly  s ig n if ic a n t ‘c ro ss  
l is tin g  d is c o u n ts ’. F irm s  f r o m  H u n g a ry , M alaysia , S in g a p o re , a n d  S p a in  a re  a lso  w o r th  less  (re la tiv e  
to  d o m e s tic  firm s) b u t  n o t  s ta tis tica lly  so . I  d o c u m e n t  s im ila r  t re n d s  fo r  R u le  14 4 a  f irm s . B y  a n d  
larg e , t ra d in g  in  th e  U .S . u n d e r  R u le  144a  is a sso c ia ted  w ith  a  ‘c ro ss  l is t in g  d is c o u n t’ fo r  th e  m a jo r i ty  
o f  firm s. F o r  e x am p le , f irm s  f ro m  F ra n c e , G e rm a n y , N o rw a y , In d ia , F in la n d , S in g a p o re , S p a in , a n d  
th e  U .K . e x p e rie n c e  th e  g re a te s t  lo sse s . I n  c o n tra s t ,  I  u n c o v e r  o n ly  4  s ta tis tica lly  s ig n if ic a n t ‘c ro ss  
l is tin g  p re m ia 1.
N e x t,  th e  e f fe c t o f  l is tin g  fo r  e ac h  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  lev e l c a n  v a ry  s izab le  w ith in  th e  sam e  
c o u n try . F o r  e x am p le , R u le  1 4 4 a  f irm s  f ro m  P e ru  a n d  C h ile  c o n tr a s t  n o ta b ly  w ith  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  
o f  th e ir  L ev e l 1 c o u n te rp a r ts :  R u le  14 4 a  P e ru v ia n  a n d  C h ile a n  f irm s  a re  w o r th  m o re  p o s t- l is tin g . In  
c o n tra s t ,  L ev e l 1 firm s are  w o r th  c o n s id e ra b ly  less. I n  th e  case  o f  f irm s  f ro m  M e x ico , N o rw a y , 
In d ia , a n d  th e  N e th e r la n d s ,  th e  ro le s  a re  re v e rse d . T h is  su g g e s ts  th a t  f irm s  f ro m  c e r ta in  c o u n tr ie s  
m ay  w ell b e  b e s t  su ite d  to w a rd s  e ith e r  a  L ev e l 1 o r  R u le  14 4 a  lis tin g . A t  th is  p o in t ,  i t  is  u n c le a r  as to  
w h y  th is  o c c u rs , a n d  th u s  m a y  w a r ra n t  f u r th e r  study .
F ina lly , th e re  d o e s  a p p e a r  to  b e  a re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  v a lu a t io n  g a in s  to  lis tin g  a n d  th e  
l is tin g  c h o ic e  o f  f irm s  f ro m  a  p a r tic u la r  c o u n try . I t  a p p e a rs  th a t  o n  av erag e , i f  a f irm s  lis ts  in  th e  
U .S. u n d e r  th e  sam e  d e p o s i ta ry  r e c e ip t  lev e l as c h o s e n  b y  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  its  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts ,  
th e y  w ill g a in  f ro m  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S .
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Table 7.1: %  Change in q for all Level 1 firms up to  tfve-vears post-listimg (relative to  lixt-year).
1 Ycai Pust-Liat 2 Years Post-List 2 Yeaia Poat-Liat 4 Years Post-List 5 Years Post-List Average 
(+1, +5]
Mean (5.82) (5.29) (8.47) (10.05) (13.76) (8 .6 8 )
1st Percentile (59.54) (60.09) (61.36) (60.09) (67.77) (61.77)
25th Percentile (12.64) (18.02) (21.16) (23.54) (28.68) (20.81)
Median (3.16) (3.16) (6.96) (7.59) (1 2 .0 2 ) (6.58)
75th Percentile 4.97 5.31 7.75 7.55 3.99 5.91
99th Percentile 68.31 71.01 76.12 122.92 93.10 86.29
Minimum (64.90) (70.95) (63.31) (69.16) (75.26) (68.71)
Maximum 113.29 112.55 91.92 145.15 123.57 117.30
Firms (Obs) 346 304 268 246 2 2 0 276.8
Positive (Obs) 157 (45%) 117(38%) 107 (40%) 93 (38%) 73 (33%) 109.4 (38.8%)
Negative (Obs) 189 (55%) 187 (62%) 161 (60%) 153 (62%) 147 (67%) 167.4(61.2%)
In this table, I report die percentage change in value, as measured by q, for Ixvcl 1 firms for each cross-listing year up to five-years post-listing, relative to the listing year. For each 
year in the post-listing period, I report the change for the mean and median Level 1 firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f  the overall distribution: 1", 
25th, 50th, and 99th percentiles. I also report the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. In the bottom  panel o f Table 7 .1 ,1 also report for 
each post-listing year, the number o f firms, and the absolute and percentage number o f  positive and negative observations.
T able 7.1(a): %  Change in q for Level 1 firms w ith  positive post-listing perform ance post-listing.
1 Year Post-List Z Years Post-List 3 Years Past-Lisl 4 Yeais Post-List 5 Years Post-List Average 
1+1, +51
Mean 13.32 16.18 18.49 23.11 24.92 19.20
1st Percentile 0.15 0.06 0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0.052
25th Percentile 2.49 2.95 3.96 4.74 4.33 3.69
Median 6.97 8.81 10.81 13.32 12.99 10.58
75th Percentile 17.36 18.74 24.42 31.44 35.31 25.45
99th Percentile 80.47 95.71 91.80 145.15 123.57 107.34
Minimum 0.038 0.05 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0.024
Maximum 113.29 112.55 91.92 145.15 123.57 117.30
Firms (Obs) 157 117 107 93 73 109.4
In this table, I replicate the analysis presented in Tabic 7.1 for all those Level 1 firms with posidve-post-listing performance. For each year in the post-listing period, I report the 
change for the mean and median Level 1 firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f the overall distribution: 1st, 25th, 50th, and 99th percentiles. I also report 
the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. The numbers o f  firms ate reported in the final row.
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Table 7.1 (b): % Change in q for Level 1 firms with negative post-listing performance post-listing.
1 Year Post-List 2 Years Post-List 3 , Years Post-List 4 Years Pnst-l.ist 5 Years Post-List A m ag e  
[+1> +51
Mean (15.41) (17.47) (20.48) (2 1 .8 6 ) (24.67) (19.98)
1st Percentile (64.21) (68.14) (63.11) (64.90) (71.89) (66.45)
25th Percentile (22.87) (25.77) (30.67) (32.50) (39.10) (30.18)
Median (10.80) (14.06) (17.58) (19.38) (21.84) (16.73)
75th Percentile (4.14) (6.24) (6.74) (9.76) (11.08) (7-59)
99th Percentile (0 .0 0 1 ) (0.15) (0 .8 6 ) (0.27) (0.57) (0.37)
Minimum (64.90) (70.95) (63.31) (69.16) (75.26) (68.72)
Maximum (0.0001) (0 .0 2 ) (0.36) (0.23) (0.08) (0.138)
Firms (Obs) 189 187 161 153 147 167.4
In this table, I replicate the analysis presented in Table 7.1 for all those Level 1 firms with ncgarivc-post-hstmg performance. For each year in the post-listing period, I report the 
change for the mean and median Level 1 firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f  the overall distribution: 1st, 25th, 50th, and 99th percentiles. I also report 
the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. The numbers o f firms are reported in the final row.
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Table 7.2: % Change in q for all Rule 144a firms up to five-years post-listing (relative to hst-vear)
1 Year Post-List 2 Years Post-List 3 Years Post-List 4 Years Post-List 5 Years Post-List Average
[+U +5]
Mean (10.09) (16.51) (23.39) (27.52) (27.52) (2 1 .0 0 )
1st Percentile (72.47) (77.68) (75.20) (73.83) (72.40) (74.32)
25* Percentile (17.99) (31.52) (34.84) (44.45) (40.42) (33.84)
Median (8.60) (20.96) (23.11) (30.10) (31.18) (22.79)
75* Percentile 2.31 0.29 (1.24) 0 .0 0 1 .8 8 0.648
99* Percentile 49.21 50.38 48.40 65.54 59.40 54.59
Minimum (78.36) (77.87) (80.29) (79.62) (72.53) (77.73)
Maximum 72.78 72.07 56.73 75.74 67.55 68.97
Firms (Obs) 150 140 131 118 105 128.8
Positive (Obs) 53 (35%) 40 (29%) 31 (24%) 31 (26%) 32 (30%) 37.4 (28.8%)
Negative (Obs) 97 (65%) 100 (71%) 100 (76%) 87 (74%) 73 (70%) 91.4 (71.2%)
In this tabic, I report the percentage change in value, as measured by q, for Rule 144a firms for each cross-listing year up to five-years post-listing, relative to the listing year. For 
each year in the post-listing period, I report the change for the mean and median Rule 144a firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f the overall distribution: 
1st, 25th, 50,h, and 99* percentiles. I also report the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. In the bottom  panel o f Table 7 .2 ,1 also report 
for each post-listing year, the number o f firms, and the absolute and percentage number o f positive and negative observations.
Table 7.2(a): %  Change in q for Rule 144a firms w ith positive post-listing perform ance post-listing
1 Year Post-List 2 Years Post-List 3 Years Post-List 4 Years Post-last 5 Yeats Post-list Average 
[+1, +5]
Mean 11.64 14.13 16.19 16.14 12.32 14.08
1st Percentile 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 :0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 2
25* Percentile 1.39 3.75 5.05 4.25 3.14 3.52
Median 5.31 8 .0 0 11.27 10.44 8.37 8 .6 8
75* Percentile 16.20 25.07 24.46 20.19 13.13 19.81
99* Percentile 72.78 72.07 56.73 75.74 67.55 68.97
Minimum 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 2
Maximum 72.78 72.07 56.73 75.75 67.55 68.98
Firms (Obs) 53 40 31 31 32 37.4
In this table, I replicate the analysis presented in Tabic 7.2 for all those Rule 144a firms with positive-post-listing performance. For each year in the post-listing period, I report the 
change for the mean and median Rule 144a firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f  the overall distribution: 1 st, 25*, 50*, and 99* percentiles. I also report 
the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. The numbers o f  firms are reported in the final row.
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Table 7.2(b): % Change in q for Rule 144a firms with negative post-listing performance post-listing.
,1 Ysai Post-List 2 Years Post-List 3 'S ears Post-List 4 Years Post-List 5 Years Post-List Ayerage 
[+1, +5]
Mean (17.18) (24.88) (28.05) (31.00) (32.57) (26.74)
I s' Percentile (78.36) (77.78) (77.75) (79.62) (72.53) (77.21)
25th Percentile (25.16) (37.57) (42.57) (47.48) (46.93) (39.94)
Median (12.84) (23.53) (28.23) (31.03) (30.17) (25.16)
75th Percentile (4.32) (7.12) (10.32) (9.76) (14.86) (9.28)
99th Percentile (0 .0 2 ) (0.27) (0.29) (0 .0 1 ) (1 .0 2 ) (0.32)
Minimum (78.36) (77.87) (80.29) (79.62) (72.53) (77.73)
Maximum (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (1 .0 2 ) (0 .2 2 )
No. o f firms (C)bs) 97 1 0 0 1 0 0 87 73 91.4
In this table, I replicate the analysis presented in Table 7.2 for all those Rule 144a firms with negative-post-listing performance. For each year in the post-listing period, I report the 
change for the mean and median Rule 144a firm. In addition, I present estimates for different percentiles o f  the overall distribution: 1st, 25th, 50th, and 99,h percentiles. I also report 
the minimum and maximum percentage change for each year relative to the list year. The numbers o f  firms are reported in the final row.
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Table 7.3: Valuation o f  cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
NCI. Level 1 Rule 144a
*1 ALL q D(q) Prc-q D(q) Post-q D(q) 1 ALLq D(q) Prc-q D(q) Post-q
1 Argentina 1.33 - - - - 1.25 (0.08) 1.52 0.19 1.17 (0.16)
2 Australia 1.85 1.98 0.13 2.19 0.34 1.93 0.08 1.47 (0.38) 1 .0 2 (0.83) 1.76 (0.09)
3 Austria 1.38 1.56 0.18 1.81 0.43 1.53 0.15 1.31 (0.07) - - 1.31 (0.07)
4 Belgium 1.51 1.53 0 .0 2 1.39 (0 .1 2 ) 1.57 0.06 - - - - - -
5 Brazil 0.76 0.67 (0.09) 0.59 (0.17) 0.70 (0.06) 0.80 0.04 - - 0.80 0.04
6 Chile 1.61 1.18 (0.43) 1.25 (0.36) 1.13 (0.48) 2 .0 1 0.40 3.18 1.57 1.97 0.36
7 China 1.19 1.14 (0.05) 1.17 (0 .0 2 ) 1.14 (0.05) 1 .1 2 (0.07) - - 1 .1 2 (0.07)
8 Colombia 1.32 1.17 (0.15) 1 .2 0 (0 .1 2 ) 1.03 (0.29) 1.34 0 .0 2 1.82 0.50 1.33 0 .0 1
9 Denmark 1.50 1.07 (0.43) 3.71 2 .2 1 1.06 (0.44) - - - - - -
1 0 Finland 1.49 1.44 (0.05) 1.25 (0.24) 1.46 (0.03) 1.32 (0.17) - - 1.32 (0.17)
11 France 1.53 1.65 0 .1 2 1.74 0 .2 1 1 .8 8 0.35 1.24 (0.29) 1.05 (0.48) 1.14 (0.39)
1 2 Germany 1.53 1.34 (0.19) 1.36 (0.17) 1.32 (0 .2 1 ) 1.35 (0.18) - - 1.35 (0.18)
13 Greece 1.99 1.78 (0 .2 1 ) 2 .8 8 0.89 1.47 (0.52) 1.34 (0.65) 1.14 (0.85) 2.31 0.32
14 Hong Kong 1.48 1.43 (0.05) 1.73 0.25 1.37 (0 .1 1 ) 2 .2 0 0.72 1.14 (0.34) 2 .2 0 0.72
15 Hungary 1.42 1.45 0.03 2.46 1.04 1.38 (0.04) 1.65 0.23 1 .8 8 0.46 1.55 0.13
16 India 1.64 2.42 0.78 2.69 1.05 2 .0 0 0.36 1.34 (0.30) 2 .2 1 0.57 1.29 (0.35)
17 Ireland 1.63 1.27 (0.36) 1.25 (0.38) 1.30 (0.33) 1 .8 8 0.25 - - 1 .8 8 0.25
18 Israel 1.50 1.16 (0.34) 1.18 (0.32) 1 .1 1 (0.39) - - - - - -
19 Italy 1.40 1.31 (0.09) 2.17 0.77 1.26 (0.14) 1.39 (0 .0 1 ) 1.09 (0.31) 1.59 0.19
2 0 Japan 1.65 1.63 (0 .0 2 ) 1.61 (0.04) 1.69 0.04 - - - - I'­ -
21 Korea 1 .2 0 1.30 0 .1 0 1.29 0.09 1.25 0.05 1.18 (0 .0 2 ) 1.19 (0 .0 1 ) L l  6 (0.04)
2 2 Malaysia 1.62 1.72 0 .1 0 2.15 0.53 1.41 (0 .2 1 ) - - - - - -
23 Mexico 1.28 1.45 0.17 1.37 0.09 1.57 0.29 1.24 (0.04) 1.28 0 .0 0 1 .2 2 (0.06)
24 Netherlands 1.61 1.85 0.24 1.48 (0.13) 2 .0 2 0.41 1 .8 6 0.25 - - 1 .8 6 0.25
25 Norway 1.56 1.24 (0.32) 1.24 (0.32) 1.24 (0.32) 1.33 (0.23) 1.23 (0.33) 1.35 (0 .2 1 )
26 New Zealand 1.75 1.24 (0.51) 3.69 1.94 1 .1 2 (0.63) - - - - -
27 Peru 1 .1 0 1.16 0.06 1 .6 8 0.58 1.14 0.04 1.78 0 .6 8 - - 1.78 0 .6 8
28 Phillipines 1.29 1.33 0.04 1.53 0.24 1.26 (0.03) 1.47 0.18 1.49 0 .2 0 1.46 0.17
29 Poland 1.47 1 .1 1 (0.36) 1.08 (0.39) 1.19 (0.28) 1.23 (0.24) 1.16 (0.31) 1.26 (0 .2 1 )
30 Portugal 1.33 1.23 (0 .1 0 ) 1.30 (0.03) 1 .2 2 (0 .1 1) 1 .8 6 0.53 2.27 0.94 1.77 0.44
31 Singapore 1.62 1.39 (0.23) 1.51 (0 .1 1 ) 1.36 (0.26) 1.15 (0.47) 1.14 (0.48) 1.15 (0.47)
32 South Africa 1.57 1.83 0.26 1.35 (0 .2 2 ) 1.28 (0.29) 1.47 (0 .1 0 ) 3.81 2.24 1.45 (0 .1 2 )
33 Spain 1.56 1.28 (0.28) 2.40 0.84 1.67 0 .1 1 1 .6 6 0 .1 0 1.52 (0.04) 1.47 (0.09)
34 Sweden 1.63 1.36 (0.27) 1.26 (0.37) 1.36 (0.27) 1.85 0 .2 2 - - 1.85 0 .2 2
35 Switzerland 1.38 1.58 0 .2 0 1.50 0 .1 2 1.81 0.43 2.28 0.90 1.93 0.55 2.61 1.23
36 Taiwan 1.76 - - - . - - 1.96 0 .2 0 2.45 0.69 1.83 0.07
37 Thailand 1.41 1.79 0.38 2.19 0.78 1.70 0.29 1 .2 2 (0.19) - - 1 .2 2 (0.19)
38 Turkey 1.74 1.56 (0.18) 4.02 2.28 1.50 (0.24) 1.33 (0.41) 1.32 (0.42) 1.37 (0.37)
39 U.K 1.77 1.82 0.05 1.95 0.18 1.71 ( 0 . 0 6 ) 1.76 ( 0 . 0 1 ) ■ - 1.76 ( 0 . 0 1 )
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N C I. Level 1 R ule 144ii
8 ALL q D(q) Pre-q D{q) Post-q D(q) q ALL q D(q) Pte-q D(q) Post-q
Sample 1.55 1.54 (0.01) 1.65 0.10 1.50 (0.05) 1.37 (0.18) 1.38 (0.17) 1.36 (0.10)
In this tabic, I compare the value o f  cross-listed to non-cross-listcd firms. In column 2 ,1 outline the average value o f non-cross-listcd firms by country. For Level 1 and Rule 144a 
firms, I calculate the average value o f q for both sets o f firms, pre and post-listing. In the remaining columns, I calculate the mean valuation difference (D(y)) between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed (NCL) firms, over the entire sample period, and for each sub-period. The mean valuation difference between the cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms is 
calculated as the difference between the average q o f listed firms and the average q o f non-cross-listed firms, over the entire sample period.
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Table 7.4: Median valuation befóte and after cross listing.
Country Level 1 ADR? Rule 144a ADRs
Tobin’s q Relative q Tobin's q Relative q
Before After Difference Before After Difference Before After Difference Before A ft« Difference
1 Argentina - - - - - - 1.52 1.17 (0.35)* 1 .1 1 0 .8 8 (0.23)**
2 Australia 2.19 1.93 (0.26)** 1 .1 0 0.87 (0.23)*** 1 .0 2 1.76 0.74** 0.61 0.76 0.15
3 Austria 1.81 1.53 (0.28)*** 1.15 0.93 (0 .2 2 )*** * 1.31 - - 0.77 -
4 Belgium 1.39 1.57 0.18* 0.93 0.90 (0.03) - - - - - -
5 Brazil 0.59 0.70 0 .11*** 0.77 0 .6 6 (0 .11)** - 0.80 - - 0.67 -
6 Chile 1.25 1.13 (0 .1 2 )** 0.78 0.69 (0.09)** 3.18 1.97 (1 .2 1 )* 1.34 1 .1 1 (0.23)*
7 China 1.17 1.14 (0.03)** 0.97 0 .8 8 (0.09)*** - 1 .1 2 - - 0.92 -
8 Colombia 1 .2 0 1.03 (0.17)** 0 .8 8 1.04 0.16* 1.82 1.33 (0.49) 1.13 1.04 (0.09)
9 Denmark 3.71 1.06 (2.65)*** 1.98 0.63 (1.35)*** - - - - - -
1 0 Finland 1.25 1.46 0 .2 1 0.96 0.85 (0 .11)* - 1.32 - - 0.80 -
11 France 1.74 1 .8 8 0.14 1 .0 0 1 .0 1 0 .0 1 1.05 1.14 0.09*** 0.61 0.62 0 .0 1
1 2 Germany 1.36 1.32 (0.04) 0.73 0.73 0 .0 0 - 1.35 - -. 0.75 -
13 Greece 2 .8 8 1.47 (1.41)** 1.19 0.67 (0.52)*** 1.14 2.31 1.17*** 0.58 0.84 0.26**
14 Hong Kong 1.73 1.37 (0.36)*** 0.98 0.79 (0.19)*** 1.14 2 .2 0 1.06 0.58 1.38 0.80
15 Hungary 2.46 1.38 (1.08) 1.33 0.89 (0.44) 1 .8 8 1.55 (0.33) 1.09 1.04 (0.05)
16 India 2.69 2 .0 0 (0.69) 0.94 0.80 (0.14) 2 .2 1 1.29 (0.92)*** 0.77 0.62 (0.15)***
17 Ireland 1.25 1.30 0.05 0.75 0.67 (0.08) - 1 .8 8 - * 1.08 -
18 Israel 1.18 1 .1 1 (0.07)* 0.60 0.72 0 .1 2 • - - - - -
19 Italy 2.17 1.26 (0.91)*** 1 .2 1 0.84 (0.37)*** 1.09 1.59 0.50*** 0.79 0.93 0.14**
2 0 Japan 1.61 1.69 0.08 0.83 0.90 0.07* - - - - - *
21 Korea 1.29 1.25 (0.04) 1 .0 0 0.93 (0.07) 1.19 1.16 (0.03) 0.92 0.89 (0.03)
2 2 Malaysia 2.15 1.41 (0.74)*** 0.94 0.74 (0 .2 0 )*** - - * - - *
23 Mexico 1.37 1.57 0 .2 0 1 .0 0 1 .1 1 0 .1 1 1.28 1 .2 2 (0.06) 0.90 0.90 0 .0 0
24 Netherlands 1.48 2 .0 2 0.54*** 0.76 1.05 0.29*** - 1 .8 6 - - 0.93 -
25 Norway 1.24 1.24 0 .0 0 0.72 0.64 (0.08) 1.23 1.35 0 .1 2 * 0.76 0.69 (0.07)
26 New Zealand 3.69 1 .1 2 (2.57)** 1.99 0.60 (1.39)** ■- - - - -
27 Peru 1 .6 8 1.14 (0.54)*** 1.24 0.92 (0.32)*** - 1.78 - - 1.52 -
28 Phillipines 1.53 1.26 (0.27) 0.78 0.81 0.03 1.49 1.46 (0.03) 0.76 0.96 0 .2 0 *
29 Poland 1.08 1.19 0 .1 1** 0.53 0.80 0.27*** 1.16 1.26 0 .1 0 0.59 0.83 0.24***
30 Portugal 1.30 1 .2 2 (0.08) 0.85 0.89 0.04 2.27 1.77 (0.50) 1.56 1.25 (0.31)
31 Singapore 1.51 1.36 (0.15)** 0.77 0.76 (0 .0 1 ) 1.14 1.15 0 .0 1 0.57 0.72 0.15**
32 Spain 1.35 1.28 (0.07) 0.79 0.77 (0 .0 2 ) 3.81 1.45 (2.36)** 1.94 0.82 (1 .1 2 )**
33 South Africa 2.40 1.67 (0.73)*** 1 .2 1 0.89 (0.32)*** 1.52 1.47 (0.05) 0.76 0.79 0.03
34 Sweden 1.26 1.36 0 .1 0 0.97 0.72 (0.25)* - 1.85 - - 0.89 -
35 Switzerland 1.50 1.81 0.31** 1 .1 2 1.15 0.03 1.93 2.61 0 .6 8 ** 1.52 1.47 (0.05)
36 Taiwan - - - - - - 2.45 1.83 (0.62)*** 1.04 0.90 (0.14)***
37 Thailand 2.19 1.70 (0.49)*** 1 .1 0 1 .0 1 (0.09) - 1 .2 2 - T 0.87
38 Turkey 4.02 1.50 (2.52)*** 1.96 0.76 (1.2 0 )*** 1.32 1.37 0.05 0.60 0.81 0 .2 1 **
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Tobin’s q Relative q Tobin’s q Relative q
Before After Difference before After Difference Before After Difference Before After Difference
39 U.K 1.95 1.71 (0.24)*** 0.95 0.77 (0.18)*** - 1.76 - - 0.76 -
Sample 1.65 1.50 (0.15)*** 0.93 0.83 (0.10)*** 1.38 1.36 (0.02)** 0.89 0.83 (0.06)***
In this tabic I outline the median value o f  Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, pre and post-listing. The valuation difference is calculated by taking the median value o f  cross-listed firms 
post-listing less the median value o f  firms pre-listing. Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as “Pink-Sheet’ issues and Rule 144a firms’ trade on Portal to Qualified Institutional 
Buyers (QIB’s). All firms are obtained from the Worldscope Country Lists. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank o f New York, and cross- 
referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. I employ Tobin’s q as our valuation metric. Tobin’s q is calculated as [(Book Value o f  Total Assets -  
Book Value o f Equity + Market Value o f  Equity)/Book Value o f  Total Assets]. Relative q is calculated as q divided by the mean q value o f all domestic firms for each year in the 
sample.
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Table 7.5: Breadth o f percentage valuation gains/losses post-listing by country
Country Level 1 Rule 144a
M e a n M e d ia n M in M a x P o s it iv e N e g a t iv e M e a n M e d ia n M in M a x P o s it iv e N e g a t iv e
1 Argentina - - - - ■ - 0.13 0.13 0 .0 0 0.27 2 / 2 0 / 2
2 Australia (0.05) (0 .0 2 ) (0.87) 0.82 12/24 12/24 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 1 / 1 0 / 1
3 Austria (0.16) (0 .2 1 ) (0.62) 0.14 2/9 7 /9 - - - - - -
4 Belgium 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.06 0.14 2 / 2 0 / 0 * - - - * -
5 Brazil 0.30 0.28 (0 .1 0 ) 0.89 16/18 2/18 , - - - - -
6 Chile (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 1 ) 0 / 1 1 / 1 (0.29) (0.29) (0.51) (0.07) 0 / 2 2 / 2
7 China (0.04) (0.03) (0.31) 0.13 3/7 4 /7 - - - - - -
8 Colombia (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 0 / 1 1 / 1 (0.09) (0.09) (0.25) 0.08 1 / 2 1 / 2
9 Denmark (0.17) (0.16) (0.29) (0.05) 0/3 3/3 - - - - - r
1 0 Finland (0 .2 1 ) (0 .2 1 ) (0.75) 0.33 1 / 2 1 / 2 - - - - - -
11 France (0.05) (0 .0 2 ) (0.59) 0.16 4/9 5/9 0.005 0.005 (0 .0 0 2 ) 0 .0 1 1 / 2 1 / 2
1 2 Germany (0 .2 2 ) (0.04) (0.87) 0 .1 0 4/15 11/15 - - - - *
13 Greece (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 0 / 1 1 / 1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 1 / 1 0
14 Hong Kong (0 .1 2 ) (0.09) (0.75) 0.61 16/59 43/59 - - - - - -
15 Hungary (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 0 / 1 1 / 1 (0.19) (0.18) (0.51) 0 .1 0 1/4 3 /4
16 India (0.39) (0.41) (0.72) (0.03) 0 /4 4 /4 (0.39) (0.38) (0.95) 0 .2 0 3 /4 21/24
17 Ireland (0.24) (0.28) (0.45) 0 .0 1 1/3 2/3 - - - - - -
18 Israel (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 0 / 1 1 / 1 - - - - - *
19 Italy (0.17) (0.17) (0.30) (0.03) 0 / 2 2 / 2 0.16 0.23 (0 .1 2 ) 0.36 2/3 1/3
2 0 Japan (0 .1 0 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0.91) 0.32 8 / 2 1 13/21 - - - -
21 Korea 0 .0 2 0.04 (0.14) 0.14 3 /4 1 /4 (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .1 1 ) 0.15 6/17 11/17
2 2 Malaysia (0.30) (0.41) (0.54) (0.05) 0/7 7/7 * - - -
23 Mexico (0 .1 1 ) (0.24) (0.44) 0.37 3/11 8 / 1 1 (0.03) 0.007 (0.48) 0 .1 1 5/9 4 /9
24 Netherlands (0.25) (0.28) (0.64) 0.004 2/7 5 /7 - - - * - -
25 Norway (0 .1 0 ) (0.004) (0.42) 0 .1 1 3/7 4/7 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 1 / 1 0 / 1
26 New Zealand 0.09 0.09 0 .0 1 0.17 2 / 2 0 / 2 - - - - -
27 Peru (0.29) (0.29) (0.58) 0.0005 1 / 2 1 / 2 - - - *- -
28 Phillipines (0.32) (0.26) (0.72) 0 .0 0 0 1 1/3 2/3 (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.28) 0 / 2 2 / 2
29 Poland 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1 / 1 0 / 1 (0.06) (0.03) (0.16) (0 .0 2 ) 0 /4 4 /4
30 Portugal (0.34) (0.34) (0.65) (0.03) 0 / 2 2 / 2 (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 0 ) 0 / 1 1 / 1
31 Singapore (0 .2 0 ) (0.13) (0.48) 0.06 1 / 1 1 1 0 / 1 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 1 / 1 0 / 1
32 Spain (0.25) 0 .0 1 (0 .8 6 ) 0.08 2/3 1/3 (0.92) (0.92) (0.92) (0.92) 0 / 1 1 / 1
33 South Africa (0.17) (0 .1 1 ) (1.04) 0.60 5/21 16/21 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 0 / 1 1 / 1
34 Sweden (0.08) 0.06 (0.55) 0 .1 1 3 /4 1 /4 - - - - -
35 Switzerland 0 .1 2 0.14 (0.04) 0.26 3 /4 1 /4 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 1 / 1 0 / 1
36 Taiwan - - - - - - (0.34) (0.35) (0.80) 0.03 2/33 31/33
37 Thailand (0.31) (0.24) (0.85) 0.04 1 / 1 0 9/10 - - - - -
38 Turkey (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 0 / 1 1 / 1 (0.24) (0.14) (0.47) (0 .1 1 ) 0 /3 3/3
39 U.K (0 .1 2 ) (0.04) (1.0 2 ) 0.37 15/36 21/36 - - - ■ - -
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M e a n M e d ia n M in  M a x P o s i t iv e N e g a t iv e M e a n M e d ia n M in M a x P o s it iv e N e g a t iv e
A L L (0 .11) (0 .0 8 ) (1 .0 4 )  0 .8 9 1 1 5 /3 1 9 2 0 4 /3 1 9 (0 .2 1 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .9 5 ) 0 .3 6 2 8 /1 1 5 8 7 /1 1 5
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Table 7.6: Rcgression estimates o f thè ‘Cross-Listini; Premium’ by country'.
Country Level 1 Rule 144a
OLS POPS OLS POI A
P Obs R 2 p Obs R 2 P Obs R 2 P Obs R 2
1 Argentina - - - - - - (0.06) (0.06)
2 Australia (0.07) 1133 0 .1 0 (0 .1 1 ) 985 0 .1 0 0 .0 2 985 0 .1 2 0.019 985 0 .1 0
3 Austria 0.27 315 0.27 0.26 315 0.24 (0.05) 260 0.37 (0.08) 260 0.33
4 Belgium (0.009) 421 0.28 0.013 421 0 .2 0 - - - - - -
5 Brazil (0.13)** 685 0.06 (0.13)*** 685 0.03 (0.04)*** 576 0.05 (0.04)* 576 0 .0 2
6 Chile (0.61)*** 388 0.19 (0.57)*** 388 0.08 0.088* 382 0.18 0 .11** 382 0.08
7 China (0.07)** 253 0 .1 2 (0.08)** 253 0.09 (0.03) 2 2 1 0 .1 2 (0 .0 2 ) 2 2 1 0.07
8 Colombia (0.49)*** 132 0.33 (0.54)*** 132 0.13 0.04 127 0.34 0.004 127 0.13
9 Denmark (0.09) 553 0 .1 2 (0.09) 553 0 .1 1 - - - - - -
1 0 Finland 0.39 448 0.24 0.40 448 0 .2 2 (0 .1 0 )*** 441 0.24 (0.13)** 441 0 .2 1
11 France 0.34 2609 0.16 0.34 2609 0.15 (0.25)*** 2474 0.17 (0.23)*** 2474 0.15
1 2 Germany (0.24)* 2457 0.31 (0.24)* 2457 0.30 (0 .2 1 )* 2328 0.31 (0 .2 2 )* 2328 0.30
13 Greece (0.19) 695 0.44 (0.06) 695 0 .2 0 0 .0 0 2 680 0.44 0 .0 1 680 0 .2 0
14 Hong Kong (0 .2 2 )* 1117 0.04 (0.23)** 1117 0.03 - - - - - -
15 Hungary (0.29) 1 2 2 0.43 (0.29) 1 2 2 0.39 0.09 1 0 2 0.53 0.08 1 0 2 0.45
16 India 1.04 1005 0.14 1.07 1005 0 .1 1 (0.19)*** 966 0.16 (0 .2 0 )*** 966 0.13
17 Ireland . - - - - - - - - - - -
18 Israel - - - - - - - - . - - -
19 Italy (0 .2 1 )** 698 0.19 (0 .2 2 )** 698 0.16 0.23 655 0 .2 1 0.24 655 0.19
2 0 Japan (0 .1 2 )* 3915 0 .2 2 (0 .1 0 ) 3915 0.19 - - - - -
2 1 Korea 0.005 1663 0 .1 1 (0.003) 1663 0.09 (0.03) 1663 0 .1 1 (0.03)* 1663 0.09
2 2 Malaysia (0.18) 1385 0.25 (0.19) 1385 0.19 - - - - - -
23 Mexico 0.43*** 347 0 .2 2 0.41*** 347 0.18 (0 .0 0 0 1 ) 231 0 .1 2 (0.007) 231 0.06
24 Netherlands 0.77*** 699 0.37 0.73*** 699 0.33 (0.082)** 626 0.42 (0 .1 2 )*** 626 0.39
25 Norway 0.48 496 0 .1 2 0.50 496 0 .1 1 (0.19)*** 433 0.14 (0.18)*** 433 0.13
26 New Zealand 0.99* 159 0.16 0.90 159 0.14 - - - - - -
27 Peru (0.42) 94 0.19 (0.36) 94 0 .1 1 0.55*** 82 0.31 Q .3 7 *** 82 0.15
28 Phillipines (0.26)* 309 0.17 (0.24) 309 0 .1 0 0.04 286 0.17 0.05 286 0 .1 1
29 Poland (0 .2 2 )** 178 0 .2 2 (0.28)** 178 0 .1 2 0 .0 2 166 0 .2 2 0 .0 2 166 0 .1 2
30 Portugal (0.03) 228 0 .1 2 (0.05) 228 0.05 0 .2 0 *** 217 0.23 0 .2 0 *** 217 0.13
31 Singapore (0.17) 800 0.09 (0 .2 2 ) 800 0.05 (0 .1 2 )*** 718 0 .1 0 (0.15)*** 718 0.05
32 Spain (0 .2 1 ) 527 0.08 (0 .2 2 ) 527 0.05 (0.18)*** 502 0.07 (0.18)*** 502 0.04
33 South Africa (0.08) 1025 0 .1 2 (0.06) 1025 0 .1 0 (0 .0 1 ) 854 0 .1 1 (0 .0 2 ) 854 0.09
34 Sweden (0.37)** 809 0.27 (0.35)* 809 0.26 (0 .0 0 2 ) 782 0.27 0.008 782 0.26
35 Switzerland 0 .2 2 731 0.16 0.24 731 0.15 0 .1 2 * 698 0.16 0.14* 698 0.16
36 Taiwan - - - - - - (0 .0 2 ) 877 0 .2 2 (0 .0 2 ) 877 0.18
37 Thailand 0.34 1044 0.19 0.31 1044 0 .1 2 0.05 967 0.18 0 .0 2 967 0 .1 0
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OI.S I’Ol-S Q1.S PQ1.S
P Obs R 2 p O bs R 2 P Obs R 2 P Obs R 2
38 Turkey (0 .2 2 )** 585 0.16 (0.28)** 585 0 .1 2 (0.08)* 552 0.18 (0.09)* 552 0.13
39 U.K 0.05 4646 0 .1 0 0.06 4646 0.13 (0 .2 2 )*** 4386 0.15 (0.23)*** 4386 0.14
Sample (0.05) 33931 0 .1 1 (0.05) 33931 0 .1 1 (0.06)*** 31384 0 .1 2 (0.06)*** 31384 0 .1 1
In this table I report ordinary and pooled least squares estimates o f the impact o f  cross-listing on the value o f Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. For each country, 1 estimate regressions 
o f the following form; for the ordinary least squares we estimate q = (X + p>CLit +  yXit + U ; , . In the case o f  our pooled ordinary least squares estimates, I estimate the following
q =  a  + pC L „+Y 1X,t +Y2 X,1 + u „ .
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Table 7.7: Intra-country ADR composition and the cross-listing premium
Countrv ADR Lcgil F.XCH
%
Level 1 °A Premium/Discount Portal A Piem ium /Disco
nnt
Argentina High Level 2 /3 6 3 .6 4 1 4.55 - 7 31.82 Discount
Australia High Level 2/3 19.23 99 7 6 .1 5 Discount 6 4.62 Premium
Austria Low Level 1 /Portal 5 16 80 P r e m iu m 3 15 Discount
Belgium Low Level 1 /Portal 25 3 75 Premium 0 0 -
Brazil Low Level 1 /Portal 41.86 46 5 3 .4 9 D is c o u n t * * * 4 4.65 D is c o u n t *
Chile High Level 2/3 80 2 8 D is c o u n t * * * 3 1 2 P r e m iu m * *
China - - 4 2 .5 0 16 40 D is c o u n t * * 7 17.50 Discount
Colombia Low Level 1 /Portal 1 1 .1 1 3 3.33 D is c o u n t * * * 5 5 5 .5 6 Premium
Denmark Low Level 1/Portal 4 4 .4 4 4 4 4 .4 4 Discount 1 1 1 .1 1 -
Finland Low Level 1/Portal 50 2 2 0 P r e m iu m 3 30 D is c o u n t * *
France Low Level 1/Portal 5 7 .3 8 2 0 32.79 P r e m iu m 6 9.84 D is c o u n t * * *
Germany Low Level 1/Portal 42.31 26 50 D is c o u n t * 4 7.69 D is c o u n t *
Greece Low Level 1/Portal 29.41 4 23.53 Discount 8 4 7 .0 6 Premium
Hong Kong High Level 2/3 6.78 109 9 2 .3 7 D is c o u n t * * 1 0.85
Hungary - - 8.33 3 25 D i s c o u n t 8 6 6 .6 6 Premium
India High Level 2/3 16.92 1 1.54 P r e m iu m 53 8 1 .5 4 D is c o u n t * * *
Ireland High Level 2 /3 5 6 .5 2 7 30.43 - 3 13.04 -
Israel Low Level 1/Portal 5 3 .3 3 6 40 - 1 6.67 -
Italy Low Level 1 /Portal 4 8 .9 4 14 29.79 D is c o u n t * * 1 0 21.28 P r e m iu m
Japan High Level 2/3 21.25 12 1 7 5 .6 3 D is c o u n t 5 3.13
Korea Low Level 1/Portal 17.07 3 7.32 Discount 31 7 5 .6 1 D is c o u n t *
Malaysia High Level 2/3 0 .0 0 17 100 Discount 0 0 .0 0 -
Mexico Low Level 1/Portal 34.57 36 4 4 .4 4 P r e m iu m * * * 17 20.99 Discount
Netherlands Low Level 1 /Portal 5 5 .3 2 18 38.30 P r e m iu m * * * 3 6.38 D i s c o u n t * * *
Norway High Level 2/3 36.84 9 4 7 .3 7 P r e m iu m 3 15.79 D is c o u n t * * *
New Zealand High Level 2 /3 42.86 4 5 7 .1 4 P r e m iu m 0 0 -
Peru Low Level 1 /Portal 2 0 4 40 D is c o u n t 4 40 P r e m iu m * * *
Philippines Low Level 1 /Portal 2 0 6 4 0 D is c o u n t 6 4 0 Premium
Poland - - 5.88 3 17.65 D is c o u n t * * 13 7 6 .4 7 Premium
Portugal Low Level 1 /Portal 3.33 2 2 2 .2 2 Discount 4 4 4 .4 4 P r e m iu m * * *
Singapore High Level 2/3 7.41 2 2 8 1 .4 8 D is c o u n t 3 1 1 .1 1 D i s c o u n t * * *
South Africa High Level 2/3 16 54 7 2 Discount 9 1 2 Discount
Spain High Level 2/3 5 5 .5 6 4 2 2 .2 2 D is c o u n t 4 2 2 .2 2 D i s c o u n t * * *
Sweden Low Level 1 /Portal 60 7 35 D is c o u n t * 1 5 Premium
Switzerland Low Level 1 /Portal 4 4 .4 4 9 33.33 P r e m iu m 6 2 2 .2 2 P r e m iu m *
Taiwan Low Level 1 /Portal 12.77 0 0 . 41 8 7 .2 3 Discount
Thailand Low Level 1 /Portal 0 15 8 8 .2 4 P r e m iu m 2 11.76 Premium
Turkey Low Level 1 /Portal 4.55 6 27.27 D is c o u n t * * 15 68 .1 8 D is c o u n t *
U.K High Level 2 /3 5 3 .6 5 83 43.23 Premium 6 3.13 D is c o u n t * * *
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Table 7.8: Mean valuation before and after listing.
Crmntrv LcygU l Rule 144a ADRs
Tobin’s q Relative q Tobin’s q Relative q
Before After Difference Before After D iffe iea tsJ Before After Difference Before After Difference
1 Argentina - - - - - - 1.64 1.29 (0.35)** 1 .1 2 0.89 (0.23)**
2 Australia 2.55 2 .2 1 (0.34)** 1.27 1 .0 1 (0.26)*** 1 .0 2 2.03 1 .01 0.61 0 .8 8 0.27
3 Austria 1.98 1.71 (0.27) 1 .2 2 1.03 (0.19) - 1.26 - - 0.77 -
4 Belgium 1.52 1.61 0.09 0.95 0.89 (0.06) - * - - -
5 Brazil 0.58 0.74 0.16*** 0.80 0.71 (0.09)** - 0.74 - - 0.75 -
6 Chile 1.24 1.15 (0.09)** 0.78 0.69 (0.09)** 2.90 2 .1 0 (0.80)** 1.33 1.13 (0 .2 0 )*
7 China 1.27 1.16 (0 .11)** 1 .0 0 0.89 (0 .1 1 )** - 1.16 - - 0.93 -
8 Colombia 1 .2 0 1.03 (0.17)** 0 .8 6 0.78 (0.08) 1.82 1.44 (0.38) 1.13 1.08 (0.05)
9 Denmark 4.02 1.65 (2.37)*** 2.19 0.98 (1.2 1 )*** - * - - - -
1 0 Finland 1.96 1.49 (0.47) 1.17 0.85 (0.32)** - 1.31 - - 0.78 -
11 France 2 .2 2 2.13 (0.09) 1.26 1.18 (0.08) 1.06 1.18 0 .1 2 0.60*** 0.62 0 .0 2
1 2 Germany 1.75 1.48 (0.27)** 0 .8 8 0.80 (0.08) - 1 .6 6 - - 0.90 -
13 Greece 3.41 1.81 (1.60)** 1 .2 1 0.75 (0.46)*** 1.16 2.50 1.34** 0.58 1 .1 1 0.53**
14 Hong Kong 2.14 1.62 (0.52)*** 1.14 0.92 (0 .2 2 )*** 1.16 2.53 1.37 0.58 1.23 0.65
15 Hungary 2.46 1.61 (0.85) 1.33 1 .0 1 (0.32) 2 .0 2 1.90 (0 .1 2 ) 1.14 1.23 0.09
16 India 2.98 2 .6 6 (0.32) 1.07 1.18 0 .1 1 2.46 1.63 (0.83)*** 0.89 0.72 (0.17)***
17 Ireland 1.52 1.36 (0.16) 0 .8 8 0.75 (0.13)* - 1 .8 8 - - 1.08 -
18 Israel 1.19 1 .1 1 (0.08) 0.60 0.72 0 .1 2 - - - - * -
19 Italy 2.07 1.34 (0.73)*** 1.23 0.87 (0.36)*** 1.19 2.23 1.04*** 0.85 1.36 0.51***
2 0 Japan 1.90 1.82 (0.08) 0.96 0.99 0.03 - - - - - -
2 1 Korea 1.29 1.31 0 .0 2 0.99 0.98 (0 .0 1 ) 1 .2 1 1.23 0 .0 2 0.93 0.93 0 .0 0
2 2 Malaysia 2.37 1.76 (0.61)*** 1.03 0.89 (0.14)* - - - - - -
23 Mexico 1.53 1.62 0.09 1 .1 0 1.17 0.07 1.34 1.35 0 .0 1 0.98 0.97 (0 .0 1 )
24 Netherlands 2 .0 1 2.19 0.18 0.98 1.18 0 .2 0 * - 1.78 - - 0.89 -
25 Norway 1.54 1.85 0.31 0.85 0.96 0 .1 1 1 .2 2 1.33 0 .1 1 0.76 0.71 (0.05)
26 New Zealand 3.20 1.71 (1.49)* 1.69 0 .8 6 (0.83)** - - - * -
27 Peru 1 .8 6 1.15 (0.71)*** 1.53 0.92 (0.61)*** - 1 .8 8 - - 1.59 -
28 Phillipines 1.77 1.34 (0.43)*** 0 .8 6 0.84 (0 .0 2 ) 1.62 1.75 0.13 0.85 1.07 0 .2 2
29 Poland 1.07 1.27 0 .2 0 0.52 0.79 0.27*** 1.18 1.65 0.47 0.61 1.07 0.46**
30 Portugal 2.47 . 1.39 (1.08)*** 1.19 1.03 (0.16) 2.27 2 .0 1 (0.26) 1.56 1.44 (0 .1 2 )
31 Singapore 1.75 1.69 (0.06) 0 .8 6 0.92 0.06 1.14 1.15 0 .0 1 0.57 0.69 0 .1 2 **
32 Spain 2.09 1.58 (0.51) 1.16 0.87 (0.29) 3.88 1.55 (2.33)*** 1.99 0.83 (1.16)***
33 South Africa 2.53 1.80 (0.73)*** 1.27 0.97 (0.30)*** 1.53 1.51 (0 .0 2 ) 0.75 0.84 0.09
34 Sweden 2.14 1.55 (0.59)** 1 .2 0 0.80 (0.40)*** - 1.82 - - 0.87 -
35 Switzerland 1.51 1 .8 6 0.35 1.06 1 .1 1 0.05** 1.89 2.53 0.64*** 1.42 1.49 0.07
36 Taiwan - - - - - - 2.82 2.07 (0.75)*** 1.25 1.05 (0 .2 0 )***
37 Thailand 2.44 1.89 (0.55)*** 1.34 1.24 (0 .1 0 ) - 1.79 - - 1.09
38 Turkey 3.97 1.60 (2.37)*** 2 .0 0 0.84 (1.16)*** 1.58 1.60 0 .0 2 0.73 0.85 0 .1 2
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Country LbvsI 1 A P R s Rule 144» ADRs
Tobin's q Relative q Tobin’s q Relative q
Before A fa i  I Difference j Before After Difference Before After Difference Before After Difference
39 U.K 2.26 1.95 I ( 0 .3 1 )* * *  1 1.06 0.87 (0 .1 9 )* * * - 1.89 - 0.82 -
S a m p le 1 .99 1 .7 4  j ( 0 .2 5 ) * * *  ] 1 .08 0 .7 5 ( 0 .3 3 ) * * * 1 .87 1 .67 ( 0 .2 0 ) * * * 0 .9 8 0 .9 3 ( 0 .0 5 ) * *
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O v e r  th e  c o u rse  o f  th e  la s t tw o  d ecad es , th e  in te rn a tio n a l c ro ss - lis tin g  m a rk e t  w a s  
ch ara c te rised  b y  an  in c re ased  te n d e n c y  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  fo re ig n  firm s to  lis t in  th e  U .S . E lsew h ere , 
th e  v a s t  m a jo rity  o f  in te rn a tio n a l ex ch an g es  e x p e rien c e d  a  dec lin e  in  th e ir  a llo c a tio n  o f  fo re ig n  lists. 
A t  its  h e ig h t, th e  n u m b e r  o f  A m e ric a n  D e p o s i ta ry  R e c e ip t p ro g ra m s  n u m b e re d  a lm o s t 2 ,200 . O v e r  
th e  c o u rse  o f  th e  sam e  p e r io d  (1995-2002), th e  n u m b e r  o f  fo re ig n  f irm s  tra d in g  o n  d ie  L o n d o n  
S to c k  E x c h a n g e  fe ll f ro m  531 to  382 . I n  th is  thes is , I  e x am in e  tw o  issu es re la tin g  to  eq u ity  c ro ss ­
lis tin g  in  d ie  U n ite d  S tates.
F irs t, I  e x am in e  w h e th e r  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . e n h an c es  in v e s to r  p ro te c tio n . A t  p re se n t, th e  
e x ta n t  lite ra tu re  su g gests th a t  fo re ig n  f irm s  are  u n a b le  to  c o m p le te ly  b o n d  to  th e  U .S . reg im e  (as 
d o m e s tic  U .S. firm s do). S tu d ies  b y  B F  (2006) a n d  L R W  (2006) c o n c lu d e  th a t  fo r  th e se  firm s 
ex ch an g e-lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . is  ‘in c o m p le te ’. I n  th is  thesis, I  d o  n o t  c o n tr ib u te  to  th is  d eb ate . I  d o  
th e  fo llow ing . I  ex am in e  w h e th e r  th e  o rd in a ry /d o m e s t ic  sh a re h o ld e rs  o f  e x c h a n g e -tra d e d  firm s (as 
o p p o s e d  to  th e  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t sh a re h o ld e rs ) , a re  b e t te r  p ro te c te d , c o m p a re d  to  o th e r  n o n -c ro s s -  
lis ted  d o m e s tic  firm s, u n d e r  th e  U .S . g o v e rn a n c e  reg im e. M y re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  th e s e  in v es to rs  are  
b e tte r  p ro te c te d , ex -p o st. T h e  d o m e s tic  in v e s to rs  o f  L ev e l 1 firm s a re  a lso  b e t te r  p ro te c te d , 
a ld io u g h  th is e n h a n c e d  p ro te c te d  is d r iv e n  by  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  firm -lev e l g o v e rn a n c e  p o st-lis tin g .
I n  th e  re m a in in g  c h ap te rs , I  e x am in e  th e  v a lu a tio n  e ffec ts  o f  l is tin g  a b ro ad . M y  a p p ro a c h  
d iffe rs  f ro m  o th e rs . F irs t, I  a b s tra c t f ro m  th e  p re v io u s  te n d e n c y  o n  th e  p a r t  o f  o th e rs  to  ex am in e  
th e  v a lu a tio n  e ffec ts  o f  lis tin g  u s in g  e v e n t  s tud ies . T h e  log ic  in  d o in g  so  is  o u tlin e d  in  C h a p te r  2. 
L ik e  D K S  (2004), I  e m p lo y  v a lu a tio n  m e tric s , b u t  u n lik e  th em , I  e x am in e  v a lue , b o th  o v e r  (event) 
t im e  a n d  in  c a len d a r tim e  (as th ey  do). M y  re su lts  h ig h lig h t th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  e x am in in g  b o th .
F irs t ,  lis tin g  a b ro a d  e n h a n c e s  v a lu e  f o r  I r is h  firm s th a t  tr a d e  o n  in te rn a t io n a l  e x ch a n g es  
(U .S. a n d  U .K .) . T h is  r e su lt  is in  s ta rk  c o n tr a s t  to  th e  c ro ss -s e c tio n a l v a lu a tio n  d is c o u n t  r e p o r te d  
b y  D K S  (2004). I n  C h a p te r  5 , I  e x a m in e  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . f o r  e m e rg in g  m a rk e t
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f irm s . F irs t ,  I  f in d  th a t  w h ile  th e  ‘c ro ss - lis t in g  p re m iu m ’ d o c u m e n te d  b y  D K S  (2004 , 2006) 
p e rs is ts  in  c a le n d a r  t im e  fo r  e x c h a n g e - tra d e d  f irm s; it fails to  p e rs is t  in  e v e n t  tim e . I f in d  th a t  th e  
g re a te s t  g a in s to  e x ch a n g e  lis tin g  o c c u r  o n  th e  y ea r o f  lis tin g , b u t  f a ll-o f f  th e re a f te r .  L ik e  C N R  
(2006 , p g . 17) I c o n c lu d e  th a t  “ th e re  is n o  su c h  th in g  as a  c ro ss  l is tin g  p r e m iu m ” .
I n  th e  re m a in in g  c h a p te rs ,  I  e x a m in e  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . o n  th e  v a lu e  o f  all 
n o n -e x c h a n g e  tra d e d  d e p o s ita ry  re c e ip t  issues. I n  g en era l, I  f in d  th a t  t r a d in g  in  th e  U .S . d o e s  n o t  
e n h a n c e  v a lu e  fo r  th e se  f irm s . H o w e v e r ,  in  C h a p te r  7, I  f in d  th a t  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . d o e s  e n h a n c e  
v a lu e  fo r  f irm s  f ro m  c e r ta in  c o u n tr ie s .
T a k e n  to g e th e r , m y  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t,  b u t  fo r  a p a r tic u la r  s u b - s e t  o f  f irm s , l is tin g  in  th e  
U .S . d o e s  n o t  e n h a n c e  v a lu e . I n  g en era l, l is tin g  is a sso c ia te d  w ith  lo w e r  v a lu e . I f in d  th a t  a f te r  
fiv e  y ears o f  lis tin g , c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s  a re  w o r th  less  in  ev ery  p e r io d  re la tiv e  to  th e ir  p re -lis t in g  
v a lu e . N o n e th e le s s ,  th e  re su lts  d o  n o t  n e ce ssa rily  su g g e s t th a t  f irm s  sh o u ld  n o t  lis t in  th e  U .S . 
F o r  e x am p le , I  sh o w  in  C h a p te r  3 th a t  l is tin g  e n h a n c e s  th e  g o v e rn a n c e  o f  l is te d  firm s. O th e r s  
h a v e  sh o w n  th a t  lis tin g  is a sso c ia te d  w ith  e n h a n c e d  m o n ito r in g  (i.e. an a ly st fo llo w in g , 
in s t i tu t io n a l  in v e s to r  fo llo w in g ), g re a te r  liq u id ity , e n h a n c e d  g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s ,  a n d  a 
re la x a tio n  o f  f in an c ia l c o n s tra in ts . H o w e v e r ,  m y  re su lts  su g g e s t th a t  th e s e  d o  n o t  m a n ife s t  in to  
g re a te r  f irm  v a lue .
F ina lly , m y  w o rk  h a s  h ig h lig h te d  issu es th a t  m a y  w a r ra n t  f u r th e r  w o rk . F irs t, th e  m a jo rity  
o f  th e  th es is  is re la te d  to  in te rn a t io n a l  c ro ss  l is tin g  in  th e  U .S . I t  m a y  b e  w o r th  e x te n d in g  th e  
analysis to w a rd s  e x a m in in g  lis tin g  o n  o th e r  n o n -U .S . in te rn a t io n a l  ex ch a n g es . F o r  e x am p le , in  
20 0 5 , th e  m a jo r ity  o f  e x c h a n g e  c ro ss - lis tin g s  w e re  in itia te d , n o t  in  th e  U .S ., b u t  o n  th e  
L u x e m b o u rg  S to c k  E x c h a n g e . T h is  su g g ests  th a t  lis tin g  in  L u x e m b o u rg  h a s  su rp a sse d  th e  U .S . 
as th e  m o s t  a ttra c tiv e  lo c a tio n  to  lis t a b ro a d . W h a t  re m a in s  u n a n sw e re d  is w hy?
N e x t,  P R Z  (2004) a n d  SS (2004) h ig h lig h t th e  p re fe re n c e  o f  f irm s  to  c ro ss - lis t  o n  
g eo g rap h ica lly  c lo se  m a rk e ts . I n  th is  re g a rd , Y L  (2006) f in d  th a t  C h in e s e  f irm s  g a in  m o s t  f ro m
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lis tin g  in te rn a tio n a lly  o n  g e o g rap h ica lly  c lo se  m a rk e ts  ( ra th e r  th a n  lis tin g  in  th e  U .S .) I t  m a y  b e  
w o r th  e x te n d in g  th is  analysis to  in c lu d e  th e  fu ll in te rn a t io n a l  c ro ss - lis tin g  m a rk e t.
F ina lly , th e  re su lts  f ro m  C h a p te r  7 su g g e s t th a t  f irm s  f ro m  p a r tic u la r  c o u n tr ie s  g a in  f ro m  
lis tin g  in  th e  U .S . O n  c lo s e r  e x a m in a tio n , I f in d  so m e  e v id e n c e  th a t  su g g e s t th a t  th o se  f irm s  th a t  
p e r fo r m  w e ll in  th e  U .S ., a re  th o s e  fo r  w h ic h  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  i ts  d o m e s tic  c o u n te rp a r ts  a lso  lis t 
u n d e r  th e  sam e  d e p o s ita ry  r e c e ip t  level. I t  m ay  w e ll b e  th a t  th e  s u p e r io r  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  early  
lis ts , in f lu e n c e d  th e  l is tin g  b e h a v io u r  o f  th o se  f irm s th a t  fo llo w e d  su it. H o w e v e r ,  w ith in  th e  s u b ­
se t o f  firm s th a t  p e r fo r m  w e ll, i t  is d iff ic u lt  to  id e n tify  a n y  c o m m o n  th e m e s . F o r  e x am p le , L ev e l 
1 f irm s  f ro m  su c h  d iv e rs e  c o u n tr ie s  as N o rw a y  a n d  T h a ila n d  g a in  f r o m  tra d in g  o v e r - th e -c o u n te r .  
I t  m ay  b e  w o r th  e x a m in in g  w h a t  c au ses  th e s e  firm s to  o u tp e r fo rm , b o th  o th e r  c ro ss - lis te d  f irm s  
( f ro m  d if fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s ) , a n d  d o m e s tic  firm s. A n  analysis, a lo n g  th e  lin e s  o f  D F R  (2005), a n d  
K R  (2006) m ay  w e ll p ro v id e  s o m e  in s ig h ts .
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